Information exchanges,diplomatic networks and the construction of European knowledge in European Union foreign policy

Introduction

This article aims to contribute to the analysis of how, within the European Union (EU) foreign policy system, information is gathered and knowledge is constructed, and to assess the potential impact of these practices on policy making within the EU. Along the lines of Deutsch, the concern is ‘less with the bones or muscles of the body politic than with its nerves – its channels of communication’ (Deutsch, 1963: ix) and what goes on therein. As this article will show, the diplomatic network of member states outside the EU has significant limitations and, apart from a few cases, member states’ ‘eyes on the ground’ cover one-third of the world or less. The EU, for its part, has been addressing foreign policy issues of all types and in all corners of the globe. It is thus crucial to understand how information about foreign affairs is gathered, how meaning is established and how it affects the European foreign policy-making process. The main argument presented here, based on a set of exploratory case studies, is that the contribution of the majority of member states to the process (especially, but not only, on issues beyond ‘red lines’) is embedded in collective European practices of information gathering and knowledge construction. While much of the literature on European integration has focused on the decision-making stage in Brussels, the contention here is that the exchange of information and the construction of common European knowledge are equally relevant and have the potential to affect national positions much earlier in the process.

Many perspectives have been brought to bear on the analysis of EU foreign policy, defined here with a special emphasis on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). There has been much analysis of the institutional framework and how the various layers relate to each other (e.g. Hill, 1993, 1998). The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has added a further dimension to the picture (e.g. Duke, 2012). Moreover, attention has also been devoted to the social networks that thrive within this institutional setting and often transcend its boundaries (Cross, 2011; Krahmann, 2005; Mérand et al., 2011). Much has also been written about the type of power that Europe is or that it might yield (e.g. Hyde-Price, 2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Manners, 2002; Pace, 2009) and about its accountability towards European citizens (Sjursen, 2011). These and other contributions shed light on the various ways in which member states interact and on how a collective, European endeavour might emerge from participants’ efforts, as well as potentially transforming them.

This article shares the above-mentioned work’s focus on the nature of EU foreign policy, but puts at centre stage practices of information exchange and knowledge construction. There is a growing interest in information and knowledge, as well as in the politics and practices that accompany and produce them. Struggles about information within the EU are not a new phenomenon (Blom and Vanhoonacker, in press), but information is becoming increasingly crucial in defining networks and governance patterns (see Slaughter, 2004). The EU has shifted from a practice of information-sharing between its member states to a more ambitious practice of information-processing, thanks to the establishment of new common institutions in Brussels (such as the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council Secretariat, later merged into the EEAS) (Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker, 2011; Smith, 2004: 40). Moreover, the EU has also acquired powers for information-gathering; these are limited to specific contexts, but their consequences are potentially much broader (Bicchi, 2012; Duke, 2006). These practices are a key element of the networks and institutions supporting EU foreign policy making. While elsewhere it has been shown how information exchanges within the Correspondance Européenne (COREU) network have sustained a community of practice (Bicchi, 2011), here the focus is on a subset of reports prepared by the EU that include both information and knowledge, and on practices related to the production and use of these reports.

This article tackles three related questions, covering a three-dimensional analytical space. First, is the EU able not only to favour information exchanges but also to gather information and construct knowledge? Second, if so, are the information and knowledge produced ‘European’? Finally, to what extent is this information and knowledge relevant to member states? To answer these questions, the article distinguishes between information and knowledge. As a starting point, information can be defined as data that are relevant to the knower (Tushman and Nadler, 1978: 614), whereas knowledge is the interpretation of information by the knower in the form of ‘cause and effect’ and ‘means and ends’ propositions (Huber, 1991: 89), as well as ‘right and wrong’. The article will show that EU documents include not only information, but also knowledge as the basis for action. Second, the focus will be on the nature of information and knowledge in relation to their origin. While the national and the European levels ideally stand at the two ends of a continuum, the intermediate stages are more complex, as highlighted by the literature on Europeanization. Despite this, the article shows that European information and European knowledge can exist, and thus it is no longer tenable to assume the contrary. Finally, the article will explore the geographical reach of national diplomatic networks, to show that several member states have large gaps in their outreach and often do not possess the necessary information (let alone knowledge) when faced with the need to take a decision at the EU level. This analysis will thus argue that these three dimensions (information–knowledge, national–European and extent of reach) delimit an analytical space within which the EU is more advanced than at times assumed.

The evidence the article will use to answer the first two questions is represented by reports prepared by Heads of Missions (HoMs) of EU member states and the (now EU) Delegations, ¹ generally referred to as ‘HoMs reports’. To put it crudely, these reports are the outcome of diplomats from member states and officials of the Delegation abroad coming together and drafting a document that reflects their shared understanding of the situation on the ground, and of what the EU could or should do about it. It is a well-established way of inputting, in a negotiated fashion, both data and policy recommendations into the EU foreign policy-making process. The record of HoMs reports between 1998 and 2010, gathered thanks to data provided by the Council Secretariat, shows that they are a regular feature in the EU foreign policy system and that they tend to provide detailed information, especially on countries where the diplomatic network of most member states is thin or non-existent. While member states might double-check the information summarized in the reports, a number of targeted interviews have shown that most are interested in the knowledge included, although this does not necessarily mean that they will embrace it. Moreover, the process of drafting HoMs reports can emerge out of genuine European cooperation, rather than purely an attempt by member states to secure their national preferences, as shown in the case of the report on East Jerusalem. This case has been chosen because it was possible to trace large parts of the process involved, thanks to the publicity surrounding the case. It consists of a set of practices leading to the adoption of the 2009 report, which were investigated through a number of in-depth interviews (seven in East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv; five in Brussels and seven in member states’ capitals) as well as through the comparison of a number of draft documents that were obtained for the purpose.

The next section will define the three dimensions relevant to this article (information–knowledge, national–European and extent of reach). The following sections will turn to the empirical evidence of HoMs reports and tackle the ‘European’ nature of information and knowledge, by drawing on the example of the HoMs report on East Jerusalem. The third section provides an overview of the diplomatic network of member states, in order to gauge the reports’ potential usefulness. The article will then present a few concluding remarks.

Europeanization by information and knowledge?

Three dimensions are crucial to the analysis of information exchange and knowledge construction in the EU foreign policy system. The first, based on information and knowledge, is the one most relevant here and the one most in need of definition. To do so, the article draws on the contributions of cognate disciplines, such as Organization studies, that have prioritized research about knowledge over more than two decades. The second dimension encompasses the national and the European nature of information and knowledge, a debate that scholars of Europeanization and, more generally, European integration have explored at length (see Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Graziano and Vink, 2007). Finally, the last dimension aims to clarify the implications of the geographical reach of the Europeans’ diplomatic networks.

The traditional starting point in the debate about information and knowledge is the definition of knowledge provided by Plato as ‘justified true belief’. ² This definition has been criticized (partly also by Plato) as misleading in terms of right and wrong, but it remains a useful starting point because it highlights the existence of a knower that reflects on an experience situated in time, space and society, all crucial points in the debate about knowledge.

Two issues emerge as relevant. First, it is widely accepted that data, information and knowledge can be placed on a continuum that ranges from less to more structure. Data can be transformed into information, understood as data relevant to the knower (Dekker and Hansén, 2004: 217–218; Rowley, 2007; Tushman and Nadler, 1978: 614). Information is in turn related to knowledge, defined as cognitive frames or the interpretation of information in the form of ‘cause and effect’, ‘means and ends’ propositions (Huber, 1991; 89) and potentially also ‘right and wrong’. To use a metaphor, and following Claude Lévi-Strauss, it can be helpful to think of information as raw, while knowledge has been cooked, in the sense of being processed. ³ Second, both information and knowledge are related to the existence of a knower, to whom information is relevant and who participates in knowledge construction on the basis of ongoing practices of knowing. In the objectivist tradition knowledge is a commodity or an outcome (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001). But the perspective embraced here is that knowledge is better studied as knowing: ‘as a social process, human and material, aesthetic as well as emotive and ethical [and] embedded in practice’ (Gherardi, 2006: xii). Knowledge is thus a socially meaningful pattern of information, which involves the existence of a practice, of a cognitive pattern, and an audience with which the pattern resonates.

The analysis of information and knowledge has been a longstanding tradition in EU studies and political sciences in general, although not always as a key priority. Several authors have addressed similar topics, but not necessarily from the same perspective (e.g. Boswell, 2008; Culpepper, 2008; Radaelli, 1995). Some have embraced an approach based on discourse analysis (e.g. Diez, 2001; Hajer, 1993; Litfin, 1994). However, it is worth stressing both similarities and differences. Knowledge, as defined here, is akin to framing, although it is more encompassing and less concerned with policy relevance. Whereas framing of an issue occurs in accordance with an overarching criterion (Daviter, 2007: 654; Surel, 2000) ⁴ and often is understood to be used strategically for policy purposes (Entman, 1993; Rhinard, 2010), an analysis of information and knowledge as defined above is agnostic in that it assumes neither coherence nor strategic behaviour. Similarly, there is a broad literature base on epistemic communities and the role of expertise in affecting policy choices (Boswell, 2008; Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011; Haas, 1992; Majone, 1997; Zito, 2001), as well as on deliberative and argumentative practices (Erikson and Fossum, 2000; Riddervold, 2011; Risse, 2000). However, in all these cases, the focus is on the influence that some actors have on others. Here, the focus is on the social practices (rather than the agents) that underpin exchanges of information and knowledge construction within a collectivity.

Beyond the borders of the EU, the literature on the relevance of information and knowledge in policy making is even broader, but the interest is overwhelmingly targeted towards knowledge as an instrument of power, to be wielded in conflicts related to agenda settings. The focus of this article here is instead on the practices, partly defined by power, but partly driven also by ‘puzzlement’ in policy making (Heclo, 1974: 305), in an attempt to navigate between the Foucauldian position that power determines knowledge (but without compromising the possibility of resistance), and the Habermasian position that knowledge creates power. While agency and power have a role, the analytical context is here represented by the knowing practice, where practices are defined as ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’ (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 4; see also Pouliot, 2010) that include an element of repetition and routine. In more empirical terms, therefore, the issue at stake is the extent to which the EU not only facilitates information exchanges and gathers information, but also participates in and leads epistemic practices: that is, practices of knowing and knowledge construction in foreign affairs.

The second dimension centres on the national and the European nature of information and knowledge. Reference to ‘national information’ or ‘European knowledge’ might seem odd, but the oddity disappears when we refer to, for example, ‘British intelligence’. European integration theories have sought to specify conditions under which national cooperation can lead to a European outcome. The aim of creating a ‘community of information’ and a ‘community of view’ has been a logical antecedent to the formation of a potential ‘community of action’ (De Schoutheete, 1980). However, the debates about Europeanization (e.g. Cowles et al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Graziano and Vink, 2007) and about European identity (Risse, 2010) have shown that this is not a linear dimension, in which less of one means more of the other. ⁵ Member states are not merely passive ‘downloaders’ of European directives. They also actively pursue their national interest in Brussels with the goal of ‘uploading’ and institutionalizing it at the European level (Börzel, 2002). It is thus possible to hypothesize that a formally ‘European’ outcome would reflect knowledge that is elaborated by and based upon national sources. It would represent the ‘hybridization’ (or ‘colonization’) on the part of few member states of (in this case) the EU foreign policy, with less knowledgeable member states adopting the position of their more savvy partners owing to a lack of alternatives. On the other hand, a truly European knowledge would instead be the product of a process in which no national contribution remains distinctive and unchecked by other partners. There are therefore three possible outcomes to the drafting of HoMs reports. First, it might lead to a European knowledge and a ‘communauté de vue’. Second, it might lead to an uploading of national knowledge, where one or more member states succeed in ‘hybridizing’ or ‘colonizing’ the report by promoting their own interpretation of facts and their priorities. Third, it might also end up with no new knowledge and simply a re-hash of information, produced by a ‘Christmas tree approach’ in which all participants ensure that their preferred outcome or issue is taken into account. ⁶

The final dimension to be considered relates to conditions under which European knowledge is more likely, and in particular the outreach of EU and national foreign policies. In theory, CFSP has a very broad remit, covering the entire globe and the whole set of foreign policy issues. De facto, not everything is addressed, discussed and acted upon. External economic relations, development and human rights probably top the list of priorities. Still, the variety of topics and countries encompassed is striking, especially when compared with the traditional foreign policy concerns of the majority of member states, which tend to concentrate most of their material and ideational resources on a limited number of areas.

What, then, is the relationship between member states and the EU? Is the EU more active (and European knowledge more likely) in those areas in which member states have more clearly defined interests? This interpretation is supported by those authors who take into account the way in which the evolution of the EU remit over time has mirrored European Communities (EC) or EU membership and, in particular, the change of tack brought about by the accession of the UK. However, a different interpretation is possible. According to Naurin (2010), the nature of European negotiations changes according to political pressure: the higher the stakes, the less likely national representatives are to argue rather than bargain during negotiation. As a consequence, deliberation is most common when least important. This argument is also potentially relevant here: the greatest scope for European information and knowledge may exist when the subject is least relevant to national decision makers. But very much like above, these two opposite positions delimit a set of more complicated possibilities. The one being put forward in this article is the possibility of a threshold linked to ‘red lines’. ⁷ While it is intuitive that member states would invest national resources in gathering information and constructing national knowledge on vital priorities, it is an empirical question whether they do so also when ‘red lines’ are not involved, that is on the majority of daily practices. Rather than a linear relationship, this would point to a hard core of national knowledges amid a broader area in which European knowledge is possible.

The empirical evidence based on HoMs reports presented below will thus be examined in order to understand the extent to which the EU is able to provide not only information, but also knowledge, the nature of that knowledge and the relevance of comparison in terms of geographical reach as a scope condition for European knowledge.

HoMs reports: information and knowledge

The EU is the official ‘author’ of a number of documents in the field of foreign affairs. Together with more ad hoc reports, for example on the outcome of démarches, the most information-rich are political reports, EU Special Representative (EUSR) reports and HoMs reports. Political reporting was introduced in 1999 (Duke, 2002: 855), but the practice took hold with the creation of the EEAS (Bicchi, 2012). It is done by EU Delegations, which are tasked with informing their EEAS colleagues in Brussels (but not member states) about developments on the ground. EUSR reports can be very interesting and reach EEAS officials as well as national diplomats with the latest news about, for example, current negotiations in which the EUSR has participated. ⁸ HoMs reports also reach both EEAS and national officials, but they are the outcome of negotiations. They do not present fresh information, but rather a summary and a state of the art. They are thus a comparatively harder test against which to assess the EU’s capacity to provide information and knowledge.

The practice of drafting HoMs reports dates back to 1986, at the time of the Single European Act, when cooperation among European officials in non-EU countries was formalized. It was agreed that Heads of member states’ Missions and the Head of the Delegation were to meet regularly and prepare joint analyses and reports, ⁹ following input from either Brussels or local actors in third countries. ¹⁰ Since then, several HoMs reports have acquired a semi-automatic character, linked to the regularity in the timetable of meetings, or have become annual round-up documents to track developments on the ground (e.g. about human rights). Reports are circulated by the EEAS via COREU to member states’ European Correspondents ¹¹ in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, to member states’ Permanent Representations in Brussels, as well as to the European Commission and to the General Secretariat of the Council, and from there they reach specific desks.

Typically, HoMs reports are divided into a descriptive component and a more prescriptive component. Both include information and knowledge, although the prescriptive part tends to be more knowledge-rich. The descriptive part assesses the situation or the impact of a specific instrument, while the more prescriptive component raises options for future actions or recommends a specific course of action.

In the case of the HoMs report on Moldova, commissioned by the EEAS and delivered in February 2011, ¹² for instance, the focus was on assessing progress against the criteria laid down in Council Decision 2010/573/CFSP. ¹³ These criteria related to establishing a political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict, addressing the remaining problems of Latin-script schools and restoring free movement of persons. The report found that few advances had been made and this, together with the inadequate human rights situation in the Transnistrian region, did not allow existing sanctions to be lifted. This part of the report was predominantly centred on information provision. The more knowledge-intensive part came at the end, where the report argued that, given some positive dynamics in connection with the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Confidence Building Measures Working Groups and informal consultations, it was worth maintaining the suspension of the travel ban for a further 6 months, especially in the light of the increasing role that the EU aimed to play in the region. The added value here was represented by the dynamic element, which argued that suspension of sanctions could lead to a positive outcome, also in conjunction with the EU effort in the area. The report was then discussed at an EU level on 22 February 2011, ¹⁴ with unanimous member states’ agreement for the proposal. The Foreign Affairs Council Decision, adopted on 21 March 2011, reflected the recommendations made in the HoMs report, thus embracing not only the information it included, but also the vision and the knowledge it established.

In their structure, HoMs reports therefore mirror the format of diplomatic messages between embassies and capitals, which also combine information and knowledge. There is, however, a substantial difference in terms of their frequency and length. The diplomatic messages sent by Heads of Missions to their respective capitals tend to occur daily and to be short, typically a paragraph or two. George Kennan’s famous ‘long telegram’ stood out not only because of the clarity of its analysis, but also because it was more than 5000 words long. Contrary to diplomatic messages, HoMs reports often follow Kennan’s approach and are long and detailed affairs. The HoMs report on East Jerusalem in 2008 exceeded 6000 words, while that of 2009 was over 4000. The report for 2011 was a 8000+ words affair, whereas the 2012-13 one was over 7000. Other reports are shorter, even 500 to 700 words. But they never approach the brevity that characterizes national diplomatic messages. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the positive side, reports are exhaustive and offer an in-depth analysis for a whole set of issues. On the negative side, their length puts them at a disadvantage in the world of time-pressured diplomats. ¹⁵

The number of HoMs reports has fluctuated over time (Figure 1). ¹⁶ Between 1999 and 2002 there was a substantial growth, with the overall number approaching 400 in 2003. Since then, numbers have generally ranged between 250 and 300. As a practitioner has commented, ‘it has become reasonably common practice for the bodies in Brussels to invite the EU Heads of Mission to submit a collective report’ ¹⁷ to begin the discussion in the Working Parties or to establish the state of the art in the Political and Security Committee negotiations. In the words of another practitioner, it has become roughly ‘equivalent to asking the opinion of the Legal Service’ of the Council. ¹⁸

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Figure 1.

Number of HoMs reports per year, from 1998 to 2010.

Interestingly, the geographical spread of the reports is grossly uneven (Figure 2). HoMs reports devoted to Africa increasingly represent the majority of the total, with 57% of messages devoted to sub-Saharan African countries in 2010. Asia is the subject of ca. 20% HoMs reports, while Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa do not reach 10% of the total. A very small percentage of reports address international organisations (IOs), while North America barely registers.

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Figure 2.

Number of HoMs reports per macro-region, as a percentage, between 2008 and 2010.

During the period 2008 to 2010, the highest number of reports were about Zimbabwe, which stood out from the rest with 19, 9 and 12 reports respectively for 2008, 2009 and 2010. Burma (also known as Myanmar) has been the subject of increasing attention, with five reports in 2008, eight in 2009 and seven in 2010. Kenya has also often been scrutinized (nine reports in 2008, five in 2009 and six in 2010), as has China (seven reports in 2008 and in 2009, and six in 2010). Not all countries were the subject of a HoMs report. Still, reports about 122 countries were sent over the period 2008 to 2010.

The titles of HoMs reports indicate that their focus varies, but not greatly. ¹⁹ Human rights are a traditional topic of concern. Several reports (20 in 2010) assessed, in 20 countries, the implementation of the various human rights guidelines adopted by the EU. After the adoption of guidelines on violence against women and girls in December 2008, HoMs reports from more than 80 countries included a section assessing their implementation. ²⁰ Several reports specifically recorded the discussion and the outcome of local political dialogues (often referred to as Art. 8 dialogues for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries). The vast majority analysed the political situation, for example before or after elections, or during the unfolding of a crisis. For instance, in 2008, several reports devoted to Zimbabwe focused on the period around the elections, when, on average, three reports were sent each month. Similarly, as the crisis in Sudan gathered momentum, so did the number of HoMs reports. While just one report was sent on Sudan in 1998 and three reports were sent in 1999, the numbers escalated thereafter (eight reports in 2000, 13 reports in 2001 and 20 reports in 2002). A similar escalation occurred in the case of Eritrea, peaking with 13 reports in 2002, and Ethiopia, with 10 reports in the same year.

This overview thus shows extensive EU activity in terms of describing and interpreting information about a broad range of topics, with particular emphasis on the southern hemisphere. Both information and knowledge were to be found in this vast array of HoMs reports.

European knowledge? A case study of the HoMs report on East Jerusalem

To what extent can HoMs reports be considered to be ‘European’ information and knowledge? Do the discussions involved in the drafting of HoMs reports lead to a ‘communauté de vue’, or to a ‘Christmas tree approach’ in which all participants ensure that their preferred outcome or issue is taken into account, or simply to the uploading and colonization of the preferred options by one or a few member states? It is, in fact, very plausible that member states, especially the big ones, will use their extensive knowledge of foreign affairs and their extended diplomatic network to affect the content of HoMs reports. Moreover, big member states are more likely to be represented in HoMs meetings. As a British source commented in the case of the HoMs report on Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict, ‘[t]he British Embassy Chisinau has taken a leading role in influencing and drafting this report’. ²¹ On the other hand, this possibility is just that; a possibility. First, the procedures leading to HoMs reports are by definition ‘European’. These reports are prepared on the basis of HoMs coordination, which is chaired by the EU Delegation, according to a mechanism established by CFSP. Furthermore, though big member states might intend to affect the outcome, their efforts might not be successful or be only partly so. The contention of this article is that it is an empirical question, and thus the analysis of an empirical case is useful.

The case selected is the set of practices leading to the adoption of the HoMs report on East Jerusalem. This report is probably one of the most widely known of HoMs reports, given its relevance in terms of the Arab–Israeli conflict. It tackles a politically sensitive issue. According to the UN 1947 partition plan of Palestine, Jerusalem was to be under a special international regime (‘corpus separatum’) administered by the UN. ²² During the 1948 war, Jordan invaded and annexed Jerusalem, while during the 1967 war Israel did the same and declared Jerusalem its capital. Since then, endless negotiations have taken place about the ‘final status’ of Jerusalem and the situation remains very tense, especially in the north-eastern areas that host the majority of Arab Jerusalemites. An assessment of developments on the ground is thus particularly important in terms of this key area of foreign affairs.

The report is prepared every year by the 22 European diplomatic missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah, together with the EU Delegation. The status of these missions is special. Because of the dispute about Jerusalem’s role as a capital, all embassies to the state of Israel are based in Tel Aviv: no country recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In retaliation, Israel does not allow for high-level diplomatic representations in Jerusalem beyond the General Consulates traditionally present prior to 1967 (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, as well as Turkey, the Vatican and the USA). ²³ Fifteen other EU countries have opened a representation in Ramallah, while five do not have a representation in Jerusalem, Ramallah or Tel Aviv (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovakia). The EU has a ‘technical office’ in East Jerusalem with competence over Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza. The 22+1 European missions started to produce a yearly report on East Jerusalem in 2004, although in the previous years a ‘Jerusalem Watch’ HoMs report was occasionally circulated. ²⁴ At first the report was public, but it became confidential in 2005. It is, however, regularly leaked to the press.

The 2009 report, examined here, was divided into five parts: three descriptive and two prescriptive. ²⁵ First, there was a political assessment of the situation in East Jerusalem, tackling the issue of settlements in and around East Jerusalem, demolitions and restrictions on Palestinian housing, access to the city for Palestinians, Palestinian institutions in the city and the holy sites. Second, there was a case study of Sheikh Jarrah, an area where tensions had escalated in recent years. Both these descriptive parts were factual and highly detailed and quoted specific statistics. The third part copied a United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs document on demolitions and displacements in East Jerusalem. The fourth included general recommendations, most notably the request to expand the mandate of HoMs in Jerusalem to address some specific points, listed in the fifth part. This final part is striking because it mentions a few very contentious points, on which there is no agreement among EU member states, notably the possibility of preventing financial transactions from EU member states’ actors that support settlers in East Jerusalem ‘by adopting appropriate EU legislation’, and information-sharing regarding violent settlers to assess ‘whether to grant entry into the EU’. While the word ‘sanctions’ is banned from EU-speak, there is a flavour of ‘smart sanctions’ in the recommendations.

The interesting aspect of this HoMs report is the process leading up to it. As customary, the report was requested by the (then Swedish) Presidency of the Council Working Group on the Middle East Peace Process to contribute to the drafting of the Council Conclusions for December 2009. Sweden began the process in Jerusalem, convening the first meeting in summer 2009. Most importantly, however, Sweden did not prepare a draft of the report. On the contrary, at the first meeting the Swedish political officer in Jerusalem raised a number of points for discussion with her colleagues such as the exact definition of the term ‘Jerusalem’, the structure of the report and the need to update and prioritize facts, as well as to discuss the EU interest. ²⁶ After three or four meetings addressing these general aspects, national representatives agreed to share the drafting of the report. ²⁷ One country focused on social services, another on identity cards, a third on religious affairs, etc., ²⁸ in an ad hoc manner and without ‘domaines réservés’. ²⁹ On the contrary, political officers discussed openly the sources they were thinking of consulting and received suggestions about further sources that could possibly deliver useful information. ³⁰ They then pieced it together, refined it as much as possible, and passed it on to the HoMs. The HoMs went over every single word, consulted bilaterally with their capitals and finalized the text. The process was, therefore, a ‘collective endeavour’, as a diplomat put it, with ‘red lines’ being decided ‘en route’. The same practice applied for the drafting of the HoMs reports on Jerusalem in 2011 and in 2012, the latter being published early 2013.’ And add an endnote after ‘2012’ reading: ‘Interview with EU official and a European diplomat, Jerusalem, 23 April 2013, and with a European diplomat, Jerusalem, 24 April 2013. ³¹

The 2009 report then went on to play a significant role in the controversial Declaration issued by the Council on 8 December 2009. The controversy focused on member states’ intention (later partially downsized) to declare East Jerusalem the capital of the future Palestinian state. As the draft of the Declaration prepared by the PSC was leaked to the press, Israel started a diplomatic battle to tone it down, with some success. ³² Still, the Declaration was unusual for the emphasis on the issue of Jerusalem, which directly relied on the content of the HoMs report.

The story of the HoMs report on East Jerusalem might be exceptional and thus difficult to generalize. The case of Jerusalem is certainly exceptional in terms of the large amount of available information. Owing to the number of non-governmental organizations and international organizations, Jerusalem resembles a ‘primeval soup’, in which all diplomats ‘go native’ and converge on a similar vision. ³³ However, as information has long since become part and parcel of the Arab–Israeli conflict, there is, at times, a paucity of accessible, reliable information reflecting a set of well-engrained, shared principles.

This case is also revealing in at least two ways. First, it stands at one end of the spectrum in terms of the number of member states’ representations involved. With 22 missions between Jerusalem and Ramallah, this is not the place with most representations, but clearly there are enough European diplomats on site to cross-check each other’s behaviour. Therefore, a scope condition worth exploring elsewhere is the extent to which fragmentation of the European diplomatic corps in place might be conducive to a more European outcome. Another point worth considering is the long-lasting meddling of European countries in the area. Although, at times, profound divergences remain, ³⁴ a remarkable convergence has occurred since the 1960s. Therefore, a second tentative conclusion is that a well-established consensus about the broad guidelines in the area might contribute to a common European interpretation of new information.

While ‘colonization’ of information and knowledge included in HoMs reports remains a possibility (and a likely one), this case shows that a process leading to a shared, European understanding of the ‘common good’ is also possible. If the option of a collective endeavour in the interpretation of political information can and does exist, it then becomes an empirical question to assess how often and under what conditions that endeavour occurs.

Useful knowledge?

Finally, to what extent do HoMs reports contain information and knowledge that can be useful to national representatives? More precisely, how are information and knowledge perceived at a national level? In order to answer these questions, this article examines two issues. First, it looks at the extent of member states’ national representation networks. ³⁵ The assumption here is that the fewer ‘eyes on the ground’ a country has at its disposal from its own national channels, the more relevant it might find the HoMs reports produced by its EU partners. The evidence shows that the EU Delegations’ network is increasingly broad, while the outreach of most national representations is increasingly limited. However, this is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for a country to act on that information. Therefore, this article has partly cross-checked the evidence by means of qualitative interviews with European correspondents. These suggest that, even if a country’s diplomats know the situation on the ground well, they still appreciate information and knowledge about their partners’ position and a brief summary of what negotiations in Brussels will be like.

The analysis of the diplomatic reach of member states shows that several countries have limited or very limited representation abroad. ³⁶ Apart from a small group, member states tend to have missions in around one-third or fewer of existent countries (see Figure 3). ³⁶ We can distinguish roughly three groups of states. In the top group, France has the best outreach, with 133 missions abroad, followed by Germany (121 missions) and the UK (113 missions). Italy and Spain have a similar number (94 and 93 respectively), followed by the Netherlands (84 missions). In the second most numerous group, the average number of missions covers around one-third of the globe. In the last group, the number of representations drops even further, to 30 or less. At the bottom of this last group, Estonia, Malta and Luxembourg have 10 or fewer missions abroad.

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Figure 3.

Total number of missions in third countries, by country (CION = European Commission), 2009.

Member states’ representations are heavily biased in favour of the northern hemisphere, leaving several trouble spots in the south poorly covered. In just three countries do all member states have a representation: China, Russia and the United States. Egypt and Japan both have 26 missions, while Canada, Israel and Turkey have 25. The average number of missions then drops, especially in the south. After North America, the highest average number is in the Middle East and North Africa, with an average of over 16 missions per country. (Non-EU) Europe comes next, with an average of around 13 missions, while Asia comes shortly after, with around 12 missions per country. There is then a wide gap in representation, with Latin American and African countries hosting around seven missions on average. Oceania is a case apart. With the notable exception of Australia (24 missions) and partially also New Zealand (nine missions), the other (micro) states in Oceania have very small numbers of European missions, or none at all. The overall picture, therefore, shows that European countries’ own ‘eyes on the ground’ are overwhelmingly biased towards the northern hemisphere, while they have very limited national sources of information in the south. Some notorious trouble spots host very few missions, such as Rwanda (four missions), Haiti (three missions) and Sierra Leone (two missions).

EU Delegations have no such geographical bias. With some omissions in micro-states, the EU now has ‘eyes on the ground’ in the vast majority of countries, and especially where most member states do not. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, EU Delegations are present in all countries apart from Somalia and three micro-states. In half of the world’s countries, there is one EU Delegation amid the one to four representations on the ground. Therefore, although there is no country in which the EU is represented while member states are not, EU Delegations have become a staple of contemporary diplomatic life.

Moreover, the trend is towards a reduction in numbers of national missions abroad and an increase in EU Delegations. ³⁷ While Nordic countries are more creative in terms of sharing resources, the pressure is on several countries with limited resources, including former communist countries that experienced an expansion of their diplomatic network after 1989. On the other hand, since the first Delegation of the European Coal and Steel Community was created in London in 1956, ³⁸ Delegations’ numbers have been constantly increasing. There were 123 Commission Delegations in 2007 (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 134); in 2009 the EU was second only to France in terms of outreach (Figure 3); and by 2012 the number of EU Delegations had climbed to 137. ³⁹ The trend is not linear, though: the creation of the EEAS boosted the number of Delegations, but the economic crisis is having an impact by limiting budgets.

In terms of who has ‘eyes on the ground’, therefore, it is clear that the majority of member states do not have a national source of information in Africa and Latin America, while the EU does. HoMs reports on African and Latin American countries will therefore be particularly relevant to the approximately 70% of member states that are not represented there, while HoMs reports on Asia and on the Middle East are likely to be read with attention by around half the member states. Whereas in the northern hemisphere EU Delegations are unlikely to add to existing information and knowledge, in the southern hemisphere there is very good complementarity between national and European sources of information and knowledge for most member states.

To what extent do member states with no representation on the ground value HoMs reports, and for what reasons? This aspect was investigated by means of in-depth interviews with European Correspondents ⁴⁰ and parallel interviews with officials in the EEAS. The findings point to two different aspects, namely (1) information and knowledge about facts on the ground and (2) information and knowledge about member states’ positions about facts on the ground and, most importantly, about the structured knowledge and recommendations embodied in the report. While the latter is relevant to all countries, the former is relevant only in some cases. Owing to the sensitivity of the material covered in the interviews, and the interviewees’ request that the material not be used in any public way, the article makes a few generalizations without being able to name the specific case or country.

The first instance is a small member state from Central and Eastern Europe. This country appreciates information about both facts on the ground and member states’ positions. Its embassy network is limited, especially in Africa, although it belongs to the middle group of countries in terms of number of embassies. As one of the interviewees put it, ‘[s]ometimes we double-check [the information included in the HoMs reports], but I would say that in general we rely upon this information. […] these reports prove to be extremely useful […] relatively unbiased and balanced.’ ⁴¹

Another example is a relatively small European country, having joined the EU long ago. It possesses a relatively extended network, but not to the point of making it into the first group of ‘big states’. Its position is not to trust HoMs reports for facts on the ground, not even in the Caucasus, where it has very little representation. Diplomats would rather rely, for instance, on their mission in Moscow to provide their version of facts than on HoMs reports. Still, the European Correspondent acknowledges that she or he and several colleagues read HoMs reports because they provide excellent insight into the ‘European consensus’ on the ground, that is what local HoMs think is feasible or useful as a joint position or action. ⁴²

A similar case is represented by a big member state, with an extensive network of embassies. It learns little from HoMs reports and actually uses the drafting process to make sure that its ‘vision’ is taken into account and its preferences reflected in the final text. Therefore, this country does not value HoMs reports as sources of information about facts on the ground and partly manipulates, for national purposes, the interpretation of what is going on. Still, this country’s representatives display an attitude similar to the previous case, by which HoMs reports are read ‘as summary of what HoMs think’, and ‘of what the EU might do’, ⁴³ that is of what kind of consensus might emerge.

While these suggestions need further research, the preliminary conclusion points towards knowledge being more likely to be considered important than information. Fresh information is relevant (and at times extremely relevant) for a minority of member states, which do not have even indirect national sources to gather data on the ground. But most members, even those with a diplomatic reach that extends to the country in question, seem to value the second part of the HoMs report, namely the more structured interpretation of facts accompanied by policy recommendations. This does not mean that countries embrace the recommendations emerging from HoMs reports. However, this is a case of adaptational pressure at a domestic level. Whether a HoMs report includes useful information or useful knowledge, in either case member states will both react and relate to it. Over time, this plays against the hypothesis of European information and knowledge as residual categories. Beyond a narrow set of issues covered by ‘red lines’, which are likely to be addressed using available national practices, there is room for mutual coordination and common knowledge.

Conclusions

Information and knowledge are increasingly relevant in the analysis of the EU and of EU foreign policy, as they highlight founding practices and their transformative effects. Looked at from the perspective of knowing practices, EU foreign policy shows a high degree of interconnectedness between member states, as national representatives strive to interpret collectively available information and make sense of international politics. The EU participates in and leads practices not only of information exchanges, but also of information gathering and knowledge construction for foreign policy purposes, as shown here with an exploratory investigation of the available data on the EU HoMs reports drafted over the period 1998 to 2010. The conclusion is that the EU produces documents that contain both information and knowledge that can be European in nature, as shown in the case of the HoMs report on East Jerusalem. This case suggests a link between, on one hand, European knowledge and, on the other, fragmentation of the European diplomatic corps on the ground and a well-established overarching policy framework. Moreover, HoMs reports are likely to be more useful for issues arising from Africa and Latin America, and for small and medium countries with limited diplomatic networks. Still, big member states are also interested in HoMs reports for what they highlight as likely and possible in the EU’s name, as well as what they reveal about future EU negotiations.

This suggests two broader conclusions. First, while information and knowledge about current affairs emerging from EU sources are valued differently by member states, all EU partners value information and especially knowledge about what the collectivity believes is likely and possible. Not only do some member states value information and knowledge per se, but all member states value information and knowledge about what their partners think about the substantive aspects of the issue at stake. The attention devoted to the cognitive frames embraced by partners highlights once again the centrality of the ‘coordination reflex’ among EU member states, as well as the socially and historically situated origins of countries’ knowledge about foreign policy. Member states keep an eye on what partners believe to be the case; it forms a crucial component of their assessment of a situation. In the long run, this plays against the residual value of European information and knowledge. Second, the quality of cooperation between EU partners outside EU borders deserves more attention. The analysis of the HoMs report on East Jerusalem has shown how practices that would be highly unlikely between capitals or in Brussels might develop instead in third countries and end up affecting the policy-making process by framing the information and knowledge required for EU discussion. ⁴⁴

More generally, this article highlights the relevance of an analysis of cooperation that focuses on the role of information, knowledge and, more broadly, cognitive practices. While negotiations are a powerful element of change for national positions, the national character might already be diluted and transformed by the increasingly thick circulation of information and knowledge within the EU foreign policy system, in a ‘Europeanization by information and knowledge’ process. Moreover, as the EEAS is strengthening its own capabilities for information gathering and knowledge construction, it is likely that the EEAS will end up having better information and better knowledge about international affairs than the majority of member states. An analysis of the ways in which cognitive practices affect policy making is thus imperative in order to grasp current transformations in EU foreign policy and in the EU in general.