Abstract
The political system of the EU and its member states is frequently seen as post-Westphalian within constructivist-inspired research. This is based on the view that political authority and legitimacy are to be found both at the EU level and the national level with no clear borders between them. The question raised in this article is how the member states conceive of themselves as foreign policy actors in this situation where they are both politically embedded in EU foreign policy structures and, in most cases, formally able to act outside the EU structures in the field of foreign policy. The overall argument is that a pertinent answer to this question can be provided by looking at how (or whether) state identity is articulated in relation to the EU. The paper first presents theoretical considerations relating to discursive articulations of state identity in an EU context. The relevance of these discursive articulations is then illustrated through the empirical example of Danish articulations of actorness prior to and post Lisbon. It is shown that the articulation of national actorness in relation to the EU varied across the different areas of foreign policy before and after Lisbon. A research agenda that flows from these considerations is outlined.
The political system of the EU and its member states is frequently seen as post-Westphalian within constructivist-inspired research, drawing inspiration from Ruggie (1993). This is based on the view that political authority and legitimacy are to be found both at the EU level and the national level, with no clear borders between them. The same can be said about the EU’s foreign policy system more specifically. The Lisbon Treaty contributes to strengthening the foreign policy structures at the EU level through some of the functions of the President and the new role of the High Representative; thus, the post-Westphalian character of the system as a dual system is bolstered, whereby both member states and EU institutions are ascribed political authority and legitimacy in foreign policy.
The question raised in this article is how the member states conceive of themselves as foreign policy actors in this situation, where they are both politically embedded in EU foreign policy structures and, in most cases, formally able to act outside the EU structures in the field of foreign policy. The approach of the article is well suited for the analysis of what we might, for lack of a better term, call ‘national’ foreign policy within the EU. The overall argument is that a pertinent answer to this question can be provided by looking at how (or whether) state identity is articulated in relation to the EU. The articulation of state identity may contribute to shaping policy practice with regard to whether national foreign policy is mainly conducted inside or outside the EU, or through some kind of combination of the two.
Wæver (1995), amongst others, has argued that the EU can broadly be seen as a supplement to or support for member states, rather than as a new sovereign subject taking over from them. While this might be a helpful generalisation, it leaves the question open as to the specific nature of the member states’ articulation of their ‘we’ in foreign policy practices in the light of the intertwining of national and EU foreign policy. This article addresses this question through a focus on the following more specific questions: How can we conceptualise the discursive articulations of the national ‘we’ within the EU foreign policy system? What kind of discursive ‘we’ do EU member states construct for themselves within the post-Lisbon foreign policy structures?
This article looks at the level of national discourse, similarly to the articles by Aydın-Düzgit (2013) and Rayroux (2013). As mentioned in the introduction by Carta and Morin, different approaches to discourse analysis can be found in the literature on European foreign policy. This article differs from the other articles on national discourses in adopting a poststructuralist approach to discourse analysis.
The paper first presents theoretical considerations relating to discursive articulations of state identity in an EU context. The relevance of these discursive articulations is then illustrated through the empirical example of Danish articulations of actorness prior to and post-Lisbon. It concludes by outlining a research agenda that flows from these considerations.
Theoretical considerations 1
Based on poststructuralist assumptions, the framework of meaning within which national foreign policy takes place is seen here as shaping and constraining national foreign policy. Basic frameworks of meaning are conceptualised as discourses. Meaning, then, is studied in terms of language. The key assumption is that people’s ways of speaking are organised in discourses which do not just mirror our surroundings, identities and social relations in a neutral way, but play an active role in shaping and changing them. Discourses are used as resources to form representations of the world. They are never just reflections of an already existing reality but contribute to creating the social world, including aspects of the world such as foreign policy. In this sense we can say that discourse is a constitutive force in the construction of the social world. Discourses attribute meaning to the world or aspects of the world in such a way that other ways of representing the world are excluded or marginalised (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).
This understanding of discourse takes as its point of departure the poststructuralist Foucauldian understanding of discourse as a limited range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings. According to Foucault, discourses create the social world by constituting certain forms of knowledge, identities and social relations. Discourses are socially and culturally specific and our knowledge, identities and social relations are constructed in discourse and therefore contingent: they are tied to a particular time and place but could have been, and can become, different (Foucault, 1989 [1972]; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Larsen, 1997). The use of discourse analysis for examining how foreign policy is ascribed meanings has at least four main advantages compared with belief system approaches or phenomenological approaches:
A discourse approach is non-individualistic. Discourses are social meanings which individuals have to draw on to communicate. Texts are not merely products of the individual’s mind.
We can read texts. This is the basis for the analysis of discourses. There is no social meaning behind/beyond the text that cannot be reached. The analyst need not worry about what is ‘really’ meant by a text.
Struggles over meaning are of special interest in a discourse approach and allow us to understand fundamental differences between or within countries’ foreign policy.
Language is given a strong theoretical foundation as self-referential (based on Larsen, 1997: 20–21; see also Hansen and Wæver, 2002 and Wæver, 1998).
The article focuses on the discursive articulations of actorness of the nation/state both in general terms and in particular policy areas. By ‘actorness’ I mean the discursive construction of the ‘we’ in a given policy context, including the aims, principles and values of this ‘we’. This is a different usage of the term ‘actorness’ from that used in the work of Bretherton and Vogler. For Bretherton and Vogler, actorness is ‘the capacity to act’ and ‘actorness logically presupposes presence’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 33). It is based on something pre-existing, a presence. It is also different from a role theoretical approach such as that set out by, for example, Bengtson and Elgstrom (2012) or Harnisch (2012), which emphasises the importance of outside role perceptions for the effectiveness of the self-perceived role. In contrast, a discursive conceptualisation of actorness is non-essentialist, based on poststructuralist premises. (State) identity is seen as discursively constructed (Epstein, 2011).
By ‘articulation’ I mean the practice which establishes a relation between elements (for example, signs) in such a way that their identity is changed as a result, in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, turning elements into moments; the structured totality of this is a discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105). The structured totality that is of interest in this article is the discourse on actorness both in general political terms and in particular policy areas.
One should not take for granted that the ‘we’ of state representatives or state documents is necessarily articulated as a narrow national ‘we’: articulations of actorness are contingent; while you would expect states to be articulated as actors in their national foreign policy documents, actorness may also be articulated with other states or international organisations (see below). Identities are not fixed once and for all and articulations of state identity may change over time. Multiple identities may be articulated in ‘national’ foreign policy. We cannot assume a particular empirical articulation of member state identity with the EU. If a particular moment goes from being articulated within a discourse of national actorness (for example ‘Denmark’, ‘Danish policies’ etc.) to being articulated with elements such as ‘the EU’, then the moment is placed in a different context of meaning and given a different identity. Importantly, the interest in this article is the articulations of the ‘we’ with other organisational or national units. This relatively narrow focus means that this article is not looking at the attributes of the ‘we’ articulated (the adjectives associated with the ‘we’ etc.); it is only interested in the association articulated with other units, the EU in particular.
The main argument in the article is that the articulations of member state identity with the EU take at least five forms. The four discursive articulations were identified in a study of Danish foreign policy and the EU (Larsen, 2005). This study suggested that the way in which a member state articulates its foreign policy identity in relation to the EU varies across policy areas. A fifth likely articulation of actorness arises from studying the national articulations of actorness during the presidencies. The five national articulations of actorness vis-à-vis the EU are as follows: 2
National ‘we’ only: ‘member state x (for example Sweden) has acted in the field of development’ .
The member state ‘we’ is articulated through its actions in the EU: ‘the x member state (for example the Netherlands) has, through the EU, supported the national reconciliation process in…’.
Combination member state + the EU: ‘member state x (for example, Denmark) and the EU have acted in the Russian crisis’.
Only ‘the EU’ (the member state disappears as a subject in national diplomatic contexts): a document from a member state foreign ministry might state that ‘the EU has condemned the violence in …’ without any reference to national agency.
The EU through the member state (the member state expresses itself on behalf of the EU, implicitly or explicitly): ‘member state x (for example Denmark) has presented this view on behalf of the EU’.
There is not seen to be any kind of teleology or finality in the articulations of member state identity with the EU. There is no necessary or expected movement from, say, 1 to 4 across issue areas. But changing articulations, including hybrid articulations, are analytically interesting.
The individual member states construct their foreign policy identity both in general terms and in particular policy areas. These articulations have implications for understanding the foreign policy of the individual member states in an EU foreign policy system. There may, then, be differences as to how the neo-medieval character is enacted at the member state level – and between areas. The debate about late sovereign diplomacy in the EU context is often conducted at a high level of abstraction. The same is the case with Wæver’s argument that the EU is a supplement to, or a support for, member states, not a new sovereign subject superseding them (Wæver, 1995). Studying the national articulations of actorness vis-à-vis the EU in different areas may allow us to nuance this more general picture – possibly in ways that challenge the post-Westphalian characterisation more fundamentally.
As in most kinds of poststructuralist discourse analysis, it is not possible to say why a particular articulation of, for example, ‘Denmark’ or ‘EU’ is used, although an empirical analysis may point to some genealogical features relating to the specific articulations at the making of a particular policy area in national foreign policy.
In other work within FPA, discourse analysis has been used to analyse foreign policy, particularly in a European setting. It has been argued that discourse analysis of the concepts of state, nation and Europe is crucial for understanding the European policy of European states. In broader terms, the argument can be extended to arguing that discourses on nation and state are fundamental for understanding the foreign policy of states, since foreign policy is based on the discursive construction of who ‘we’ are (see Hansen and Wæver, 2002; Larsen, 1997, 1999; Wæver, 1998). This article draws on the same basic understanding of discourse as shaping, enabling and restraining foreign policy as is used in these works, but takes a different focus. Studies so far – including my own (before my 2005 book; see below) – have attempted implicitly or explicitly to examine general discourses in order to understand a general foreign policy line (Hansen and Wæver, 2002; Larsen, 1997, 1999; Wæver, 1998). Most of the studies have analysed the basic discursive configurations in relation to states, nations and Europe in the countries examined and linked these to general foreign policy or to European policy. This article is interested in discourse as a shaping and enabling force also in specific foreign policy areas. On the one hand, and in line with previous analyses, the general discourse on the role of the state/nation (or another state) as an actor in the EU, or IR more broadly, could be expected to be the source discourse or root of discourses on the role of states in specific policy areas. On the other hand, more general discourses about the role of the state, of the nation and of the EU in foreign policy also function as myths in the sense used by Laclau and Mouffe (1985): they claim a unity of meaning which is impossible in society due to the fluidity and unfinalisability of meaning-making. Traditionally representatives of states, often foreign ministries, have constructed an image of a cohesive unit across policy areas through, for example, speeches about national foreign policy (Neumann, 2001: 146–152). Discourse analysts have used such general speeches as an empirical basis for identifying the discourses that construct who the general ‘we’ are in foreign policy. But a general ‘national foreign policy’ is an articulation of various activities and areas of policy. The concepts or issues at stake in each field of policy do not per definition link up with more general statements of policy.
The two analytical strategies (focus on a general national ‘we’ versus focus on the ‘we’ constructed in different policy areas) can be united by assuming that general policy statements on the role of the state/nation are expressions of a discursive hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: ch. 3) which may have spread across policy areas and thus provides the conceptual roots for the role of the state in all policy areas. But the extent to which this hegemony is present in all policy areas is an empirical question.
It could be argued that a poststructuralist text looking at constructions of a ‘we’ should also look at the constructions of ‘they’ or the ‘Other’ as part of the constitution of the ‘we’. However, the article does not deal directly with this aspect, because the focus is different: the interest is in constructions of equivalence at the level of actorness, not difference. It is a focus on the ‘we’ without investigation of the substance of the ‘we’. The interest is in the association of the speaking ‘we’ with the EU or others, rather than who this ‘we’ is constructed against or the substantial content of this ‘we’ (for an analysis of a the content of the ‘we’ see Larsen, 2005) . To the extent that there is a relevant ‘Other’ in the analysis presented here, it is the actors or fora that the policy of the (co-) articulated ‘we’ is directed at – the actors and fora that the ‘we’ is not articulated with.
The focus on whether and how the national articulations of actorness are articulated with the EU also means that the analysis does not look at the historical or institutional genealogy of national or EU articulations of actorness in particular areas (see Larsen, 2005 for an empirical analysis of these aspects).
Agency in Danish foreign policy vis-à-vis the EU
In this section we will look at how Denmark articulated its relationship with the EU before and after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The general purpose is to illustrate the relevance and fruitfulness of the theoretical considerations outlined above. The aim is to identify the extent to which the articulation of the national ‘we’ is interwoven with the EU in the case of a particular member state. One may argue that Denmark contains some unique features that make it uninteresting as an example or a case for the EU as a whole. For example, Denmark has opt-outs in four areas (defence, the euro, justice and home affairs and citizenship). However, it has been shown that Denmark is, in fact, a full participant in nearly all areas of EU foreign policy. There are no signs of a special approach to EU foreign policy as a whole, in spite of the opt-outs (Larsen, 2000, 2005, 2011). Moreover, in the present EU, composed of 27 members with very different histories, cultures and sizes and varying opt-outs and restrictions on participation, it is difficult to establish what a typical member state is. While it would certainly be interesting to look at more, or ideally all, member states, there is no reason why Denmark is not an interesting case for the pre/post-Lisbon analysis.
The analysis is divided into two parts. The first deals with the situation between the end of the Cold War and the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. This part presents the general findings in Larsen (2005) and Larsen (2011), giving illustrative examples. Larsen (2005) analyses in depth (amongst other things) the Danish articulations of actorness in seven policy areas after the Cold War: bilateral member state policy, 3 development, anti-terrorism, Africa, the Balkans, Latin America and trade. The rationale for the choice of these areas is that they cover the breadth of the issues involved in Danish and EU foreign policy, including both the geographical and the functional policy dimensions. Areas both inside and outside Europe (two different regions) have been chosen. Trade, security and development are different and important functional areas in both Danish and EU foreign policy (see Larsen, 2005: 9–10 for an in-depth explanation of the choice of policy areas). The book also sketched out some preliminary findings in other areas of Danish foreign policy (Larsen, 2005: ch. 10). This provided a full picture of the articulations of agency in the areas of Danish foreign policy with special reference to the role of the EU. Larsen (2011) updates the findings to 2009 where this is relevant.
The source material drawn on in Larsen (2005) and Larsen (2009) is, to a large extent, official Danish material about the policy area in question. An important source is the annual article ‘The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 20xx’ by the Permanent Secretary on Danish Foreign Policy in the Danish Yearbook of Foreign Policy. The article is a tour de horizon of Danish foreign policy and its priorities. The source material also includes other official material from the Danish Foreign Ministry regarding Danish foreign policy areas and, to a lesser extent, parliamentary debates (where this material is quoted directly, it is referred to in the reference list).
The analysis here looks at the discourses which are dominant within the formal political/administrative system as found in this material. This is for the practical reason that the formal political/administrative context is one in which we can find a focused treatment of/debate about a foreign policy area. This is not always easy in other spheres of society, and therefore becomes more difficult to research (Larsen, 2005: 59; see also Larsen, 1997: 26–27). The extensive use of source material from the Danish Foreign Ministry means that the analysis draws heavily on an institutional context which can be strongly expected to articulate Danish agency. While this heavy reliance can be seen as a weakness, it also has advantages: if we find co-articulations with other countries or organisations here, it will be analytically interesting and noteworthy.
The first part presents results of analyses of instances where the subject matter is Danish foreign policy, and where expressions of Danish actorness or ‘we’ in some form would therefore be expected due to the institutional context (material from the Danish government including the Foreign Ministry or the Danish Parliament, the Folketing).
The second part deals with the situation after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The main sources of the analysis are the annual accounts of Danish foreign policy in 2010 and 2011 in the Danish Yearbook of Foreign Policy (2011, 2012). The method is the same as that used in the studies on which the findings before Lisbon are based, except that the corpus drawn on is much narrower due to the short period examined. In this section, the analysis of the material is presented. The analytical strategy is to focus on whether and how agency is co-articulated with the EU in the areas outlined above.
Danish articulations of agency before Lisbon
During the Cold War the dominant Danish foreign policy discourse presented the EU as one of four cornerstones in Danish foreign policy, the other three being the UN, NATO and Nordic cooperation. After the Cold War, the markers of Danish foreign policy were articulated differently in the dominant discourse. The other cornerstones were, to a large extent, presented as being dealt with through the EU, which therefore acquired a pivotal role (Larsen, 2000).
At least five articulations of Danish and/or EU agency in a given area are found (as outlined in general terms above). The first three are a) ‘the state’ (Denmark), b) only ‘the EU’, c) ‘Denmark and the EU’ . ‘Denmark and the EU’ also includes constructions of the relationship between ‘the state’ and ‘the EU’ in which the two agents are not directly co-located, but co-articulation is nevertheless identifiable from an analysis of texts, for example in the form of ‘Denmark in cooperation with its EU partners’. This category also encompasses instances where it is difficult to distinguish between the two agents in articulations in a particular policy field as the identity of the actor is not clear from the text (for example through an amorphous ‘we’). It also comprises cases of polysemy where usages of ‘the state’ and ‘EU’ slide into each other.
In the fourth and fifth articulations, d) the ‘EU’ is presented as an important instrument for ‘Denmark’. This need not involve the use of the term ‘important’, but can take forms such as ‘Denmark has, through the EU’ or broader articulations of the EU as essential for ‘Denmark’s’ foreign policy in a given field; and e) the EU is presented through Denmark, for example in the form ‘on behalf of the EU, Denmark has…’.
The analysis shows a mixed picture, with different articulations of the Danish ‘we’ with the EU. At the most general level, the EU is articulated as a prerequisite or point of departure for Denmark’s ability to influence the surrounding world. This draws on a discourse according to which the EU is constructed as an indispensable and pivotal framework for Danish foreign policy, including Danish participation in the CFSP (Larsen, 2000). A Changing World: the Government’s Vision for New Priorities in Denmark’s Foreign Policy, from 2003, reads:
‘The EU is the key to Denmark’s ability to influence the world around us…’ (Regeringen, 2003: 4)… ‘the foreign policy situation more than ever calls for a EU that stands united and assumes global responsibility…’ (Regeringen, 2003: 12–13).
Here the EU is articulated as an instrument for Denmark’s aims in the world. This is the background for why Denmark must strengthen the EU as an international actor. Because the citation above is a general statement about Denmark’s foreign policy, this may lead the analyst to believe that this same articulation of the EU with Danish agency could be found across policy areas. However, the concepts or issues at stake in each field of policy do not per definition link up with more general statements of policy articulating one general policy line. The following presentation of the Danish case before the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates that the articulations of Danish actorness vary across policy areas.
Geographical areas 4
Co-articulations with EU foreign policy in Danish foreign policy are very significant with respect to Latin America, Oceania and Asia. Articulations in the form of ‘Denmark’ can often, if not only, be found in relation to bilateral trade promotion (see for example Udenrigsministeriet, 2007: 2, 11). However, the EU is clearly presented as the most important policy instrument and the central multilateral forum, particularly vis-à-vis Asia. Articulations of agency often take the form of ‘Denmark through the EU’, ‘Denmark and the EU’ or just ‘the EU’. The EU is, to a large extent, the focus for more general policy concerns (as opposed to trade promotion):
Denmark does not stand alone in Asia. In a number of areas we act through the EU, for example in connection with wide-ranging foreign policy issues or in the area of trade agreements…Where the EU takes care of Denmark’s interests, the task is to ensure that Danish interests and views are presented to the best effect in the EU policy conducted (Udenrigsministeriet, 2007: 11).
The EU is also attributed a central role in relation to the general political and security aims in the region, and thus also to the fulfilment of these goals in relation to China and other major states of the region:
The EU’s presence in Asia must be more marked. In recent years steps have been taken to strengthen the EU’s dialogues on the security situation… with a number of key players [such as] China, Japan… Denmark will work towards… further strengthening of the bilateral and EU based dialogues with important Asian players, in particular China, Japan… (Udenrigsministeriet, 2007: 14).
The EU is thus presented as the other main channel of policy towards China, besides bilateral action. It is the most important multilateral framework for Denmark’s policy towards China.
The frequent association of the EU with Danish agency in these areas suggests that Danish identity is constructed in conjunction with an EU identity in these areas, even if there are also areas in these regions in which ‘Denmark’ is presented as an actor without reference to the EU and Danish agency is presented as pre-existing.
Articulations of actorness with the European Neighbourhood, Russia and, in particular, North Africa are predominantly articulations through the EU. The Danish ‘we’ with regard to Russia involves the EU in most general policy contexts. This is also the case with regard to the Balkans. The exception is the UN/NATO military deployments in the area. Here Copenhagen articulates actorness as ‘Denmark’.
With regard to Danish policy towards the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Danish ‘we’ also involves the EU in most general policy contexts, although there are also articulations of ‘Denmark’, particularly in relation to aid given to the Palestinian Self-Ruling Authority or the Arab Initiative. Danish agency is, however, often co-articulated with the EU in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU’ or ‘Denmark has through the EU…’. Even so, Denmark does construct itself as an actor in this field (without the EU).
As far as the relationship with the US is concerned, significant elements of policy are conducted with the EU. In the 2003 Priorities in Danish Foreign Policy, Danish policy towards the US on non-security issues is presented as increasingly going through the EU, so that the Danish ‘we’ with regard to the US is also an EU ‘we’.
Outside the northern hemisphere, Denmark articulates strong agency as ‘Denmark’ in the field of development. On development issues, the UN and its special agencies are also articulated with ‘Denmark’ in a way that the EU is not (Regeringen, 2007b). A Danish ‘we’ is also articulated in relation to Africa. However, in the Danish Foreign Ministry’s strategy for Africa from 2004, Denmark is presented as an actor as well – ‘with’ or ‘through’ the EU in relation to general trade issues and cooperation with the African continent as a whole – where there is no bilateral equivalent. The more general and political the issue, the more articulations with the EU.
Functional areas
The impact of the EU on Danish foreign policy is strongest in trade, agriculture and external fishing, where there is no policy outside the EU due to the legal establishment of the Community as the international negotiator in these fields. Co-articulations with the EU in official texts are common in official texts. These take the form of ‘the EU’, ‘Denmark and the EU’ or ‘Denmark through the EU’. For example, in a publication from the Danish Foreign Ministry in 2004, it is stated that ‘[t]ogether with other countries, the EU and Denmark would like to see WTO agreement on these … subjects…’ (quoted in Larsen, 2005: 188).
However, even if articulations of ‘Denmark and the EU’ or ‘Denmark through the EU’ are very common, articulations of just ‘Denmark’ as the only acting subject are also found. For instance, in an information booklet from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the WTO and trade policy, the main focus is on describing the WTO system and Danish views and initiatives in relation to the WTO (Larsen, 2005: 189).The full legal competence of the EU in this field has not, in other words, brought about a merger or a persistent co-articulation of actorness. This can be understood on the basis of the strong Danish agency in this area, historically linked to heavy involvement in international trade (Larsen, 2005: ch. 9).
In relation to the non-military aspects of security, Danish agency is often articulated with the EU. This is in contrast to the military aspects of security, as in Kosovo or Afghanistan, where articulations of Danish actorness often take the form of ‘Denmark’ or ‘Denmark and NATO’ (Larsen, 2005: chs 4 and 10). In relation to military security, there are no co-articulations of agency with the EU. To the extent that there are articulations other than ‘Denmark’, they are with ‘the US’ or ‘NATO’.
All in all, the general picture of Danish articulations of actorness in relation to the EU is mixed. The general articulation which presents the EU as the key to Denmark’s influence cannot be found uniformly across policy areas. There are areas where ‘the EU’ is rarely articulated as an actor with ‘Denmark’ in any form. This is particularly the case in the areas of development and military security. But in the majority of areas the EU is the most important organisational framework with which ‘Denmark’ is articulated, mostly in the form of ‘Denmark through the EU’, and in some of these areas ‘Denmark’ is not the main actor articulated in concrete instances of policy, but rather ‘the EU and Denmark’ or just ‘the EU’. Such articulations of actorness are found in the cases of the Balkans and Latin America and, to a lesser and varying extent, in the other policy areas analysed in Larsen (2005).
However, in most areas (apart from development and military aspects of security), the co-articulation with the EU takes the form of ‘Denmark via the EU’. Denmark is thus the privileged part of the subject articulated. As this is the most common articulation beside ‘Denmark’ in these cases, it is analytically very interesting. The prominent place of the EU in the articulations of actorness positions the EU as essential to Danish foreign policy.
It should be stressed that membership of the EU has not done away with national articulations of ‘Denmark’ altogether. A total co-articulation or merger of agency in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU’ or just ‘the EU’ is found in any of the foreign policy areas analysed. Even so, the mixed articulations of the ‘we’ show that actorness is not stable and therefore point to how participation in EU foreign policy may have profound effects on the ‘we’ in Danish ‘foreign’ policy. If the ‘we’ articulated is frequently something other than ‘Denmark’ in a particular area, this challenges the general assumptions in FPA, which tends to assume a state actor with a stable ‘we’ identity.
Danish agency and the EU after the Lisbon Treaty
In what follows, the paper will look at whether Danish articulations of actorness changed in parallel with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in October 2009. The main aim is to examine whether changes with regard to the Danish articulation of the Danish ‘we’ can be identified in line with the strengthening of the EU-level foreign policy institutions. As mentioned, the main sources of the analysis will be the annual accounts of Danish foreign policy in 2010 and 2011 by the director of the Danish Foreign Ministry, published in the Danish Yearbook of Foreign Policy (2011, 2012). 5
The EU is still articulated as the point of departure for Danish foreign policy after the Lisbon Treaty:
As a small state, Denmark primarily promotes its interests through international organizations such as NATO, the UN and the WTO. Yet it is first and foremost the EU that provides Denmark with a gateway to influence on the global scene (Grube, 2011: 22).
It is ‘Denmark’ as an actor which promotes its interests through the EU ‘gateway to influence’ (‘Denmark through the EU’). The Lisbon Treaty is central in furthering Danish interests and the importance of the Lisbon Treaty is attributed weight. The Treaty can and will enhance the abilities of the EU:
For the EU member states it has become increasingly clear that they need to stand together in the face of global transformations. In this respect the year 2010 was a momentous one for the EU … The Lisbon treaty will help the EU punch above its weight in the world… [through elements such as the] High Representative… European External Action Service’ (Grube, 2011: 22–23, see also Grube, 2011: 24).
This gives Denmark ‘all the more reason for supporting the High Representative’ (Grube, 2011: 23), which indicates the importance of the new foreign policy structures for Denmark:
… yet there is still some way to go before the EEAS is fully functioning. This gives Denmark all the more reason to support the High Representative in her difficult task. We need to overcome national idiosyncrasies and improve our coordination on the ground. This also involves close cooperation between the tried, tested diplomatic services of the member states’ (Grube, 2011: 23. See also Grube, 2012: 27–29).
The Danish Foreign Ministry still presents its aim as the defence of Danish interests after Lisbon, through both bilateral and multilateral measures. The general aims of ‘Denmark’ remain the same:
… ensuring that Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains effective and performs at its best to promote and safeguard Danish interests. … Focus will be on ensuring that Danish interests are promoted through traditional channels, such as the most important multilateral organizations, and not least the EU, with the new possibilities provided by the Lisbon Treaty. Of course, there is still a need for strong bilateral diplomacy, which, apart from merits, is also a prerequisite for effective multilateral diplomacy… budget cuts … general trend towards maintaining a certain breadth in promoting Danish foreign policy interests while at the same time steering that policy towards greater depth and focus in promoting and safeguarding Danish interests’ (Grube, 2011: 47).
However, while the state’s aim is still the defence of Danish interests, a dilemma arising between the bilateral and multilateral dimensions is hinted at. Budget cuts bring up suggestions for a greater focus on the safeguarding of Danish interests and, in this context, this implies an allusion to the potential role of the EU in taking over some of the broader tasks of national foreign policy. Although the interest-promoting ‘we’ is still ‘Denmark’ as the point of departure, it is a ‘we’ whose instrumental concerns slide towards the EU as a forum in the formulations above (‘… maintaining a certain breadth in promoting Danish foreign policy interests while at the same time steering that policy towards greater depth and focus in promoting and safeguarding Danish interests’).
Turning to the question about how Danish foreign policy is articulated with the EU across policy areas after Lisbon, the mixed pattern of articulations can also be found after Lisbon. With regard to geographical areas, co-articulations of agency with the EU are very common with regard to areas around Europe. In a section on the EU’s neighbours in the 2010 Danish Foreign Ministry’s annual account (Grube, 2011: 37–38), the first two paragraphs are only about the actions of the EU. In the third paragraph, the only reference to Denmark occurs: ‘In the EU, Denmark has emphasised the need to develop the attractiveness of the Eastern Partnership for our partners…’. This paragraph then continues with a description of the EU’s policies. The section continues with a paragraph on the Baltic Sea Region, which starts with a description of the EU’s strategy: it is stated that ‘… Denmark has assumed considerable responsibility for implementing the strategy’ (Grube, 2011: 38). The structure is the same in the 2011 article (Grube, 2012: 30–31).
The section on Russia in Grube (2011) draws on three kinds of articulations. It starts out with an articulation of Danish agency – ‘mutual efforts by the Russian and Danish governments to expand bilateral relations’ – then turns to an articulation of the EU and its member states in relation to a declaration signed with Russia. It finishes with a co-articulation of Denmark and the EU: ‘Russia is set to become an even more important economy for Denmark and the EU countries’ (Grube, 2010: 38–39). The 2011 article only articulates Danish agency. The focus is the economic/trade-related dimension and not foreign and security policy (Grube, 2012: 26).
The section on the Middle East (Grube, 2010: 32–33) starts with two paragraphs in which only the EU is articulated as an actor. Danish agency is only mentioned in relation to the Danish forces in Southern Lebanon, and then only in one line. There is one paragraph articulating Danish agency in relation to the Danish–Arab Partnership without any co-articulation with the EU (in the 2011 article, the EU is not mentioned in this context; see Grube, 2012: 35–36). A final paragraph on Iran in the 2010 article only articulates EU (and UN) agency.
There are other areas where we first encounter an articulation of Danish agency, and then articulations where the only actorness expressed is ‘the EU’. In the section China and India Still on the Rise, ‘Denmark’ is the only articulation of actorness in the first three paragraphs, which mainly deal with trade promotion and technical cooperation: ‘… Danish policy in 2010 was a reflection of this, with a … stronger … focus on … the largest emerging economies, China and India’ (Grube, 2010: 40). In the final paragraph, which mainly deals with general strategic issues, ‘Denmark’ disappears as an actor and the actorness articulated is the EU’s: ‘… the rise of China, India and other emerging global players has prompted calls for a more unified European approach to its strategic partners’ (Grube, 2011: 39–41). However, in the 2011 account there is no mention of the EU. Here it is the economic/trade elements that are highlighted and not foreign and security issues, where co-articulations with the EU are frequently found (Grube, 2012: 42–43).
With regard to the transatlantic relationship, Danish actorness is articulated first:
The US continues to be a natural and very close ally with which Denmark shares both values and economic interests. Therefore, Denmark cooperates closely with the USA on a very broad range of political and economic issues…
It can even be argued that there is an articulation of actorness with the USA. Later in the section on the US, the EU takes the stage as an actor. The section finishes with ‘Denmark’ and ‘Denmark… through the EU’:
‘… Denmark will work to ensure the strengthening of increased and results-oriented cooperation with the US, both bilaterally and through the EU’ (Grube, 2011: 39).
In discussion of the Nordic area and the Arctic Council, there are only articulations of Danish actorness or ‘The Nordic Countries’ (Grube, 2011: 44–45, 2012: 22–23).
As for functional areas, there are areas where EU articulations of agency are dominant. In a section on global free trade, it is stated that ‘… it became even more evident that Denmark has a vital interest in global free trade… It is essential that the fight against protectionism through the EU and the G20 continues’. The remaining part of the section is about the EU (and the G20), with no mention of ‘Denmark’ (Grube, 2011: 20). There are also sections where the articulations of actorness start out with ‘Denmark’, followed by articulations of ‘EU’, ‘Denmark and the EU’ or ‘Denmark through the EU’ (see also Grube, 2012: 20–24).
A section on a new Danish policy on fragile states in the 2010 account starts out by describing efforts to integrate dimensions in Danish policy. This is followed by:
… hence we often need to combine our instruments in an integrated approach that respects humanitarian principles. This applies both to bilateral Danish efforts and to efforts challenged through the EU and multilateral frameworks such the UN and NATO… [Danish payments stated in Euros]… Strengthening Danish involvement in stabilization efforts in fragile states, either through bilateral engagements or contributions through the EU and multilateral frameworks such as the UN (Grube, 2011: 31; see also Grube, 2012: 44–46, where the co-articulation with the EU is weaker).
A section on Democracy and Human Rights starts out with an articulation of Danish actorness: ‘Respect for … human rights … constitute[s] a key element of the Danish government’s basic values’. In a second section Denmark is articulated as an actor within the EU (with Germany) in relation to developing a human rights strategy within the EU. The third section goes further into Danish priorities, whereas the rest deals with the UN, USA and EU stances in this field (Grube, 2011: 45–46; see also Grube, 2012: 47, which ends with a section on ‘the EU level’).
A section on international terrorism contains articulations of Danish actorness, but it also contains articulations such as ‘the EU and Denmark’ – ‘Immediate threats to Europe and Denmark from some of the regional affiliates of Al-Qaeda’ (Grube, 2011: 36) – and Denmark through the EU:
‘… Denmark has worked to prevent … through a combination of bilateral projects and international cooperation, building not least on the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy and EU cooperation. In 2010, Denmark played a very active role in developing the EU counter-terrorism activities under the EU Instrument for Stability’ (Grube, 2011: 36).
Finally, there are functional areas in which substantial articulations of EU actorness do not occur. This is the case in the section on security (including Afghanistan and Pakistan). Denmark is mostly articulated as a subject, often together with NATO. In the 2010 account the EU is only mentioned substantially once on the 6 pages, where Denmark and the EU are co-articulated in the form of ‘Denmark through the EU’ in Pakistan (Grube, 2011: 24–30; see also Grube, 2012: 36–41). This is also the case in relation to two to three-page sections on a new strategy for Denmark’s development cooperation and Danish development policy in general, in which only ‘Denmark’ is articulated as an actor (Grube, 2011: 23–24, 41–44).
It should be added that many articulations in the Permanent Secretary on Danish Foreign Policy’s 2011 article on ‘The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy’ have a different emphasis from the previous articles by the Permanent Secretary analysed in this paper. There is generally more Danish agency articulated, without co-articulations. Denmark is, to a larger extent, presented as a promoter of European interests, in terms of ‘the EU through Denmark’. An important background to this was the forthcoming Danish EU Presidency in spring 2012:
6
One overall ambition of the Presidency … is to create concrete results that demonstrate the value and necessity of European Cooperation. The first priority is achieving an economically responsible Europe…’ (Grube, 2012: 29).
and
An important initiative was taken with the launching of a positive dialogue between the EU and Turkey, which will be explored during the Danish Presidency. Finally, on Iceland, enlargement negotiations gained decisive momentum in 2011, leaving the Danish Presidency with a firm base to build on (Grube, 2012: 30).
All in all, the EU is by far the most common multilateral organisation with which Danish agency is articulated. In most areas there is an expression of EU agency in a Danish foreign policy context, but the character of the articulation varies across areas, and in some areas there is hardly any articulation of EU actorness.
The main features are very similar to the pre-Lisbon period, although there are some indications of a stronger articulation of the general role of the EU. Articulations are also affected by the Danish EU Presidency that commenced in spring 2012. The EU is, to a slightly higher extent, articulated as an instrument for Denmark, and there is a slight increase in articulations of ‘Denmark and the EU’ when the subject is general Danish foreign policy. Apart from the very short distance in time from the pre-Lisbon period, this may also show that articulations of (national) agency do not necessarily change across the board with treaty changes. Articulations vary across EU policy areas in a manner which does not relate, in a simple way, to treaty changes. The role of the EU across national foreign policy areas may have as much to do with national articulations of foreign policy identity in particular areas as it does with the role of the EU driven by treaty changes. At the same time, it looks as if treaty changes may go together with changes in articulations of general Danish agency, possibly because treaty changes and general articulations are expressed at the same level of generality.
Concluding remarks
The article has presented a theoretically based way of conceptualising and analysing the ‘we’ in national foreign policy through studying the articulations of actorness – the ways in which the national ‘we’ was (or was not) co-articulated with the EU.
The analysis of Denmark showed that the articulation of national actorness in relation to the EU varied across the different areas of foreign policy. The analysis of articulation of Danish foreign policy agency after Lisbon suggested that the pattern identified after Lisbon could still be seen as varied: to the extent that there were any changes, general articulations of the relationship between ‘Denmark’ and the EU tended to further stress the important instrumental value of the EU for Denmark. The EU was still the most common multilateral actor with which Danish foreign policy actorness was co-articulated and, in many of those areas, ‘the EU’ was the ‘we’ that was presented in the annual accounts from the Danish Foreign Ministry. ‘Denmark’ remained the actor articulated in areas such as military security and many parts of development policy, sometimes co-articulated with ‘the UN’ or ‘NATO’. It would, of course, be interesting to follow the developments in the Danish articulations of actorness over a longer period of time. This is not just central from the point of view of whether the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as a watershed in Danish foreign policy in a longer time perspective. In a broader sense, studies of articulations of actorness in member state foreign policy may contribute to mapping out where EU foreign policy is ‘inside’ member state foreign policy, ‘outside’ member state foreign policy, or both. From the perspective of Danish foreign policy, this could be linked to discussion of activism in Danish foreign policy (Pedersen, 2012).
The analysis presented showed that the articulation of ‘national’ identity within the foreign policy system of the EU is not uniform. Rather, we find a varied configuration of national discursive constructions of actorness with the EU in different foreign policy areas along the lines of the five articulations of national actorness outlined above. This configuration does not seem to be altered by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, even if the EU seems to be attributed a slightly more important role in general Danish articulations of actorness.
The general picture identified has implications for the analysis of ‘national’ foreign policy in foreign policy analysis (FPA). If the national constructions of actorness are frequently articulations with the EU, this means that the traditional focus on the state as the container of identity is challenged fundamentally in the case of the EU member states.
Against this background, studies of national articulations of actorness with the EU in different policy areas can therefore provide an interesting picture of how member states construct their foreign policy identity with the EU. We may well find that some states’ identities are more interwoven with the EU in particular policy areas than others. The resulting mosaic can be said to be the state-level complement to the general argument above about post-Westphalian structures in Europe. Analysis of the states’ construction of foreign policy identity with the EU is a central part of analysing ‘national foreign’ policy in the EU. In terms of ways of analysing EU member states’ formation of national foreign policy, it makes a difference whether the analyst is dealing with a policy area that is understood by national foreign policy makers as conducted without the EU, with the EU, or both. This arguably gives rise to three analytical lenses for understanding the making of national foreign policy in the EU: traditional, transformational or postmodern. In the first case, the analyst would focus on the internal and external environment of the member state. In the second, the focus would be on the internal environment and EU decision making procedures. In the last case, the analysis would deal with the external and the internal environment and EU decision-making procedures. In the Danish case, co-articulations with the EU were the most common across policy areas, which suggests that the postmodern approach would be the most fruitful for analysing many areas of Danish foreign policy. This suggests that the postmodern lens would also be relevant for analysing other member states’ foreign policy in many areas, if not most (Larsen, 2009).
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.