Identifying parameters of foreign policy change: An eclectic approach

Abstract

This paper examines foreign policy change, identifying structural parameters of domestic and international origins that bring about major foreign policy shifts. Domestic structural parameters comprise the politico-institutional setting and advocacy groups in support of alternative foreign policy options. International structural parameters refer on the one hand to systemic changes that may bring about foreign policy realignment and, on the other hand, to the country’s role in the international system and its interactions with other countries that may activate foreign policy changes. We posit that this eclectic approach is necessary to account for major, multi-dimensional and complex, foreign policy decisions. We use this analytical framework to examine the Israeli re-orientation that enabled the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement in the early 1990s.

Keywords

Foreign policy Israel Oslo Accords parameters of change

Introduction

How do we account for foreign policy change? Which political environments are more conducive to it and which parameters increase its likelihood? Foreign policy studies have long tended to focus on continuity and stability with only sporadic attempts to account for change. However, systemic changes in international politics and paradigm shifts in the discipline have reversed this trend, with recent contributions addressing explicitly the issue of foreign policy change (Alden and Aran, 2012; Carlsnaes, 1993; Gustavsson, 1999; Hermann, 1990; Rynhold, 2007; Skidmore, 1994; Walsh, 2006; Welch, 2005).

Although these contributions offer useful insights on the dynamics of foreign policy change, they provide a kaleidoscope rather than a coherent set of parameters. They look at different levels of analysis and some of them embrace multi-causality. Gustavsson (1999: 77–80) clusters the existing works into three groups: firstly, inductive ‘checklist’ contributions that identify independent and intervening factors of change with a potential generalization value; secondly, studies that emphasize the existing cognitive, structural and policymaking constraints that impede change and need to be overcome; and thirdly, cyclical models that advocate the study of longer time periods in order to identify recurrent behavioural patterns that lead to foreign policy change.

Following Hermann’s typology (1990: 5–6), this article focuses on problem/goal and international orientation changes that refer to fundamental changes in the conceptualization of a foreign policy problem/goal or to the strategic repositioning of a country in the international system. We offer an eclectic, analytical typology of domestic and international structural parameters that lead to such changes. We cluster the identified parameters of foreign policy change according to their domestic or international origins (Kaarbo et al., 2012: 7–19).

We focus on changes at foreign policy outputs that may occur in three circumstances: firstly, new alternative inputs from various domestic and/or international sources may enter in and alter the foreign policymaking process and its outputs. Secondly, pre-existing alternative inputs may find their way to the policymaking nexus as a result of changes in the domestic political, institutional and bureaucratic structures. Thirdly, discourse changes may alter foreign policy outputs without necessarily requiring new inputs or new structures, but rather capitalizing on cognitive and ideational shifts within the existing members of the core policymaking group.¹ We examine all these changes – new inputs, new structures, new discourses – to account for change in foreign policy outputs.

In this analysis, we look exclusively at structural parameters and not parameters of a conjunctural nature. Unexpected developments may always occur, upsetting the existing status quo and triggering foreign policy changes. Domestically, they may take the form, for example, of a leadership change due to death or sudden resignation, with the new incumbent aspiring to an alternative course of foreign policy action. Micro-level, behavioural analyses of international politics have located the individual decision maker at the heart of the policymaking system and filter the explanatory significance of structural – domestic or international – features through this prism (Breuning, 2007; Hermann et al., 2001). Obviously, in such a context, random events that bring about leadership change may alter fundamentally the terms of the domestic foreign policy debate. In the same vein, a humanitarian and environmental disaster, such as an earthquake or a nuclear accident, may generate positive public sentiments, relax the public opinion constraint, and create a more conducive environment for foreign policy realignment towards an adversary. However, although such events may have far-reaching implications, they cannot be theorized and, thus, we do not discuss them thoroughly here.

We illustrate the appropriateness of the analytical typology by reference to the Israeli re-orientation that enabled the Oslo Peace Agreement in the early 1990s. This is a primary example of major foreign policy realignment and constitutes the outcome of complex and multi-dimensional processes. The case study illustrates best our main argument that foreign policy change has various origins and therefore an eclectic analytical approach is needed.

In the following section, we discuss, firstly, the osmosis between different theoretical approaches in pursuit of multi-causality in foreign policy analysis (FPA). Then we elaborate on our analytical framework and position our typology in this debate. Following that, we turn to the case study in question and conclude by revisiting the typology of parameters and discussing their interplay.

Theoretical synthesis and analytical eclecticism in foreign policy analysis

There is a general acquiescence in FPA nowadays that different levels of analysis should be studied in parallel, combining individual factors, inputs in the decision-making process and institutional features of the decision-making process itself, as well as cultural and societal, domestic and international, factors (Garrison, 2003: 155; Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 3–4). In the real world, action in the foreign policy domain is a combination of purposive behaviour, cognitive-psychological factors and the various structural features that characterize and affect states’ interaction. Hence, the analysis of any such foreign policy action can neither exclude nor privilege any of these types of explanans (Carlsnaes, 2002: 342), but assess the relevance and explanatory value of each parameter on a case-by-case basis.

Synthetic approaches have been used in the past to account, for example, for the Soviet foreign policy re-direction in the Gorbachev era, integrating not only domestic and international levels of analysis (Checkel, 1993) but also structure and agency, in an attempt to bridge the gap between realist and constructivist perspectives in International Relations (IR) (Snyder, 2005). These works build on early pioneering work that sought to capture and analyse international politics, overcoming archetypical theoretical rigidities. Snyder first identified the point of theoretical intersection between material and ideational factors, focusing not on the state but rather on the human decision maker and prioritizing the study of the decision-making process rather than the foreign policy output per se (Hudson, 2002). This focus was taken further with subsequent research on ‘linkage politics’ (Rosenau, 1969) and ‘two level games’ (Putnam, 1988).

Following these early endeavours, theoretical integration has gone a long way towards building a comprehensive framework of FPA (Gustavsson, 1998; Smith et al., 2008). In particular, two research strands are currently preoccupied explicitly with bringing together different levels and units of analysis. Firstly, role theory is premised on understanding the interaction between agents and structures, either from a social psychology perspective appropriate for FPA scholars or a sociology-based, constructivist perspective for IR scholars (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; Kaarbo, 2003; Thies and Breuning, 2012). Role theory envisions national role conceptions as intervening variables that filter the impact of traditional domestic and international factors such as the domestic political, institutional and socio-economic system and the deriving state capabilities, the international balance of power, and the idiosyncratic features of the policymaking elite or leader (Grossman, 2005: 337). Secondly, poliheuristic theory makes cognitive and rational perspectives of foreign policy decision-making compatible by introducing a two-stage process. In the first stage, the menu of available options is narrowed down by the use of some cognitive shortcuts that render some options socially and politically unacceptable (such as – on some occasions – military engagement or the use of force) and eliminate them. In the second stage, rational choice theory applies in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits (Mintz, 2004).

Synthesis reflects the need to integrate previously distinct bodies of knowledge in a single analytical strategy. Less ambitiously, multiperspectivism and eclecticism represent a research trend to elucidate and juxtapose insights from analytical frameworks based on different theoretical – and even ontological – assumptions, without necessarily seeking integration (Stern, 2003: 185). Along these lines, we provide an eclectic analytical typology of parameters stemming from both rational choice and cultural approaches to foreign policymaking. Looking at parameters enables us to integrate in our framework earlier work both on sources and agents-processes of foreign policy change, albeit in a different format and classification (see, in particular, Hermann, 1990 and, more recently, Kaarbo et al., 2012: 7–19).

Parameters of foreign policy change: an analytical typology

As mentioned above, we cluster the change-inducing parameters in two groups, according to their domestic or international origins.

Domestic structural parameters

Domestic structural parameters refer to the domestic political and institutional setting as well as advocacy groups of an alternative foreign policy course. The former cluster focuses mainly on structural features of the foreign policymaking process. The latter comprises mostly the collective or individual sources of alternative foreign policy input that struggle to gain access and exert influence over state institutions and the outcomes of the foreign policymaking process.

The policymaking process constitutes a distinct level of FPA, which captures the ‘aggregation function’ of the multiple societal inputs, ceteris paribus systemic constraints (Alden and Aran, 2012: 50–53; Hagan, 2001: 5–6). The aggregation function assumes an authoritative decision unit, namely an individual or a set of individuals with the ability and authority to make a decision and commit the resources of a society on a foreign policy issue (a powerful leader, a single group or a multitude of autonomous actors, such as coalition governments and actors with veto power over foreign policy decisions) (Hermann, 2001: 47–48, 57–64).

The form and properties of each unit, as well as its capacity to induce foreign policy change vary according to the existing political and institutional structures (number of formal and/or informal veto points, political opposition, scope of societal involvement, electoral system, policymaking style of the leader, etc.) (Doeser, 2011; Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 521–522; Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 19–21). Ceteris paribus, we should expect less frequent changes in highly bureaucratic states with democratic regimes than in autocratic regimes with a minimal policymaking role for the bureaucracy and little or no regime accountability (Welch, 2005: 45). In general, autonomy and insulation of the unit from political dependencies (i.e. Army, veto power actors, electoral concerns, coalition partners, etc.) create a policymaking environment more conducive to change. In a democratic regime, foreign policy change is more likely to occur in cases of strong, single-party governments with a Prime Minister dominating decision-making in the Cabinet, few or no veto points (by a President, Constitutional Court or other), and small societal involvement or interest.

The second cluster of domestic structural parameters consists of advocacy groups in support of an alternative foreign policy course of action (Richardson, 2000; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). We identify at least three categories of such groups: firstly, adherents to an alternative political culture and foreign policy options; secondly, socio-economic groups with divergent views and interests and the public opinion; and thirdly, policy entrepreneurs who constitute potential authoritative decision units and may engineer such change. These groups seek access and influence over the political decision-making nexus (i.e. the authoritative decision unit) in democratic regimes through party-, electoral- and coalition-politics. Less frequently, alternative politics may occur as a result of individual initiatives by dissatisfied citizens and a proactive course of action independent of – and occasionally contra – governmental authorities. Such action threatens governmental monopoly in foreign policy, often compelling the authoritative decision unit to consider policy alternatives (Ben-Porat and Mizrahi, 2005: 177). The three groups may have overlapping membership, such as for example a policy entrepreneur embracing an alternative political culture. The general proposition is that the stronger these groups emerge in the domestic political arena in terms of membership, voice and potential influence over policy outcomes (or the more easily their objections are accommodated), the more probable foreign policy change becomes.

Political culture and, in particular, the subset of attitudes related to security issues denotes the overall orientation towards and assumptions about the system of IR within a particular country (Duffield, 1994: 179). It entails a specific conceptualization of foreign and security policy, a deriving prioritization of objectives, and a predisposition of societal and political elites towards certain actions and policy instruments. Given the deep-rooted effects of culture in social activities, political culture has been long associated with continuity rather than change in foreign policy (Duffield, 1999: 770–772). However, there is a constant current of empirical and theoretical studies, illustrating how social actors with alternative collective identities and aspiring to alternative norms can initiate major foreign policy changes (Adler, 1997; Barnett, 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Rynhold, 2007; etc.).

Socio-economic groups with alternative preferences may also advocate foreign policy change. Along a liberal account of IR, most international agreements with economic and political implications have a distributive aspect, which triggers private and aggregate welfare shifts in domestic constituencies. According to conditions of domestic political enfranchisement and relative political power, the alternative preferences of individual groups may become predominant ones and induce foreign policy change (Evans, 1993: 414). Both in the structuralist and the pluralist approaches to IR and FPA, ‘capturing’ the state and following a specific foreign policy path is crucial for domestic socio-economic actors to preserve and enhance their relative power and status. Needless to say, changes in the domestic political contours, following the ascendance of new societal forces, may bring about substantial re-orientation of foreign policy.

Furthermore, socio-economic groups operate within domestic society, the collective actorness of which is expressed through public opinion. The influence of public opinion in foreign policymaking stems from the assumption that rational political actors in democratic regimes function under the imperative of acquiring or retaining power (Hagan, 1993: 4). Public opposition to foreign policy shift is costly in political terms for democratic leaders, especially if it comes from their electoral constituency, and may undermine the political future of the incumbent and the solidification of the new foreign policy course (Doeser, 2011: 224–226; Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 131–132). How significant a determinant the public opinion is depends on the size of the gap between supporters and opponents of foreign policy change, the leader’s own preferences vis-à-vis change, and his/her sensitivity to public opinion (Mor, 1997: 204). In that respect, the role of the media comes also into play as a bridge between the public, the government and the international arena, either setting the foreign policy agenda, acting as a clearing house vis-à-vis foreign policy priorities, and/or constituting a potential governmental propaganda tool (Alden and Aran, 2012: 56–58).

Policy entrepreneurs initiating foreign policy change are usually political figures with special skills, vision and/or leadership capacity, who manage to overcome the inertia of previous foreign policy action (cf. Byman and Pollack, 2001; Hermann et al., 2001). They embrace and push forward specific alternative proposals of action, advocating policy change in the hope of a future political return that will exceed the incurred cost of taking up any such entrepreneurial activity. In a given systemic international setting, their capacity to orchestrate policy change depends on domestic structural parameters associated with the political and institutional features of the policymaking process mentioned above. An element that affects crucially their change-inducing potential is their capability to capitalize on ‘opportunity windows’ that facilitate their political venture and pave the way for foreign policy change (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2012; Mintrom, 1997; Sheingate, 2003). The origins of their preference divergence and the drive of their policy differentiation can be located in a different understanding, conceptualization and prioritization of international challenges, stemming from their belief systems, cognitive factors and other idiosyncratic features. Degrees of cognitive openness and complexity of political leaders and entrepreneurs complement rationalist accounts of foreign policy change, focusing on how statesmen internalize and respond to systemic and conjunctural changes (Gustavsson, 1998: 24; Ziv, 2011).

International structural parameters

International structural parameters refer to and emanate from the state’s participation in the international system. We identify two potential origins of foreign policy change, the first one related with the state’s interaction with the system and the second one with developments in the structural features of the system per se. Starting from the latter, very much like (neo)realist theorists have argued, systemic factors delimit and constrain foreign and security policy.² Systemic changes may lead to a re-conceptualization of security threats and challenges, a re-prioritization of foreign policy objectives, and the emergence of new means of actions and foreign policy options. Therefore, systemic changes may well bring about major foreign policy realignments. To name only a very characteristic example, the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar world opened up a broad new range of foreign policy options for US, Germany and the countries of Central and Eastern Union that was previously unavailable (Duffield, 1994).

The state’s position and role in the system may induce foreign policy change through at least three mechanisms. Firstly, states interact within the system with friends and foes and are susceptible to changes in their course of foreign policy action. Domestic upheavals that bring about radical foreign policy shifts in one country impose a differentiated response by the other countries with an interest in the region (e.g. the American repositioning after the Islamic revolution and Shah dethronement in Iran). States’ conflicting interaction may generate conditions of crisis and open an ‘opportunity window’ for foreign policy change (Boin et al., 2005; Keeler, 1993). If such crises highlight the inappropriateness of past policies to deal with new international developments, they may trigger a re-evaluation of current policies and practices leading to foreign policy change (Walsh, 2006; Welch, 2005: 45–46).

Secondly, within the framework of international interactions, states may aspire to membership in an international organization (IO), closer engagement with other states or integration in the international system more generally. Potential strengthening of relations is usually offered through positive (economic and political incentives – ‘carrots’) or negative (sanctions – ‘sticks’) forms of conditionality policy, imposing changes in the foreign policy of the candidate state. The use of political conditionality has grown impressively in recent years, evolving into a primary instrument for the international community to exercise exogenous pressures for political and institutional isomorphism (Checkel, 2000).

Thirdly, participation in IOs may activate foreign policy changes through socialization processes. Assuming an IO has a distinctive normative and cultural basis, membership in it entails if not an a priori adherence to its norms and values, at least their gradual internalization. The level of institutional embeddedness in an IO (membership continuity and commitment), as well as the depth and scope of interaction, constitute important parameters that determine the pace of the social learning process and may eventually lead to foreign policy re-direction.

The making of the 1993 Oslo Accords: a major change in Israeli foreign policy

Setting the background

The negotiation and adoption of the Oslo Accords in August 1993 constituted a major change in Israel’s foreign policy. It marked a radical shift from its previous hard-line foreign policy towards the Palestinians in two ways. Firstly, in negotiating and signing the Oslo Accords, Israel reversed its long-held rejection of the PLO as a negotiating partner. The decision to hold direct talks with the PLO, as the authentic representative of the Palestinian people, constituted a revolution in Israel’s foreign policy (Shlaim, 2001: 512). From the two larger political parties, Likud was primarily committed to the ideology of Greater Israel that claimed the West Bank as an internal part of the state whereas Labor appeared more pragmatic in that respect, giving emphasis on national security rather than territorial concerns. However, on the Palestinian question, the two parties converged. All Israeli Governments (since the capture of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967) had consistently rejected the PLO as a negotiating partner in the past, seeking to negotiate instead with alternative partners, such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria or even delegations of local Palestinians from the West Bank (Shlaim, 1994: 6–10, 1995: 21). Secondly, in Oslo, Israel officially recognized the legitimate and political rights of the Palestinian people, while in return the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in conditions of peace and security (Rynhold, 2007: 423).

To recall, up to Oslo Israel had no intention to commit to a peace process, only to register a presence in the negotiations. In Oslo, Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel and leader of the Labor Party, agreed with the PLO for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank and affirmed the Palestinian right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian rule was to last for a five-year interim period to be granted in stages during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated. Remaining difficult and controversial issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, security and borders, were deliberately excluded from the Accords and left to be decided later.

International structural parameters

The end of the Cold War with the consequential collapse of bipolarism and the Gulf War in 1991 created permissive conditions for Israel’s initiative to change course in its foreign policy. Firstly, a systemic change occurred in the Middle East as the US emerged as the supreme, undisputed, extra-regional power in the region. To consolidate its dominant role in the Middle East in the wake of the Gulf War, the US had to show its ability to affect events in the region. It had to do it in such a way that would appeal not only to Israel, but also to the major Arab states with which the sole superpower wanted to maintain strategic relations, having entered a military alliance during the Gulf War. One way to do so was to accede to one of the most basic demands of the Arab states, namely to put pressure on Israel to change its ‘no-dialogue policy’ with the PLO and enter into serious negotiations with it with a view to promoting the peace process. In all previous attempts to bring about a viable settlement, the strategic dimension of the peace process overshadowed the protagonists’ concerns and preoccupations in the US thinking, creating a corresponding disparity between the pursuit of comprehensive security – especially for Israel – and comprehensive peace (Aruri, 1992: 137–138). Little wonder, therefore, that all US proposals had ended in failure. However, in the new environment, the two concepts were converging and the Bush administration sought the establishment of a new regional Middle East order by sponsoring the Madrid conference in October 1991. The Madrid conference set in place a framework for negotiations and paved the way – even if indirectly – for the eventual Oslo breakthrough.³

From the Israeli point of view, a few Israeli decision makers perceived their country to be weakened – militarily, strategically and politically – in the new order created in the region. Despite the fact that the 1991 Gulf War crippled Iraq as a serious threat, it also showed the Israelis that their reliance on their armed forces to defend their territory had been overstated. Israel felt during the Gulf crisis, when it was subjected to missile attacks launched from Iraqi territory, that it is not militarily self-sufficient but it had to rely more than ever before on the US for its defence (Kelman, 1997: 187). Furthermore, the Israeli perception that the country’s potential role as a ‘strategic asset’ for the US in the Middle East became, after the end of the Cold War, less significant, and heightened a sense of insecurity and political dependence on the US (Barnett, 1999: 18). These circumstances and concerns over maintaining a close relationship with the US increased Israel’s vulnerability to US pressures for a foreign policy reversal and engagement in a peace process. However, this perception of weakness was not universally held. Rabin, for example, was convinced that Israel could enter negotiations after 1991 from a clear position of economic, political and military strength and should take advantage of this opportunity because ultimately time was not on Israel’s side (Peri, 1996: 66–67). This contradiction captures well the differences between the two main political parties in the Israeli political system at the time, Likud and Labor.

At the same time, the Rabin government rightly perceived that the Gulf War had caused serious division among the Arab states that had supported the coalition forces under the US command and those having stood aside or supported Iraq. As Peres, the Foreign Affairs Minister in the Rabin government, put it ‘…no longer were the Arab States inevitably united among themselves and against Israel. An Arab state has engaged in naked aggression against a sister state. An international coalition, including Arab states, had been formed to beat back the aggressor’ (Peres, 1995: 277). For the Rabin Government, all these structural changes had weakened the PLO. The dissolution of the Soviet Union deprived the PLO from its most important diplomatic patron. Furthermore, Arafat’s stand in favour of Saddam Hussein not only caused much international opprobrium, but also resulted in the cutting off of financial assistance from the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Bercovitch, 1997: 224). For the Israelis, a politically and financially weaker PLO was a potentially more malleable and receptive negotiating partner. If Israel wanted a deal with the Palestinians, it could no longer avoid the PLO; the alternative would be a rejectionist and more radical section of Palestinians, such as Hamas, which would be worse, as far as Israel was concerned, than the PLO.

In our typology, we have identified two potential international origins of foreign policy change, namely systemic developments and changes emanating from the state’s interaction with the international system, especially other states. The cataclysmic changes and the collapse of the bipolar international system altered security perceptions in Israel and led to the re-prioritization of Israeli foreign policy objectives and the means to realize them, not least through dialogue with the PLO. At the same time, the US acquired an undisputable hegemonic role in the post-bipolar environment. In search for a new Middle East order, the US put pressure on Israel, contributing to the Madrid talks. Regarding the interaction with the international system, the regional security crisis (first Gulf War) not only brought about the division of the Arab world, but also weakened the PLO, thus rendering it a more amenable negotiating partner in the Israeli quest for peace and security.

Domestic structural parameters

Domestic politics in Israel revolve around coalition, party and electoral politics (Arian, 1998: 74). Because of the proportional electoral system, a single Israeli party seldom enjoys an absolute majority in the Israeli Parliament (Knesset). That means that both major parties govern routinely in cooperation with smaller parties or rarely in cooperation with each other in coalitions of national unity. Surplus majorities that contain more parties than are necessary to control the absolute majority are most often the case. This is due to the regional political uncertainty that produces frequent and intense military conflicts that may thwart junior coalition members with an undermining effect to governmental stability (Stinnett, 2007). The most important foreign and security policy issues remain in the competence of the Prime Minister, who usually comes from the largest party in the Knesset, and are usually dealt with in an inner political circle, with little direct input from other sources. Prime Ministers have also tended to take on the defence portfolio, thus removing a potential source of intra-governmental opposition in the making of foreign and security policy. In that respect, the Prime Minister plays a very influential, although by no means exclusive, role in the decision-making process (Barnett, 1999: 17). Heading the coalition that rules the Knesset, the Prime Minister has to take into consideration intra-coalition politics and make the necessary compromises to ensure the coalition’s political viability.

The 1992 electoral victory of the Labor Party, headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, served as the triggering event for Israel’s foreign policy U-turn and constituted the last building block in the formation of a negotiating context conducive to the settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute (Gewurz, 2000: 186). After 15 years of Likud’s political predominance, Labor regained its pivotal role in the Israeli political system, since no coalition could be formed either to its right or to its left without Labor’s participation. Subsequently, a Labor-led coalition government was sworn into office, which consisted of Labor, with 44 seats, Meretz, a secular-liberal-dovish party with 12 seats, and Shas, an ultra-orthodox religious party with six seats. The thin majority of only 62 of the 120 seats in the Knesset would plague the coalition government throughout its tenure (Hazan, 2000: 366).

The Labor Party ran on a political platform of re-conceptualization and re-prioritization of security-related national objectives, associated politically with an alternative, more engaging, political culture against the traditional ‘hawkish’ one (Inbar, 1991). This platform emanated from a fraction within the Labor party, which consisted mainly of a younger generation of politicians that had been less engaged in war and conflict than the old guard and, consequently, less associated with realist security approaches (Hazan, 2000: 374–376). The new approach entailed a cultural shift vis-à-vis the ‘threat from the Arab world’ (Rynhold, 2007: 428–432). In contrast to the conflict-prone foreign and security policy of the earlier years based on containing conflicts through military strength, the new political culture embraced engagement in combination with a willingness to take calculated risks for building peace with the ‘enemy’ through real dialogue and compromises.

The political ascendance of the new culture was incremental; it gained overwhelming support among Labor party cadres, including major political figures such as Peres and later Rabin, only after the outbreak of the 1987 Intifada. The Palestinian uprising against Israel’s occupation of Gaza and West Bank led to the transformation of the Arab–Israeli conflict from an interstate to an intra-state dispute. More importantly, it had a very negative impact on the Israeli economy and society and generated serious security concerns among Israeli citizens (Ezrahi, 1997: 71–72; Makovsky, 1996: 88–89). As a result, the Israeli public became critical of the exclusive reliance on military force to solve Israel’s problems (including those created by Intifada) and more amenable to a peaceful accommodation with the Palestinians.

Early studies of the Intifada’s impact on Israeli public opinion, prior to Oslo, highlighted a steady and increasing moderation of opinions on certain long-term issues of security policy but also a growing polarization between the conciliatory left and the more hard-line right (Arian et al., 1992). The shock caused by Intifada made a considerable segment of the domestic political setting more receptive to foreign policy change, illustrating the limits of the previous policy and highlighting the need for a new approach (Auerbach and Greenbaum, 2000: 37–45; Rynhold, 2007: 426). The outbreak of Intifada contributed significantly to the ascendance and consolidation of the alternative political culture by generating serious security concerns to the Israeli public and a broad public criticism over crisis management. In that respect, it created an ‘opportunity window’ for Israel’s political entrepreneurs, reinforcing the proponents of the alternative political culture within the Labor Party and accelerating its political and ideological transformation and final embracement of the new approach.

In this environment, Rabin’s (and to a great extent also Peres’) political entrepreneurship was critical in three respects: firstly, he orchestrated the Labor party’s incremental rupture with the old approach to some extent in response to the changing public attitude. As a result, the Party reinstated in the 1992 national elections its long-held advocacy of ‘territorial compromise’ to resolve the conflict, promising an agreement with Palestinians within six to nine months. The first step in that direction was the elimination of a negative reference to the establishment of a Palestinian state in Labor’s political platform for the 1992 elections. Secondly, in the post-electoral stage, he formed a Labor-led coalition government with the secular party of Meretz, with whom they shared the same foreign policy aspirations (Rynhold, 2007: 430–432). Thirdly, prior to and after the elections, he managed, together with Peres, to forge a comprehensive partisan unity and build a substantial intra-partisan base of cohesive political support. This fact enabled him to embark on the Oslo’s strategic shift that caught the public by surprise (Hazan, 2000: 372–374).

To understand Rabin’s political role, it is important to stress that he was initially reluctant to negotiate with PLO directly and preferred the formal Madrid’s negotiating framework. However, he displayed considerable flexibility and cognitive openness in the light of changed circumstances (Ziv, 2011: 434–437). The prominence of security is clear throughout Rabin’s memoirs and public statements and for that reason he was willing – in line with Labor’s political direction – to consider options that would entail territorial compromise if they contributed to a stable security environment for Israel. According to Eitan Haber, head of Rabin’s political bureau and one of his closest aides, the lack of progress in the Washington talks that were based on the Madrid’s framework caused it to dawn upon Rabin that direct talks with PLO were at some point unavoidable (interview cited by Sasley, 2010: 699).⁴ Thus, he was convinced to accept Arafat as a negotiating partner, partly due to pragmatic interest in pursuit of Israel’s security and partly due to the growing public appeal of the expected peace.

After all, Rabin’s political credibility and survival, as both Prime Minister heading the coalition government and as leader of the Labor Party, depended on delivering the pre-electoral promises for an agreement with the Palestinians within a very tight schedule (Kelman, 1997: 188). Realizing the detrimental effect that Oslo could have had on his political career, Rabin paid special interest in public opinion swings and was the first Prime Minister to have a special personal advisor, Kalman Gayer, for assessing public disposition in the course to Oslo. A series of private surveys conducted by Gayer for Rabin indicated public pragmatism and even some degree of indifference as to whether talks were held with non-PLO Palestinians or with formal PLO representatives (as was the case in Oslo without public awareness), so long as they could deliver peace and security (Auerbach and Greenbaum, 2000: 42–48). Thus, on the issue of negotiations, public opinion was also undergoing at the time a transition, narrowing the gap between supporters and opponents of such a perspective. Only after Rabin envisaged the political feasibility of a potential agreement did he give the green light for a serious engagement in the Oslo track of negotiations (Mor, 1997: 209–210).

In terms of institutional set-up, Israeli policymaking in the course to Oslo exhibited a high degree of concentration, excluding even the higher echelons of the political and military bureaucracy, to ensure the insulation of the ongoing negotiations (Arian et al., 2002: 121–125). Besides Rabin and Peres, only a handful of officials were aware of the secret talks, including at different stages, the deputy-minister of Foreign Affairs, Yossi Beilin, the director-general of the same ministry, Uri Savir, and a retired officer, an expert in international law, Yoel Singer. Top officials at the Prime Minister’s office were kept in the dark, let alone members of the cabinet and the Knesset (Beilin, 1999; Peres, 1995; Rabin, 1996; Savir, 1999).

Our typology gives emphasis on the domestic political and institutional setting as well as the alternative inputs in the foreign policymaking process by three kinds of advocacy groups, namely proponents of an alternative political culture, socio-economic groups and the public opinion, as well as policy entrepreneurs. As regards the former, the Israeli political life revolves around coalition politics, thus increasing the political dependency of the ‘authoritative decision unit’. The Labor party had to seek the political support of other parties with similar foreign policy views (such as Meretz) and be always on edge to ensure the longevity of the governmental coalition. At the same time, the capacity of Prime Minister Rabin (and Peres) to orchestrate the Oslo path of negotiations in secrecy and outside the formal policymaking process provided some breathing policymaking space until conditions were considered ripe for signing the Oslo Accords (Table 1).

Table 1.

Structural parameters of foreign policy change and the Oslo Accords.

Structural parameters	Israeli foreign policy and the Oslo Accords
Domestic
Political and institutional setting
Policymaking process and ‘authoritative decision unit’	• Coalition politics: political dependencies ↑• Concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister
Advocacy groups: inputs
Alternative political culture	• Younger generation in Labor Party: ■ cultural shift towards peaceful accommodation and engagement ‘with the enemy’, not military confrontation→ political platform in the 1992 elections
Socio-economic groups and public opinion	• Gradual shift of public opinion (socio-economic and political repercussions of Intifada)
Policy entrepreneurs	• Role of Rabin (and Peres)
International
Systemic changes: effects	• Different security perceptions in Israel → re-prioritization of foreign policy objectives (dialogue with PLO)• Hegemonic role of the US in the post-bipolar environment: ■ search for a new Middle East order ■ pressure on Israel→ Madrid and Washington talks
Participation in international system	• Regional security crisis (Gulf War – Iraq): ■ division of Arab world ■ international weakening of the PLO

In terms of alternative inputs, it is possible to discern an incremental cultural shift towards peaceful accommodation and engagement ‘with the enemy’. This emanated from the younger generation of the Labor party, redefining the party’s foreign policy agenda as epitomized in its political platform for the 1992 elections. Labor’s transformation evolved in close association with the gradual shift in Israeli public opinion vis-à-vis the handling of the Palestinian problem. This shift owed much to the socio-economic and political repercussions of the 1988 Intifada, a domestic crisis situation that opened an ‘opportunity window’ for change. Finally, Simon Peres and at a later stage Yitzak Rabin, two emblematic political figures at the heart of the Israeli foreign policymaking system, played a critical entrepreneurial role in the course to Oslo.

Conclusions

The Israeli case study illustrates the variety of parameters at play that lead to foreign policy re-orientation. Revisiting the eclectic analytical framework in view of the empirical evidence, we should point out two important qualifications. Firstly, as regards the sources of alternative foreign policy input, we need to be more cautious on their impact; they do not lead teleologically to foreign policy change, but rather their input is filtered through the existing institutional and policymaking structures. For example, societal input may play a minimal role in a totalitarian regime or a policy entrepreneur in office may be coalition-bound or with a fragile governmental majority and thus not in a position to initiate foreign policy change despite his/her own policy preferences. Secondly, we should not a priori consider coalition governments to constitute an obstacle to foreign policy shift; actually, the Israeli case suggests that foreign policy re-orientation may forge a coalition, triggering rather than hindering change.

These two framework-specific qualifications lead to three more general comments on the interplay among the identified parameters. Firstly, it is very difficult to account for change or attribute it to a single factor or by reference to a single theoretical paradigm. Most of the time it is difficult to identify the relative weight of each parameter. In the Israeli case, which parameter is most important to account for change, the collapse of the bipolar world, the ascendance of a new political culture, or the electoral and coalition politics? Can we possibly isolate and measure the impact of each parameter? And if we do so in quest of theoretical and methodological purity, how close to reality is our achieved outcome?

Secondly, our interest and focus lay in foreign policy shifts; we do not examine the sustainability or viability of such change. We analyse national critical junctures in the foreign policy domain without claiming that these changes are necessarily consolidated in the long run or that they may not be upturned or remain incomplete as the change-inducing parameters evolve. The causal mechanisms of transforming foreign policy change to a new foreign policy path may differ and equally so may differ in the importance of the identified parameters in the policy entrenchment process.

Thirdly, directly linked with the entrenchment prospects of a foreign policy shift, foreign policy change is a dynamic process that feeds back to the identified parameters, with intended or unintended consequences, further reinforcing or undermining the change momentum. Such effect can be seen on the human agency involved and/or the structural conditions within which foreign policymaking evolves. Arguably, it may not be so obvious in the systemic parameters, but is more easily discernible at the domestic level of FPA. For example, the authoritative decision unit may have the capacity not only to introduce new inputs in a given policymaking process, but also to alter the terms and the institutional milieu of policymaking per se, marginalizing opposition and ensuring the longevity of the new policy. This point highlights and reinforces our underlying assumption of a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between human agency and social structures, which lies at the heart of the agency-structure problématique in foreign policy and IR.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biographies

Spyros Blavoukos is Assistant Professor in the Department of International and European Economic Relations at the Athens University of Economics and Business; Dimitris Bourantonis is Professor in the Department of International and European Economic Relations at the Athens University of Economics and Business.

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