Unifying conceptualizations of interstate rivalry: A min

Abstract

This study reconstructs the concept of interstate rivalry in accordance with a min–max strategy in order to determine the necessary characteristics of rivalry, provide a template with which to assess existing conceptualizations, and provide a means by which conceptualizations of rivalry can be formulated and operationalized. I argue that there are two necessary characteristics of a minimal conceptualization of interstate rivalry — temporal dependence and issue competition. Contextual conceptualizations are then formulated by adding dimensions, such as militarization, identification, and psychological hostility, among others, to the minimal definition. By defining interstate rivalry in its most extreme form (when all of the potential dimensions of rivalry are present in the fullest), I also establish a maximal or ‘ideal-type’ conceptualization. In adopting a min–max approach, this project seeks to unify conceptualizations of interstate rivalry along a common continuum in which the empirical coverage of cases decreases as properties are added to the minimal definition.

Keywords

Concepts conflict rivalry security

Introduction

Rivalry is endemic to world politics. Prior to the emergence of the Westphalian system, Persia and Greece, Athens and Sparta, and Rome and Carthage among others competed as rivals (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998: 66). Multiple proximate rivalries (Britain and Germany, Austria–Hungary and Russia, France and Germany, etc.) intersected prior to World War I (Thompson, 2003) and the Cold War was rooted in the US–Soviet Union superpower rivalry (Larson, 1999). Current examples of rivalry include such volatile dyads as India and Pakistan, Israel and Syria, and North Korea and South Korea. The concept of rivalry deserves attention in part due to the centrality of interstate rivalry to global politics.

A focus on rivalry is warranted, furthermore, due to the conflict-prone nature of interstate rivals. Some states engage in repeated instances of militarized conflict. Israel and surrounding Arab states have engaged in four wars since 1948 (Diehl, 1998: 1). India and Pakistan engaged in 43 militarized disputes from 1947 to 2001, four of which are classified as wars (Diehl et al., 2005).¹ At the systemic level, approximately three-fourths of all militarized interstate disputes (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 61) and wars (Colaresi et al., 2007: 88–89) occur between interstate rivals.

Despite the potential for the establishment of a more peaceful international system due to the spread of democracy, increasing levels of economic interdependence, and nation-state involvement in international organizations, a number of conflicting states continue to engage in rivalry. Since the Second World War, over 90 percent of all wars have been between strategic rivals (Colaresi et al., 2007: 89), indicating that international conflict remains heavily concentrated within the rivalry context.² Developing a deeper understanding of intestate rivalry is consequently as important as ever.

Although rivalry may seem to have an ‘I know it when I see it’ quality, there is striking disagreement concerning interstate rivalry conceptualization, operationalization, and the identification of cases. For example, concerning conceptualization, some argue that interstate rivalry is in part rooted in psychological hostility (Maoz and Mor, 1998: 129, 2002: 5; Vasquez, 1993, 1996: 553) while others maintain that states can be rivals in the absence of psychological enmity (Brummett, 1999; Levy, 1999: 174). Operationally, there are disagreements such as whether states must engage in at least a certain number of militarized disputes or be competitors for beyond a certain number of years to qualify as rivals. Conceptual and operational differences have led to discrepancies in the coding of cases. Among six of the major approaches to identifying cases of interstate rivalry, there are only 23 cases out of a possible 355 (6.5 percent) on which there is consensus (Colaresi et al., 2007: 56–57).

Relying on one approach over another may affect empirical results. The concept of rivalry is often employed as a case selection device, an explanatory variable, or a phenomenon to be studied in its own right. Deterrence (Huth and Russett, 1993), power transitions (Geller, 1993, 2000), arms races (Gibler et al., 2005; Rider, 2009), and other issues have been examined in the context of rivalry. As an independent variable, scholars have assessed the effects of rivalry on such things as democracy (Colaresi and Thompson, 2003; Rasler and Thompson, 2011), terrorism (Conrad, 2011), and nuclear proliferation (Gartzke and Jo, 2009; Kroening, 2009; Singh and Way, 2004). The dynamics of rivalry — causes of rivalry initiation, maintenance, and termination — have also been explored (Diehl and Goertz, 2012; Valeriano, 2012). The results of empirical studies that employ the rivalry concept are tied to the conceptual approach adopted and the dyads that are coded as cases of rivalry.

While some of the differences in the coding of cases across perspectives may be due to differing operationalizations of similar conceptual dimensions, the first step in sorting through various approaches is careful consideration of rivalry conceptualization. Similar to many scholarly disagreements, it is unlikely that complete consensus will ever be established concerning the ‘proper’ conceptualization of interstate rivalry. What can potentially be provided, however, is a framework within which to situate, evaluate, and formulate rivalry conceptualizations.

This study utilizes a min–max approach (Gerring, 2001; Gerring and Barresi, 2003) to provide such a framework for the concept of interstate rivalry. Minimal definitions include only the bare essential characteristics of a concept and have broad empirical coverage, while maximal definitions describe a concept in its most ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’ form and have narrow empirical coverage. Contextual definitions fall between the min–max extremes. Through a min–max approach, conceptualizations can be unified along a common continuum in which the range of cases decreases moving from minimal, to contextual, to maximal formulations.

Developing a min-max conceptual template provides the means through which the most appropriate conceptual approach can be chosen for empirical analyses. Rivalry approaches that tend toward the minimal side of the conceptual continuum may be utilized when testing theories that are expected to travel well across various contexts. Approaches that tend toward the maximal side of the conceptual continuum may be relied on when testing theories primarily applicable to rivalries in their purest form. Contextual approaches may be adopted for studies seeking mid-range generalizability.

Developing a minimal and maximal conceptualization of interstate rivalry also provides the means through which further conceptualizations of rivalry can be formulated and operationalized. The interstate rivalry concept has not yet been defined in minimal or maximal terms. Once such definitions are established, contextual conceptualizations of interstate rivalry can be derived by adding dimensions to the minimal conceptualization or subtracting dimensions from the ideal-type conceptualization.

In this paper, I first discuss the process through which concepts are reconstructed and formed. Following Sartori’s (1984) guidelines for concept reconstruction and formation, I then delineate the multiple dimensions of interstate rivalry and consider which properties are necessary characteristics of the concept. A review of ten prominent approaches to the conceptualization of interstate rivalry reveals that temporal dependence and issue competition are minimal characteristics of interstate rivalry while militarization, spatial consistency, identification, psychological hostility, and parity are dimensions that can be added to the minimal conceptualization to produce contextual conceptualizations and a maximal or ideal-type conceptualization. Once developed, I use the min–max conceptual template to evaluate existing conceptualizations and to discuss how further conceptualizations could be formulated and operationalized.

Concept reconstruction and formation

Concepts are fundamental to social science research. They provide a means for grouping together similar objects and differentiating dissimilar objects (Gerring, 2001: 44; Goertz, 2006: 30–33; Sartori, 2009: 165). Concepts are central to theorizing and provide a basis from which to select appropriate cases for analysis (Goertz, 2006). Simply put, ‘It is impossible to conduct (social scientific) work without using concepts’ (Gerring, 2001: 35).

Despite the centrality of concepts to social science research, conceptual issues generally receive little attention (Goertz, 2006: 1–2). Quantitative studies often emphasize the importance of appropriate measurement at the expense of careful consideration of conceptual issues (Goertz, 2006: 2). A focus on operationalization prior to establishing proper conceptualization puts the cart before the horse. As Sartori (1970: 1038) has forcefully argued, ‘Concept formation stands prior to quantification…We cannot measure unless we first know what we are measuring.’ The starting point, then, in sorting between the various lists of pairs of states coded as being rivals is an examination of the interstate rivalry concept.

Most concepts are multilevel and multidimensional (Goertz, 2006). First, concepts have a basic level (also referred to as a primary category [Collier and Mahon, 1993] or the background concept [Adcock and Collier, 2001]), which is a broad formulation that is relied upon for theorizing. Subtypes of basic level concepts can be formed by adding adjectives to the basic level term. For example, democracy is a base level concept for which subtypes can be created by adding qualifiers such as ‘neopatrimonial,’ ‘presidential,’ or ‘parliamentary’ (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). For the purposes of this study, the term ‘rivalry’ is the basic level concept with the modifier ‘interstate.’ Additional rivalry subtypes include intrastate, sports, and sibling rivalries, among others. The second level of a concept includes the constitutive dimensions. Concepts are rarely one-dimensional. In relation to the concept of democracy, for example, both the extent of enfranchisement and the competitiveness of elections are separate characteristics that cannot be reduced to a single dimension (Coppedge, 1999: 468).

This project follows the classical approach of identifying necessary and sufficient conceptual dimensions (Gerring, 2001: 73; Mill, 1843/1872; Sartori, 1970, 1984: 55), which naturally goes together with an all-or-nothing dichotomous view (e.g. states are either rivals or non-rivals) of a concept (Goertz, 2006: 29). Such an approach uses the logical AND to create the basic level concept (Goertz, 2006). For example, properties X, Y, AND Z may be necessary and jointly sufficient properties of concept A. This contrasts with the family resemblance approach (Collier and Mahon, 1993; Goertz, 2006; Wittgenstein, 1953) in which the logical OR is used to create the basic level concept (for example X, Y, OR Z is a sufficient characteristic of concept B) (Goertz, 2006: 40–42).

Sartori (1984) has provided guidelines for reconstructing and forming concepts. Reconstruction requires surveying the existing literature on a given concept in order to determine the concept’s constitutive dimensions. The process of concept reconstruction involves three steps: examining existing definitions, delineating a concept’s attributes, and arranging the concept’s characteristics in a matrix. For example, in reconstructing the concept ‘revolution,’ Kotowski (1984) surveyed several major conceptualizations of revolution, delineated the dimensions of revolution such as popular involvement and political structural change, and arranged the attributes in a matrix indicating which conceptual approaches include which dimensions. Other examples of concept reconstruction include Graham’s (1984) analysis of the concept ‘consensus’ and Kurtz’s (2000) study of the concept ‘peasant.’ Following reconstruction, the next step is concept formation — organizing a concept’s attributes in a meaningful way and producing an improved conceptualization. This study follows Sartori’s (1984) guidelines of concept reconstruction and formation for the interstate rivalry concept.

One way of defining a concept is in minimal terms, in which the attributes minimally necessary to form a concept are identified. Minimal properties of a concept are those characteristics that most or all scholars agree on as constituting dimensions of the concept. In relation to ideology, for example, scholars agree that the location of ideology lies at least in part in attitudes, beliefs, and values (Gerring, 1999, 2001: 78). ‘Thought’ consequently is a minimal characteristic of the concept. Others believe that language and behavior are also locations of ideology. Yet because there is disagreement, language and behavior are not properties of the minimal conceptualization. The standard adopted in this analysis for inclusion in the minimal conceptualization is that the dimension must be explicitly included in a majority of conceptual approaches and there must not be explicit and reasoned opposition to including the dimension as a necessary property of the concept. This allows for inclusion in the minimal conceptualization only those characteristics for which there is broad consensus.

While minimal definitions include only the skeletal attributes necessary for concept formation, maximal definitions describe concepts in their ‘purest’ or most ‘ideal’ form. Ideal-types are cases in which all of the potential characteristics of a concept are present in the fullest (Goertz, 2006: 83–84). Falling between minimal and maximal conceptualizations are contextual conceptualizations. One of the primary ways in which minimal, contextual, and maximal approaches vary is reflected in the relationship between intension and extension (Cohen and Nagel, 1934; Collier and Mahon, 1993; Jevons, 1877/1958; Sartori, 1970, 1975, 1984). Intension refers to the properties of a concept, while extension refers to a concept’s empirical coverage. As intension (i.e. the number of conceptual dimensions) increases, extension (i.e. the range of cases to which the concept applies) decreases for concepts that are formed by delineating necessary and sufficient properties (Goertz, 2006). There is not an inverse relationship between extension and intension for family resemblance concepts (Goertz, 2006). The min–max approach and the relationship between intension and extension allows for the creation of a continuum along which to arrange conceptualizations.

Social science concepts are nearly always (if not always) multidimensional (Goertz, 2006: 6), leaving room for disagreement concerning which dimensions are essential elements of a concept. Though establishing consensus on a single way to conceptualize interstate rivalry would standardize the meaning and understanding of the concept, there are advantages to conceptual pluralism. Different conceptualizations of rivalry emphasize different aspects of competitive interstate relations. The complexity of rivalry cannot be fully understood through the scope of a single perspective. Conceptual pluralism, furthermore, allows one to identify strengths and weaknesses of different approaches by assessing them comparatively.

In order to reconstruct the concept of interstate rivalry, I reviewed previous definitions and delineated rivalry dimensions. Many studies employ use of the term rivalry or are case studies of states commonly considered to be rivals. This study focuses on previous research in which scholars have defined rivalry and have carefully considered which dimensions are characteristics of the concept. Table 1 presents a matrix of the dimensions of interstate rivalry and whether various approaches explicitly include each dimension in the conceptualization of rivalry. Dimensions are listed roughly in accordance from those for which there is the most agreement as constituting dimensions of interstate rivalry to those for which there is the least agreement moving from the left to the right. This matrix will guide the following discussion concerning the necessary and sufficient characteristics of interstate rivalry and will facilitate the formulation of minimal, contextual, and maximal conceptualizations. Rather than providing a comprehensive discussion of each dimension, the intent is to identify general areas of scholarly consensus as well as points of disagreement.

Table 1.

Conceptual dimensions of interstate rivalry.

	Temporal Dependence	Issue Competition	Spatial Consistency	Militarization	Identification	Psychological Hostility	Parity
Vasquez (1993)	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Maoz and Mor (2002)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Thompson (2001)		Yes		Possibility Of	Yes
Hensel (1998)	Yes	Yes			Yes
Levy (1999)	Yes	Yes			Yes
Bennett (1996)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Diehl and Goertz (2000)	Yes		Yes	Yes
Klein et al. (2006)	Yes		Yes	Yes
Hewitt (2005)	Yes		Yes	Crises
Mitchell and Thies (2011)		Yes		Yes

The dimensions of interstate rivalry

Temporal dependence

Nearly every approach surveyed explicitly includes a temporal dimension to the conceptualization of interstate rivalry (see Table 1). Maoz and Mor (2002: 4) define interstate rivalry in part as a, ‘persistent, fundamental, and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states.’ Bennett (1993, 1997) views rivals as two states that contend over the same issue for an extended duration. States must engage in a competition for a ‘substantial period of time’ to be considered rivals, according to Hensel (1999a).

Although it is generally accepted that there is a temporal dimension to interstate rivalry, there is recognition that some rivalries may be relatively short in duration (Colaresi et al., 2007: 33; Klein et al., 2006: 334). The key point concerning the temporal component of interstate rivalry is that past events affect the present behaviors of states engaged in rivalry (Colaresi et al., 2007: 21; Klein et al., 2006: 335) and rivals operate on the assumption that contention will continue into the future (Goertz and Diehl, 1993: 154, 2000: 226). The temporal dependence of events in the context of interstate rivalry can be contrasted with isolated instances of conflict that tend to be less rooted in past events and for which there is not an expectation of future contention (Goertz, 2006: 30–33).

Not all approaches explicitly include a temporal dimension to rivalry conceptualization. The strategic rivalry approach defines interstate rivals as states that are competitors and enemies for which there is a possibility of militarized conflict (Colaresi et al., 2007: 25; Thompson, 2001: 560). Thompson and his colleagues nonetheless also recognize that rivalries are part of historical processes in which states become ‘prisoners of the past and future’ (Colaresi et al., 2007: 51; Thompson, 2001: 569). Mitchell and Thies (2011) include two dimensions to the conceptualization of interstate rivalry: issues and militarization. Although a temporal dimension is not included, there is not explicit opposition to the inclusion of a temporal dimension to rivalry conceptualization.

A clear majority of approaches include temporal dependence as a characteristic of interstate rivalry. Additionally, there is not explicit or reasoned opposition to the notion that past events affect the present and there is an expectation of future contention among rival states. I consequently consider temporal dependence to be a necessary property of the interstate rivalry concept.

Issue competition

Similar to the dimension of temporal dependence, most approaches explicitly include issue competition as a dimension of rivalry conceptualization (see Table 1). Hensel (1998, 1999a, 1999b) argues that competition over issues is a fundamental component of interstate rivalry. Vasquez (1993, 2009: 78–79) contends that, ‘Rivalry is, above all, a term that characterizes a competitive relationship between two actors over an issue that is of high salience to them.’ Mitchell and Thies (2011) include issue competition as one of the two fundamental properties of interstate rivalry.

Some approaches place a greater emphasis on characteristics other than issue competition to rivalry conceptualization. Diehl and Goertz (2000) highlight three dimensions of interstate rivalry: spatial consistency (i.e. rivalries tend to be dyadic), duration, and militarization. The crisis density approach similarly does not explicitly include issues in rivalry conceptualization (Hewitt, 2005). Yet issue competition is implied for approaches that include a militarization or crisis dimension to rivalry conceptualization given that neither militarized disputes nor crises are likely to occur in the absence of a conflict of interest.

Competition over an issue (or issues) complicates but does not necessarily prevent cooperation over other issues. Despite the existence of a salient point of disagreement between two states, rivals may cooperate on issues of lesser importance out of convenience or necessity. For example, although India and Pakistan are fierce rivals due primarily to conflicting claims over Kashmir, they have cooperated on other issues, such as access to the Indus River.

There are several different types of issues that rivals may compete over. Rivals may contend over territory, power, economics, ideology, etc. Regardless of the type of issue(s) under contention, rivalry is rooted in competition over one or more issues. Due to the general consensus that rivals are competitors, issue competition is included as a necessary characteristic of the minimal conceptualization of interstate rivalry.

Spatial consistency

All of the approaches reviewed operationalize interstate rivalry as a dyadic phenomenon (which Diehl and Goertz (2000) refer to as ‘spatial consistency’). Yet only some conceptualizations explicitly define interstate rivalry in dyadic terms (see Table 1). More than two actors can compete over an issue (or issues) for a protracted period of time. Some scholars consequently define interstate rivalry as occurring between ‘two or more states’ (Hensel, 1998, 1999b: 87–88; Paul, 2005: 3). The relationship between the US, China, and the Soviet Union during parts of the Cold War is an often invoked example of a triadic rivalry (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 19–20; Goldstein and Freeman, 1990, 1991; Thompson and Dreyer, 2011; Valeriano and Powers, forthcoming). Lesser known examples of triadic rivalry include Iran–Iraq–Saudi Arabia, and relations between Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa before the end of apartheid (Thompson and Dreyer, 2011: 7). Competition between the member states of NATO versus the member states of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War may qualify as a case of multistate rivalry (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 19–20).

Despite such examples, some scholars caution against defining rivalry more broadly than in relation to dyadic interactions. Diehl (1998: 5; Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 20) notes that dyadic rivalries are often at the heart of ‘security complexes’ (groups of states in which security concerns are linked). The south Asian security complex, for example, is centered on the India–Pakistan rivalry. In relation to US–China–Soviet triadic relations, Diehl and Goertz (2000: 20) argue it should not be assumed that ‘each leg of the triadic linkage is symmetrical in duration, processes, or relative importance.’

Although interstate rivalry most commonly occurs among pairs of states, due to recognition that states may engage in triadic or multistate rivalry, spatial consistency is not included in the minimal definition. Nonetheless, the commonality of dyadic rivalry makes the dimension a strong candidate for inclusion in contextual conceptualizations.

Militarization

Similar to the dimension of spatial consistency, there is a lack of consensus on whether militarization is a necessary dimension of interstate rivalry (see Table 1). For some scholars, there must be the possibility of, or actual militarized conflict for competitors to be considered rivals. For others, states may become rivals in instances in which there is sustained competition over a salient issue (or issues) even if it is unlikely that competition will become militarized.

Some states may, for example, become non-militarized commercial rivals (Hensel, 1999a; Levy, 1999). The US rivalry with Japan in the 1970s and 1980s is an example of a commercial rivalry in which there was little expectation that competition would lead to militarized hostilities (Hensel, 1999a; Rapkin, 1999: 337). The Anglo–Dutch rivalry began as a commercial rivalry that did not develop into a militarized rivalry until a later phase (Levy, 1999; Levy and Ali, 1998). Kelly (1999) argues that commercial–naval rivalries have been a central feature of global politics for approximately five hundred years, beginning with the Genoa–Venice rivalry.

Economic competition may at times be relatively ‘healthy,’ leading to increases in efficiency and lower consumer prices. According to classical liberalism, states can accrue mutual gains by specializing in producing goods in which one has a comparative advantage and engaging in economic exchange. While not all economic competitors are rivals, states may become commercial rivals if trade leads to market dislocations, competition over market shares escalates, or a state engages in (what is perceived as) unfair trade practices.

Due to the possibility of non-militarized rivalry, the characteristic of militarization is not included in the minimal conceptualization. Militarization can nonetheless be included in contextual conceptualizations to restrict cases to only those for which there is a significant probability of or actual engagement in militarized conflict.

Identification

Some conceptualizations of interstate rivalry include rivalry identification as a necessary dimension (see Table 1). According to such approaches, rivals explicitly label one another as such and act accordingly (Kuenne, 1989: 555; Thies, 2001: 697–698; Thompson, 1995: 200). Ingram (1999) argues that one state viewing the other as a rival is sufficient to fulfill the identification requirement. In some instances, state A may view state B as a rival while state B does not view state A as a rival. For example, although Britain viewed Russia as a rival until the Suez Crisis in 1956, Russia no longer viewed Britain as a rival following the Nazi invasion of Russia (Ingram, 1999). Perceptions of rivalry, like love, Ingram (1999: 269) notes, may not be reciprocated.

Not all approaches include the identification dimension. States may compete over issues at low levels of intensity for extended periods of time without either identifying the other as being a rival. For example, the US and Canada continue to compete over maritime and other issues and are, therefore, considered to be rivals according to the issue rivalry approach (Mitchell and Thies, 2011) despite an absence of rivalry branding. Because there is not explicit inclusion of the identification dimension in a majority of the approaches to rivalry conceptualization surveyed and because states can conceivably be rivals in the absence of identification, the dimension is not included in the minimal conceptualization.

Whether the identification dimension entails rivalry branding among political elites, members of the mass public, or both has thus far not been addressed in the literature. Operationally, Thompson (2001) emphasizes identification at the elite level through his focus on the perceptions of state leaders in identifying rivals. Yet moving from a minimal definition to the maximal definition could entail not only elite-level rivalry identification but also the identification of rivalry status among the mass publics of competing states. Adding such criteria would further restrict the number of states considered to be rivals by excluding feuds among political elites that do not resonate among either state’s citizenry.

Psychological hostility

Intense rivalries may in part be rooted in psychological hostility. Maoz and Mor (1998: 129) characterize interstate rivalry as a long-term ‘hate affair.’ Some rivalries are plagued by mutual feelings of fear, animosity, and insecurity (Maoz and Mor, 2002: 5; Vasquez, 1996: 533). Psychological hostility in some cases may be so intense that rational cost–benefit analysis gives way to states privileging inflicting harm to one’s adversary over the pursuit of obtaining positive goals (Vasquez, 1993, 2009).

Yet rivalries are not necessarily rooted in psychological animosity (Brummett, 1999; Levy, 1999: 174). Rivalry may instead be driven by sustained instrumental competition in which a state continually pursues objectives that conflict with another state. A state may view another state as a rival and nonetheless approach competition in a relatively cool and calculated manner. Certain instances of rivalry, such as the Ottoman Empire’s rivalry with Venice have not been rooted in the animosity that has at times animated other rivalries (Brummett, 1999) such as India’s with Pakistan. Similar to the identification dimension, psychological hostility may be uni- or bi-directional and may imbue political elites, the mass public, both, or neither.

Psychological hostility is not a necessary characteristic of a minimal conceptualization of rivalry due to the possibility of rivalry in its absence. The dimension can nonetheless be added to contextual definitions in order to further limit empirical coverage. The dimension can also be included in the maximal conceptualization in order to restrict cases to only those of an ‘extreme’ or ideal-type.

Parity

In the absence of relative power parity, one state would seemingly be capable of dominating the other, inhibiting the establishment of true competition (Vasquez, 1993, 1996: 553, 2009: 66–68, 85–86). If competition is a necessary dimension of rivalry, can states become rivals in the absence of relative parity?

Although states that are near equals may tend to be more likely to become rivals, there are several factors that can enable rivalry between states with asymmetric capabilities. Weaker states may make up for power discrepancies by forming alliances with other states (Thompson, 1995: 205). Nuclear weapons may serve as somewhat of an equalizer between states with asymmetric conventional capabilities (Khan, 2005; Paul, 2005: 14). A strong state may be preoccupied with another rival (Thompson, 1995: 205), or there may be relative parity in relation to the main issue under contention (Colaresi et al., 2007: 52; Paul, 2005: 13). Intangible factors, such as a high level of resolve (Mack, 1975; Paul, 1994: 20) or superior tactics (Arreguin-Toft, 2001), may enable weaker states to compete militarily with a stronger adversary. A weak state may overestimate its power, or repeatedly engage in challenges against a stronger foe, due to dissatisfaction with the status quo (Diehl et al., 2005: 36–38). Power may fluctuate over time creating power asymmetries without necessarily leading to the termination of rivalry (Diehl, 1998: 4; Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 24–24; Goertz and Diehl, 1993: 155). Table 2 summarizes factors that may enable states with asymmetric power capabilities to become rivals.

Table 2.

Factors that enable asymmetric rivalry.

Alliances

Nuclear weapons as an equalizer

A stronger state’s preoccupation with other rivals

Parity in relation to the issue under dispute

A weaker state’s resolve

A weaker state’s superior military tactics

A weaker state’s overestimation of its own power

A weaker state’s dissatisfaction with the status quo

Fluctuations in power over time

There are numerous empirical cases of asymmetric rivalry. Although Thompson (1995: 197–199, 2001: 565; Colaresi et al., 2007: 32) argues that power discrepancies exclude some dyads from consideration, he identifies several asymmetric examples of strategic rivalry, such as India–Pakistan, China–Taiwan, and China–Vietnam (Colaresi et al., 2007: 32; Thompson, 1995: 205, 2001: 565). More significantly, Klein et al. (2006) find in their population of cases identified as rivals that nearly 80 percent of all interstate rivalries are asymmetric.

Since states can become rivals in the absence of power symmetry, parity will not be included in the minimal definition. Nonetheless, competition may be particularly fierce for cases of rivalry in which states are relative equals. The dimension of power parity can consequently be included in a maximal definition of rivalry in which characteristics of rivalry are present in the fullest.

Minimal, contextual, and maximal approaches

Reconstruction of the interstate rivalry concept enables the formulation of minimal, contextual, and maximal conceptualizations. The dimensions of rivalry have been discussed roughly in order according to those for which there is the most scholarly consensus that the dimensions are necessary factors of rivalry to those for which there is the least agreement. Such dimensions can consequently be added in somewhat of a hierarchical manner (from the most to the least agreement), creating a conceptual continuum. This section provides a min, max, and three contextual conceptualizations of interstate rivalry, considers ways in which each conceptualization could be operationalized, and evaluates where existing approaches fall along the min–max spectrum.

Regarding a minimal conceptualization, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient dimensions of interstate rivalry — temporal dependence and issue competition. The concept of interstate rivalry can be defined minimally as ‘two or more states that compete over an issue (or issues) in which past events affect present relations and there is an expectation of future contention.’ Constructivist studies of cases of international rivalry that emphasize the importance of social identity are arguably compatible with the minimal conceptualization of rivalry. For example, while Piret and Berg (2009) emphasize the conflicting and antagonistic nature of national identity structures in accounting for contentious relations between the Baltic states and Russia, they recognize that such identity structures are based on historical narratives and collective memories (i.e. there is a temporal dimension) and that identity conflict produces disagreement over specific issues (i.e. there is an issue competition dimension). Operationally, states that engage in issue competition for more than a few years (perhaps three) could be identified as rivals. Once competition over the same issue or (issues) persists beyond a few years, it could be assumed that past contention will affect present relations, and the inability to settle conflicting claims will create expectations of future contention.

None of the conceptualizations of interstate rivalry in Table 1 map precisely to the minimal conceptualization. The issue rivalry approach (Mitchell and Thies, 2011), which emphasizes the issue competition dimension, most closely approximates the minimal definition. The issue rivalry approach does not, however, explicitly include a temporal dimension to its conceptualization and limits the identification of interstate rivals to dyads, territorial, river, or maritime competitors, and states that compete over multiple issues simultaneously.

Broadening the issue rivalry conceptualization to include multiparty disputes, competition over other issues, and single-issue competitions would increase the number of cases identified as rivals. The identification of cases of interstate rivalry in accordance with a minimal conceptualization would establish a dataset that could be relied on for empirical analyses in which the intent is to generalize to the broadest range of cases possible. Identifying rivalries in accordance with a minimal conceptualization would also create the basis from which the scope of cases could subsequently be narrowed by increasing the number of dimensions included in the conceptualization of rivalry.

Although there arguably have been instances of triadic and multistate rivalry, most rivalries and militarized conflicts are dyadic (Diehl and Goertz, 2000: 19; Gochman and Maoz, 1984). The spatial consistency dimension is consequently a good candidate for inclusion in a contextual conceptualization of rivalry. Interstate rivalry can be defined contextually as ‘two states that compete over an issue (or issues) in which past events affect present relations and there is an expectation of future contention.’ Spatial consistency can be operationalized as two independent nation-states.

While some rivalries may be rooted in competition in which there is little possibility of militarization, the interstate rivalries central to international security relations are those for which there is the possibility of, if not active engagement in, militarized conflict. The militarization dimension is consequently also a good candidate for inclusion in a contextual conceptualization of rivalry. Interstate rivalry can be defined more narrowly contextually as ‘two states that compete over an issue (or issues) militarily in which past events affect present relations and there is an expectation of future contention.’ Militarization can be operationalized as either the presence of a possibility of militarized conflict as determined by assessing leaders’ statements and perceptions (Thompson, 2001) or engagement in a minimum of a certain number of militarized disputes (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). Several existing approaches to rivalry conceptualization (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Hewitt, 2005; Klein et al., 2006) approximate the militarized rivalry contextual conceptualization.

In some cases, it is relatively clear whether or not there is a possibility of militarized conflict. For example, given statements made by each state’s political leaders, it is apparent that there is a non-zero probability of militarized conflict between Iran and Israel. Militarized conflict between France, Germany, and other members of the European Union, on the other hand, seems unthinkable. In other cases, there may be considerable ambiguity in a state’s potential willingness to engage in militarized conflict with another state due to difficulties in assessing political leaders’ intentions. Expert judgment is required for coding such cases.

The above conceptualizations may include cases in which states engage in sustained competitions in which there is an absence of psychological animosity and neither state explicitly identifies the other as a rival. The range of cases that qualify as interstate rivals can be further restricted by including the dimensions of identification and psychological hostility to rivalry conceptualization. Including such dimensions, interstate rivalry can be defined as ‘two mutually psychologically hostile states that view one another as rivals and compete over an issue (or issues) militarily in which past events affect present relations and there is an expectation of future contention.’

Such a conceptualization is most similar to Thompson (2001) and Maoz and Mor’s (2002) conceptualizations of interstate rivalry. Adding the identification and psychological hostility dimensions to interstate rivalry conceptualization excludes protracted competitions at low levels of intensity. Rivalry branding and psychological hostility can be gauged at the elite level through an examination of the perceptions of state leaders (Thompson, 2001) and could potentially be gauged at the mass level through an assessment of public opinion data.

The identification and psychological hostility dimensions can be defined in unilateral or bilateral terms, and in relation to political elites, the mass public, or both. The above contextual definition provides one possible formulation in which the identification and psychological hostility dimensions are included in interstate rivalry conceptualization. Additional definitions can be derived by making the conceptualization less or more restrictive.

A maximal conceptualization of interstate rivalry can be formulated by adding the parity dimension to the previous contextual conceptualization. Interstate rivalry can be defined maximally as ‘two mutually psychologically hostile states of relatively equal capabilities that view one another as rivals and compete over an issue (or issues) militarily in which past events affect present relations and there is an expectation of future contention.’ Power parity could be operationalized as rivalries for which neither state’s power exceeds the power of the other state by a ratio of 3:1 for a majority of dyad-years (Klein et al., 2006). Vasquez’s (1993, 2009) approach most closely approximates the maximal conceptualization of rivalry.

Existing conceptualizations of interstate rivalry can roughly be arranged along the min–max continuum (though operational differences complicate comparing across existing approaches (see the concluding section)). Empirical coverage would be widest for an issue rivalry approach (Mitchell and Thies, 2011) that is expanded to include triadic and multistate relations, additional types of issue competition, and single-issue cases. Adding the militarization dimension narrows the concept’s empirical coverage. Including the duration, issue competition, spatial consistency, and militarization dimensions, Klein et al. (2006) identify 290 cases of militarized interstate rivalry. Adding the identification dimension further restricts the concept’s empirical range. In excluding cases in which neither state explicitly views the other as a rival, Thompson (2001) identifies 173 cases of strategic rivalry. Adding the parity dimension (see Vasquez, 1993, 2009) would limit empirical coverage still further by eliminating asymmetric cases such as Cambodia–Vietnam, China–Vietnam, and Israel–Jordan, among others.

Conclusion

Interstate rivalry is a fundamental aspect of global politics. Conflict in the international system is highly concentrated within rival dyads. International peace remains tenuous due to the persistence of contention between such interstate rivals as Ethiopia and Eritrea, India and Pakistan, Israel and Syria, and others. Resolving the world’s most volatile rivalries could drastically decrease the overall levels of hostility and violence in the international system.

Developing an understanding of interstate rivalry begins with careful consideration of rivalry conceptualization. There are several ways in which interstate rivalry has been conceptualized. The intent of this study is not to determine which existing conceptual approach ‘truly’ captures the essence of interstate rivalry, but rather to unify conceptual approaches under a common framework.

Concept reconstruction and formation enables the development of a min–max conceptual template. Existing approaches can be arranged along the min–max continuum. The development of minimal and maximal conceptualizations also creates the means through which additional conceptualizations can be formulated. This study provides three examples of contextual conceptualizations of interstate rivalry in which dimensions are added to the minimal conceptualization, thereby narrowing the concept’s empirical coverage. Additional formulations are possible. For example, the psychological hostility dimension could be formulated first in reference to political elites and then more narrowly (regarding empirical range) in relation to both the political elites and the mass publics of each state.

Differences in operational criteria complicate comparing across existing approaches. For example, in order to satisfy the militarization requirement, the strategic rivalry approach (Thompson, 2001) requires that there is a significant probability of militarized conflict (as determined by assessing political leaders’ statements and intentions) while dispute–density approaches require that states engage in at least a particular number of militarized disputes (Bennett, 1997; Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Maoz and Mor, 2002). Future research could identify cases of rivalry moving from a minimal to maximal conceptualization applying consistent operational criteria for each dimension. This would enable an assessment of the extent to which adding each dimension affects empirical coverage.

The study of interstate rivalry in accordance with the min–max approach can be undertaken by qualitative as well as quantitative scholars. Most quantitative studies of interstate rivalry focus on dyadic relations. This may in part be due to difficulties involved with measuring variables and estimating models related to triadic and multistate relations. Complex triadic and multistate cases of rivalry can perhaps be best untangled through qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis can also be employed to test theories and trace causal processes at the maximal or contextual levels. Once support for a theory is established among contextual or maximal cases of rivalry, quantitative analysis can then be utilized to assess a theory’s broader generalizeability.

Interstate rivalry is not the only concept for which the min–max approach can be applied. Few, if any, concepts in the social sciences have a single agreed upon conceptualization. There are several conceptualizations of war (Vasquez, 2009). Non-rivalry or peace can be arranged on a continuum from ‘negative peace’ in which states are not openly hostile but there is a non-zero probability of militarized conflict, to ‘positive peace’ in which using force is ‘off the table’ (Klein et al., 2008). In future research, scholars could develop min–max frameworks for important social science concepts in a similar manner in which this study reconstructs the interstate rivalry concept.

Concepts are the building blocks of social science research. Investigation of the rivalry concept provides the basis from which the concept can be operationalized, cases of interstate rivalry can be identified, and empirical analyses can be conducted. Further exploring the nature and dynamics of interstate rivalry can facilitate developing an understanding of the means through which the issues that drive the world’s most volatile rivalries can be peacefully resolved.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

David R Dreyer is an Assistant Professor of political science at Lenoir-Rhyne University. His research interests include international conflict, rivalry and contentious issues in world politics.

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Unifying conceptualizations of interstate rivalry: A min–max approach

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Concept reconstruction and formation

The dimensions of interstate rivalry

Temporal dependence

Issue competition

Spatial consistency

Militarization

Identification

Psychological hostility

Parity

Minimal, contextual, and maximal approaches

Conclusion

Footnotes

Funding

Notes

Author biography

References