State feminism going global: Norway on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

Abstract

This article examines the role played by small states in the promotion or reinforcement of new ideas and emerging norms within international society. More specifically, it examines the role played by Norway in reinforcing the normative framework of ‘women, peace and security’, with a particular view to Norway’s first period of membership in the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Norway is regarded internationally as one of the lead countries in terms of promoting women’s rights in relation to peace and security. The article discusses four possible reasons that may explain Norway’s apparent suitability and effectiveness as a norm entrepreneur in this particular issue-area.

Keywords

Norm entrepreneur Norway small states state feminism United Nations Peacebuilding Commission ‘women,peace and security’

Introduction

The role played by small states in the promotion or reinforcement of new ideas and emerging norms within international society is an issue that has caught the attention of a number of international relations scholars over the last couple of decades (Ingebritsen et al., 2006). In lack of power relative to size and military capabilities, small states often exercise issue-specific power. The Nordic countries are often chosen to exemplify how small states can influence international agendas and world politics by adopting the role of norm entrepreneur (Björkdahl, 2007b). In this article, I examine the role played by Norway in reinforcing the normative framework of ‘women, peace and security’ (WPS), with a particular view to Norway’s first period of membership in the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Norway is regarded internationally as one of the lead countries in terms of promoting women’s rights in relation to peace and security, and I discuss here four possible reasons that may explain Norway’s apparent suitability and effectiveness as a norm entrepreneur in this particular issue-area.

Firstly, Norway has a legacy of being a staunch supporter of both the UN and multilateralism more generally. As a small state, Norway has a strong self-interest in promoting ideas and norms that contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of international law and order. The WPS agenda is seen as contributing to such a system maintenance.

Secondly, the welfare-state model that defines the structure of Norwegian society has strongly influenced the country’s political visions as to how sustainable development, social justice and peace can be achieved at the global level. The WPS agenda encompasses a set of norms on women’s rights that fit hand in glove with what is seen as Norway’s normative state interests, and the UN has become the central organizational arena for the promotion of these interests.

Thirdly, since the early 1990s, Norway has been able to operate successfully as a norm entrepreneur on a wide range of issues related to conflict resolution and peacebuilding because it enjoys a strong standing internationally and is regarded by many countries of the global south as a neutral actor (having no history of colonialism), with no obvious material or geopolitical agendas. Perceptions of neutrality, combined with a donor policy characterized by relatively few strings attached, have given Norway an opportunity to enter into dialogue with governments that from the outset may have been sceptical of, or indifferent to, liberal normative agendas such as WPS. Yet, by virtue of being a major donor, both multilaterally and bilaterally, Norway has the means to backstop normative agendas and policy priorities financially, which again provides Norway with leverage, although perhaps not always explicitly recognized.¹

Finally, civil society involvement is a key component of the Norwegian model for development cooperation and foreign policy execution. While civil society collaboration may not be exclusive to Norway, what is particular in the Norwegian model is the level of institutionalization of such collaboration, as well as the broad domestic consensus across political parties on the application of this collaboration as a Norwegian foreign policy instrument. Close cooperation with both national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, advocacy groups and individual experts – often organized in transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) – has become the rule rather than the exception. Rather than viewing civil society actors and transnational advocacy networks with scepticism – as is often the case with many other UN member states – Norway has taken advantage of their expertise and made them implementing partners on issues of high priority to Norwegian foreign policy.²

Close collaboration between the state and civil society groups in developing machineries and policies friendly to women’s rights has a particularly long tradition in Norway. Helga Hernes (1987) first coined the concept ‘state feminism’, which refers to the interplay between civil society – specifically women’s organizations – and state institutions in developing policies for gender equality in the Scandinavian countries. According to Hernes, these policies were ‘a result of the interplay between agitation from below and integration policy from above’ (Hernes, 1987: 11). At the global level similar strategies have been pursued in setting WPS on the UN agenda, and bringing it to fruition with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). The resolution was an outcome of intense lobbying by international women’s organizations ‘from below’ in combination with diplomacy ‘from above’ by individuals within the UN system and in a small group of UN member states, including Norway (Tryggestad, 2009).

In this article, the above theses about Norway’s ability to act as a norm entrepreneur are discussed in the context of and supported by a case study of Norway’s performance during its time as co-chair of the UN PBC and chair of the latter’s Burundi country configuration from June 2006 to July 2008. A founding member of the PBC, Norway was well-placed to influence policy development and promote issues of particular concern to Norwegian foreign policymakers, including the WPS agenda. In order to analyse how this agenda was pursued and reinforced during the period of Norway’s PBC membership, I have examined official documents from both the UN and the Norwegian government, including resolutions, reports, action plans, speeches and press statements. Secondary literature, such as books and NGO reports, has also been an important source of information. In addition, a number of individuals centrally involved in the PBC deliberations during the period in question have been interviewed. The narratives of my informants proved to be important sources of data for capturing discussions and processes that took place behind the scenes. My study also included an element of participant observation, as I attended (as an observer) both meetings of the PBC and seminars organized by NGOs (in New York) on the topic of women and peacebuilding in Burundi. However, before outlining the empirical study in more detail, I will begin by providing a brief introduction to the conceptual framework on which it is based.

Norm emergence and norm advocacy

A norm is generally defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). In explaining how norms influence behaviour and policy change, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895) refer to a three-stage process where norms in the first stage emerge, in the second stage cascade (or proliferates), before finally becoming internalized. At each stage you will typically find different types of actors – or norm entrepreneurs – applying different kinds of strategies and methods to influence behaviour and policy change.

Realist theorists would argue that it takes a hegemonic state to set this process in motion. Other states will then follow (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Keohane and Goldstein, 1993). Sikkink (1998) takes issue with the realist approach and claims that it does not explain the origins of social purpose of hegemonic action. This is particularly the case when it comes to the emergence of human rights norms. It could also be added that the realist approach does not explain instances where norms emerge and cascade without a hegemonic state in the lead. This has indeed been the case with the WPS agenda, where hegemons have been followers rather than leaders (Klotz, 1995).

According to Sikkink (1998: 518), ‘Norms research suggests that the origins of many international norms lie not in pre-existing state interests but in strongly held principled ideas (ideas about right and wrong) and the desire to convert others to those ideas’. For the Nordic countries ‘gender equality’ is one such principled idea they strongly believe in promoting. However, states rarely operate on their own when it comes to norm promotion (Jolly et al., 2009; Weiss and Thakur, 2010). In their seminal book Activists beyond Borders (1998), Keck and Sikkink show how transnational advocacy networks of norm entrepreneurs inside governments, within international organizations and NGOs are becoming increasingly influential in setting agendas and changing international politics, particularly on human rights issues. These advocacy networks have also played a key role in setting the WPS agenda and promoting the proliferation of this normative framework.

The normative framework of women, peace and security

For new norms to proliferate they need to be institutionalized in organizations with high legitimacy (Elgström, 2000). The first step towards legitimization of the WPS agenda was made when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in October 2000. The provisions of the resolution build on a set of norms related to women’s rights in the social, political and economic spheres that are already acknowledged in international legal instruments, such as the Human Rights Declaration (1966) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979). Thus, at the time of the adoption there was little principled disagreement as to the legitimacy of women’s rights in general. What made Resolution 1325 groundbreaking, however, was that women’s rights were now also to become an integral part of UN deliberations on international peace and security (Tryggestad, 2009). The resolution calls for women’s full involvement in all UN peace and security activities, along with the mainstreaming of women’s interests and particular needs in peace negotiations, conflict management and peacebuilding processes. By implication, women’s inclusion in such processes and the integration of women’s issues and concerns in peace agreements, strategy documents, operational programming and planning, as well as in budgeting for various peace and security initiatives, is to become standard practice. The choice of location for the lobbying and negotiation of this normative framework – the Security Council – has proved to be very important for the proliferation of the WPS agenda (Coleman, 2011).

In UN parlance, the provisions of Resolution 1325 are referred to as the ‘WPS agenda’ and are treated as a formal item on the Security Council’s agenda. The WPS agenda is recognized and referred to as ‘a normative framework’ – or standard of behaviour – by a steadily growing number of UN member states, actors within the UN system and NGOs alike. As per September 2013, 43 UN member states have adopted national action plans (NAPs) on the implementation of Resolution 1325, and a number of others are in the process of doing so. Also, regional organizations, such as the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the African Union, have all adopted implementation policies. However, the WPS agenda is a normative framework that has not yet reached the final stage of the Finnemore and Sikkink norm life-cycle, where it has been fully accepted and internalized. It is still dependent on the support and mobilization of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ if it is to be fully incorporated into strategic analysis, policy planning and operational activities. In the context of its engagement in the UN PBC, Norway seized the opportunity and used the power of being co-chair of the Commission and chair of the Burundi country configuration to advocate for the WPS agenda (for more on the ‘power of the chair’, see Björkdahl, 2007a). This was a deliberate policy approach, one that enjoyed strong political and financial backing. It also involved close cooperation with civil society actors, both nationally and internationally. What Norway did as norm entrepreneur was not to put a new issue on the agenda. Norway decided to take a norm that was in the making and give it an extra push by bringing it to the forefront in PBC deliberations.

Norway and system support

Norway has a long tradition as a staunch supporter of the UN and its efforts to strengthen international law and world order. The general sentiment among the majority of Norwegian politicians – irrespective of party affiliation – has long been that small countries such as Norway are best served by a UN that is as strong and effective as possible in protecting the interests of small states (Frydenlund, 1982; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Since the early 1970s, successive Norwegian governments have promoted a series of UN reform initiatives – often as part of a Nordic block of member states (De Carvalho and Schia, 2004). In addition, several prominent Norwegian politicians have served in high-level UN positions, which have given them an opportunity to influence organizational matters and policy processes.³

The strengthening of the UN through increased efforts at reform was a key element of the Government Platform adopted by the Norwegian coalition government, which was in office from October 2005 to October 2013. Accordingly, when the PBC was formally launched in 2005 as a key UN reform initiative, it received the wholehearted support of the Norwegian government (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, 2005). The Norwegian government even envisaged a special role for itself in relation to peacebuilding efforts. The Government Platform states that ‘Norway can play a more important role in peace building than in other foreign policy areas, and Norway can strengthen this field through a further systematisation of Norwegian initiatives and activities’ (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007).

The PBC was established to fill a capacity gap within the UN system related to the provision of assistance to countries in an immediate post-conflict transitional phase (UN General Assembly, 2005; UN Security Council, 2005). The Commission was mandated, among other things, to assist countries emerging from conflict to develop integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, and to strengthen the coordination among the many actors (both multilateral and bilateral) involved in peacebuilding efforts.

The PBC works through two primary configurations: a central Organizational Committee (OC) and country-specific meetings (also referred to as ‘country configurations’). In addition, there is a Working Group on Lessons Learned. The OC consists of 31 member states, representing key UN bodies and important groups of member states. A Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) have also been established to support the Commission’s work. Together, these three central entities – the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF – make up what is known as the ‘UN peacebuilding architecture’. The PBC became operational in June 2006, with Burundi and Sierra Leone as the first two countries on its agenda (for more on the PBC, see Berdal, 2009; Jenkins, 2008; Tryggestad, 2010).

Norway was elected co-chair of the UN PBC at the Commission’s first formal meeting, representing the group of major donors to the UN system. Beyond serving as co-chair of the OC – and in that capacity being centrally involved in deliberations on a number of organizational matters in the startup phase – Norway was also assigned specific responsibility for chairing the process on developing a peacebuilding strategy for Burundi. As this study shows, the Burundi country configuration would soon become an arena for the promotion of norms and values important to the Norwegian government. Among these were women’s rights in relation to peace and security matters, with a particular emphasis on women’s political empowerment and inclusion in decision making processes.

The Peacebuilding Commission: An arena for Norwegian norm entrepreneurship

The fact that it was not only a member of the PBC’s OC but also co-chair of an entirely new body provided Norway with a unique possibility to influence deliberations, guidelines, work procedures and the institutional identity of the PBC. One of Norway’s overarching goals during its membership period was to contribute to the establishment of guidelines and routines for consultations between the PBC and civil society – including women’s groups – both in New York and in the countries that fell under the PBC’s agenda. In the Commission’s formative years, this was quite a controversial issue, particularly among member states representing the global south, but it was an area on which the Norwegian government was unwilling to make any compromises.⁴ The importance of both cooperation and consultation with civil society is firmly embedded not only in Norway’s ‘multi-stakeholder approach’ to peacebuilding, but also in the country’s approach to peace and reconciliation efforts more generally. Since the early 1990s, close cooperation with Norwegian NGOs with a presence in conflict areas has opened up various windows of opportunity for Norwegian government involvement in peace and reconciliation processes around the world. In turn, a range of Norwegian and international NGOs have become operational partners in the execution of a number of peace and development projects and programmes. Among these NGOs we also find national and international women’s organizations and networks. NGO collaboration is a key characteristic of the much-discussed ‘Norwegian model for peace and reconciliation’. In addition, what may have started out simply as an ad hoc arrangement became institutionalized as a formal foreign policy instrument in 2000 through the establishment of a Section for Peace and Reconciliation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egeland, 2008; Neumann, 2011; for a critical account, see Tvedt, 2009).⁵

Membership in the PBC was also regarded by senior diplomats and the political leadership of Norway’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs as providing an important arena for the exercise of political influence and the promotion of Norwegian policies and interests on a whole set of thematic issues beyond that of civil society cooperation. According to one senior diplomat who was centrally involved in the process, the ‘Platform for Norwegian Membership in the PBC’⁶ served as the guide for the day-to-day work of the Norwegian chairmanship.⁷ In addition to providing overarching guidance on Norwegian goals and priorities for the period of Norway’s membership, the platform states that in the country configurations particular priority should be given to the following issue-areas:

women/gender-equality perspective – with a particular emphasis on effective integration of such a perspective in strategies discussed and recommended by the PBC;

security sector reform (including the military, police and justice system); and

effective resource mobilization through the PBC.

The Norwegian prioritization of particular issue-areas and normative frameworks that should ideally be integrated into peacebuilding strategies for post-conflict countries was in keeping with a long tradition of Scandinavian norm entrepreneurship – or what Christine Ingebritsen (2002: 13) has referred to as promotion of ‘a particular view of the good society’. Ingebritsen argues that the Scandinavian countries ‘share distinct ideas about appropriate forms of domestic and international interventions’, and suggests that, since they lack military and economic power, the Scandinavian group of countries ‘pursues “social power” by acting as norm entrepreneurs in the international community’. Ingebritsen lists ‘sustainable development’, ‘peaceful resolution of conflicts’ and ‘provision of foreign aid’ as issue-areas where the Nordic countries have been particularly influential as norm entrepreneurs. To these, I would add ‘gender equality’ and ‘women’s rights’ as another distinct issue-area in which the Nordic countries have exercised normative power, not only in relation to the social, political and economic spheres, but also increasingly within the sphere of international peace and security.⁸

Ingebritsen (2002: 18) claims that the evolution of the welfare state has been an important catalyst for the normative-entrepreneurship role of the Scandinavian countries internationally. Global social solidarity is a logical extension of the intrastate social solidarity enjoyed by the Scandinavian countries, she suggests. The role played by Norway as a norm entrepreneur in relation to the WPS agenda during the country’s membership of the UN PBC provides yet another example of this Nordic social responsibility ethos going global.

State feminism going global

Internationally, Norway is regarded as a lead country with considerable normative power on women’s issues and gender equality. In addition, Norway’s specific engagement with women’s issues in relation to international peace and security began years before the adoption of Resolution 1325. Already in the mid-1990s, Norway was providing financial support to a series of Expert Group Meetings on gender, peace and conflict initiated by the UN Department for the Advancement of Women (now a part of UN Women).⁹ Together with Sweden, Norway also initiated and funded the first major study under the auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) on how to mainstream a gender perspective in UN peace operations (Olsson et al., 1999). Directed by an external expert, the study consisted of a number of case studies conducted by a group of independent researchers (Olsson, 1999; Stiehm, 2000), and its preliminary findings were presented and discussed at a high-level seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, in May 2000. The outcome of this seminar was the ‘Windhoek Declaration’, which also included the ‘Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations’ (United Nations, 2000) – a document that served as an important precursor to Resolution 1325, which was adopted later that year.

Furthermore, in 1996 the Norwegian government appointed a female ambassador, Helga Hernes (the ‘mother’ of the state feminism concept), as the Norwegian foreign ministry’s Special Advisor on Peacekeeping Operations.¹⁰ Hernes was one of the first ambassadors that in statements and speeches in various UN forums – most notably within the influential Special Committee on Peacekeeping (also known as the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly) and the Commission on the Status of Women – called for the acknowledgement of women’s roles in relation to international peace and security and highlighted the need to recruit more women as peacekeepers.¹¹ In 2004, the UN DPKO established a gender adviser position, which for many years was funded by Norway, while Norway simultaneously lobbied for the incorporation of this position within the regular DPKO budget. Since 2000, Norway has also been an active member of the ‘Friends of Resolution 1325’ – a group of UN member states, coordinated by Canada, that meets regularly to discuss policy initiatives and issues relevant to the implementation of Resolution 1325. The funding and political support provided by Norway for the various initiatives listed above were important early steps to build normative power in relation to the emerging WPS agenda. Throughout this early period of lobbying and policy development there was a close collaboration between Norwegian policy makers and national as well as international women’s organizations and individual experts on women’s rights issues.

Another important step towards normative power by Norway was the adoption in March 2006 of a NAP for the implementation of Resolution 1325 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 2011). In November 2004 the Security Council called on member states to develop NAPs to speed up the implementation of Resolution 1325. Norway was the second member state to respond to this call. The NAP sets out a series of implementation initiatives and commitments made by the Norwegian government, both multilateral and bilateral. In relation to the PBC, the NAP states that ‘Norway will seek to ensure that a gender perspective is integrated into all aspects of the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s work’ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006: 13). It should be noted that the NAP was drafted and published long before it was decided that Norway would become a member of the PBC, to say nothing of being co-chair of that body. Still, already at this point Norway had clear views on which norms should be promoted through the PBC.

Accordingly, it is perhaps unsurprising that women’s issues formed part of the Norwegian platform for the PBC membership. What is interesting to note, however, is that the WPS agenda was listed first among Norway’s thematic priorities for the work in the country configurations.

The platform was developed immediately after the adoption of the Norwegian NAP on Resolution 1325. Thus, it is likely that the level of political commitment among Norway’s ministers of foreign affairs and development cooperation, as well as awareness among key civil servants regarding the relevance of the WPS agenda for policy development, budgeting and operational activities, were still strong. The process of developing a peacebuilding strategy for Burundi was regarded by the Norwegian diplomats and policymakers involved as an important test case for the PBC and UN reform efforts. It was also seen as a test case for the NAP on Resolution 1325.

Political and financial backing of a normative agenda

Norway was not at the outset an obvious candidate to chair the Burundi country configuration, and the country has never played a particularly active role as either donor or partner in development cooperation in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Nevertheless, when asked by the group of major UN donors to take on the role of chair of the Burundi country configuration, it was difficult for Norway to respond negatively. Indeed, according to Johan Løvald, former Norwegian ambassador to the UN, the Norwegian government regarded it an honour to be asked.¹² Of course, the matter was not just a question of honour. Taking on the role of chair of the Burundi process was an expression of what Neumann (2011) refers to as ‘small-state routine diplomacy’, in which Norway could both maximize its own national interests and contribute to the maintenance of the UN system.

The Burundian government itself also favoured Norway as chair. Because of its lack of a colonial history, Norway was regarded by the Burundian government as a country with no self-interests in Burundi or the Great Lakes Region.¹³ Informants also alluded to the fact that Burundian representatives regarded it as favourable to have a rich donor country as chair of the peacebuilding strategy process, as it was expected that bilateral donor support would increase as a result of the process.

After the decision had been made, the efforts of the New York-based Norwegian chair enjoyed strong political and financial backing from Oslo. According to Løvald, the backing of the Norwegian government strengthened Norway’s credibility and ability to influence negotiations.¹⁴ The quality and scope of support provided by then Norwegian minister for international development and the environment, Erik Solheim, was noticed both in New York and Bujumbura. Just prior to his appointment as minister in 2005, Solheim went on a parliamentary visit to Burundi to get a first-hand impression of the peace process. Once appointed minister, he identified Burundi as a promising case for successful peacebuilding – a peacebuilding process that Norway as a peace nation should actively support.¹⁵

Consequently, when Norway was elected chair of the Burundi country configuration in June 2006, considerable political prestige and resources were invested to support the country’s ongoing peace process. Norway worked through different channels and by different means. Diplomatic negotiations were supported by the high degree of visibility of top-level Norwegian politicians and dignitaries, both multilaterally through the PBC and bilaterally with the Burundian government. A few months after Norway was elected chair of the Burundi configuration, Minister Solheim went on an official visit to the country. To emphasize Burundi’s newly gained importance to Norwegian peace and development efforts, a Norwegian embassy section was established in Bujumbura in May 2007.¹⁶ It was hardly a coincidence that the Norwegian crown prince, in his capacity as goodwill ambassador for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), paid Burundi an official visit in October/November 2007. He was also invited by the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs to open a high-level seminar on the Burundi peacebuilding process in Oslo in February 2008. Further, in early 2008, Minister Erik Solheim appointed a senior diplomat, with longstanding experience from diplomatic postings in the Great Lakes Region, as his special envoy to Burundi. The appointment was an ad hoc arrangement, as the category ‘special envoy’ is not a regular job category within the Norwegian foreign ministry.

The political prestige invested in the Burundian peace process was backed by a considerable investment of financial resources. On his second visit to the country to attend the donors’ roundtable in Bujumbura in May 2007, Solheim pledged NOK 60 million in bilateral budget support for Burundi per year for a three-year period (2007–2009). The level of support was increased to NOK 100 million in 2008. Norway was one of the first countries to provide direct budget support to the Burundian government. In addition, considerable financial support for the peace process was channelled through Norwegian and international NGOs operating in Burundi,¹⁷ regional initiatives, and various UN agencies, programmes and funds – including the UN PBF, to which Norway was and still is one of the largest contributors.¹⁸ The PBF provided US $35 million for Burundi during 2006–2008, of which US $7 million was spent on projects with a special focus on women and/or gender equality (PBSO, 2009). This is a fairly high percentage of ‘gender earmarking’ of funds in a UN context. The projects were largely initiated by women’s organizations in Burundi, through UN entities already operating in the country (such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), now a part of UN Women). However, the projects enjoyed strong political backing from the PBC in New York in the bidding process for PBF funds.¹⁹

Norm-building through negotiations

One of the PBC’s core principles is that peacebuilding strategies should be developed and owned by the governments of the countries in question. The role of the PBC is to support, facilitate and coordinate actors involved in peacebuilding efforts. However, since it was an entirely new creature within the UN family, the Commission’s work procedures were not set in stone from the outset. Due to a lack of formal guidelines, neither the PBC member states, the PBSO nor the countries on the PBC agenda knew exactly how to go about having the strategy work done. This left member states with experience of international negotiations and staff members within the PBSO with the upper hand in terms of being proactive and able to influence the final outcome of the strategy work. In Burundi, neither the government nor civil society knew quite what to expect from the PBC process. The Burundian government had little experience of international negotiations and insufficient human resources to undertake consultations and coordination efforts nationally. Civil society got involved in the process after the government had put together the first draft of its peacebuilding priorities, and after pressure had been exerted on the government both from New York and from various international and national civil society actors – including women’s organizations.

When the Burundian government delegation arrived in New York in October 2006 to present the first draft of its peacebuilding strategy, ‘women’s issues’ were not on the list of prioritized issue-areas. Rather, the head of delegation, then minister of foreign relations and international cooperation Antoinette Batumubwira, emphasized that Burundian women had already made it into decision making by ensuring a high level of women’s representation in the country’s parliament and among government ministers.²⁰ Thus, there was no need to raise women’s issues in particular. According to Burundi’s recently adopted Constitution (February 2005), women were to make up at least 30% of all members of parliament – a target that had been achieved when Burundi held its first democratic elections during the summer of 2005. In addition, the Burundian government had a high number of female ministers in posts traditionally held by men in most countries, including the posts of minister of foreign relations and international cooperation, minister of finance, and minister of commerce and industry. Also, both the vice-president and the speaker of parliament were women (United Nations Operation in Burundi, 2005).

The Burundian delegation was proud and self-confident about how Burundian women had achieved high-level representation in politics. Former minister Batumubwira admits that she had no knowledge of Resolution 1325 or the WPS agenda when she joined the Burundian cabinet in 2005.²¹ When she presented her government’s priorities for peacebuilding to the members of the PBC, the list contained issues that she regarded as being important for Burundians – without highlighting women in particular. She remembers that the Burundian delegation had long discussions with the PBC chair about this issue.

Inexperienced with international negotiations, the relatively newly elected Burundian government had little knowledge and awareness of the types of problems and challenges they would need to watch out for. Government capacities were also weak. Batumubwira recounts that she only had a small group of people working on the strategy document, in close collaboration with the UN presence in Burundi. They were also working under considerable time pressure. For the PBC, it was important to have some quick results to point to. Thus, in the beginning there was not really much time for broad national consultations. The consultations were first and foremost with the Norwegian chair and the staff at the PBSO, supported by the UN presence in Burundi. Still, Batumubwira remembers the negotiations with the PBC – or its Norwegian chair – as a dialogue and learning process rather than as a process in which certain issues or ideas were forced upon the Burundian representatives against their will: ‘We knew that we were not equal. But they, the way they behaved, helped us to feel really confident and that we could talk like people who are at the same level’.²²

In the end, the Burundian government had no real problems with including specific references to women in the strategy document, as long as employment remained the most important priority. In the words of Batumubwira, ‘[reference to women] remains an added value, as long as it is not diluting the other priorities. So it was not pressure, but we felt that it would be preferable’.

For their part, the Norwegian diplomats in New York were surprised to find that women’s issues did not figure high on the agenda of the Burundian delegation, particularly since women were so prominent in government positions in Burundi. Based on long experience with negotiations both within multilateral frameworks and as facilitators in a number of peace processes around the world, the Norwegian diplomats knew that issues not specifically addressed or made mention of in key agreements and strategies tend to be forgotten in the implementation phase, ending up far down the list of priorities of the governments and donors in question. This has been particularly the case in relation to the status of women and women’s interests in peace negotiations and peacebuilding processes (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010, 2011).

In the Burundian case, although the country had a modern constitution, well ahead of most other countries in terms of accommodating women’s rights and gender equality, Burundian society at large remained very conservative and traditional in terms of gender roles. According to ambassador Løvald, it was important for the PBC to base its approach to women’s issues on the legal instruments already available.²³ In this way, the PBC could play an important role in reinforcing and promoting a national process that was already under way. Accordingly, the Norwegian chair regarded it as important that references to women and Resolution 1325 were integrated into the formal peacebuilding documents, if only to keep the wording as a reference point for later advocacy and policy-formulation processes.²⁴ From a theoretical point of view, this was a clear-cut act of normative interventionism and norm-building by the chair, and very much along the traditional state feminist way of thinking on how to best promote women’s rights.

Norm promotion through civil society cooperation

Another example of Norway’s state feminist approach to norm promotion is the way by which women and women’s organizations were included in the formal peacebuilding process in Burundi. At the time when Burundi was referred to the PBC, there was already a vibrant women’s movement in the country, actively lobbying for the inclusion of women and women’s concerns in the country’s ongoing peacebuilding process (Anderson, 2010; Falch, 2010). Nevertheless, irrespective of what had been achieved in terms of women’s representation in politics, Burundian women’s organizations still struggled to be heard and relied heavily on the international network of women’s NGOs and entities to get access to information on PBC matters and funding from the PBF (Klot, 2007). The central international NGOs were International Alert, Care and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, as well as UN entities such as the UNIFEM (International Alert, 2008; NGO Working Group, 2006; NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security et al., 2005; Tripp et al., 2009).

As part of the peacebuilding process a PBF National Steering Committee was set up, which served as a forum for national dialogue on peacebuilding priorities and as a point of contact between the national level and the PBC in New York. In the initial phase of its operation, membership was limited to representatives of the Burundian government and various UN entities already operating in the country. Gradually, participation at committee meetings was expanded to include donors, international NGOs and national civil society representatives as observers (ActionAid et al., 2007), although women and women’s organizations were still excluded.

In early 2007, the NGO Working Group in New York was contacted by a representative of the Dushirehamwe (‘Let’s Reconcile’) women’s network in Burundi, who expressed her concern about the lack of women’s representation in the National Steering Committee. This came as something of a surprise to the NGO Working Group. Gina Torry, former coordinator of the group, notes:

Despite having 30% representation of women in government, despite having women inside the UN Headquarters helping set this up, somehow the National Steering Committee in Burundi had been set up without any women.²⁵

The NGO Working Group immediately invited a Burundian women’s representative to New York to meet with the PBC and its Norwegian chair. For the Norwegian ambassador and his team, the idea of chairing a strategy process for peacebuilding without somehow including women and women-specific concerns was unthinkable. Such an approach would go against key political priorities for the Norwegian chairmanship period. In negotiations with the Burundian government, Norwegian diplomats argued that it would be in the interest of peace and stability, as well as the government’s international standing, to include women and women’s concerns in the peacebuilding process.²⁶ Through a combination of emphasis on integration policies from above and NGO agitation from below changes took place. As Torry put it:

Norway played a very important role in getting women onto the National Steering Committee in Burundi. So within, I would say, eight weeks, there were women sitting on the National Steering Committee. Dushirehamwe credits the NGO Working Group and Norway with this happening.

The Norwegian chair also made a point of meeting with women’s groups and organizations whenever a delegation from the PBC visited Burundi. Likewise, it was regarded as important to meet with representatives of Burundian women’s organizations when these visited New York. By attending gatherings for women only in Burundi, the PBC made women’s organizations not just legitimate actors in the peacebuilding process, but also harder for the Burundian government to overlook.²⁷ Many of these organizations also received funding either through the PBF or bilaterally from Norway for projects aimed at women’s empowerment. Such support included the creation of a position within an international NGO so that a coordinator could work with Dushirehamwe to ensure that women’s rights were integrated into PBC/PBF processes (ActionAid et al., 2007).

Concluding remarks

The PBC’s founding resolutions call upon the Commission’s members to integrate the WPS agenda into all aspects of its work (UN General Assembly, 2005; UN Security Council, 2005). During the first formative years of the PBC, Norway was both a regular commission member and served as chair of the so-called Burundi configuration. Norway used ‘the power of the chair’ both to negotiate gender language in formal peacebuilding documents and to negotiate the inclusion of women in a number of peacebuilding activities.

Although women’s concerns were not on the Burundian government’s initial list of priorities for a peacebuilding strategy, the WPS agenda (including a specific reference to Resolution 1325) was well integrated into the final Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi adopted by the PBC in June 2007 (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2007). Not only did this have direct implications for women’s involvement in the peacebuilding process in Burundi, but the strategy document also served as an important formal reinforcement of an emerging normative agenda in international relations. Since the Strategic Framework for Burundi was the first strategy document to be adopted by this entirely new UN body, it set an example and provided direction for the strategy processes to follow in other post-conflict countries on the PBC agenda.

In the beginning of this article four possible explanations were outlined for why a small state like Norway is particularly well-placed to take on a norm entrepreneur role. In the case of Norway on the PBC all of these explanations were at play. Normative power was exercised through diplomacy, backed by both political and financial means. Advocacy and awareness-raising through close cooperation with national and international civil society actors were also important. Interestingly, Norway’s normative interventionism took place without giving rise to any criticism of imposing agendas – at least none visible in any of the data generated for this study. Rather, the role Norway played as norm entrepreneur has been applauded both by UN member states and by the NGO community as an example to be followed by other state actors.

One reason for this absence of criticism may be Norway’s integrity as a longstanding supporter of the UN system, in both normative and financial terms. Another may be the perception prevalent among countries of the global south of Norway as a neutral, altruistic actor in international affairs. In the case of the Burundian government, the absence of criticism may of course also be a result of the asymmetric power relations at play during negotiations. Burundi was – and still is – a very poor country, totally dependent on donor support, while Norway was one of the major donors to the UN peacebuilding architecture in general, and to peacebuilding initiatives in Burundi in particular.

In the literature on norms and global governance, the emergence of the normative framework of WPS, as well as the role that small states like Norway have played in its promotion and reinforcement, remains largely unrecognized. Yet, the integration of the WPS agenda into the deliberations of the UN PBC exemplifies both the normative power that small states can exercise and the difference they can make in reinforcing norms in the making – if they are willing and able, of course, to take on the role of norm entrepreneur. It also illustrates how, through the exercise of such normative power, small states are able not only to promote and/or reinforce a given issue, but also to reinforce their own standing within the international community of states.

Footnotes

Funding

This research has been conducted as part of the research project Gender, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, PRIO. The research project is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Notes

Author biography

Torunn L. Tryggestad is a researcher and project leader at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Her main areas of interest are the UN and the gendered dimensions of UN peace and security politics, currently with a particular emphasis on gender and mediation. Her most recent publication is a book chapter (in Norwegian) on the relevance of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security to the Norwegian Armed Forces (Abstrakt Forlag, 2014).

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