Normative Power Europe and the importance of discursive context: The European Union and the politics of religion

Theoretical considerations – Normative Power Europe

Since its launch by Manners in 2002, the concept of ‘normative power’ has fruitfully generated a debate about the possibly unique role of the EU in IR (see Manners, 2013; Whitman, 2013). The concept has been a source of inspiration in empirical analyses for a significant number of scholars, not least due to the openness of its central formulations (Huelss, 2011: 87). Criticism of the concept and the inherent claim that the EU is a ‘normative power’ has also been raised as part of the debate about NPE. ² Amongst the constructive critics, attempts have been made to refine the concept, often focusing on different analytical connotations of NPE or selective appraisals of particular aspects of the EU’s external activity (Wood, 2011: 242). Here, the concept has been recast with the EU as an ethical power (Aggestam, 2008), a pragmatic power (Wood, 2011) or an emerging military power (Sangiovanni, 2003; Treacher, 2004). The discussion about NPE also runs parallel to the literature about the older idea about the EU as a civilian power launched by Duchêne in 1972 (Duchêne, 1972). However, at present NPE is generally seen as more analytically interesting than ‘civilian power Europe’ (Forsberg, 2011: 2).

Less attention in the discussion about NPE has been paid to analysing Manners’ understanding of power and discussing whether another or a more nuanced understanding of power would enhance the value of the concept of normative power. The understanding of power is always a central part of any concept in IR (Guzzini, 2005: 508) and thus also for the discussion about NPE. In IR, a power can basically mean a unit with certain capabilities or characteristics attached; in the case of NPE, the EU is seen as a unit that, in some sense, is based on norms. In addition, (normative) power can also be understood as the power exercised by this unit vis-à-vis the outside world (cf. Forsberg, 2011: 8–9). This paper focuses on the second sense of (normative) power, the exercise of power. In line with the criticism by Diez below, the former use of the term is not particularly fruitful because all states or other units can be said to have a normative foundation of some kind that affects their foreign policies (Diez, 2005).

Central to Manners’ (2002) understanding (and thus in line with the second understanding above) is the ‘ability to shape conceptions of what the “normal” is in IR’ (Manners, 2002: 239–240). In political science, power is often theorised in terms of four dimensions: the first dimension, often associated with Dahl (1957), is the ability of A to get B to do something that B would not otherwise have done. The second dimension is A’s ability to prevent an issue from reaching the decision-making agenda (Barach and Baratz, 1963). The third dimension is ‘the power to shape, influence or determine others’ beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance’ (Lukes, 2005a: 486). The fourth dimension is based on a Foucault’s radical critique of conceptions of power in terms of the first three dimensions. Here, it is the social context within which social actors are embedded that ascribes certain roles and possibilities to the actors. Power is not the property of particular individuals, classes or states, but the different forms of domination that operate whenever social relations exist (Lukes, 2005b: 88–89). All social actors and relationships are subjects of power. Power is in this sense both productive and oppressive. Frequently, and differently from the first three dimensions of power, there is no conception of actors’ ‘objective’ interests (cf. Hindess, 2005: 116). There is also less of an interest in the overt exercise of power, and more of an interest in general patterns of domination. The fourth dimension provides the background for the exercise of power within the first three dimensions.

Manners (2002) is not explicit about his understanding of power. However, the six mechanisms for the diffusion of norms presented in Manners (2002: 244–245) suggest that his concept of power is restricted to or, at least, concentrates on the exercising of power in terms of the third dimension and, to a lesser extent, the first dimension (Huelss, 2011: 88): his mechanism of ‘transference’ fits within Dahl’s first dimension of power and is thus not different from the way states are often seen to further their own views. His mechanisms of ‘contagion’, ‘informational’, ‘procedural’ and ‘overt diffusion’ all come with examples of how EU norms are passed on to the outside world in specific situations (Manners, 2002: 244–245). However, there are no considerations about why the outside world might take on these norms. Only the mechanism of ‘cultural filter’ suggests a broader interest in why the outside world might (or might not) adopt EU norms. However, his conceptualisation of power gives no clear suggestions about the nature of the processes whereby other states might adopt the EU’s norms as part of a ‘cultural filter’. The six mechanisms for the diffusion of norms ‘shaping conceptions of the “normal”’ are thus mainly concerned with concrete ways in which the EU might shape or influence others’ beliefs and desires through norm transfusion with few considerations about the broader structural context that allows these processes to pass on norms. Manners’ concept of power can thus be said to come closest to the third dimension of power, and to a lesser extent, to the first dimension of power.

Manners’ conceptualisation of power is not helpful for examining how the EU is in a unique category as an international actor that shapes conceptions of the normal, since the usage of the first and third dimensions of power in imposing norms would not make the EU different from the way other international actors further their norms (cf. Diez, 2005). If we look at whether the EU influences conceptions of the normal in IR (as opposed to affecting more concrete aspects of IR), a more structural conception of power is, this paper argues, more appropriate – a more context-based notion of the power of an actor.

Manners comes closer to this in a later text from 2009: ‘If relational power is concerted action and structural power is environment-shaping, then normative power presents a third form of power – the power of ideas themselves….Normative power is to be found wherever powerful ideas and argumentation is encountered….’ (Manners, 2009: 570, 567–571). However, the argument is not developed. Moreover, there is a tendency in Manners’ work to see ideas in an area as powerful in themselves rather than powerful by virtue of the broader ideational context in which they are embedded (Manners, 2009: 570–571).

Considerations about the importance of context are not part of reformulations of the concept referred to in the beginning of this section. None of the critics of the concept (constructivists/deconstructivists) has included substantial consideration about the importance of context. An exception to this is the interesting contribution of Huells. However, for Huells the issue of context is not the main focus of his analysis. Keene (2012) draws on a sociological approach to the contextual elements of NPE where the EU’s normative power is based on status stratification and social closure in international society. Although his contribution is significant in its focus on ideational context, it does not look at how the context defining of the ‘normal’, including status, is shaped in negotiations of meaning or how power is exercised. The EU’s status appears to have a static character.

By looking at what discursive structures of meaning provide the EU’s particular discourses on liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights with an ability to influence the normal (Manners, 2002: 242–243) in particular areas, we are going beyond the six mechanisms for exercising normative power presented by Manners in his 2002 article. However, this broadening of the understanding of power through the inclusion of the non-static, discursive contextual preconditions for exercising power, which is the central theoretical suggestion in this paper, is not incommensurate with Manners’ ambition to examine the shaping of conceptions of the normal by the EU. On the contrary, it provides the broad understanding of power that is necessary for understanding something as wide-reaching and fundamental as the shaping of conceptions of the normal in IR. In addition, it is in line with the tendency in the tradition of constructivism to which Manners broadly belongs to embrace the fourth dimension of power (Guzzini, 2005: 495) (the article does not, therefore, deal with the possibility that the structural context could be looked at from a power political perspective).

The latter parts of this article will present two central understandings of the discursive context of NPE – labelled here as Habermasian and Derridean. The labelling is justified on the grounds that these two thinkers are often associated, respectively, with modernist approaches with their adherence to universalism and postmodernist/poststructuralist approaches and their turn to particularism. The key works of Habermas in this respect are Theory of Communicative Action (1984) and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1990). Habermas argues that the use of language with the aim of understanding is the original mode of language use. With regard to universal claims to reason, Habermas states:

In action oriented to reaching understanding, validity claims are ‘always already’ implicitly raised.Those universal claims (to the…..rightness of the speech act with respect to existing norms and values) are set in the general structures of possible communication. In these validity claims communicative theory can locate a….claim to reason…that must be recognised de facto whenever and wherever there is to be consensual action. (Habermas, 1979 quoted in Bernstein, 2006: 77)

Even if modernisation both furthers strategic and communicative rationalisation, Habermas has high hopes for the latter (Habermas, 1984), which makes him an heir of the Enlightenment and Reason. Meaning can be found outside discourse.

The central works of Derrida are Positions (1981) and Of Grammatology (1976). A central assertion in these works is that there is no meaning outside the text (Derrida, 1976), which leads to the claim that signs are traces with no other foundation than the movement of ‘différance’, the endless distinction of signs from other signs (Derrida, 1981). There are therefore no extra-discursive foundations of meaning. Moreover, following on from that, norms are never truly universal. They are always based on something communitarian, something belonging to the particular, constituted in language, rather than the universal (Thomassen, 2006: 2). This is a poststructuralist approach (Diez, 2005; Thomassen, 2006: 6), and it differs radically from Habermas who believes in a rational discourse and consensus through deliberation, which comes before language games, even though he is well aware of particularisms (Habermas, 2006: 24). For Derrida the constitution of the Other in language (rather than rational discourse) is integral to co-existence: ³

…. I don’t use the word ‘dialogue’ very much— its sometimes exploitative connotations are well known. I would call it ‘speech addressed to the other recognized as other, recognized in his alterity’ …. (Derrida cited in Cherif et al., 2009: 44)

and

….A civilization must be plural; it must ensure a respect for the multiplicity of languages, cultures, beliefs, ways of life….. Respect for this multiplicity and plurality is very difficult, because we must cultivate the idiom. What I call ‘idiom’ is the uniqueness of the language of the other, that is, the poetry of the other. There is no poetry and opening up without the idiom of the other. We must respect the idiom of each one of us, not only the so-called national idioms, but each person’s idiom; this is his or her way of speaking, of being, and of signifying, while at the same time of communicating and translating…. (Derrida cited in Cherif et al., 2009: 44)

The universalist/particularist distinction is the relevant focus for this paper. Therefore, it does not deal with elements such as Habermas’ more recent interest in religion or Derrida’s focus on the play of differences, deconstruction or ethics (for an empirical example of the use of these aspects of Derrida in IR see, for example, Ahn [2010]).

These two different approaches are central in the study of discourse in the social sciences. The tension between the Habermasian and the Derridean approaches is a ‘force field’ in the debate about the character of the discursive context of politics. The theorisation of the two different mechanisms of power that the two approaches provide is therefore fruitful for understanding and examining the ways in which the EU can exercise normative power, given their different assumptions about the character of the discursive context (Bernstein, 2006: 93; Thomassen, 2006: 2; cf. Forsberg, 2011: 14). In the following, two interpretations of NPE are presented based on the Habermasian and the Derridean approaches.

The implications of the Habermasian understanding can be summed up as follows: the EU promotes universal values or rights, as opposed to specific communitarian (European) values. The structural context is the existence of universal values that gives the EU’s views a special resonance in open and reflective deliberation. Since the EU persistently pursues these universal values as part of its deliberative processes, the EU is a normative power in so far as its special status as a lighthouse of universal values gives its views legitimacy.

Habermas does not explicitly give the values presented in the NPE argument status as universal values. This article extends his logic to the implications for NPE (cf. Manners, 2007: 81). On the basis of Habermas’ thinking, the argument with regard to NPE would be that the EU’s norms are not narrow communitarian values but, in fact, are universal values, fundamental to claims of reason. In contrast to bargaining, an actor accepts the validity of these universal arguments as actor-independent so that he acts upon it because they are seen as mutually acceptable (Riddervold, 2011: 576). Universal values, given open and reflective deliberation, can and will gain widespread acceptance. They are also the basic tenets of secular reasoning (Barato and Kratochwill, 2008: 17).

The Derridean take on NPE is as follows: the EU is only a normative power if the Union’s construction of itself in discourse as a normative power is accepted in international politics. If not, the EU will only be a normative power if the EU’s values are already hegemonic, that is predominant in the international environment of the time. Otherwise the EU’s norms will be part of the international discursive struggle over meanings.

From the Derridean perspective, there is no EU essence or historical background that makes it an inherently normative power from this perspective. Rather it is the way international actors, including the EU, construct themselves – and others – that is important.

The Derridean understanding has two important implications for NPE: firstly, battles over meaning take place in IR when actors promote (contingent) values emanating from constructions of their identities. The EU can, therefore, not be assumed to have ‘normative power’ due to a basic concordance between its communitarian values and cosmopolitan values. This is because no common cosmopolitan values exist apart from the contingent values enacted through discursive struggles for hegemony. Secondly, the EU articulates its own discursive identity as a normative power, a special power, defined in opposition to international ‘others’; there is nothing inherent in this articulation that automatically gives the EU international power. It is only a ‘normative power’ if it is accepted by others as such, thus giving the EU a say in international matters beyond the expected.

This article will now examine empirically whether the EU is a normative power in line with Habermasian expectations or rather one more actor that promotes communitarian values as the poststructuralists would expect. Even if it is difficult to fully establish whether an idea is gaining its way because of already existing universal foundations or because of an emerging hegemony (cf. Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005), the Derridean–Habermasian division has an important heuristic function. The common denominator of the two perspectives is that discourse is a central analytical dimension which, to a large extent, is constitutive of the social world. The disagreement is about whether this is a potential expression of universal standards of reasoning (Habermas), or an expression of discourse as a range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings as poststructuralists assert along the lines of Derrida. The article is open towards both perspectives in the examination of the case. However, as will be clear below, the poststructuralist perspective on discourse turns out to be the most fruitful. The argument in this article can thus also be seen as a contribution to work on poststructuralist discourse analysis in IR.

In the following empirical analysis of the politics of religion in the UN human rights, and using a rough measure, the focus will be on whether the EU can be said to be an agenda-setter in the politics of religion, whether the EU’s discourses have gained hegemony or whether the EU’s discourses are subject to constant contestation. Dealing with the three power dimensions, it is important to stress that they are played out within the framework of the fourth dimension.

The European Union and the politics of religion

Until the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, religion was largely kept outside the central documents of the EU (Eur-lex, 2012b; Leustan and Madely, 2009: 6). A discourse analysis of the fundamental treaties has shown that religion has not been a central legal topic for the EU itself. The larger interest in religion in the EU from the late 1990 can, to some extent, be linked to the discussions of Turkish membership from the late 1990s (Challand, 2009: 69, 76–77).

The role of religion was discussed in the 2002/2003 Convention and the subsequent 2003/2004 inter-governmental conferences (IGCs; where the formulations from the Constitutional Treaty were maintained). The discussions focused on whether or not reference should be made in the new Treaty to Europe’s Christian inheritance, God, or religion more broadly as part of Europe’s inheritance. The discussions were framed in terms of a general secularist discourse about the place of religion in politics and society (Holm, 2004), where the historical role attributed to religion reflected different emphases within the secularist discourse. At one end of the continuum was France who, on the background of its laïcité, opposed references to God or Christianity. At the other end was the Catholic Church and several member states, with Poland and Hungary amongst the most prominent (not EU members at the time). The Polish government representative in the Convention argued during the debate in the Convention of 27–28 February 2003 that ‘Religions and Christianity among them have been part and parcel of our continent’s history’. The Hungarian government representative at the convention stated during the same debate that ‘[we] Europeans, know that the Judeo-Christian tradition is at the very foundation of the idea of Europe’ (Maccrea, 2011: 56). However, a majority of the member states opposed references to Christian religion. The result was the decision to include a reference to the cultural, religious and humanist legacies in the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty: ‘Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable…rights of the human person….’ (Eur-lex, 2012a).

Generally speaking, the EU’s common framework of meaning can be said to be Western secularist discourse that brings together human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This discourse holds in check the influence of, or respect paid to, religion at a political level. Human rights are now more than anything the sacred profane. Religions are only welcomed into the political sphere to the extent that they adopt the language of human rights as a foundation of democratic society, a civic ethical religion (Massignon, 2007: 578–579). Whether it is the French understanding of laïcité or other European understandings that allow some kind of a state affiliation with religion, politics and religion are two separate realms (Hurd, 2006). The concern with religion is predominantly about the individual’s right to choose his beliefs freely, although an issue such as interfaith dialogue is also promoted (Council, 2008: 100). There is an emphasis on freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Discrimination based on religious beliefs is seen as a human rights violation. It is not confined to any one religion or belief (Council, 2008).

This was illustrated by the EU’s reaction to the Danish Cartoon crisis in 2006 (Klausen, 2009; Larsen, 2012). In the EU’s reactions to the Danish Cartoon Crisis, a common position on the balance between freedom of expression and respect for religion was formulated. In a Council declaration of 27 February 2006 the balance was such that ‘freedom of expression’ was emphasised as an absolute value with the addition that freedom of expression carries responsibilities with it. The declaration drew on a general secularist discourse in its strong emphasis on freedom of expression (Council, 2006; Larsen, 2012). It should be added that the Council of Europe (CoE) has dealt extensively with the relationship between religion and human rights for many years. Although the EU does not make direct reference to CoE documents, the discourses drawn on in both CoE and EU documents are almost identical (see, for example, CoE, 2008).

In summary, the EU’s common framework of meaning is the Western secularist discourse in which the influence of religion at the political level is kept in check by the importance placed on individual human rights.

The United Nations Human Rights Council/Human Rights Commission – the role of the European Union

Amongst the arenas where the politics of religion are played out, the UN is an interesting area to examine due to the global representation of countries and the frequent reference to UN standards in international politics. The fora on human rights have served as central institutional loci for debates about the politics of religion. Up to 2006 these were the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the UN General Assembly Third Committee. In 2006 the CHR was replaced by the UN HRC in the light of the wider debate about reform of the UN.

The existence of UN human rights fora can be said to be an important institutional power base for countries or organisations like the EU who promote human rights over religion. As human rights are here the point of departure for the political processes, the individual, rather than entities, such as religions, is the starting point in the negotiations of meaning in relation to declarations, etc. A challenge to the focus on the individual will have to rearticulate the traditional position of the individual in human rights discourse. The EU sponsors resolutions, explanations of votes and makes statements in debates. However, the member states also put forward national resolutions, although the number of EU-sponsored resolutions is usually greater than those of any of the individual member states. EU cohesion in roll calls on human rights issues is higher than on other issues in the UN (Smith, 2006: 129–130). Up until 2010, there have only been three split votes (on Israel, the Occupied Territories and Gaza). Key examples of EU resolutions that are put forward regularly are the resolutions on religious intolerance, Myanmar and Zimbabwe (Smith, 2010: 229–231). The EU every year introduces a resolution in the UN General Assembly on ‘Elimination of all forms of intolerance based on religious beliefs’ (Council, 2008: 101). On issues involving the politics of religion the EU states have voted together. Considerable diplomatic resources are spent on coordinating views, which arguably also impedes a more leading role for the EU (Smith, 2010: 235). In spite of this weakness, the EU can be defined as an actor, following Bretherton and Vogler’s definition. It has policies based on a common framework of meaning, executive powers to project these and instruments in the form of voting power (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: ch.2).

The article will now turn to an analysis of the role of the EU in the field of religion and human rights within the CHR and the HRC since 2000. It looks at whether EU views can generally be said to set the agenda, whether they are controversial or generally accepted, and whether there are clashes between different fundamental viewpoints rather than a consensus emerging around the EU’s stances. Thus, in the following, it is asked first whether the EU sets the agenda in the CHR/HRC and, secondly, whether the EU’s views prevail. This examination draws heavily on the work by K Smith (2006, 2010) on the EU in the UN Human Rights bodies. It also draws on EU Council documents and reports of the proceedings in the HRC from the organisation Human Rights Watch that follows the meetings (statements, resolutions put forward, voting) closely (http://www.hrw.org/news). Rather than engaging in detailed analysis of each individual document, the analysis attempts to sketch out the general pattern in the EU’s influence with regard to the debates, drafting and voting on the resolutions on defamation of religion and against Islamophobia since these were first put forward in the UN human rights fora in 1999. ⁴ If there are few signs of the EU putting forward or shaping the central resolutions which were adopted, and different significant discourses can be identified, it can be concluded that Habermasian or Derridean dynamics are not predominant in furthering the views of the EU (even if a Derridean play of competing discourses are characterising the situation). If, on the contrary, there are signs of the EU setting the agenda and shaping central resolutions, this calls for further considerations about whether Habermasian or Derridean dynamics are furthering EU normative power. As we shall see, the latter does not appear to be the case.

The work of the UN human rights bodies has become more and more politicised after the Cold War, as indicated by the increase in resolutions that are not passed by consensus. The general UN pattern with a North–South divide has increasingly become salient here. There is, as Smith puts it, ‘an increasingly argumentative atmosphere in both forums. When there is actual voting, splits appear because the details of language used in the resolutions become more important’ (Smith, 2006: 129–130).

This split has to do with an increasing tendency for a majority in the UN to challenge Western conceptions of human rights and their implications sustained by the active support of Russia and China. From the late 1990s, the EU (and the US) has gradually lost its leading role in advancing agendas based on human rights principles in the UN. This is due to a shift in political forces, institutional changes and global views on human rights and religion (Gowan and Brantner, 2008).

There is a growing opposition in the UN to Western conceptions on human rights that has been linked to dissatisfaction with other international issues, such as the representativity of the UN Security Council. As the US was not elected to the last CHR and decided not to take part in the HRC because of the rules, this considerably weakened the forces defending a Western conception of human rights.

Moreover, in the change from the CHR to the HRC in 2006 the rules for membership have given a more prominent role to countries that were sceptical towards Western conceptions of human rights and religion. Most importantly, the states that were sceptical of Western conceptions of human rights and felt that religion should figure more prominently have become more persistent and outspoken (Smith, 2010: 234–235). This was particularly the case with the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC), which had been growing to 57 member states with Muslim populations since its creation in 1969. The members of the OIC drew on a discourse that attributed a role to religion in politics and, in some situations, placed religion over individual human rights. The concept of ‘defamation of religions’ has been promoted by the OIC, which presents ‘defamation of religions’ as a threat to human rights.

The EU does not consider ‘defamation of religions’ as a concept that ought to belong to official UN language:

… The Council stresses that international human rights law protects individuals and groups of individuals and, in this regard, reiterates that defamation of religions is not a human rights concept. ….., the Council underlines that no restrictions in the name of religion may be placed on those [human] rights … (Council, 2009)

As to the balance between freedom and expression and respect for adherence to religions, the EU stresses that

Freedom of expression and freedom of belief are complementary rather than competing concepts. ….these rights are not unlimited, but the EU believes that the balance between these rights and their limitations is well struck in existing international human rights law. (Council, 2008: 102)

Therefore – and crucially – the EU has opposed a redefinition of the balance between these concepts. The EU is, in this important respect, a status quo power with regard to the position of human rights norms in the UN system and, in a broader sense, the post cold war political landscape where the protection of human rights has played a central role.

The EU has voted against the resolution on defamation of religion in the CHR/HRC every year in which it has been put forward. This issue has been strongly promoted by the OIC (Smith, 2010: 234–235). Moreover, the EU has also generally voted against an OIC resolution put forward repeatedly since 1999 that singled out Islamophobia as a particular evil, viewing religious discrimination as a general issue that should not single out any specific religion. The Islamic countries generally wanted the 2006 cartoon crisis to result in the passing of a UN declaration in favour of religious tolerance and against Islamophobia (Hansen and Hundevad, 2006: 210–218). The EU has maintained its opposition to such a declaration.

Is the EU, then, an agenda-setter in the HRC with regard to issues that relate to religion? The answer to this is that the EU is one of the agenda-setters, but not a dominant agenda-setter. The EU has put forward fewer resolutions than in the old CHR, although it, according to some calculations, still sponsors the greatest number of resolutions and issues the greatest number of statements (Smith, 2010: 229–232). Other groups, in particular the OIC, the Africa Group and the Group of Arab States, are also active in putting forward resolutions, etc.

The existence of the HRC itself means that human rights are institutionally anchored; this is a structural source of influence for EU agenda-setting. At the same time, there are no signs of the EU being the predominant agenda-setter within this forum in the period examined. In this respect, then, the EU is not exerting significant normative power, neither in a Habermasian nor in a Derridean sense.

Although the EU is not the main agenda-setter in the HRC, it is still possible that the EU may win in crucial resolutions and EU discourse may form the dominant framework of meaning in documents adopted in the HRC. However, this does not seem to have been the case in the HRC with regard to religion and human rights.

There is an immediate reason for the EU’s difficulties in carrying through its views in the HRC – its relative numerical inferiority compared with the CHR. The EU has got roughly the same proportion of members (15%) as in the old CHR, so the EU has to gain considerable support if it wants its resolutions passed. The OIC, at the present moment, has got 32% of the members compared with 24.5% in the old CHR. So the EU has stronger opponents. The polarised nature of the debate makes it difficult to find allies. There is a deepening North/South split where the South supports the OIC. The absence of the US has been felt in diplomatic terms; without the support they would have been likely to have received if the US were present, the EU often has to go for consensus rather than forcing a vote. The EU’s minority position has been expressed in the 24 total roll-call votes in the first six regular session of the HRC. Here, EU member states have been in the minority on all but three votes (Smith, 2008: 6–7).

The most central and contentious issues with regard to religion have been the debates and votes on the resolutions on Defamation of Religion and Racism/Islamophobia. Karen Smith writes that:

The defamation of religions and racism/Islamophobia are issues of particular interest to OIC Members and the African group. The EU has frequently been unable to support their initiatives because the predominant view has been that free speech should be limited to avoid harm to religious sentiment. A March 2007 HRC resolution on combating the defamation of religion, for example, indicates that freedom of expression should be ‘exercised with responsibility, and can be limited with regard to the protection of public health or morals, and respect for religions and beliefs’ …… The resolution on combating defamation of religion passed by the 2005 CHR … did not contain such provisions – though the EU (and the US) still opposed it…… Pakistan and Egypt – backed by other states – have repeatedly argued that ‘freedom of expression if unchecked, could hurt religious feelings and respect for a religion’ and cited the case of the Danish cartoons….. Furthermore, OIC states have objected to an EU resolution on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion and belief, because it calls for respect of the right to change one’s religion which according to OIC states, goes against the Sharia (though the OIC abstained… in December 2007, and the resolution was still passed). (Smith, 2008)

The resolution on defamation has been put forward by the OIC in the former CHR every year since 1999. It was voted through for the first time in 2005. However, the language in the 2007 resolution placed more emphasis on respect for religion over human rights. On 20 March 2008 a new resolution on ‘Combating Defamation of Religion’ was passed against the votes of the EU countries (Human Rights Council, 2008). The text also made reference to ‘Islamophobia’. In March 2008, the HRC changed the mandate for the special rapporteur on freedom of expression on the initiative of the OIC. The special rapporteur shall now also ‘report on cases where misuse of freedom of expression is an expression of racial or religious discrimination’. The Secretary General of the OIC wanted to send a ‘Clear message to the West about the red lines which should not be crossed regarding the Danish Mohammed caricatures and the Dutch politician Wilder’s film….’ (Frontpagemag.com, 2011).

On the issue of freedom of speech versus religion, there have been few internal differences between the EU countries. The OIC’s views are so much in opposition to European views that the EU’s internal differences fade into insignificance (Smith, 2010: 18). There is a clear discursive struggle between the EU’s secular-based discourse and that of the OIC.

In summary, this article has shown that the EU has been an actor in the debates about religion in the HRC, but also that it has had great difficulties in setting the agenda or influencing the debate in this forum in the first decade of the new millennium. The same pattern could also be found in relation to the April 2009 UN Durban II Review Conference on Racism in Geneva. Considerable political attention was paid to the organisation of the conference – a follow up on the 2001 UN Durban Review Conference.

The conference planning group under the HRC was headed by Libya, with Iran as its deputy. As a consequence of that, formulations about a worldwide ban against the defamation of religion figured in the draft declaration from the conference until March 2009. France –the EU President in autumn 2007 – declared as the first EU country that the planning for the conference should follow a very different line if it were to send delegates (Petrova, 2010), thus demonstrating the gap in basic understandings surrounding the conference.

The outcome of Durban II was that the formulations about ‘defamation of religion’ were deleted from the draft. That this happened close to the actual conference in April 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 2009a) illustrates the persistence of the states in favour of these formulations. At the conference most of the 23 EU countries participating (four boycotted) were represented at very low levels to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the nature of the debates. The EU Presidency, Slovakia, walked out after the speech of the Iranian president that underlined the gap between the basic understandings among the participating states even after agreement on the declaration has been reached (Human Rights Watch, 2009b). ⁵

It could be seen as a sign of European or Western power that the formulations about defamation of religion were taken out of the final document: the EU, then, had the institutional power to keep formulations about defamation of religion out of a UN consensus document on human rights. However, the EU/the West only had the power to prevent formulations on defamation from occurring; it was not able to set the agenda in a way that kept ‘defamation of religion’ off the agenda altogether. Strong actors adhering to other discourses than that of the EU promoted defamation of religion as a concept and shaped the debates on human rights and religion.

In summary, there are no signs of the EU being the predominant actor in discussions about human rights and religion within the HRC or the UN more broadly in the period examined.

The European Union as an actor in the politics of religion – a normative power?

The analysis of the CHR and HRC with special reference to the period from 2000, presented in this article, demonstrates that there are few indications that the EU is exerting massive normative power in the field of politics of religion and human rights. This suggests that the ability of the EU to exert normative power depends on the socially and historically contingent discursive context. If a large proportion of actors in a policy area or in IR in general adhere to a different discourse than the EU’s, the EU cannot set the agenda according to its own discourse. The EU’s discourse apparently does not have an overwhelming appeal just because the EU is a carrier of it or because of the nature of the discourse itself. However, the EU’s views are supported by the very existence of human rights bodies such as the HRC.

The case examined shows that in the field of politics of religion and human rights, other discourses than the EU’s are articulated in the UN fora and the EU’s discourse is not predominant. This would not matter much for the debate about NPE if religion were a marginal issue in politics today. However, politics of religion is not a marginal issue, as the Danish Cartoon Crisis, the Wilders film case and the 2009 Durban II conference illustrate. There is, in other words, a central area in world politics today where it is not appropriate to characterise the EU as a normative power, neither in a Habermasian nor in a Derridean way.

However, there are signs that the discursive context for NPE in the politics of religion may be changing. As outlined above, the OIC has since 1999 won approval in the HRC for the view that defamation of religion is a threat to human rights. However since 2009, the support for this view in terms of votes has been weakening in the HRC. In March 2011, a resolution (still put forward by the OIC) that in earlier drafts included reference to defamation was passed with unanimity without reference to defamation (Reuters, 2011). Pakistani and Saudi representatives stressed that previous resolutions on defamation still stood and that they would continue to work for a ban if the West did not live up to resolution. However, significantly, the emphasis in the resolution was changed from protecting beliefs to protecting believers along the lines of the Western/EU discourse (Reuters, 2011). Moreover, the OIC decided in June 2011 to set up a Commission for Human Rights based on the UN’s Universal Declaration of 1948 (Arab News, 2011).

The background for this change is less clear. We may be seeing a broader change of views amongst UN member states possibly as a result of pressure by Western non-governmental organisations (NGOs). There is no obvious link to the Arab Spring, as the situation with regard to a possible strengthening of the role of religion in North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring is unclear. Whatever the reasons, there are some indications that the discursive context for NPE in the politics of religion may be changing.

Conclusion

The question asked in this article was how the discursive context of the politics of religion impinged on the EU’s ability to exert normative power in this area.

It was shown not only that the EU is an actor in the debates about religion in the HRC, but also that it has had great difficulties in setting the agenda or influencing the debate in the first decade of the new millennium: the analysis of this area shows that the EU has certainly not exerted normative power in a Habermasian sense in this field: neither has it exerted power in a Derridean sense. There were no signs that the EU as an actor is seen in such a favourable way in the HRC that this in itself gives its stances power in either a Habermasian or a Derridean sense. The discursive context has been such that the EU’s stances in the politics of religion have not been able to set the agenda in the UN human rights fora; rather, discussions in these fora are characterised by a struggle between the EU’s secularist discourse and the OIC’ s discourse. The outcome of the Durban II process suggested, though, that the EU, together with other Western countries, may have had defensive power in the sense that it can contribute to preventing formulations from occurring in consensus documents.

The analysis has implications for the use of the term ‘NPE’. If the EU has difficulties setting the agenda or influencing resolutions due to a non-hegemonic position in a discursive struggle, this is likely to be the case in other policy areas as well. In a broader sense, this points to the importance of the international discursive constellations when evaluating whether the EU can be said to exert normative power in a given area. It suggests that there is nothing inherent in the EU that gives it normative power. Whether the EU can exert normative power depends on a (socially contingent) discursive context where its stances strike a chord. This discursive context arguably was in place in human rights in the first 10 years after the Cold War, but less so after 2000 Gowan and Brantner, 2008). The same pattern could be found in the politics of religion.

At the same time, signs are that the international discursive context in the politics of religion might be changing, as indicated by the waning support for the resolution on defamation of religion in the HRC. Some non-Islamic countries in Africa, the Pacific and Latin America have switched from supporting the resolution to abstaining or opposing it – partly as a result of pressure by Western governments and NGOs (suggesting a possibly partial NPE influence). In March 2011, a consensus resolution in the HRC focused on protecting believers rather than beliefs (Evans, 2011). If this trend were to hold, this would alter the circumstances for NPE and the possibilities for the EU to exert power in a Derridean sense in the politics of religion and human rights. On the other hand, if religion continues or increases its discursive strength, as suggested by the public reactions in the Islamic countries in September 2012 to the release of the film about Muhammed on the internet, pressures may be placed on the EU for a more radical form of reflexivity with regard to the basic features of its own identity. More than just reflexivity about its own internal politics, which has been suggested as a counterweight to hybris and to raise EU credibility internationally (Diez, 2005), there may be pressure on the EU to rearticulate the relationship between politics and religion in order to allow the EU a stronger position in the politics of religion. In a broader perspective, the potential negative and positive scenarios for NPE illustrate the limits to, and the contingent character of, NPE and its reliance on the international discursive context.