Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS

Abstract

This paper examines a supranational actor, the European Union (EU), as a producer of energy diplomacy. This study uses a comparative analytical framework of state-centred vs. multistakeholder diplomacies to explore EU energy diplomacy towards the ‘emerging’ powers of Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BICS). It also elaborates the multistakeholder model by advocating the inclusion of a new element – a consumer of diplomatic actions – into its conceptualization. In this way the paper suggests a new synthesis of the concepts of multistakeholder and public diplomacies. Advancing the notion of energy diplomacy, our analysis suggests that this type of diplomacy goes beyond state actors as producers of diplomatic outcomes, and is no longer confined to the norms of security of supply and competitiveness; EU energy diplomacy is a complex blend of multistakeholder and state-centred diplomacies, participants (producers and consumers) and communication modes. This comprehensive approach to diplomacy – led in the EU’s case by norms of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – is a response to the challenges of global governance, multipolarity and multinational cross-sectoral networks.

Keywords

BICS energy diplomacy EU multistakeholder diplomacy model

Introduction

As global governance, networking and multipolarity challenge states as the main diplomacy actors, traditional diplomacy is facing an identity crisis. The practice of diplomacy is now attempted by multilateral and supranational organizations as well as NGOs, companies and lobbies. Scholarly reflections on this complexity argue for a parallel existence of state-centred and multistakeholder diplomacies (Hocking, 2006). In state-centred diplomacy, the state is the diplomatic actor and other stakeholders are the consumers. In the multistakeholder context, other actors can also become producers of diplomatic outcomes. While international policy is still predominantly shaped by governments, the roles of ‘consumers’ and ‘producers’ of diplomacy are dependent on the ‘dynamics underpinning the trisectoral interactions between governments, NGOs, and business’ (Hocking, 2006: 17). In the shaping of international politics, states find it increasingly difficult to ignore other stakeholders.

This paper applies the multistakeholder diplomacy model to the energy interactions of the European Union (EU), as a supranational actor, with major ‘netto’ energy consumer countries in the South: the four ‘emerging’ powers of BICS (Brazil, India, China and South Africa). In an increasingly multipolar world, with a growing demand by newly ‘emerging’ powers for energy, external energy relations between the main ‘poles’ who remain energy consumers is a high-priority issue for policy-makers and scholars. However, these relations are scarcely addressed in the relevant literature. Driven by significant strategic constraints that risk the securitization of energy policies, how does the EU harness the potential for cooperation with newly ‘emerging’ powers and realize the possibilities for multipolar energy relations?

Our study has both an empirical and a theoretical aim as it explores the EU energy interactions with BICS, which range from formal negotiations to a variety of partnerships and interactions between state and non-state actors. The multistakeholder analytical model is thus useful to classify the EU as a producer of energy diplomacy. Energy diplomacy remains under-operationalized and under-defined. Goldthau’s widely accepted definition states that energy diplomacy is:

…the way countries give their energy companies a competitive edge in bidding for resources by using the state’s power: consumer countries strengthen their supply situation by diplomatically flanking energy contracts, whereas producer countries use diplomacy to enhance access to markets or reserves. (Goldthau, 2010: 25)

This paper revisits the concept of energy diplomacy as a type of diplomacy generated only by state or state actors and limited to the security and competitive norm only, and argues a conceptual difference between energy diplomacy on the one hand and global energy governance and energy markets on the other. More specifically, our research focuses on a supranational producer of energy diplomacy outcomes (the EU) and the scope of its relations with a wide range of state and non-state actors (including businesses, NGOs, scientific experts and even the general public).

A complex sui generis entity, the EU is a unique international actor – neither a centralized federal state, nor simply a loose intergovernmental organization. Much of the literature has reflected on the EU’s role as an actor in the international arena (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Elgström and Smith, 2006; Rhodes, 1998; Smith, 2002), including EU performance since the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of the European external action service (EEAS) (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). Relevant literature also contends that this supranational producer of diplomatic efforts aspires to and claims its global identity as a ‘normative power’. ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) (Manners, 2002) intends to shape and transfer norms, rules and values of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply by non-coercive practices and recognition of this identity in the energy field by its external partners, including BICS.

Considering a range of global reactions to the EU’s normative messages – from acceptance to rejection (Björkdahl et al., 2015) – this paper proposes to extend the multistakeholder diplomacy model’s exclusive focus on a producer of diplomatic outcomes to an additional focus on a consumer of those outcomes and on the interactions between them. Respectively, the notions of a true dialogue and dialogue-based collaboration – typical in the theorization of public diplomacy – enter our conceptualization of energy diplomacy in a multistakeholder context. This paper departs from the narrow definition of public diplomacy as the ‘actions of governments to inform and influence foreign publics’ (The Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, online, as cited in McDowell, 2008: 8), taking on a new, broader interpretation of ‘the transnational impact of all government or private activities’ (McDowell, 2008: 7). These activities ‘inevitably, if not purposefully, have an impact on foreign policy and national security as well as on trade, tourism and other national interests’ (The Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, online, as cited in McDowell, 2008: 7–8).

We argue that EU energy diplomacy towards BICS is an essential part of the EU’s wider strategic diplomacy in a rapidly changing, globalizing and increasingly multipolar world. The type of diplomacy produced by the EU is found to be of a complex, ‘blended’ nature that combines the levels of diplomacy models, participants and communication modes. Firstly, it is characterized by a simultaneous use of state-centred and multistakeholder tools. Secondly, it mixes a range of state and non-state participants (producers and consumers of diplomatic outcomes). Thirdly, it engages two overlapping modes of communication – ‘talking at’ external partners (a top-down one-way communication of externally projecting internalised norms and values typical for energy governance discourses) vs. ‘talking with’ international counterparts (a horizontal dialogue-led two-way communication process typical for diplomacy conduct). The three strands arguably advance the understanding of the notion of ‘energy diplomacy’.

Energy governance, energy market and energy diplomacy

Relevant literature features three concepts to describe global energy interactions: energy governance, energy markets and energy diplomacy. These concepts are radically different in terms of how they conceive and communicate with the ‘Other’ in international interactions.

Energy governance

The concept of energy governance dominates research on global or international energy interactions (see Barbé et al., 2014; Goldthau and Witte, 2009; Lesage et al., 2010; Selianova, 2011; Van de Graaf, 2013). Governance allows energy-related interactions to be defined in a functionally confined, institutionalized arena and comprises of interactive arrangements in which different kinds of actors, including private actors, cooperate. These forms of liberal governance arrangements aim at ‘solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities’ (Kooiman, 2002: 73). Governance arrangements concerning energy policies face a number of issue-specific demands. Energy governance involves a more complex and fragmented array of public and private actors (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Lesage et al., 2010) than other policy fields. This diversity needs to be addressed. The arrangement of energy relations on the basis of bilateral resource agreements poses a challenge for the introduction of more flexible, sustainable, multi-actor and multilevel modes of energy governance (Florini and Sovacool, 2011: 63–67). Thus, external energy governance is defined here as a ‘form of coordination and cooperation, involving a variety of actors within a multilevel system, and seeks to regulate inter- and transnational energy relations through a combination of soft steering instruments, policy diffusion, communicative arrangements and diplomatic activities’ (Müller et al., 2015). External energy governance in particular is conceptualized as a one-way communication process, projecting and imposing internal values, principles and rules onto international interlocutors. This view is shared by Herranz-Surrallés (2014), who argued that energy governance is about externalizing internal rules for external markets.

The EU is a striking example of an international actor whose external energy message is heavily shaped by internal positions and norms. Since 2005, the demand for more coherent energy policies has increased. The Treaty of Lisbon (Title XXI, Art. 194 TFEU) (The Treaty of Lisbon, n.d.) clearly defines the three main priorities of the EU in the energy field: sustainability, security of supplies and competition. The sustainability vision aims to promote energy efficiency and includes the EU’s emphasis on renewable energies. Security of supplies is interpreted as ‘the goal of ensuring the security of energy supply in the Union. Finally, competitiveness is defined as ensuring the functioning of the energy market’ and the promotion of the ‘interconnection of energy networks’ (European Commission, 2010, 2013, 2014).

Energy markets

Energy markets treat energy as a commodity and are in place to deal with the trade and supply of energy. This paper’s focus on the EU raises discussion of a relevant notion of ‘market power Europe’ (MPE) (Damro, 2012) in the energy context. As a reply to Manners’ concept of the NPE (2002), Damro pointed to the fact that ‘we should reconsider what the EU is and conceptualize it as MPE, a powerful actor that actively engages in international affairs through the externalization of its economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures’ (Damro, 2012: 697). Damro empirically demonstrated that the EU has developed from a market integration experiment ‘into the world’s foremost economic bloc’. He points out that the EU has developed strategies and efforts ‘to exercise MPE through the externalization of its economic and social agendas’ (Damro, 2012: 696).

The same argument can be found in analyses of EU energy policy, especially in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). As Herranz-Surrallés (2014) argues, the changes to global energy markets and the structure of the world economy over the past decade have substantially diminished the EU’s ability to exert influence, especially in the international regime of the ECT.

It has been argued by legal scholars such as Bradford (2012), Fahey (2014) and Scott (2009, 2013) that, as a market, the EU is capable of externalities. Bradford remarks that companies that want to trade with the EU as one of the world’s largest internal markets must decide whether to adopt one set of standards for Europe or multiple sets of standards for the rest of the world. In most cases, they opt for the EU’s single standard. Therefore, despite its financial and political shortcomings, the EU is a major force in the global economy (Bradford, 2012). This interpretation of global energy interactions suggests pragmatic interaction between buyers and sellers based on competition.

Energy diplomacy

Ultimately, diplomacy is about the practice of influence. In terms of process, energy diplomacy is about the practice of influence through negotiations to manage energy-related international relations. Self-centred promotion of internal positions (associated here with energy governance) or competitiveness (typical for energy market discourses) are counterproductive to the dialogue promoted by the diplomatic approach.

However, the definition of energy diplomacy is problematic. Energy dialogue spans policy fields ranging from external relations to trade, energy supply, development, environment, human rights and climate. While the combination of the concepts of ‘energy’ and ‘diplomacy’ has always been present in the conduct of international relations, a ‘generally accepted definition of energy diplomacy does not exist’ (Goldthau, 2010: 28). Goldthau proposed his popular definition to address the lack of conceptualization and operationalization of energy diplomacy. He conceptualizes state or state actors as the ‘primary units of analysis’ (Goldthau, 2010: 28): ‘the use of foreign policy to secure access to energy supplies abroad and to promote (mostly bilateral, government to government) cooperation in the energy sector’ (Goldthau, 2010: 25). This definition is limited to the security and competitiveness norm only.

These definitions are the departure point for our study; however, we disagree with Goldthau’s other two key arguments, which have an exclusive focus on states as energy policy actors and on the security and competitiveness norms.

In addition to states, Baccini et al. (2011: 3) identified 24 different organizations dealing with energy in the international realm. The absence of a ‘World Energy Organization’ has led to a highly diversified network of international governmental organizations that deal with the regulation of energy supplies (Müller et al., 2015). Moreover, the EU is among a plethora of supranational actors including NGOs, transnational companies and multinational lobbies all seeking to participate in the energy field.

Secondly, we challenge Goldthau’s linking of energy diplomacy to security and competitiveness norms only. Goldthau depicts energy diplomacy as the strategic and instrumental use of foreign policy to secure and compete for a country’s energy supplies only. According to this vision, energy diplomacy exclusively follows political logic, prioritizing national security goals over maximizing business opportunities. Our challenge to this narrow definition is supported by the relevant literature. Within the debate on energy security, Dyer and Trombetta (2013) argued the need for new research directions to consider dimensions such as renewable energy, environmental change, climate governance and human security. Goldthau himself, in his most recent edited book (Goldthau, 2013), advocates for a variety of perspectives when analysing the challenges in global energy policy. Alongside the energy market and security issues, these perspectives now also incorporate issues of development and sustainability.

We argue that energy diplomacy extends far beyond the debate on energy security and competitiveness to include such norms as sustainability. Our focus is on the EU’s European external energy policy (EEEP). It has three central norms: sustainability, competition and security of supply, thus demonstrating that an exclusive focus on security and competitiveness in energy diplomacy is insufficient. Significantly, the EEEP serves as a policy background to a range of EU diplomatic interactions with international counterparts (state and non-state) in the energy area.

Any type of diplomacy is increasingly about the ‘creation of networks, embracing a range of state and non-state actors focusing on the management of issues that demand resources over which no single participant possesses a monopoly’ (Hocking, 2006: 13). Hocking captured the differences between the state-centred diplomacy and multistakeholder diplomacy in a nine-part paradigm of context, forms, participants, roles, communication patterns, functions, location, representation patterns and rules. In the next section, we use this framework to explore the EU’s energy interactions with the four BICS countries and argue that the EU is already an established energy diplomacy producer.

Applying the multistakeholder diplomacy model to EU global energy interactions

Contexts, forms and participants

Hocking (2006) argues that the first key difference between the state-centred diplomacy vis-à-vis multistakeholder diplomacy is the contextual position of the state. In the former case, states remain an ‘unchallenged terminal authority’; in the latter, there are ‘multiple spheres of authority’ (Hocking, 2006:18).

In its external energy relations, the EU addresses both state and non-state actors. The EU’s state-level interactions occur externally at the level of intergovernmental energy agreements, and internally by treating energy as an intergovernmental competency area for its member states. At the same time, there is overwhelming evidence of the EU’s energy multistakeholder contexts. In the international arena, including its interactions with BICS, the EU is challenged by the polyphony of European voices typical of EU diplomacy. The EU actors engaged in energy-related diplomacy include: the European Commission with its commissioners and directorates-general (DGs) on energy, DevCo, climate action, enterprise, environment, research and trade; EEAS; the European Parliament; the Council of the EU; EU Delegations; and individual EU member states with their own governments, parliaments, ministries of energy and national diplomatic missions. EU energy actors performing internationally include corporations and transnational companies, as well as business chambers and associations. The EU’s multiple energy-related diplomatic actions and messages are not well orchestrated, sometimes duplicating and sometimes contradicting each other (Knodt et al., 2015b). This is a challenge inherent to multilateral, intergovernmental or supranational organizations attempting any kind of diplomacy.

The contexts of diplomatic activities dictate a set of forms and outline targeted participants. Government-led forms using bilateral and multilateral channels are typical for state-centred diplomacy. In a multistakeholder diplomacy, forms are more diffused and may be led by governments or other stakeholders (Hocking, 2006: 18). As for participants, in the state-centred vision of diplomacy, diplomats are professionals with ‘credentials based on the principles of sovereignty’ (Hocking, 2006: 18). The non-state actors in this scenario are reduced to diplomacy consumers only. In contrast, in a multistakeholder diplomacy, there are multiple participants, often based on the ‘trisectoral model incorporating government, NGOs, and business’ (Hocking, 2006: 18). Participants, whose credentials are based on interests and expertise, are able to become producers of diplomacy.

State-level actors remain the focus of the EU external energy activities. Increasingly, the EU prioritizes energy dealings with ‘emerging powers’, including BICS (Knodt et al., 2015a). One of the most visible energy-related interactions is the EU’s bilateral energy dialogues with BICS, carried out under the ‘umbrella’ of the strategic partnerships. Within the scope of the annual summits between the EU and BICS (with parallel business summits for the private sector), different sectoral dialogues have been established, including a dialogue on energy. Over the years, energy dialogues have connected political actors and enhanced a regular exchange of ideas (Knodt et al., 2015a). In addition to the highest level political dialogue, the BICS case studies elaborated below provide evidence of the EU as an energy diplomacy actor through a multistakeholder lens. The BICS preference for bilateral cooperation with EU member states presents a diplomatic challenge for the EU. To address this, the EU attempts to coordinate its policies and projects with its member states demonstrating a policy networking typical of the multistakeholder mode.

The EU initialized a direct political dialogue, including an energy dialogue, with Brazil in 2007, with the aim of intensifying relations and improving cooperation. The dialogue focuses principally on biofuels, in line with the high priority that Brazil attributes to biofuels in its external energy relations and its vast energy resources and high technological expertise in this field. With Brazil cultivating the image of a ‘green energy country’, many EU energy diplomacy projects aim at enhancing green energy production within the country and biofuels are of mutual interest to the EU and Brazil. However, biofuels remain highly controversial in terms of certification of production standards. Other energy discussion points include indirect land-use change, renewable energies and climate change. The latest dialogue included two new areas – offshore safety and ocean energy (Piefer et al., 2013).

The EU–India energy dialogue was initiated within the EU-India Strategic Partnership in 2004. The key EU energy diplomacy issues towards India are energy access, energy import dependency and climate change concerns, with priorities on developing clean coal technologies, increasing energy efficiency and savings, promoting environmentally friendly energies as well as assisting India in energy market reforms (Knodt et al., 2013). The Republic of South Africa (RSA)–EU energy dialogue was initiated in 2008, along with 12 other sectoral dialogues (health, education, customs, science and technology, etc.) within the Strategic Partnership. EU energy diplomacy towards RSA prioritizes climate policy and development as well as poverty alleviation. EU energy diplomacy also sees RSA as essential in the EU’s support to regional energy cooperation (Knodt et al., 2015).

The oldest and most elaborated dialogue is the EU–China energy dialogue, institutionalized in 1994. Six priority areas have since been identified: renewable energies, smart grids, energy efficiency in the building sector, clean coal, nuclear energy and energy law. Each of these areas has an established working group that meets regularly. Many energy-related EU initiatives towards China are linked to the promotion of competitiveness and sustainability norms (consider, for example, the EU-China Clean Energy Center (EC2) or EU-China Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy (ICARE)). The security norm was addressed in the dialogue for the first time in 2006, against the background of the stalemate of the Doha Development Round and the first Russian–Ukrainian gas conflict. It was then linked to sustainability and competitiveness with initiatives supporting exchanging resources through policy networks and information exchange, as well as monitoring, defining and promoting global interests (Knodt et al., 2013).

Roles and communication patterns

In the classification by Hocking (2006: 18), diplomats perform the role of gatekeepers in the state-centred model, while diplomats are ‘boundary spanners’ in the multiple stakeholder model (i.e. they may be stake-givers as well as stake-takers). According to Hocking (2006: 18), in the state-centred model, interactions occur in government-focused hierarchical flows of information. Stakeholders are seen as the receivers of information and diplomats are the senders. The multistakeholder model features different flows of information: open, inclusive, fluid, unstable and multidirectional. Significantly, these flows occur in non-hierarchical networks.

Empirical research in BICS within the transnational project ‘EU energy governance’¹ demonstrated that in the eyes of the BICS stakeholders, DG Energy was seen among the two most important actors for exchange networks in China and India. EU Delegations in India, China and South Africa were also seen among the top three actors in terms of being an information broker (ranked at number one in India, and number two in China and South Africa). While the stakeholders in these three ‘emerging’ powers are mainly interested in European expertise, experience and technology, they also recognize that dialogues provide a platform for information exchange among their own actors. Dialogic network structures also showed complex bilateral networks between the EU and BICS public and non-state actors. In most of the EU–BICS bilateral networks, EU public actors communicate with BICS private and non-state actors to a great extent. With the exception of Brazil, EU outreach to the Chinese, Indian and South African actors is greater than average, whereas the communication efforts of the Chinese, Indian and South African public actors falls below the average within the respective network.² Beyond minor communication towards EU public actors, in the Chinese case public actors’ communication with non-state European as well as non-state Chinese actors is higher than the average. In South Africa, the pattern is somewhat different. Here, communication from public actors is below average, whereas non-state actors try to outreach to the South African public actors. In India, public actors try to speak to each other and non-state actors, and vice versa (Piefer et al., 2015).

While interpretation of these patterns is a subject for a different analysis, our study notes the complex patterns of information flows suggesting that EU energy-related dialogues with BICS go beyond state-to-state communication and indicating that there are no exclusive state-focused hierarchies in information flows.

Functions

For Hocking (2006: 19), the function of diplomacy in the state-centred model is to manage relations between sovereign entities [in order to] define and promote national interests. The multistakeholder model acknowledges the deficiencies of the diplomatic process. To remedy them, resources are exchanged through policy networking, information exchange, monitoring processes, and defining and promoting global interests (Hocking, 2006: 19).

The EU’s diplomatic service was only established in 2009 following the Treaty of Lisbon. The EEAS’ mandate and composition had remained unclear for some time, leaving the many EU actors listed above to carry out energy activities in various international arenas. Among those actors are the EU delegations, EEAS diplomatic representations in 139 locations with energy-related activities within their portfolios. The EU Delegations in BICS tend to run EU-sponsored, development-focused energy projects more than other types of energy-related projects. The EU Delegations are tasked with disseminating information about these projects among local stakeholders. However, the EU Delegations’ activities on the ground are often challenged by an enduring confusion about who should speak for the EU; the EU Delegations’ size, expertise and capabilities in external energy relations which remain dwarfed by member state diplomatic efforts; and institutional loyalties and behavioural dynamics within the EEAS and its delegations.

The EU Delegations’ energy-related activities in BICS are guided by a set of priorities such as sustainability, energy security and energy technology transfer, as well as climate change and policies targeting underprivileged groups and regions, with the aim of improving living conditions, facilitating the overall development of struggling communities and building the capacity of civil society organizations. The EU Delegation to India focuses on the themes of energy goods, energy services, technology cooperation and demand side management. The key issues for this Delegation are energy access and energy import dependency, and climate. In addition, this Delegation prioritizes energy in the context of development (EUD to India, n.d.). In the EU–Brazil joint action plan, energy is a key area. However, the context of the EU Delegation energy-related activities in Brazil is very different from the other ‘emerging’ countries due to its vast energy resources and high technological expertise (especially in the biofuels sector), as well as Brazil’s concern about climate change and sustainable development. As discussed above, Brazil’s strategy is to brand itself internationally as a ‘green energy country’. Many projects facilitated by the EU Delegation aim at enhancing green energy within the country (EUD to Brazil, n.d.). The EU Delegation to South Africa emphasizes climate policy and development issues and lists a number of multisectoral projects, many of them with energy-related elements in the context of sustainable development and poverty alleviation (EUD to South Africa, n.d.). Finally, the EU Delegation to China also lists a number of EU-supported projects in the field of ‘energy diplomacy’. Paralleling the EU–China energy dialogue, energy efficiency is a dominant theme in these projects (EUD to China, n.d.).

Another characteristic of multistakeholder diplomacy is promoting global interests. On different levels, the EU aims at integrating BICS into global governance on energy and climate change as well as strategic issues, such as energy security (e.g. for China that will be with Central Asia).

Location and representation patterns

Hocking (2006: 19) locates the diplomatic activities of the state-centred model in arenas outside the domestic sphere. Intergovernmental sites are the main location of the diplomatic interactions. Unsurprisingly, this model emphasizes mission diplomacy in mixed bilateral and multilateral representations. These settings are contrasted with the multistakeholder locations which cross the boundaries between the domestic and international, have multiple diplomatic sites and variable permanent representations, and are both multilateral and mission oriented (Hocking, 2006: 19).

The energy-related diplomatic activities of the EU correspond to the multistakeholder model in terms of locations and representations. In addition to a set of EU Delegations with some energy-related tasks, there is also a plethora of international energy arenas where 28 EU member states negotiate with each other and also with international actors, including BICS (Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), International Energy Agency of the European Commission (IEA), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), International Energy Forum (IEF), G-20, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), UN and the World Bank). These multilateral representations of the EU are further complemented by the bilateral, mission-oriented representations through the EU delegations to BICS. The EU Delegations discussed serve as focal points of EU foreign policy outreach with increased competencies, including the energy field.

EU energy diplomacy also faces the challenge of building a good reputation with EU citizens. One initiative that addresses this challenge is the EU Sustainable Energy Week (EUSEW) initiated by the European Commission in 2006. Each year, hundreds of state and non-state organizations and individuals from the EU and outside it are involved. This event is designed to appeal to both the general public and experts: ‘through bottom-up efforts, organisers of EUSEW Energy Days, events and activities connect directly with citizens and energy stakeholders at local, regional and national levels’ (EUSEW, n.d.). EUSEW events are also organized outside of Europe with the EU’s support. The activity showcases the EU as the producer of diplomatic efforts – a facilitator and entrepreneur – able to act across domestic and international arenas, and multiple diplomatic sites.

Rules

The final category in Hocking’s models is rules. Sovereignty related rules emphasize the ‘centrality of protocol’, ‘confidentiality’ and the ‘immunity of diplomatic agents’ in the centre-centred model (2006: 19). Hocking also stipulates clear normative expectations of behaviour. The multistakeholder model features ‘underdeveloped rules’, a multitude of clashes between ‘sovereignty and non-sovereignty based rules’, ‘institutional tensions’ and expectations clashes (Hocking, 2006: 19). This mode is also characterized by the ‘openness, accountability and transparency’ of the diplomatic practices.

A number of the EU’s energy-related diplomatic interactions with BICS at the summit level and in sectoral dialogues between the high level officials are dominated by protocol and strictly confidential. The Heads of EU Delegations are full ambassadors who enjoy the privilege of diplomatic immunity. However, with energy diplomatic outputs produced by both the EU and its member states, the clash of sovereignty and non-sovereignty based rules is inevitable. Accountability and transparency are an EU mantra; excessive secrecy in the field of global energy interactions is impossible. With many EU stakeholders involved in energy-related diplomacy production, there are predictable tensions between participating institutions. If we consider that some energy-related diplomatic activities of the EU are carried out by the EU delegations of the EEAS (as discussed above), the multistakeholder characteristics described by Hocking correspond to the features of the ‘interstitial organization’ of the EEAS (Bátora, 2013). According to Bátora, such organizations have ‘different and sometimes conflicting organizational principles and practices introduced within the organization … and different and sometimes conflicting sets of expectations in relation to the Service from actors within the organization as well as from outside’ (Bátora, 2013: 598).

This section demonstrated that the EU – a supranational sui generis actor – is a producer of various modes and modalities by which the EU exercises energy diplomacy towards the ‘emerging’ powers of BICS. The EU is able to establish ‘relationships of varying scope and composition … bring[ing] together governmental actors, and business’ (Hocking, 2006: 20). These energy-related external activities could be classified as ‘energy diplomacy’ using the multistakeholder model. This challenges the first key feature of Goldthau’s popular definition of energy diplomacy, where states are the primary units of analysis.

Our analysis also observed that EU energy activities with ‘emerging powers’ are dominated by priorities of sustainability, energy security and energy technology transfer, as well as climate change and policies targeting underprivileged groups and regions, with the aim of improving living conditions, facilitating the development of struggling communities and building the capacity of civil society organizations. The EU’s normative messages – either of a moral/cosmopolitan nature (e.g. sustainability, development) or of a liberal/market nature (e.g. competitiveness, security of supply) – are not necessarily unanimously accepted or positively received by international counterparts. External reactions to the EU’s normative messages range from acceptance and adoption to resistance and rejection (Björkdahl et al., 2015). The energy field will not be an exception. Negative reactions are often associated with the Euro-centred content of the ‘normative’ message and the ensuing process.

Focusing on the receiver of the EU diplomatic messages, we challenge the multistakeholder model’s preoccupation with the producer of diplomatic outcomes and suggest the incorporation of the notion of the consumer of such outcomes. It is somewhat puzzling that the multistakeholder model – which argues ‘influence and the right to be heard should be based on the value of each stakeholder’s unique perspective and expertise’ (Hemmati, 2000: 7) as well as ‘inclusiveness and partnership in policy processes’ (Hocking, 2006: 17) – has overlooked the consumer of diplomatic efforts in its conceptualizations. The next section addresses this oversight, and engages analytical concepts of public diplomacy theory to complement the multistakeholder model.

Focus on the receiver

Moving away from the ‘narrow’ definition of public diplomacy as the ‘actions of governments to inform and influence foreign publics’ (The Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, on line, as cited in McDowell, 2008: 8), we employ the concept of a ‘new’ public diplomacy: ‘new thinking, new tools, and adaptation by government hierarchies to network capabilities and stronger more imaginative relationships with civil society’ (Gregory, 2008: 286). We argue a number of conceptual connections between the ‘new’ public diplomacy and the multistakeholder diplomacy model. Very similar to the multistakeholder model, the ‘new’ public diplomacy conceptualizes government as one of many stakeholders: ‘not necessarily undertaking the entire conception and execution of a project but at least playing a role, working with civil society partners, funding, coordinating, and/or directing’. (McDowell, 2008: 8). ‘New’ public diplomacy aims to take into account diverse targets – state and supranational actors, elites and experts as well as ordinary citizens. It accounts for technological innovations and has to faction the networking nature of relations between different actors (Gregory, 2008).

The ‘new’ public diplomacy is argued to be exercised by ‘states, associations of states and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance interests and values’ (Gregory, 2008: 276) [italics original]. This emphasis on influence via communication, relations and understanding suggests the central position of the consumer of the diplomatic outcomes – on a par with the producer. As such, we propose to link the conceptualizations of the multistakeholder model in the energy diplomacy context to the three theoretical modes of public diplomacy: monologue, dialogue and collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008). We also advocate for active listening as a part of a successful multistakeholder diplomacy outreach. Listening is one of five levels in the public diplomacy theorization (Cull, 2008).

Introducing the concepts

The monologue mode is a ‘one-way communication to advocate foreign policy strategies’ (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 13). It is a necessary but limited mode of communication: a heavy reliance on monologue in the world of networks and interdependencies is no longer sufficient to ensure the success of a sender’s ‘strategic communication’. Communication modes of dialogue and collaboration have become crucial. The dialogue mode provides an ‘opportunity to listen or allow for feedback or critical responses from the audience’ (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 16). Executed at the personal or organizational level, dialogue is seen as a ‘method for improving relationships and increasing understanding, not necessarily for reaching consensus or for winning an argument’ (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 19). Finally, collaboration means ‘initiatives in which participants from different nations participate in a project together’ (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 21). Collaboration efforts could attempt to solve shared problems, or advance shared visions, or aim to complete a joint physical project (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 21). Engaging external stakeholders in concrete projects and achieving successful joint outcomes is argued to be key in building a relationship and mutual trust. Ideally, the three communication modes should co-exist and inform one another. Despite its inherent limitations, monologue is still necessary to convey an idea, a vision or a perspective, and to present it eloquently and clearly (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 21). At the same time, dialogue and collaboration modes present numerous challenges in their planning and execution, not least due to the lack of skills among practitioners.

Further conceptualization of public diplomacy includes consideration of five levels of activities: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international news broadcasting (Cull, 2008). Of particular interest to this analysis is listening (as defined by Cull, 2008) as a prerequisite of all successful public diplomacy efforts. Specifically, listening is ‘actors’ attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly’ (Cull, 2008: 32).

Applying public diplomacy concepts to EU energy diplomacy

One of the typical criticisms of the EU’s external affairs is that it is good at ‘talking at’ the world rather than ‘talking with’ it (Holland and Chaban, 2011). In diplomatic terms, this could be interpreted as a preference for monologue and advocacy over other modes and levels of diplomacy. Incorporated into every level of the multistakeholder model, reflections on the three modes and five levels of public diplomacy would help to maximize the shift from monologue to a true dialogue and then to a meaningful and inclusive collaboration in energy diplomacy conduct. ‘True’ dialogue is understood here in Buber’s (1958) interpretation – an exchange of opinions where the expected outcome is not an imposition of one side’s opinion on the other side, but a better understanding of the interlocutors’ positions, even when disagreement emerged at the end of the dialogue.

A range of activities in the dialogue and collaboration modes is currently observed in EU energy diplomacy. As discussed above, dialogues and collaboration activities transcend the target groups and involve state, non-state and supranational actors in specific energy-related projects. In the BICS cases, EU energy diplomacy involved top government officials and institutes, private businesses and members of the scientific community in the dialogue frequently brokering interactions not only between the EU and a local actor, but between local actors. In addition, many collaborations in the energy field are supported by the EU. Among such projects are the ones administered by EU delegations. They typically target sustainable development and local capacity building, access to renewable energy sources linked to environmental aspects of energy operation, and poverty alleviation.

While dialogue-based advocacy and scientific exchanges remain the most typical level of diplomatic exchanges, the arsenal of the EU’s listening activities on energy-related matters around the word remains limited. This is despite the central place assigned to listening in a successful diplomatic outcome. In the past, DG Energy in its external dimension has not been coordinated with EEAS and, as such, the mandates the EU Delegations around the world have for collecting energy-related information remained unclear. One exceptional example of systematic listening is a research project, supported by the Jean Monnet Programme, which looks into EU images as a global normative energy actor in BRICS (BICS plus Russia) and compares them with EU self-perceptions (External Images of the EU (EXIE) as a Global Normative Energy Actor, n.d.). Future research could explore the potential role international broadcasting and cultural/science diplomacy could play in energy diplomacy.

Discussion and conclusions

In today’s globalizing environment, states are no longer the only significant global actors. State, non-state and supranational actors are intertwined in a multitude of networks, with numerous ‘poles’ of power (Castells, 2009). This swiftly changing multipolar architecture challenges international relations practitioners and scholars to conceptualize and operationalize an obvious paradox: the increasingly interconnected world with all its networks and interdependencies is also a progressively competitive environment where ‘established’ and ‘emerging’ powers are vying for influence, appeal and resources. This paradox tests the art of modern-day diplomacy. This paper addressed this challenge by revisiting the notion of energy diplomacy in a case-study of the EU towards the ‘emerging’ powers of BICS. The four BICS countries are strategic partners for the EU, and energy diplomacy towards them is an important part of a larger strategic diplomacy with these ‘rising’ powers.

The EU was conceptualized as a supranational actor producing energy-related diplomatic efforts, and a systematic insight into the EU’s procedural issues was conceived within the multistakeholder model. The model proved to be a useful tool to advance the conceptualization of energy diplomacy as a phenomenon in international relations. Our analysis showed that the EU, a supranational actor, is already a producer of diplomatic outcomes in the field of international energy relations. Advancing understanding of energy diplomacy, our analysis suggests that energy diplomacy is a complex phenomenon featuring a number of blends in its process. In our case, those were observed on the levels of diplomacy models, participants (producers and consumers) and communication modes.

The application of the multistakeholder model to EU energy diplomacy revealed our first intertwining – the EU did not use the multistakeholder tools exclusively, but simultaneously employed both ‘multistakeholder’ and ‘state-centred’ tools. This blended pattern was most frequently observed on the levels of forms (e.g. in using bilateral channels used exclusively by the government in addition to a simultaneous use of other diffused channels involving the government along with other stakeholders); representations patterns (e.g. the EU Delegations as formal diplomatic missions of a supranational actor); and roles (e.g. the diplomats as gatekeepers and facilitators/entrepreneurs). This observation may indicate that a sharp opposition of the multistakeholder vis-a-vis the state-centred model is idealized. In reality, diplomatic efforts in the energy field include the simultaneous practice of both models. This blended type could be explained by the fact that states are still visible and prominent actors in the International Relations (IR) practices. Unsurprisingly, the EU often has to resort to the established state-centred structures – either because its international interlocutors are states, or because states remain an important element of the EU as a supranational body. It may also indicate that in order to achieve success any modern-day producer of diplomacy must master both models and apply them appropriately. This also raises the bigger question: if the EU blends the models intentionally, is it a well-planned strategy or merely a random combination? Our preliminary observation suggests the latter; however, future research may provide more answers to this question.

In terms of participants (consumers and producers), our analysis showed a complex blend of consumers on both state and non-state levels. Where the EU is targeting a range of diplomacy consumers such as high officials and the local top government bodies in a bilateral regime, EU energy diplomacy actions sit comfortably on the state-centred diplomacy side of the continuum. There is also plenty of evidence that EU energy diplomacy targets its own and ‘emerging’ powers’ stakeholders, including businesses, energy experts, civil society and even the general public. The EU’s focused effort to involve the international general public in its energy diplomacy activities (e.g. through EUSEW) is a diplomatic innovation. This event appeals to the expert groups (scientific and technology community) and civil society, as well as the general public. Communicating with the general public is a new facet of energy diplomacy practice that warrants future research.

The EU’s supranational institutional architecture establishes a blend of multiple spheres of authority that do not necessarily coordinate with each other. The open, inclusive, fluid, unstable and multidirectional flows of information coming from the EU are not always coherent. Institutional tensions within the EU structures and the clash of sovereignty and non-sovereignty rules between the EU and EU member states are constant. This lack of cohesion may send mixed messages to the consumers of diplomatic practice. It may translate into an image of a ‘weaker partner’ – and external interlocutors will respond to this negatively. The next question is: does this negative image of the EU dominate the perceptions of its external partners, or is there another interpretation that guides foreign policy production towards the EU in the energy field? This question suggests that the multistakeholder model must incorporate another conceptual dimension on a par with the producer – the consumer of the diplomatic effort – and advocate an active and systematic listening component within it. This is crucial, as networks, open communication and collaboration are the cornerstones of the multistakeholder model.

The final conceptual intertwining is between communication modes. EU energy actions in the third countries (including BICS) are informed by norms declared by EU internal discourses; namely sustainability, competitiveness and security of a supply. In itself, the normative message of the EU is a blend between the cosmopolitan/moral norms (sustainability, development, environment protection) and liberal/market norms (competitiveness, security of supply, technological exchanges). The interplay between the moral and market norms and values will then dictate the type of energy actors the EU will engage internationally, and thus guide EU diplomatic practice on the ground. These norms are not only used for internal decision-making but are projected onto the consumers of the diplomatic outcomes. This suggests a mixture between a one-way top-down communication approach informed by the diffusion of norms (typical of governance discourses) and a two-way horizontal dialogic communication patter (typical of diplomatic discourse).

It is clear that EU energy diplomacy is challenged by the supranational sui generis nature of this entity and the multilevel nature of its international energy-related dialogue. In light of this, two directions for future research are proposed. Subsequent analyses could compare the EU’s energy diplomacy efforts with different multilateral organizations such as NATO or the UN. Future studies could also examine the EU’s energy diplomacy practices vis-à-vis such efforts by EU member states, in particular looking at whether all member states are acting in concert, as well as developing the notion of multilevel diplomacy.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received support from two projects: (1) Jean Monnet Multilateral Project ‘External Images of the EU (EXIE): Images of the EU as a Normative Energy Player (BRICS vis-a-vis the EU)’ supported by Lifelong Learning: Erasmus, Jean Monnet Programme of Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, European Commission, Grant Agreement 2012-2884; and (2) an international interdisciplinary research project on EU External Energy Governance towards the emerging powers China, Brazil, India and South Africa financed by Volkswagen Foundation (VW, Germany), Riksbankens Jubieumsfonds (Sweden) and Compagnia de San Paolo (Italy).

Notes

Author biographies

Natalia Chaban is Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. She has significant experience in analysing EU identity outside the EU, widely publishing and advancing methodological expertise in this regard. Since 2002, she has co-led a comparative transnational project on EU external perceptions comprising a multicultural team from 20 Asia–Pacific locations, as well as a ‘mirror’ perceptions project: ‘Asia in the Eyes of Europe’.

Michèle Knodt is JM Chair, specializing in European multilevel governance, European external energy governance and interest intermediation. She is a leader of the Energy Centre at TU Darmstadt. She is currently coordinating an international project on EU external energy governance towards the emerging powers supported by the VW Foundation (Germany), Riksbankens Jubieumsfonds (Sweden) and Compagnia de San Paolo (Italy), which incorporates 11 EU partners and four emerging powers.

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