Agentic constructivism and the Proliferation Security Initiative: Modeling norm change

Abstract

Recent developments in global politics and international relations theory have raised questions about the strength of international norms. Critical constructivists identify instances of norm change, contestation, and even regress, arguing that norms may be less deeply internalized and more fragile than often assumed. This study builds on contemporary constructivist scholarship to advance a model of elite-driven norm change with stages of redefinition and substitution through contestation. It conducts a plausibility probe of the model by analyzing the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the US-led program that appeared designed to change normative principles from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation and from freedom of navigation on the high seas to maritime interdiction of suspect weapons and technology shipments. The model lends valuable insights on the evolution of norms to accommodate new realities over the last decade, and it suggests the need for more contingent and multi-linear theories of international cooperation.

Keywords

Constructivism international norms norm change Proliferation Security Initiative

Introduction

Policy-makers have struggled for centuries to establish normative architectures that would help prevent international conflicts. For example, in the face of conquest, exploitation, and lawlessness in the world’s oceans, western leaders espoused freedom of navigation of the seas as the foundation of a new norm. This principle was later institutionalized in Geneva Conventions and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a comprehensive legal platform for maritime activity that granted legitimacy to freedom of the seas and exclusivity of jurisdiction of the flag state. In a similar way, policy-makers advanced the nuclear non-proliferation norm during the Cold War to help prevent the spread of these dangerous weapons. The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was constructed to bind countries to the common goal of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. In exchange for a commitment not to seek nuclear weapons, developing countries received assurances for assistance with peaceful nuclear energy programs.

Constructivist international relations theory has advanced through two generations of the study of ideational foundations of cooperation. First-generation works described the norm life-cycle as the development of new principles for global politics by norm entrepreneurs, their advancement through a cascade effect, and state embrace and ‘internalization’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896). Constructivists argued that institutional cooperation and identities become mutually constitutive, providing legitimacy and reinforcement for positive practices. Conversely, advances in second-generation critical constructivism suggest traditional norms may be more fragile than previously acknowledged; they promote careful examination of relationships between agent and structures in norm contestation (Acharya, 2011; Müller and Wunderlich, 2013; Wiener, 2014).

Building on critical constructivism, this study advances a model of norm change driven by great power agents with advanced capabilities and material resources. It posits that norms may be less constitutive and more malleable when powerful players are determined to change them, yet the regulatory factors and legitimacy of norms frames remain important in defining the ultimate outcome. It conducts a plausibility probe of a two-stage model of elite norm entrepreneurship and interdependency in the George W. Bush administration, focused on discursive interventions to foster norm change by establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI was designed to sanction multinational coordination for forceful interdictions of suspected illicit weapons or dual-use technology shipments on the high seas, and it has been endorsed by dozens of countries. This suggests a shifting norm frame to support multilateral operations including surveillance, monitoring, and interdiction as a new form of assertive counter-proliferation.

This article proceeds as follows: First, it surveys theoretical foundations in constructivism related to international cooperation and its limitations. Next, it draws on second-generation agentic constructivism and insights from international law and political psychology to present a new model of norm change. The article then conducts a plausibility probe of the model in the case of the PSI. An in-depth, single case study method, supported by process tracing and elite interviews, examines the evolution of policy behavior relative to norm frames through two stages of elite-driven redefinition and constructive norm substitution through contestation. Successful norm change is defined here as the substantive alteration of ‘acceptable’ behavior as articulated by a critical mass of players, and as measured by legitimacy and bandwagoning behavior. Finally, the article assesses results of the study and draws implications for a more reflexive model of the life, contestation, and evolution of norms.

Constructivism and the limits of norm ‘Life’

Constructivist international relations theory offered compelling perspectives on ideational forces at work in global politics in the post-Cold War era. In 1995, Alexander Wendt advanced a constructivist study of social structures as, ‘shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge…[which] constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of their relationships, whether cooperative or conflictual’ (Wendt, 1995: 73–74). He defined international norms as, ‘intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world” that shape “actors, their situations, and their possibilities of action’ (Wendt, 1994: 384). International relations theorists hail norms as important standards that are both regulative and constitutive in their effect on national interests and identity. They acquire a taken-for-granted quality that is no longer subject to contestation. Norms that intersect with international legal structures, scholars contend, foster significant pressure for state compliance (Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002; Sikkink, 2011b).

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s norm life-cycle model outlined three stages of norm development: emergence; broad acceptance (also referred to as a ‘norm cascade’); and internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895; Risse et al., 1999: 5). The first stage represents development of the norm, ‘actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community.’ Those primary agents are norm entrepreneurs at the grassroots level, ‘who attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). The transition to the second stage occurs when agents attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers through a cascade process, and a ‘tipping point’ in norm life occurs when a critical mass of actors adopt the norm. In the third stage in the life-cycle model, internalization, norms become accepted standards of behavior for the international community. This stage is broadly equated with compliance and routinization of a norm by a critical mass of states. Norms become reflections of societal values and the embodiment of shared beliefs sustained by members’ approval or disapproval.

This study counters, however, that celebrations of norm longevity may be premature. While first-generation constructivist scholarship has highlighted the ideational dimension of international relations, the literature faces several limitations. First, the end stage of the life-cycle model, internalization, is characterized as static in many studies. Once norms are disseminated and internalized, they are assumed to serve as unquestioned, framing principles for state behavior. Yet, this emphasis has left the potential for norm change under-theorized in first-generation scholarship (Krook and True, 2010; Legro, 1997: 34–35; Sandholtz, 2007). Emerging critical constructivist studies have begun to embrace the potential for norm change and contestation, though they exhibit diverse perspectives. Scholars investigate themes including localization, adaptation, and diffusion of universal norms to regional contexts (Acharya, 2004; Wiener, 2004; Wiener and Puetter, 2009). Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann (2013) suggest change may be a product of at least two types of norm challenges—applicatory contestation and justificatory/validity contestation. Critical work by Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich (2013) also focuses on ‘norm dynamics’ including decay and unintended consequences of normative evolution. It should be noted that these works do not dismiss the importance of norms; to the contrary, they call for more detailed and sophisticated exploration of the relative and conditional power of ideational constructs.

Second, accepting that norms are undergoing constant evolutions in the face of assertiveness and innovations highlights the interdependent relationship between agents and structures. While traditional constructivists believe that norms are important independent variables in our understanding of international affairs, a modified approach would characterize norms as interdependent with great power norm stewardship, subject to bounded manipulation and refinement by actors that have sufficient material power. In the face of dramatic events or external ‘shocks’, agents with material resources may change their own definitions of national interest and alter their views on even well- ingrained existing norms accordingly. In such an environment, norms may be manipulated by power and interest over which they may have less influence than typically assumed by first-generation constructivists. At the same time, existing norms offer regulative aspects and legitimacy that must be incorporated into any changing frames. Exploration of the process of norm contestation—by modeling agentic constructivism and this interdependency—will provide greater analytical perspective on advances in norm theory. This proposed solution addresses what is consistently one of the weakest areas of constructivism: how norms connect with local agents and have constitutive effects. Just as they are sometimes players in building norms, this article asserts, agents play an important role in shaping both norm compliance and norm challenges. This also revisits arguments about the constitutive qualities of norms in internalization and the acceptance of the logic of appropriateness (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Risse, 2000; Sikkink, 2011).

Third, constructivism also opens exciting new debates regarding norm diffusion, internalization, and compliance. For example, Wiener has called attention to the ‘dual quality of norms…as both structuring and socially constructed through interaction in a context’ (Wiener, 2007: 49). This then prompts a question regarding whether contestation necessarily weakens or strengthens norm frames? According to first-generation constructivism, contestation itself would be unlikely, and if it were to occur, this would surely be a sign of norm weakening. But critical constructivist models have embraced the possibility of norm change and contestation as a revitalization process. In this sense, contestation fosters greater norm legitimacy (Diez, 2013; Hyde-Price, 2006; Manners, 2002). Meanwhile, others scholars appear to straddle the line on this question, seeing hegemony as combining material and discursive dimensions that inevitably foster contestations over compliance (Bruff, 2011). An exploration of development and implications of contestation of the norms of maritime security and non-proliferation should yield greater insights on the questions of the evolution and importance of norms.

Elite agency, redefinition, and constructive norm substitution

This study sets out to conduct a plausibility probe of a dynamic model of norm development and change. It adopts a critical constructivist perspective on the norm life-cycle and argues norms may change at the hands of vested great powers. While many assume these agents to be the protectors or stewards of norms, leaders of powerful countries also can play the role of norm entrepreneurs by regularly engaging in assessments and domestic political discourses of norm commitments. These deliberations, in turn, can shape state behavior in multilateral forums, though they are often bounded by regulative guidelines and norm legitimacy. Such an approach does not relegate norms to the sidelines. Rather, an agentic constructivist model sees government leaders participate in dialogues related to normative limits and prescriptions on a regular basis, with the assumption that these help maintain the effectiveness and legitimacy of normative commitments. Given the potential complexity of ongoing processes of contestation, this study suggests norm change can be framed as a phased dialectical process—including redefinition and substitution through contestation—practiced with the intent to foster new, legitimate cognitive frames and ways of understanding problems.

Presidents and executive branch officials in the United States interpret and sometimes contest the meaning of norm frames for state behavior. They are well situated to evaluate strategic interests relative to norms, and they have the authority to allocate government resources. In this sense, policy consensus relative to norms might be viewed more as the product of a ‘negotiated reality’ among elites who are staking claims on normative interpretations and a preferred foreign policy path, rather than a set of fully internalized normative principles (and, thus that interests are constituted by existing norms).

This study proposes a process of norm entrepreneurship in democratic states involving two important stages: changing conceptions of norm parameters in the domestic political arena (redefinition); and multilateral diplomacy to grant legitimacy to the new norm frame (constructive norm substitution). The preferred outcome would be international endorsement of new principles and bandwagoning behavior by a critical mass of states. Redefinition refers to the process of recalculation of a state’s approach to a traditional norm or interpretation of its meaning and implications for policy behavior. Redefinition typically occurs through rhetorical means and policy debates, as traditional enforcers of a norm raise questions of normative utility or legitimacy. This process may be most transparent in democratic states, where power-sharing necessitates the constructive exchange of ideas among leaders.

The next stage, constructive norm substitution through contestation, involves attempts by leaders to persuade their peers in multilateral venues of the legitimacy of the new norm frame. This process typically begins when Western leaders or government representatives encourage others in multilateral institutions to revisit existing normative standards in light of new challenges or opportunities, generating policy discourse and debate in the international institution. Leaders attempt to persuade their counterparts in multilateral venues to consider norm substitution and attempt to build policy consensus in the struggle to define prevailing norms. This process is constructive because new norm frames require a measure of the regulative effects and legitimacy of existing norms.

Traditional norm frames: non-proliferation and maritime security

The PSI is situated at the intersection of at least two normative architectures: non-proliferation; and freedom of navigation on the high seas. Both norms were developed over decades of negotiation and institutionalized through major treaties that garnered near universal support. Both became widely accepted standards for the regulation of state behavior. Thus, attempts to alter norm frames raise fascinating questions about standards and limits of the global political order.

Western powers played critical roles in the non-proliferation norm as both architects and enforcers during the Cold War. President Eisenhower proposed the Atoms for Peace program in 1953 to promote civilian uses and foster great power cooperation on arms control (Maddock, 1998: 554). In 1968, the United States and other major powers formulated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), based on three fundamental principles: (1) non-proliferation; (2) peaceful use of nuclear energy; and (3) disarmament. Export controls on nuclear technology became an important means to an end for the non-proliferation pillar of the norm. Building on the NPT, advanced industrialized countries established export control regimes including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The NPT also required that all signatory non-nuclear-weapon-states conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and IAEA enforcement mechanisms for full-scope safeguards were thus critical to the effectiveness of the new multilateral non-proliferation regime. The Statute of the IAEA (n.d.) included promises not to exchange fissile material, equipment, or technologies, even for peaceful purposes.

International maritime law was developed in a somewhat similar fashion. The world’s oceans have served as the primary route of international commerce and exchange for centuries. They also have served as transfer routes for the illicit trafficking of dangerous weapons, technologies, and delivery systems (Byers, 2004; UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 2002: 13). The principle of freedom of navigation of the seas, including standards for maritime activity embedded in the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982), has a complicated history. Maritime transit regulation represents a delicate balance of respect for state sovereignty as well as a commitment to freedom in the global commons. Customary international law grants ships the right to freely navigate the oceans, as well as ‘expeditious’ passage through territorial waters in certain circumstances (Joyner, 2009). While great powers evinced support for this principle, many disagreements emerged over maritime rights. In the 19th century, piracy and the illegal impressment of sailors sparked major conflicts. Other controversies regarding access to the commons, such as fishing, commerce, and ocean mining rights, also continued.

In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson espoused freedom of navigation of the seas as a defining principle for a new world order. Three more modern agreements also established key pillars of the maritime norm in the 20th century. First, the 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Seas established sovereign state control over coastal territories and inland waterways, and provided the ‘right of innocent passage’ for vessels needing to pass through territorial seas in an expeditious manner. This meant that ships were to be protected by the national sovereignty of their flag state, even when passing briefly through waters controlled by another. Second, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (also passed in 1958) outlined standards for open transit in international waters, further ensuring the use of the ocean to promote commerce (Logan, 2005; Valencia, 2007). Article 2 of the Convention underscored: ‘The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty.’ Third, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) represents the most comprehensive legal platform for maritime activity ever developed. The convention underscores legal standards governing international waters, especially the principles of freedom of universal usage and exclusivity of jurisdiction of the flag state (Kwiatkowska, 1991). According to Article 110 of the treaty, ‘a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship…is not justified in boarding it.’ The UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and has been praised by supporters as a comprehensive legal and political framework for governance of the global commons (Song, 2007: 102).

The Proliferation Security Initiative

Uncle Sam and the sea

As noted above, the United States traditionally supported the principle of freedom of the seas, that all vessels and peoples have the right to travel unmolested in international waters during times of peace or war. When the Continental Congress gathered in the summer of 1776, framers argued the fledgling nation should operate on a model of neutral commerce with foreign countries in times of both war and peace. Not only did this stance reflect broader principles for which the new nation stood, freedom on the high seas also would be critical for commerce and the security of the young country. Later, even as the United States established itself as a naval presence in the late 19th century and early 20th century, leaders maintained their commitment to freedom of the seas. In 1966, President Johnson reaffirmed, ‘We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings’ (quoted in Van Dyke, 2000: 141).

Norm redefinition in the modern era

The George W. Bush administration began to revisit US commitments to a number of different security norms, including freedom of the seas and non-proliferation, in the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The White House interpreted the attacks as a serious challenge to security, but also a ‘moment of destiny’ for the nation that dictated bold and decisive action. Officials quickly concluded that past defense strategies and traditional norm stewardship were no longer adequate to guarantee security, and they set about redefining US commitments. Within days, Congress passed a broad resolution that authorized the president: ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against’ terrorist groups and their sponsors. The president effectively articulated a new doctrine of preemption that would be much more forward-leaning than traditional deterrence.

In March 2003, allied coalition forces launched an invasion of Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein; observers at the time called it America’s first true counter-proliferation war. The Bush administration also grew concerned in this period that the world’s oceans had become another vector for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In December 2002, Spanish and US intelligence agencies tracked a North Korean-flagged vessel, the So San, following its departure from the North Korean port of Nampo. The ship was bound for Yemen, and officials suspected it might be carrying intermediate-range Scud missiles, capable of delivering conventional weapons or WMD warheads. The Spanish Navy attempted to stop the So San about 600 miles off the coast of Yemen on the grounds that it had changed flags while on the high seas and that its name did not match any vessel on the official registry (Doolin, 2006). Together, Spanish and US Special Forces boarded and searched the So San, and they discovered a hidden cache of Scud missile components, conventional warheads, and chemicals used in Scud missile fuel. The United States threatened seizure of the cargo, but after days of diplomatic wrangling determined they lacked any legal basis to do so. The Yemeni government publicly confirmed the order of missile components and had agreed to purchase them in 1999; a series of tense phone calls among Yemen’s President Ali Abdallah Saleh, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell soon followed. The So San was released and allowed to sail on to a port in Yemen.

This episode left a profound mark on the Bush administration. In an environment of already heightened concerns, experts warned that this was the ‘tip of a global iceberg in weapons proliferation’ and furthermore that international law appeared to protect the neutrality of commerce, allowing such cargoes to ‘pass with impunity.’ President Bush admitted that the So San incident had made him a ‘very, very unhappy man’ (quoted in Sanger and Shanker, 2002: A1).

One of the first major questions the administration faced when considering a new multilateral interdiction program was just how committed the United States was to existing international law. The United States was not a party to the UNCLOS because when original negotiations on the convention occurred during the Reagan administration, the White House raised a number of concerns that were interpreted as an ultimatum by its negotiating partners (Winner, 2005). When no compromise was reached, the White House switched positions and began actively lobbying other countries from ratifying the convention. The US government argued that the convention simply did not protect vital sovereign interests of advanced industrialized states. Indeed, the United States was the only permanent member of the UN Security Council and the only member of NATO not to be a party to the agreement.

Officials in the Bush administration recognized the complexity of the issues at hand and attempted to finesse a balance between domestic support for interdiction and formal support for UNCLOS. In the spirit of the post-9/11 security environment, officials determined that a serious interdiction program for suspected shipments of dangerous weapons and technologies could bolster national security. The 2002 National Security Strategy offered an early framing of this issue focused on enhancing capabilities to ‘prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations’ (Bush, 2002). In 2003, Undersecretary of State John Bolton became the architect of a new approach, now termed the PSI, for surveillance, intelligence sharing, and maritime interdiction. Bolton stated, ‘Where there are gaps or ambiguities in our authorities [for interdiction on the high seas], we may consider seeking additional sources for such authority, as circumstances dictate. What we do not believe, however, is that only the UN Security Council can grant the authority we need’ (quoted in Byers, 2004: 451).

However, critics in Congress began to question whether the PSI would be consistent with UNCLOS, as well as whether the United States should accede to the treaty in order to launch the PSI. This issue divided policy-makers: some said PSI represented a legal extension of UNCLOS and, thus, there was no rationale for the United States not to be involved. Congressional hearings called for the immediate ratification of UNCLOS, with support from representatives of trade consortiums including the American Petroleum Institute and the International Association of Drilling Contractors (Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, 108th Congress, Second Session, March 23, 2004). Meanwhile, other legislators charged that PSI was inconsistent with UNCLOS and that accession would actually prevent the US from implementing a serious interdiction regime. They recommended instead that UNCLOS be ignored while the United States continued its unilateral and mini-lateral action to prevent the spread of weapons through interdiction (Chaffee, 2004; Foley, 2004; Holmes and Winner, 2009).

Bush administration officials seemed to take a middle course, adopting the position that the PSI was consistent with existing standards of international maritime law and that no fundamental change in US policy would be necessary. Rice argued the PSI was legal and reflected the spirit of the UNCLOS. A State Department legal counsel claimed, ‘The Convention carefully balances the interests of controlling activities off their own coasts with those of all States in protecting the freedom to use ocean spaces without undue interference’ (Taft, 2003). In a period of about two years the Bush administration seemed fairly successful in silencing its critics. The government moved forward to invite other countries to join the PSI and pursue intelligence sharing and maritime interdiction with them.

Constructive norm substitution

Bush administration initiatives suggested a transformation of the US posture toward the traditional norm of freedom of the seas, as well as a move away from deterrence and defense as a preferred non-proliferation posture. In the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, for example, the Bush administration made clear its doctrine of preemption: ‘We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge’ (US Department of State, 2003a: 4). The traditional way of doing things was ‘obsolete,’ the government declared, and a new, flexible military response program would address perceived terror threats. This new normative frame would do more than err on the side of caution, governments might use military force based on even the suspicion of wrong-doing. Maritime interdiction became a centerpiece of this shift in normative orientation, with the goal of stopping illicit shipments of technologies around the world. President Bush unveiled the PSI in a speech at the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized nations summit in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003, stating, ‘the greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. And we must work together to stop them’ (Bush, 2003).

Bush’s speech was both a declaration and a bid for a broad endorsement for this new initiative from the G-8. The system would devote greater attention to prevent proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials. The government also would develop procedures for intelligence-sharing with key allies. The administration intended to prevent the transport of WMD by vessels by taking specific actions it deemed consistent with national and international laws (US Department of State, 2003b). The plan was bold, but it was not yet fully formed. According to a candid assessment by John Bolton, the Bush administration had only just begun to establish the specific elements of the PSI at the time of its unveiling in Poland. Working-level officials were then left to ‘put the meat on the bones’ of the Bush statement (Bolton, 2007: 154).

Following positive responses from some G-8 foreign ministers, US officials quickly expanded talks to promote a forceful interdiction program. They argued that the PSI would be entirely consistent with existing international legal standards and statements. Eleven countries quickly joined the initiative as the ‘Core Group’ (in spite of the fact that many of the finer details had not yet been worked out). Follow-up meetings were held in Madrid and Brisbane to explore areas for policy coordination and intelligence sharing. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Semmel said that the Bush administration constructed the PSI by practicing ‘gap analysis’ in the wake of the So San episode. The government assessed what they believed was missing or limited in nuclear security and advanced an ‘innovative’ approach to counter-proliferation. Semmel added that based on his experience in government, ‘If there is a strong desire to do something at the White House, then you look at existing institutions and find exceptions and ways to do it. You engage in tradeoffs and consideration of alternatives and figure out how to do it.’ He added that the executive was clearly a norm entrepreneur in this case given the reality on the ground that the White House had gotten ‘ahead’ of its own bureaucracies and foreign governments on PSI (Semmel, 2014).

In September 2003, the eleven member states of the PSI met in Paris to hammer out a ‘Statement of Interdiction Principles.’ This document described the PSI as ‘a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.’ Once again, members stressed that the PSI was fully consistent with customary international law. PSI was building on prior efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of dangerous weapons, including existing treaties and regimes, as well as actions by the United Nations. Members also argued PSI was supported by the G-8 and the European Union, with the goal of preventing proliferation to terrorists or rogue states (‘Statement of Interdiction Principles,’ September 4, 2003).

Just a month later, the Bush administration claimed a high profile victory for the program in the interdiction of the BBC China, a German-owned ship carrying centrifuge components for Libya’s nuclear weapons program, which helped unravel the A.Q. Khan proliferation network; in a fascinating post-script, however, statements by former administration officials later revealed that the BBC China operation actually was ‘separate’ from PSI (Boese, 2005). The PSI continued to expand its reach in 2004. The Core Group leadership expanded to become the Operational Experts Group, which oversaw actions and operational planning and training (Wolf et al., 2009). The Bush administration pushed allies to endorse the PSI and take a more holistic approach to proliferation security. Semmel made the pitch for PSI at multiple international security conferences in 2004. He argued the United States had helped to construct a complex non-proliferation regime to deal with diverse proliferation threats, but Semmel warned that when it came to PSI, ‘We simply did not believe that we had the luxury of our predecessors for negotiation crossing many months or years to arrive at an immediate solution to this danger’ (Remarks at Conference on Global Non-proliferation and Counterterrorism, October 12, 2004).

However, once again this position raised tricky international issues. The PSI increased the likelihood that ships carrying dual-use materials might be stopped, interfering with larger patterns of international commerce. Critics also pointed out that under international law, sovereign states have the right in general to possess weapons for self defense, and only their use is restricted by customary international law. The very principle of interdiction seemed on shaky legal ground. The UNCLOS provided a sharply defined set of reasons for interdiction, including suspicion of piracy, international broadcasts carried out in foreign waters, and issues of re-flagging (so-called ‘stateless vessels’). Otherwise, international legal precepts were quiet on the question of authority to seize a ship flying the flag of another state, confiscate its cargo, or arrest and prosecute its officer and crew (Etzioni, 2009; Shulman, 2006). On the legal jurisdiction issue, customary international law supports that ‘failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power…in the territory of another State…[Jurisdiction] cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention’ (Byers, 1999: 53). This stance was supported by legal rulings from the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice.

Endorsement by the United Nations

The United States and its allies argued in the United Nations that the existing law, the UN Charter, and previous Resolutions all supported the PSI. For example, they noted the UN Charter called for a broad concept of arms control within a collective security system, and Articles 11, 26 and 47 provided general outlines for the regulation of armaments. Article 51 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter also gives states the right to use force in limited circumstances of anticipatory self-defense. Collectively, they argued these principles provided legitimacy to interdiction efforts to regulate the proliferation of WMD. In 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 687 imposed specific weapons-related prohibitions on Iraq following the Persian Gulf War, and Western governments viewed this as a precedent for a more proactive system of interdiction. This resolution included the establishment of a compulsory inspections regime to locate and remove technologies related to WMD (Joyner, 2007). Later, the Security Council issued a statement claiming the proliferation of all WMD constituted a threat to international peace and security. The UN General Assembly also held three special sessions devoted to arms control and disarmament in 1978, 1982, and 1988 and sanctioned work by the Conference on Disarmament to try to develop relevant arms control protocols.

The UN Security Council also took a more proactive stance on these matters in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The body passed Resolution #1373, asserting that acts of international terrorism constituted a threat to international peace and security. The resolution’s operative clauses condemned providing any form of support to terrorists (Joyner, 2007). US diplomats also pushed their allies on the UN Security Council to adopt an anti-proliferation resolution that would fill a critical gap in international law by criminalizing the proliferation of WMD and related materials. Resolution #1540, passed in April 2004, was designed to tighten export controls and security related to terror threats through extensive consultations. By requiring states to build monitoring infrastructure and enact stronger controls on the export of dual-use or sensitive technologies, materials and equipment, Western countries hoped that a more rigid network of protections would boost capabilities and the will to prevent transfers of these materials to non-state actors (Semmel, 2004). Under the auspices of the UN International Maritime Organization, the Bush administration also championed a new Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) (1988). The convention was originally established in 1988 to criminalize acts of terrorism and to counter narcotics trafficking committed at sea. The new Protocol, advanced in 2005, would essentially try to fill gaps in international law by criminalizing the transportation of WMD materials and their delivery vehicles to unintended targets. The amendments proposed to outlaw ‘uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive material or BCN (biological, chemical, nuclear) weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage.’ A new article of the Convention also outlined the procedures for cooperation in circumstances of interdiction. Bush administration officials supported the treaty, and the Senate gave its advice and consent for ratification of the 2005 SUA Protocol on September 25, 2008.

Anniversary celebration

In May 2013, members of the PSI celebrated the tenth anniversary of establishment of the program at a high-level meeting in Warsaw. This gathering of representatives of 71 partner states hailed the critical role the program played in countering the spread of WMD and advanced an agenda for continued development, including more regular and robust PSI exercises, advancing more legally binding international treaties to criminalize international WMD-related trafficking by commercial ships and aircraft, and sharing expertise and resources to build critical interdiction capabilities. Officials also briefly lifted the veil of secrecy surrounding PSI operations, reporting that participants had conducted nearly fifty interdiction exercises and ‘scores’ of successful interdiction cases in its first decade (Joseph, 2006). For all intents and purposes, the Warsaw celebration seemed to confirm that many countries in the world had agreed that they could no longer afford to wait for the enemy to strike. The nature of threats that the United States and its allies face had forever changed. In many ways, then, the United States achieved its goal ‘to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing proliferation transfers to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern’ (US Department of State, 2004). The Defense Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called PSI ‘an important tool in our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept WMD materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. It is an innovative and proactive approach to preventing proliferation that relies on voluntary actions by states that are consistent with their national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks’ (US Department of Defense, 2010: 34).

Analysis and conclusion

Many have celebrated the achievements of norms such as non-proliferation and freedom of navigation on the seas. This optimism was certainly mirrored in first-generation constructivist international relations theory in the post-Cold War era, which emphasized the constitutive and regulatory power of international norms. However, this study has highlighted the special role that elite norm entrepreneurs play in a (surprisingly delicate) balance of international cooperation. When great powers were confronted by new layers of security challenges in illicit proliferation and transit on the high seas they seemed willing to revisit normative commitments. The George W. Bush administration led a new coalition of states ready to engage in preemption and interdiction.

Top officials in the government began this process by redefining the US commitment to the existing norm architecture. They were able to rapidly build domestic support for a more proactive posture of interdiction in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. A more challenging dimension was multilateral contestation, where Bush administration officials sought to substitute a new normative frame that included legitimacy from existing norms of non-proliferation and regulatory aspects of maritime laws. The result of this interdependent, dialectical exchange was the creation of the PSI—what some have termed a shift from a non-proliferation defensive posture to a new ‘proliferation security’ or counter-proliferation norm frame. The bandwagoning process started ‘with fewer than a dozen US allies and greeted by widespread international wariness,’ but ‘now boasts support from nearly a hundred governments spanning six continents’ (Cooper, 2011: 317). There were also clear signs of legitimacy of the new arrangement as well, with PSI tenets integrated into UN Security Council resolutions and formal endorsement of this more proactive approach by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2005. Over time, international organizations appeared to endorse the new normative architecture by enacting an elaborate system for enforcing international non-proliferation regime requirements, more rigorous inspections of nuclear facilities worldwide (through the IAEA Additional Protocol), tightened export requirements for civilian and sensitive nuclear technologies (Nuclear Supplier Group action in 2011), and greater oversight and controls to prevent terrorist acquisition of WMD technologies or materials (through UNSC Resolution #1540). In 2009, President Obama pledged to ensure the durability of the PSI, and the program also appeared to enjoy continuing bipartisan support in Congress.

This study suggests several implications for constructivist theory. First, the study shows that in certain circumstances, traditional norm frames may be less constitutive than assumed by first-generation constructivism. Leaders may exhibit varying degrees of norm internalization, allowing consideration of alternatives when confronted by new stimuli. Some norms may undergo a rather continuous evolution requiring stewardship and discourse. The end stage of the traditional life-cycle model, internalization, is far from static as an unquestioned standard for state behavior. Rather, through a process of norm redefinition and substitution, great powers embrace and grapple with norm frames, debating both applications and justifications and validity through contestation. This model suggests a measure of interdependency between agents and structures that has important consequences for theory development. For example, further research is needed to explore scope conditions under which agents may be more or less likely to ‘protect’ traditional norm frames versus initiate their change. How and when do agents reconsider the constitutive boundaries of norm architectures, and what role do regulations and legal restrictions play in this process?

The potential for variable internalization also pushes the envelope on the agent–structure question. Norms are maintained through greater power stewardship, but they are also changed by them. Further exploration of what is consistently one of the weakest areas of constructivism—how norms connect with local agents and have constitutive effects—is clearly needed. The depth of constitution of norms also may be a function of personal and political constraints. For example, in the case of the PSI, the reality that the United States Senate had not ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty and that debates about its validity and applicatory criteria were alive and well in the United States may have been an enabling condition for redefinition. In some ways, President Bush may have been less restricted (or normatively bound) by UNCLOS commitments than other actors who might have internalized its implications and enacted implementing legislation to support international legal strictures.

Interdependency between international norms and great power supporters also means that the acts of redefinition and constructive norm substitution are a two-way street. While norms may not be as constitutive as first-generation scholars hope, they clearly foster regulatory restrictions. By acknowledging that great powers grapple with international norms and institutions in the process of attempting to manipulate them, we recognize the potential power of these ideational factors. This study showed that leaders must carefully strike a balance between redefining state interests and building an international coalition of legitimacy. This study also addresses exciting new debates regarding norm diffusion, internalization, and compliance. Critical constructivist models have embraced the possibility of norm change and contestation as a revitalization process. In this sense, contestation appears to have fostered greater norm legitimacy, albeit modified in the spirit of counter-proliferation. Finally, the study highlights the complexity of ongoing processes of contestation: this study suggests norm change can be framed as a sequential, dialectical process—including phases of redefinition and substitution through contestation—practiced with the intent to foster new cognitive frames and ways of understanding problems. Greater understanding of the significance of norm stewards, entrepreneurs, and social processes of deliberations through critical constructivist inquiry, both internally and externally, may add significantly to theories of international cooperation.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received financial support for research of this article from the Henry Luce III Fund for Distinguished Scholarship at The College of Wooster.

Author biography

Jeffrey S Lantis is Professor of Political Science at The College of Wooster. His teaching and research interests include international security, international norms, critical constructivism, strategic culture, and nuclear nonproliferation. He is author of Arms and Influence: U.S. Technology Innovations and the Evolution of International Security Norms (Stanford University Press, 2016).

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