The bridge on the Neretva: Stari Most as a stage of memory in post-conflict Mostar,Bosnia–Herzegovina

Introduction

The title of this article parodies Ivo Andrić’s novel The Bridge on the Drina (1945). Andrić’s work of fiction is centred on the lives and stories of the people who lived around and interacted with the Mehmed Paša Sokolović Bridge in Višegrad over the course of 400 years. The stage of Andrić’s novel is one of five bridges on the UNESCO Heritage List (UNESCO, 2015b). Two of the five bridges on the UNESCO list are located in Bosnia–Herzegovina; the other bridge, Stari Most in Mostar, is the focus of this article (UNESCO, 2015b). Through the completion of the reconstruction, Stari Most (Old Bridge) and the surrounding area Stari Grad (Old Town) became an internationally certified UNESCO World Heritage Site and was regarded as a ‘symbol of reconciliation’ (UNESCO, 2005a: 1). Though the original and reconstructed Stari Most are both important structures for the growth of the city of Mostar (in terms of infrastructure originally, but also with respect to tourism) it is identifiable that the replication of the Ottoman construction provides a space of renovation not reconciliation.

The research for this article was conducted through ethnographic observations regarding the use of Stari Most and participant-produced ‘mind maps’ or rough maps of social movement, accompanied by narrative interviews with some participants additionally providing answers to follow-up questions (Sulsters, 2005: 1). This research locates the reconstruction of Stari Most as a staged reconciliation of the city and theoretically reflects on the work of Till (1999) ‘Staging the past’, Nora (1989) ‘sites of memory’, and extends Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical theory to conceptualise Stari Most as a stage of memory. The term ‘stage of memory’ will be applied to Stari Most to reflect the international consumption and also the performativity of the institutionally directed narrative of the bridge. The term ‘re-scripting’ will be used to refer to the social meaning that is inscribed in space through social movement and use.

Empirically, this article sets out the institutional historical and contemporary staging (physical transformation through deliberate damage, restoration) of Stari Most, comparatively outlining the local scripting (symbolic transformation through social usage) of the bridge. Additionally, this article identifies local actors in the city of Mostar in outlining the local scripting of a space for reconciliation in the establishment of the youth cultural centre Omladinski Kulturni Centar (OKC) Abrašević. Both of the spaces can be contextualised as spaces of peace, with Stari Most regarded by UNESCO (2005a: 1) as a ‘symbol of reconciliation’, while OKC Abrašević is noted as existing as a space in Mostar ‘that is open to everyone’ (Kappler, 2014: 174). However, the two sites are staged and scripted in different ways and represent the complex negotiation of space by local, national and international actors which occurs in post-conflict cities. Through the analysis of these two spaces and how they engage, and are engaged with, in the city of Mostar, this article puts forward the importance of local involvement in the process of transforming post-conflict space, beyond formalised stages of memory.

Though this article reflects on one example of the reconstruction of cultural heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the dimensions of how actors negotiate destruction and reconstruction of cultural heritage is of a growing importance due to the targeting of cultural sites by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The widespread cultural destruction instigated by ISIL has led to the establishment of the UNESCO-directed ‘Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Cultural Heritage’, a technical assistance project, and also ‘Unite4Heritage’ a social media campaign launched to raise awareness of the importance of protecting cultural heritage (UNESCO, 2015d: 1; Unite4Heritage, 2015). In this it is important to mark the growing relevance of the topic and to identify post-conflict responses to the reconstruction of cultural heritage and also the reconciliation of urban spaces. Turning now to outline the process whereby memory can be regarded as staged, the next section will identify the dynamics of how stages of memory are constructed and exist in physical space.

Stages of memory

The narrative that physical memorials perform is representative of top–down accepted narratives due to the power dynamics inherent in the production of physical place (Lefebvre, 1991: 26). The relevance of the director responsible for the stage of memory is integral to what is staged as the official narrative. Stages of memory typically dictate a predictable spatiality of recalling or remembrance which transfers and dehumanises remembering. Publically situated sites are highly visible yet are integrated as part of the everyday landscape. Amidst the constant social movement within and through place there exists a social need to physically locate memory, in ‘lieux de mémoire or sites of memory’ (Nora, 1989: 12). The sociological theory of rationalisation highlights four key components, ‘predictability, accountability, efficiency and…dehumanisation’, as evident in everyday social life, which significantly, can be identified in public memorials or ‘sites of memory’ (Nora, 1989: 12; Weber, 1958). Such sites are, through a small use of public space, emotively efficient and rationalised (Weber, 1958). Till (1999: 275) observes that ‘public sites of memory’ exist as a physical site of cultural remembrance and they achieve this status through a complex ‘interplay of historical narratives, official cultural politics, local interests’. Comparably, ‘sites of memory’ are defined by Nora (1989: 12) as a deposit ‘where memory crystallises and secretes itself’. These sites

originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organise celebrations…because such activities no longer occur naturally. (Nora, 1989: 12)

Furthermore, Nora (1989: 7) notes that the creation of such ‘sites of memory’ are a substitute for ‘mileux de mémoire, real environments of memory’. The preservation of remembrance in such spatially and emotively efficient ‘sites of memory’ assists with the continuation of the social self (Nora, 1989: 12), in so far as top–down-directed ‘sites of memory’ generate efficient places of remembrance which allow for the continuation of the individual in everyday life (Nora, 1989: 12). This can be regarded as the formation of ‘collective memory’ (Halbwachs, 1992: 22). As Coser (in Halbwachs, 1992: 22) notes, Halbwachs (1950: 84, in Halbwachs, 1992: 22)outlines this as ‘a socially constructed notion’ which importantly ‘requires the support of a group delimited in space and time’. Through this criteria, Halbwachs (1992: 53) puts forward the notion that the recording or staging of memory physically and existing transgenerationally is integral to the establishment of ‘collective memory’. Assmann (2008: 52) expands on this transgenerational dynamic, through identifying how memory or the ability to perform memory establishes group membership, noting that

To be part of a collective group such as the nation one has to share and adopt the group’s history, which exceeds the boundaries of one’s individual life span…The past cannot be ‘remembered’; it has to be memorised.

Furthermore, Assmann (2008: 55) notes that ‘Institutions and larger social groups…do not “have” a memory’ but that they construct or ‘“make” one for themselves’. Such larger groups stage memory through physically placed ‘memorial signs such as symbols, texts, images, rites, ceremonies, places, and monuments’ (Assmann, 2008: 55). Through the top–down staging of the narrative of a group, it is identifiable that ‘collective memories’ have a spatial and temporal dimension to their existence (Assmann, 2008: 52, 55; Halbwachs, 1992: 53).

With regard to Nora’s (1989: 7) analysis of ‘sites of memory’ as a constructed substitute for ‘real environments of memory’, Krishnamurthy (2012: 94) further discusses these conceptualisations with reference to Stari Most, designating that the bridge, which contributed greatly to the expansion of the city, was once a real environment of memory as an ‘unintentional monument’ (Krishnamurthy, 2012: 94; Nora, 1989: 7). However, following reconstruction of the bridge as a ‘symbol of reconciliation’, according to Krishnamurthy (2012: 94–95) the bridge has become a ‘lieu de mémoire’. Critically, a top–down-directed ‘site of memory’ as a socially situated spatial identifier is identifiable as generating and maintaining social knowledge of place (Nora, 1989: 7). Through this, it is linked to ‘domination’ and also ‘power’ in the production of physical place (Lefebvre, 1991: 26). As such, the local social acceptance of the narrative of a top–down-directed ‘site of memory’ can be regarded as important in post-conflict divided spatialities (Nora, 1989: 7).

Additionally, in noting the importance of the role of ‘architecture’ in ‘performing urban memory and forgetting’, Krishnamurthy (2012: 81) outlines the two core functions of the bridge as an ‘object seeped in history and commemoration’, and as a representation of reconciliation. According to Krishnamurthy (2012: 98), Stari Most is not just ‘a stage where actions merely take place… [but] where an urban artefact enables interaction with a site of memory’, outlining the process as a ‘performance where the viewer’ can engage in either ‘remembering or forgetting’. This complex interplay of remembering and/or forgetting is further discussed by Kostadinova (2014: 138) who outlines that ‘places of common memory’ – what this article terms ‘stages of memory’ – are ‘also places of social forgetting as they represent a past that is subjectively selected and politically imposed’. Directed ‘sites of memory’ and the social acceptance of such sites are important processes in cities and, in particular, in negotiating local involvement in post-conflict spaces as contested ‘historical narratives, collective memories…myths and ethoses’ may remain (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010: iv; Nora, 1989: 12). In post-conflict spatialities, stages of memory can become a continuation of conflict as a result of ‘contested narratives’ and re-lived trauma (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2014: 114). Such ‘contested narratives’ can inhibit the fostering of ‘positive peace’, conceptualised by Galtung (1967: 12) as ‘cooperation and integration between human groups’; however, in the context of Bosnia–Herzegovina it can also be regarded as a process inhibited by institutional divisions (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010: iv; Bekerman and Zembylas, 2014: 114).

Through deliberate destruction Stari Most was catalysed from a historical construction of ‘topophilia’ (love of place) to a distinct stage of memory and a site of reconciliation in top–down narratives (Tuan, 1974; UNESCO, 2005a: 1). Reflecting on the case study of Stari Most, Kostadinova (2014: 147) describes the reconstruction as demonstrating a ‘reinterpretation of myths of the past and their attachment to material culture in order to serve the political considerations of the present’. However, stages of memory also provide a spatiality to invoke recollection and recall times of peace and co-operation in order to challenge dialogues surrounding ‘intractable conflicts’ (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352). It is through the performativity of the institutional staging of the bridge as a site of reconciliation, fit for international consumption, that the term ‘stage of memory’ contextualises the site of Stari Most. The positionality of Stari Most can be identified in the historical context of its construction. This historical context of the construction of Stari Most will be explored in the next sections which will outline the directed re-staging and re-scripting of Stari Most, and will reflect on the actors involved in post-conflict re-staging.

The construction of Stari Most

The initial construction of Stari Most is categorisable as an act of international staging, as the bridge was commissioned and constructed in 1566-1567 during the Ottoman Empire’s occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pašić, 2004: 5). Stari Most replaced an unreliable wooden bridge and facilitated an increased movement of trade and produce; this movement assisted residential and commercial growth of the city around the Neretva River (Pašić, 2004: 5; Riedlmayer, 2002: 103). Though the Ottoman Empire’s ‘conquest’ and the subsequent rule is referenced in literature as one that provided ‘relative tolerance of non-Islamic groups’, the occupation notably altered the ‘religious composition of Bosnia’ (Andjelic, 2004: 7). Following the Ottoman invasion and the start of occupation, ‘the majority of Bosnians accepted Islam’ and, at the same time, ‘Bosnian Christians […] disappeared, the number of Orthodox, and especially Catholic believers decreased and a large group of Moslems emerged’ (Andjelic, 2004: 7). The changed religious demographics across Bosnia–Herzegovina during Ottoman occupation are debated in the definitions of the processes as ‘Conversion vs. Islamization’, which reflects the perceived ‘freely chosen or forced nature’ of the shift, respectively (Alibašić, 2014: 430–431). The different perceptions of the changes to social demographics in Bosnia-Herzegovina during Ottoman rule as outlined by Andjelic (2004: 7), with respect to an increase in individuals practicing Islam and a decrease in the numbers of individuals of Orthodox and Catholic faith, is important to note when reflecting on the cultural heritage of Stari Most.

Prior to the 1992-1995 war, Stari Most stood as a connecting structure which linked ‘supposedly heterogeneous cultural communities’ (Coward, 2008: 5). Also, symbolically, the bridge represented cultural co-existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ‘where Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim communities co-existed’ (Coward, 2008: 5). Socially and transgenerationally, the bridge became a source of topophilia for Mostarians, with Mostari meaning ‘the bridge keepers’ in Bosnian; in this respect, the Ottoman institutional staging of the bridge was transgenerationally scripted into social identity (Tuan, 1974; UNESCO, 2005b). However, through the accomplished engineering and the development of infrastructure that the Ottoman Empire established, and which the Austro-Hungarian Empire later contributed to; an acceptability of ‘developmental’ occupation is identifiable with regard to Bosnia–Herzegovina.

Stari Most renovation and destruction

As previously noted, the construction of Stari Most facilitated residential and commercial growth of the city around the Neretva River (Riedlmayer, 2002: 103). Four centuries later, when part of Yugoslavia, manufacturing boosted the economy and population of Mostar during the 1970s and 1980s (UNESCO, 2005a). A further boost came following a municipality-led renovation plan to ‘preserve and reconstruct the old city of Mostar’ (UNESCO, 2005a: 19). This attracted ‘thousands of tourists from the Adriatic coast’ and also led to the award of the ‘Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1986’ (UNESCO, 2005a: 19). The Eastern European collapse of communism led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia; this resulted in institutional pressure for the establishment of ethnically separate spatialities, which cumulated in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war (UNESCO, 2005a: 19). During the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, Mostar was split between East and West; the West designated to ‘Greater Croatia [and the East to] Greater Serbia’ (Calame et al., 2011: 111–112). In late 1992 Croat and Serb forces focused efforts on defeating ‘Bosnian resistance’ from the new territories they controlled (Calame et al., 2011: 112). However, by May 1993 ‘a second phase of major hostilities’ broke out in Mostar, with the establishment of a spatial division of the city through the expulsion of Muslim residents ‘from the west side’ of Mostar (Calame et al., 2011: 114).

During this time, the Neretva River, which Stari Most is constructed over, became one of the perceived dividing lines in the Croat–Bosniak War in the city of Mostar (Calame et al., 2011: 111). From May to November 1993, Stari Most was used as a river crossing ‘as a means of communication and supply’ by the Army of Bosnia–Herzegovina (ABiH) and also civilians living on both sides of the bridge (Prlić et al. judgement 2013, vol. 3 IT-04-74-T, no. 1582). During this period of time, Stari Most could be regarded as being re-staged due to its position on one of the perceivable front lines of the conflict in East Mostar. Those who crossed the bridge ‘for food and medical supplies’, mostly ‘residents of…the Muslim enclave’ but also the ABiH which defended the Bosnian Muslim territory, were exposed to artillery and sniper fire from Croatian Defence Council (HVO) forces on both Stotina Hill and Hum Hill (Petrovic, 2012: 179; Prlić et al. judgement, vol. 3 IT-04-74-T, no. 1583).

Over the 8–9 November 1993, Stari Most was destroyed by shelling, which is attributed to a Croat use of force (Calame et al., 2011: 116). In 2013, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) delivered judgement on the Prlić et al. case, which in 2004, had brought war-crime charges ‘for the attack on Stari Most’ (Walasek, 2015: 314). The ICTY Chamber attributed the destruction of Stari Most to ‘an HVO tank positioned on Stotina Hill [which] fired on the Old Bridge of Mostar all day long’ (Prlić et al. judgement 2013, vol. 3 IT-04-74-T, no. 1581). As the ABiH was identified as using the bridge, according to the Prlić et al. judgement, Stari Most was considered ‘a military target’ (2013, vol. 3 IT-04-74-T, no. 1582). The definition of Stari Most as a military target in the judgment is attributable to its use by the top–down-directed actors of the ABiH. This is representative of how institutional actors directed social movement divisions in public city space through making certain spaces distinctly unsafe in the city of Mostar. In the wider context of the war, it can be noted that the whole of Bosnia–Herzegovina was institutionally staged as in conflict by institutional narratives of division.

Though reflected on as a military target, the ICTY Chamber noted the impact of the destruction of Stari Most on civilians, with the destruction of the bridge resulting in the isolation of ‘the residents of Donja Mahala, the Muslim enclave on the right bank of the Neretva’ (Prlić et al. judgement, vol. 3 IT-04-74-T, no. 1583). Furthermore, in taking into account the ‘immense cultural, historical and symbolic value [of Stari Most] for Muslims in particular’ the destruction was found to be a purposeful action with the intent of ‘sapping the morale of the Muslim population of Mostar’ (Prlić et al. judgement 2013, vol. 3 IT-04-74-T, no. 1585, 1586). The destruction of Stari Most can be considered in this respect a re-staging of a spatiality in two ways; functionally this impacted on civilian access to supplies; and culturally the destruction of Stari Most re-staged the city in destroying a key landmark with strong cultural ties to all Mostarians, but in particular, the Muslim residents of Mostar (Prlić et al. judgement 2013, vol. 3 IT-04-74-T, no. 1583, 1586)

Post-Dayton reconstruction

In 1995 the Dayton agreement was signed, ending the 1992–1995 Bosnian conflict. The formation of the agreement delivered a ‘negative peace’ as it provided the cessation of active violent conflict but implemented geo-institutional divisions (Galtung, 1967: 12). This was directed by the dominant liberal peace model which aims to bring comprehensive peace primarily through ‘democratisation, human rights, civil society, the rule of law and economic liberalisation in the form of free-market reform and development’ (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 3). This approach aims for peace to ‘trickle-down’ to social levels from institutional levels (Richmond, 2012: 29). The Dayton agreement split the country constitutionally with the creation of the Republika Sprska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mostar, located within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is also divided by spatial jurisdictions which correlate with the 1992–1995 divisions of the conflict. The international institutional staging of the bridge refers to the social unification of the city via the reconstruction of Stari Most; however, this overlooks the institutional divide in the city and country at large, which is maintained via the Dayton agreement. Critically, the liberal peace ‘trickle-down’ model overlooks the probability of divisions trickling down to social levels; while the Dayton agreement ensured Bosnia-Herzegovina is ‘peacefully’ divided, ‘ethnicity remains central to Bosnian politics’ (Lublin, 2014: 330; Richmond, 2012: 29).

With regard to Stari Most, the response for reconstruction came from the ‘East Mostar authorities’ in the week following the destruction of the bridge (Walasek, 2015: 214). Notably, Turkey was involved in the reconstruction process from 1994 with the signing of the ‘Protocol on Co-operation for Reconstruction of the Mostar Bridge’, and ‘pledged technical co-operation’ and extensive financial support (Walasek, 2015: 214). In the same year as the Dayton accords, a proposal to restore and protect Stari Most and the surrounding Stari Grad in Mostar was put forward. In December 1995 a ‘Cooperation Memorandum’ was established in preparation for restoration projects (UNESCO, 1995). A subsequent ‘Cooperation Agreement’ signed in March 1996 led to UNESCO producing drafts of four ‘projects for the restoration of cultural heritage’, which included the restoration of Stari Most (UNESCO, 1995).

By June 1996 Turkey demonstrated further intent to support the reconstruction through pledging one million dollars to the project; however, the then-Mayor of Mostar, Safet Oručević, ‘put the offer on hold in search of a more varied assortment of international donors’ (Walasek, 2015: 214). The problematic power dynamic identifiable in Turkey’s support and financial involvement can be traced back to the cultural heritage of Bosnia–Herzegovina. As a result, the dynamic of Turkey’s involvement in the restoration had to be balanced – this is highlighted by Walasek (2015: 214–215), who notes that ‘some felt’ that the project could be ‘characterised as a purely “Muslim”’ project if Turkey was to be the only source of financial support.

As Walasek (2015: 214) notes, Oručević negotiated the dynamic of Turkish investment and involvement with a wish for ‘the reconstruction of the bridge to involve Serbs, Croats and Muslims’ as well as international actors. In line with this, an international team consisting of ‘the World Bank, UNESCO, the Council of Europe Development Bank and various governments’, alongside local and national institutions, directed the reconstruction of Stari Most and Stari Grad through the establishment of the ‘International Stari Most Foundation’ (ArchNet, 2004). The reconstruction began on the 29 September 1997 (UNESCO Heritage sign, Stari Most), received funding from ‘the Turkish government, the EU and the World Bank’, and was delivered by a Turkish company, considered an authority in the process of the ‘reconstruction of Ottoman stone bridges’ (ArchNet, 2004; Charlesworth, 2007: 108). Further replication was sought through the stone, which was sourced from ‘the same quarry as the original bridge’, with pieces of the original bridge also utilised (ArchNet, 2004). In 2004 the reconstruction was completed, with the 23 July re-opening attended by ‘hundreds of international leaders and officials’ and ‘international guests and delegations’ (The Telegraph, 2004; Traynor, 2004). The spatial and temporal dynamics of actors involved in the narrative of the space, and importantly, what this represents, are noted by Björkdahl and Selimovic (2015: 8) who state that Stari Most ‘reveals multiple narratives making and remaking the meaning of the place’. This is identifiable, in particular, through the negotiation of the international actors involved in financing and facilitating the reconstruction, balancing Turkey’s contribution to the project (Walasek, 2015: 214). Having identified the international actors involved in the reconstruction, the next section will outline the re-staging and re-scripting of the youth cultural centre OKC Abrašević in Mostar, and will reflect on the space provided through the establishment of the centre.

OKC Abrašević

At a local level in Mostar, in August 2003 OKC Abrašević was working between spaces from metal containers ‘on the site of [a] never built sports centre’ one street west of its current location on Alekse Šantića (Participant J, November 2015). From its establishment, OKC Abrašević aimed to operate as an inclusive space in the city of Mostar, located on one of the previous frontlines of the conflict and in the ‘central zone’ of the city (Participant H, September 2015). The main purposes of the centre are outlined as a place

to offer young people another kind of education and another set of skills, to complement the education they might get in school, for free…to offer a place of expression of one’s creative interest. And of course, one of the ideas behind that is to be able to bring closer the youth of so called, both sides of Mostar. (Interview with Participant J, November 2015)

By the end of 2003 the centre had drawn the attention of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia–Herzegovina, which wanted to represent the centre as ‘a moment for unification’(Participant H, September 2015). Early in 2004 ‘the then High Representative, Paddy Ashdown’ imposed a city statute which split ‘one pre-war municipality’ into six municipalities – three Bosniak, three Croat, and one ‘Central Zone to be administered by an overarching city government’ (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2003: 2). This statute officially unified Mostar but it notably ‘failed to resolve political contestation’ (Björkdahl, 2015: 113). Subsequent ‘political paralysis’ led the following High Representative Valentin Inzko ‘to change several clauses to facilitate the governing of the city’, though Mostar remains divided (Björkdahl, 2015: 113).

At the same time as the introduction of the 2004 city statute, the High Representative ‘passed a decision that all buildings in the central zone of Mostar’ must be ‘reconstructed for their pre-war purposes’ (Participant J, November 2015). The Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the High Representative position were established to monitor the implementation of the Dayton Accords. The decision regarding the central zone assisted in the establishment of OKC Abrašević and helped ‘secure the building of Abrašević, because there were other plans for it’ (Participant J, November 2015). In the spring of 2004 the OKC Abrašević team began the move to Alekse Šantića; following a continued issue with land ownership, it was not until 2005 that the space which is now the OKC Abrašević Centre was legally defined as such (Participant H, September 2015). While the establishment of the OKC Abrašević Centre was scripted socially, the staging of the centre in its current location was assisted and legitimised by international support. The support came not only through the OHR central zone renovation stipulations but also through verbal and written support, ‘along with other international organisations, embassies, governments, UNESCO, etc.’ (Participant J, November 2015).

At the same time as the OKC Abrašević team sought the property rights of the space of the old socialist club, the July 2004 completion of the reconstruction and re-opening staged Stari Most as a ‘symbol of reconciliation’ (Participant H, September 2015; UNESCO, 2005a: 1). Both Stari Most and OKC Abrašević existed, or in the case of the centre, had been built on a perceivable frontline of the conflict. However, comparative to the metaphorical reconciliation of the city through the reconstructed Stari Most, the establishment of the OKC Abrašević Centre provided a physical space in which reconciliation may be engaged on a day-to-day basis. Through a comparison of the international response to the two sites, there is an identifiable prioritisation of the top–down, symbolic reconciliation over the establishment of a local social space of reconciliation. Reflective on peacebuilding literature, Kappler (2014: 173) outlines a tendency for cultural actors to be marginalised, noting that an identifiable ‘negligence of cultural activities has downplayed cultural actors’ ability to mobilise social energies, which form a necessary input into a localised, or hybrid, version of peacebuilding’.

Kappler (2014: 173–174) regards the OKC Abrašević Centre as exemplifying this, noting that the centre works ‘deeply into the local community in terms of cooperating with schools, fan clubs, NGO’s cultural groups and so forth’ and also exists as a space that is ‘open to everyone’. Socially directed, the establishment of the centre reclaimed physical property damaged by the conflict and re-scripted the city through the provision of a space for the residents of Mostar. In this, those who worked to conceive OKC Abrašević formed an important hub which facilitates social connections beyond the physical space of the centre. Having identified the social re-scripting in Mostar through the establishment of OKC Abrašević, the following section of this article discusses the current staging of Stari Most.

The stage of Stari Most

Approaching the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Stari Most and Stari Grad, the history of the bridge is visible, with its destruction signposted. On the East side of the old town there is a grey stone inscribed with the compelling words ‘Don’t Forget’; crossing westward on the other side of the bridge there is another stone inscribed ‘Don’t Forget 93’. The staging of the bridge for memorial and touristic purposes compels visitors not to forget the destructive actions that transpired in 1993; through these internationally accessible reminders, the bridge is identifiable as a constructed stage of memory rather than a reconciling construction. Firstly, at the same time as the bridge was reconstructed, Mostar’s divisions were administratively established, and secondly, the space of the Stari Grad and Stari Most functions as an internationally directed site of consumption (Björkdahl, 2015: 113).

Local stone plaque

On the west bank, below the bridge, lie pieces of the original structure of Stari Most retrieved from the river. On one piece is a stone plaque (Figure 1) which, reads ‘Extremists HVO and HV destroyed the 427 year old bridge. The entire world condemned this inhumane act’ (Kontra Press, 2013). The plaque is highlighted by a Bosnian news article (Kontra Press, 2013) written on the 20th anniversary of the destruction of the bridge as appearing ‘a few years’ prior to 2013. Unlike Stari Most, Stari Grad, and the multiple UNESCO signs, the stone plaque is not internationally staged and, therefore, does not feature as part of the tourist trail of the Old Bridge and Old Town (Ethnographic research, April 2015). The plaque has low visibility compared to the internationally, linguistically accessible UNESCO heritage signs, as it is away from the tourist area of the bridge itself. Additionally, the plaque is written in BCS and represents a social locally scripted memorialisation of the destruction and reconstruction of the bridge. It can be regarded as locally owned and scripted as it is written in BCS, as opposed to the ‘Don’t Forget 93’ and ‘Don’t Forget’ rocks. It is an example of socially directed change in a former section of Stari Most, as the message it displays is divergent from the international narrative in providing a memorialisation of the destruction of the bridge.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

Plaque attached to a piece of the original Stari Most on the bank of the Neretva River, April 2015 (159 mm × 119 mm).

Stari Most as a tourist site

The popular attraction of the reconstructed bridge is notable as a stage of memory for the conflict through the international definitions of the symbolism behind the reconstruction, staged as a ‘symbol of reconciliation’ (UNESCO, 2005a: 1). Furthermore, the consumability of the bridge as a site of ‘dark tourism’ is identifiable through the 1992–1995 war memorabilia for sale in some shops in Stari Grad, including ornamental jets and tanks constructed from bullet casings, postcards that feature the destroyed bridge, and ‘Don’t Forget’ stones (Foley and Lennon, 2000: 11). War memorabilia and imagery of the destroyed bridge reflects the point that Foley and Lennon (2000: 11) raise regarding ‘objects of dark tourism’ as instigators of ‘anxiety and doubt about the project of modernity’ and note the ‘“rational planning” and technological innovation’ utilised to execute the Holocaust (with reference to tourism surrounding such sites). This can be reflected on with reference to the destruction of the bridge and the occurrence of ethnic cleansing; ‘cultural and religious “cleansing”’ through the destruction of people and property in the wider spatialities of Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Riedlmayer, 2002: 99).

The narrative of the reconstruction of Stari Most is internationally sanitised and romanticised in its symbolism and purpose. Through the space of performance and consumption which surrounds the bridge, the staging of the bridge can be regarded as a ‘Disneyization’ (Bryman, 2004: 2). The main principles of ‘Disneyization’ are outlined by Bryman (2004: 2) as ‘theming, hybrid consumption, merchandising and performative labour’. These properties are identifiable in the space of Stari Grad and Stari Most and represent the exoticisation of the staging of the space which allows the performed narrative to be internationally consumed (Bryman, 2004: 2). The staging of Stari Grad and Stari Most as an internationally directed yet culturally romanticised site reflects the international consumption of the site as one of ‘dark tourism’ (Foley and Lennon, 2000: 11). Stari Most and the surrounding Stari Grad can be regarded to be consumed as a romanticisation of the Western-held ‘frozen image’ of the Balkans, as ‘the backward, the primitive’ (Todorova, 2009: 3, 7). The consumability of the narrative of the bridge as a stage of memory is reflected by tourists posing for photographs on the steps of the bridge and on the banks of the Neretva below. Visual souvenirs reflect the commodification of the narrative of the bridge and such photographic representation becomes bound up in a narrative contextualised by the photographer via the directed capturing of an image (Dauphinee, 2007: 59). This directed visual narrative, congruent with the international staging of the bridge, is also identifiable in academia via the use of photography of the reconstructed bridge as a cover picture for textbooks on conflict resolution, without any actual mention of Stari Most or Mostar in the text book.

Over time, this structure, which was at the time of its construction a functional bridge that facilitated trade, has been socially and transgenerationally scripted to be symbolic of the narrative of what Coward (2008: 5) refers to as ‘the nature of Bosnian society…as a bridge between the European West and the Ottoman East’. The identical re-staging of the bridge evokes the historical narrative of peaceful co-existence in Mostar’s history during the hundreds of years the bridge stood (Krishnamurthy, 2012: 94). However, it is through the context of the destruction and the following re-construction of Stari Most that the value of the bridge was identified internationally by UNESCO. The next section reflects on the international narrative of the reconstruction and will situate the narrative as one that aimed to establish a top–down staged reconciliation.

The international narrative of bridging

It is in the post-intrastate-conflict setting of Stari Most that the bridge exists, not only as a ‘real environment of memory’ (transgenerationally integrated into Mostarian identity through construction, destruction, and reconstruction), but also as an institutionally constructed and identified stage of memory (Nora, 1989: 7). As previously noted, spatially, the bridge connects the ‘two banks of the [former] Bosniak sector’ and is located away from the actual dividing line of the Croat–Bosniak War (Bougarel et al., 2007: 2; Calame et al., 2011: 104). Nevertheless, as Björkdahl and Selimovic (2015: 8) note, the ‘international narrative employed the bridge metaphor to present the reconstructed Stari Most as a bridge that brought together two ethnic micro-worlds’. This is identifiable in the UNESCO nomination description which outlines the reconstruction of Stari Most and Stari Grad as a ‘symbol of reconciliation, international cooperation and of the co-existence of diverse cultural ethnic and religious communities’ (UNESCO, 2005a: 1). Similarly, the institutional International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank reported that the rebuilt bridge was part of ‘the reconciliation of war-divided people’ and that ‘reconstructing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s greatest symbol [Stari Most] bridges ethnic divides’ (IDA, 2007).

However the usage of the term ‘bridge’ and ‘bridging’ used institutionally and in scholarship to refer to successful reconciliation discursively situates the conflict divide as natural, and reconciliation as dually unnatural and engineered; something that can be completed but also dismantled and destroyed. In its usage, the descriptive term generates an image of disparate groups connecting through a constructed effort for interaction over a natural division. As such, the metaphor of bridging can be inherently negative in post-intrastate-conflict discourse in overlooking the natural presence of conflict in human relationships by reducing complex processes to a metaphor (Lederach, 2003).

While symbolically and socially important to the city, the bridge does not actively facilitate reconciliation, nor does it act as a space for reconciliation to occur in the everyday. Furthermore, opportunities for direct local use of the space largely arise temporally though ceremonial events and anniversaries. These opportunities may still be directed by top–down actors, such as the events organised by the City of Mostar and UNESCO in 2015 for the 10th anniversary of the bridge and Stari Grad’s inscription onto the Heritage List (UNESCO, 2015c). This event consisted of a conference entitled ‘Historic Urban Landscape – MOSTAR 2015’ and a concert held under the Old Bridge titled ‘The Bridge Embracing the River Banks’ (UNESCO, 2015c). At the evening concert the Mayor of Mostar, Mr Ljubo Bešlić, referenced the reconstruction of the bridge as ‘a symbol of reconciliation’ and that in his opinion the reconstructed bridge represented ‘more than [the] physical connection of stone arch with two shores of [the] beautiful Neretva River’ (City of Mostar, 2015). It is identifiable that linking the reconstruction of Stari Most with social reconciliation may be representative of some international and local views. However, it is important to note that municipality divisions spatially established at the time of the reconstruction of Stari Most are congruent with the 1992–1995 conflict divisions, and as such, foster a spatial narrative which is disjointed from the institutional staging of Stari Most as a ‘symbol of reconciliation’ (UNESCO, 2005a: 1).

Conclusion

The common designation of the spatiality of Bosnia–Herzegovina as post-conflict entails certain expectations of the positionality of the citizens of the country in that they are contextualised by the conflict. As previously noted, following a cessation of violence in an intrastate conflict and the achievement of a ‘negative peace’, barriers to a ‘positive peace’ may still exist in the form of contested ‘historical narratives, collective memories…myths and ethoses’ (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010: iv; Galtung, 1967: 12). Whilst in this analysis Bar-Siman-Tov reflects on the debate between parties actively involved in the conflict ‘regarding the origins and development of the conflict’, it is also transferrable to reflect on the collective conceptualisations of a post-conflict spatiality by top–down actors (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010: iv).

The staging of Stari Most as a symbol of unification in an institutionally ‘divided city’ represents a disengagement between with the local political and social divisions (Björkdahl and Gusic, 2013: 317). Additionally, the top–down identification of the bridge as a symbol of unity in this post-conflict space transfers the non-linear process of achieving ‘reconciliation and human solidarity’ to the physical restoration of the bridge (Sopova, 2004). This represents a top–down narrative of ‘control, calculability, dehumanisation and [relative] efficiency’ in institutionally concluding the reconciliation with the completion of the construction (Weber, 1958). This involves a low amount of local social involvement and reduces complex processes to a neat metaphor. Additionally, the local stone plaque at the site reflects conflicting and overlapping stages of memory at the physical site of the bridge.

What can be taken away from this analysis of the post-conflict reconstruction of Stari Most, and the comparative establishment of OKC Abrašević, is the importance of the engagement of local actors in re-scripting post-conflict spaces beyond top–down stages of memory. While both examples of socially and institutionally directed physical transformation re-stage and re-script the city space of Mostar respectively, this article identifies that OKC Abrašević also engages with conceptual, non-physical spaces through providing a network for local residents to engage in reconciliation. Through this, it is important to locate engaging and essential work groups and organisations such as OKC Abrašević perform at a local level through facilitating social places in which individuals can interact.

Reflecting on the narrative of the bridge, it is identifiable that top–down institutional and particularly international actors have attributed the reconstruction to a reconciliation. This is not to disregard the value of the reconstruction of Stari Most, but to highlight that an emphasis on symbolic reconciliation in post-conflict spaces can overlook local narratives and locally generated spaces of engagement. Furthermore, the narrative of Stari Most and the tourism surrounding the bridge represents a romanticisation of the post-conflict space. In this respect, Stari Most (and Stari Grad) represent a balance (through the narrative of the reconstruction as ‘bridging’ divided ethnicities) as exotic enough to be internationally consumed, but only desirable to be consumed through the precarious position of the re-constructed bridge as something that could, in the future, and has in the past, been destroyed.