Features of foreign policy birds: Israeli prime ministers as hawks and doves

Abstract

Scholars and policymakers have long used the shorthand of hawks and doves to characterize leader personalities that correspond to a particular political inclination, whereby hawks are considered right-wing and more aggressive in foreign policy, and doves are left-wing and more peaceful. This article posits that a sound discussion of who hawks and doves in foreign policy are requires an engagement with research on political leadership. It promises a less superficial understanding of the dichotomy of hawks and doves, and uses leadership trait analysis to explore hawkish and dovish leaders’ qualities. The article profiles Israel’s prime ministers since the end of the Cold War, where in a high security environment, these words are most often used to describe its domestic and foreign matters and its cooperative and conflictual actions. This article’s findings encourage an unpacking of these commonly used shorthand labels with political leadership approaches. They are also useful to highlight, most notably, the significance of complexity and distrust in understanding hawkish and dovish leaders. Hawks think simpler and are more doubtful of others than doves, this article finds. Future research, the article suggests, will benefit from looking deeper than simple, dichotomous use of this analogy, and exploring ways to operationalize individual-level measurements of hawks and doves in foreign policy.

Keywords

Doves foreign policy hawks Israel’s prime ministers leadership traits

Hawks and doves are among the most commonly used shorthand labels to characterize elites’ preferences in foreign and security policy. Journalists and scholars frequently resort to this dichotomous reading of leaders’ foreign policy preferences across the world. Every electoral cycle, debates about conflicts, wars, and candidates’ foreign policy positions evoke hawks and doves in public conversation.¹ Common to most portrayals of hawks and doves is that elites’ willingness to use force in international politics is what distinguishes these two birds in foreign policy. Hawks, the assumption goes, are conflictual, while doves are cooperative. Beyond this distinction – notwithstanding the wide usage of this framing – inquiries into the hawk–dove dichotomy are relatively rare (e.g. Snyder and Diesing, 1977; see also Holsti, 1979; Rosati and Creed, 1997).

Since hawks and doves refer to individuals, this article argues, a sound discussion of who they are, what and how they think requires an engagement with research on political leadership. Here, this article uses a prominent approach to studying political leaders systematically, leadership trait analysis (LTA), to explore hawkish and dovish leaders’ qualities. LTA offers direct connections to common notions about hawks and doves, and promises a less superficial understanding of this common shorthand. Based on few attempts to define hawkish and dovish policy preferences and building upon leadership studies, this article examines characteristics associated with hawks and doves.

This article starts with an overview of references to this dichotomy in foreign policy debates.² Then, it brings in political leadership studies to explore the usefulness of this simple dichotomy of hawks and doves in explaining foreign policy. Accordingly, the article develops hypotheses about personality traits of hawks and doves. The article then introduces the Israeli case as one example that has long invited a systematic analysis of its hawkish and dovish leaders. Findings support that there are some distinct personality traits separating hawks from doves. Indeed, this article illustrates that LTA provides a systematic way to assess hawks and doves. Personality traits of Israeli prime ministers point to multiple ways Israel’s hawks and doves differ from each other. In conclusion, this article calls for an exploration of these distinctions and the use of existing approaches to political leaders beyond a simple typology for a more nuanced understanding of shared features of foreign policy hawks and doves.

Ornithology in foreign policy

Frequently utilized, yet under studied, the usage of the hawk–dove metaphor is arguably “impossible to chronicle” (Marks, 2011: 127). The first in-print use of these birds to refer to foreign policy is during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (Holsti, 1979; Marks, 2011). In their report, Alsop and Barlett (1962: 20) wrote: “The hawks favored an air strike to eliminate the Cuban missile bases … The doves opposed the air strikes and favored a blockade.” This simple distinction between willingness to use force and desire to pursue diplomacy has continued to separate hawks from doves. Most research that carries hawks and doves in its titles has not necessarily even defined the terms, but rather assumed this a priori categorization (Marks, 2011: 129). Hawks and doves, nonetheless, make some memorable titles: among others, When Doves Cry (Colaresi, 2004) and Why Hawks Become Doves (Ziv, 2014).

The birds’ appearance in the title, or numerous references to them in the text, may or may not suggest a clear definition beyond a distinction between conflict and cooperation, if any is provided at all.³ In other cases, when there is a definition, it may not go beyond this basic understanding. For instance, in his study about politics of peace, Schultz’s (2005) hawks appear to be simply those who would not seek peace/cooperation. In this piece, Schultz presents a compelling case that when initiated by a hawkish political party, peace/cooperation has a better chance to endure in the long run.⁴ Similarly, Wallace et al. (1993) distinguish between hawks and doves solely based on Congress members’ vote to authorize the US president to use force in the Gulf War. Kahneman and Renshon (2007) define hawks as those who “favor coercive action, are more willing to use military force, and are more likely to doubt the value of offering concessions” (34). In contrast, while Marsh and Jones (2017) do not define what they mean by a hawk, they appear to assume that it is about use of force. To distinguish between hawks and doves, others created a measure based on the foreign policy statements in political party manifestos (see Clare, 2014; Heffington, 2016). Lastly, doves, if they receive any attention at all, also appear in simplistic terms; for Colaresi (2004), “a leader who offers unreciprocated cooperation to a rival” is a dove, and one with a hardline approach is a hawk. To Kahneman and Renshon, doves are “skeptical about the usefulness of force and more inclined to contemplate political solutions” (34).

One other prominent line of discussion in the hawk–dove references is about ideology and foreign policy, thereby implying that this dichotomy may be deduced from leaders’ (or, rather, their perceived) ideological association. Accordingly, this position advances the idea that right/conservative and left/liberal leaders (and political parties) are hawkish and dovish, respectively. A review of literature on ideology and foreign policy behavior will point out there exist firm conclusions that “right leaning governments support more hawkish foreign policy actions than their left wing counterparts” (Calin, 2010: 57). This association is observable in the Israeli context as well (see Peleg, 2004). The fact that hawkishness and dovishness are not ideologies but policy preferences, which may originate from ideological differences, is often missed in such debates. Nonetheless, this association between political ideologies and the hawk–dove dichotomy is widely shared and research also supports this linkage.

Mirroring the hawk–dove label, multiple works in American foreign policy literature reference the eagle (Holsti, 1979; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984; Rosati and Creed, 1997; Wittkopf, 1986). Broadly applied to the American foreign policy elite and the public, these works aimed to capture foreign policy preferences as the Cold War was ending, or later. Accordingly, the elites’ perceptions of the international system were the mainstay of this approach. At this moment of change, Holsti’s three-headed eagle eventually formulated into a four- (Wittkopf) and a six- (Rosati and Creed) headed eagle. In Holsti’s work, these were internationalists (with two variants: Cold War and Post-Cold War) and isolationists (Holsti, 1979; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984); then, Wittkopf added hardliners and accommodationists. Finally, Rosati and Creed proposed a multi-faceted typology from global crusaders and containers, selective containers, global reformers and transformers, to selective engagers. Like other relevant work that emphasized preferences about the use of force, these studies focused on elites’ overarching policy preferences.⁵

The most in-depth coverage of hawks and doves appears in Snyder and Diesing (1977: 297–310). The authors use the terms hard-liners and soft-liners, yet they hint clearly that hawks and doves are substitutable (1977: 297). According to Snyder and Diesing, a typology of hawks and doves may be developed in looking at elites’ general world views and image of the opponent. In brief, hawks perceive a “highly conflict-ridden” world, are “sensitive to power-strategic considerations, to the potential aggressiveness of other states, and to the need to preserve or improve the power and security position of his own state” (1977: 298). They prefer “military strength, deterrence, and firmness in crises.” Doves, on the other hand, seek “mutual accommodation” in world politics, and pursue that before any other options; “willingness to negotiate and flexibility in negotiations” also distinguish doves from hawks (1977: 298). Snyder and Diesing also argue that doves’ “relative insensitivity to power-strategic factors in world politics is combined with a considerable emphasis on emotional factors” (299).

This overview suggests scholars share a similar, basic understanding of the two birds of foreign policy; the benchmark preferences of hawks and doves – conflict and cooperation, respectively – are uncontested. Students and practitioners of foreign policy know what a hawk, or a dove, is and what she or he would do. Simply put, the hawk is who “advocate[s] the use of force in foreign policy, whereas the dove will be reluctant to use force” (D’Amato, 1967: 303). There were few studies that look past this distinction, and research that problematize it is rare (i.e. Snyder and Diesing, 1977). This article makes a first attempt to develop the hawk–dove typology from an individual level of analysis. It claims that one area of scholarship that can advance our understanding of the hawk–dove dichotomy is political psychology – specifically, the use of approaches to personality assessment at-a-distance (Post, 2003).

The feathers and beaks of hawks and doves: bringing political leadership in

The references to hawks and doves in foreign policy invoke “a certain set of characteristics” and “define certain foreign policy preferences … rather than some empirical observation of foreign policymaking” (Marks, 2011: 129). Sometimes these presumed hawkish and dovish characteristics inspire hypotheses about states’ international behavior (Marks, 2011); a complete leadership profile of these hawks and doves, though, is yet to be explored. Indeed, according to Snyder and Diesing (1977), hawkish and dovish “attitudes are more of a function of personality than of governmental role” (emphasis added); however, they find the matter of personality an “enormously complex question” (297). Building upon clear, yet unexplored, hints of hawkish and dovish characteristics in the political leadership literature, this section develops how hawks and doves may differ as it introduces and applies a political personality assessment approach to this matter.

The study of elites in foreign policy offers different approaches and tools for this undertaking (see Post, 2003). Hermann’s leadership trait analysis (LTA) is one of the most suitable approaches to construct political personality profiles of hawks and doves.⁶ Showcasing LTA’s explanatory power, many scholars have successfully applied it in various political contexts (e.g. Cuhadar et al., 2017; Dyson, 2006; Hermann, 1987; Kille and Scully, 2003). Here, using LTA and following the lead of earlier studies on hawkish and dovish leaders, this article instigates a discussion about how hawks and doves may differ in their leadership traits.

According to Hermann’s LTA, political personality is a combination of seven traits: belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-conﬁdence, and task orientation. Table 1 briefly summarizes each trait. LTA utilizes a content analysis scheme to calculate numerical scores between 0 and 1 for each trait; a higher value indicates that the leader exhibits the trait more saliently. Furthermore, these scores gain their explanatory power in comparing the leader’s scores to a norming group’s average scores. In addition, with this information, one can interpret leaders’ behavior and their leadership styles. Based on LTA’s propositions, these traits can explain leaders’ propensity to challenge or respect constraints in their environments, openness to information and advice, and the structure of their advisory systems, the quality of the decision-making process, and the policies leaders choose for their country or organization.

Table 1.

Personality characteristics in leadership trait analysis.

Trait	Description
Belief in ability to control events	Perception of own degree of control over political world
Need for power	Interest in developing, preserving, or reinstituting own power
Conceptual complexity	Ability to distinguish complexities of political life
Self-confidence	Notion of self-importance, and of his/her capacity to take on the political environment
In-group bias	Belief that own group constitutes the center of political world
Distrust of others	Suspicions, skepticism, worry of others than own group
Task focus	Concentration on problem solving vs. building relationships

Source: Cuhadar et al. (2017), adapted from Hermann (2003).

Hermann’s LTA is a suitable approach to trace hawks’ and doves’ leadership traits. Most common understandings, and existing literature, about hawks and doves suggest that of the seven personality traits in LTA, distrust and in-group bias would be the most important traits to distinguish the two birds of foreign policy. In addition, some research suggests that complexity may also differ between hawks and doves (Wallace et al., 1993).⁷ Margaret Hermann, who developed the LTA, also mentions that “just as in common parlance, heads of state tend to be hawks or doves, hardliners or accommodationists—more threat and problem oriented or more opportunity and relationship oriented” (2003: 201). Hence, Hermann (2003) suggests hawks and doves will differ in terms their task focus (see also Snyder and Diesing, 1977). Other personality traits (belief in ability to control events, need for power, and self-confidence), this review suggests, may not necessarily differ in relation to hawkishness or dovishness of a leader.⁸ Table 2 summarizes the expected hawkish and dovish traits in this article.

Table 2.

Traits expected to differ between hawks and doves.

Trait	Hypothesized behavior
	Hawks	Doves
Conceptual complexity	Simple, dualistic understanding of opponent(s)	Seeking contextual information and multiple perspectives about the political environment
In-group bias	Centered on self’s group, its identity, culture, status	Understanding of other groups’ concerns, needs
Distrust of others	Doubtful of others’ intentions; coercive, readiness for deterrence	Accommodative of others; optimistic about others’ intentions
Task focus	Goal, problem orientation at the expense of maintaining or improving relations	Concern with relationship with others (including opponents); sensitivity to others’ objectives, fears

Distrust of others and in-group bias

Distrust of others reflects a leader’s perception of his/her trust in the motives and actions of other actors. Leaders high in this trait become very suspicious of those who are competitors for their own positions or against their cause and ideology. In-group bias assesses the individual’s view of the centrality of his/her own group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) to the world. Leaders have strong emotional attachments to this in-group, and perceive it as the best (Hermann, 2003: 201). High in-group bias scores indicate that leaders value the identity of their group, its culture and status, become very protective of their in-group and find other groups’ interests in their group as interference in their internal affairs. These leaders tend to have an “us–vs.–them” view of the world, and they would like to maintain this at all costs. Finally, distrust and in-group bias are highly correlated (Hermann, 2003: 201).

For Aronoff (2014: 8), a hostile perception of the world “magnifies the enemy’s goals to their most extreme form – the destruction of one’s nation” (8). This view also makes international pressure ineffective on these leaders. When leaders do not have such a view, they are then “more open to the idea that one has allies” (Aronoff, 2014: 8). Earlier research on political personality claimed that distrust is an important characteristic of “warfare personality” (Hermann, 1980). In fact, Foster and Keller (2014) take distrust of others as “the most important cognitive precursor to a hardline orientation in political leaders” and claim this trait “implies a Hobbesian view of the political universe, a hawkish disposition toward the use of force” (209).

To many scholars, as discussed earlier, readiness to use force – or its variations such as militarism – was the single criterion to determine hawkishness (e.g. Marsh and Jones, 2017; Wallace et al., 1993). This willingness to use force derives from a combination of these two traits: protect a leader’s own group, and expand its interests – at all costs. If high scores in both traits is a defining feature of a hawk, such leaders perceive the world as “centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as “evil” and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries” (Hermann, 2003: 200). Like Hermann’s analysis of these two traits, according to Snyder and Diesing (1977), because hawks see the world as a threatening place, they must be strong and exploit weaknesses (see also Brown, 2017). As to doves, there is no direct connection in Hermann’s own discussion; Snyder and Diesing portray doves viewing the world as potentially harmonious and mention their efforts in seeking accommodation.

Hypothesis 1: Hawks are more distrustful of others than doves.

Hypothesis 2: Hawks have higher in-group bias than doves.

Conceptual complexity

Conceptual complexity assesses an individual’s ability to approach other people, places, policies, or ideas, etc. from multiple perspectives. A conceptually complex leader can reason that there may be various explanations for a particular thing or happening. A conceptually complex leader would seek additional contextual information from their environments, and invite other actors to the decision-making processes. Leaders with low conceptual complexity, in contrast, would find less ambiguity in the world, because they are more likely to make decisions based on stereotypes.

Complexity is a trait that is likely to change between different groups of elites and under different circumstances. Indeed, research suggests that the social context – location (Levi and Tetlock, 1980), before and after elections (Tetlock, 1981), successful and unsuccessful revolutionary leaders (Suedfeld and Dennis Rank, 1976), before the outbreak of war (Suedfeld et al., 1977) – can cause variation in leaders’ complexity. Additionally, there is the argument that conservatives (right) and liberals (left) differ in complexity scores (Tetlock and Boettger, 1989). Since the right-left spectrum is often associated respectively with the hawk–dove dichotomy (in Israel specifically, see Peleg, 2004), this difference is of interest here.

The literature also points to clear inferences about complexity in hawks and doves. For instance, if we follow the simple argument that hawks are conflictual and doves are accommodative, Hermann (1974: 205) proposes that leaders with high conceptual complexity are likely to rely more on cooperation, and make increased use of diplomacy. More specifically, others argue that hawks perceive their opponents in monolithic terms and, unlike doves, are unable to distinguish various factions that may exist among them (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; also, Brown, 2017). Essentially, this indicates an ability, or lack thereof, to see the shades of gray in actors, events, the political world – the very definition of conceptual complexity. Wallace et al. (1993:103) find that hawks’ complexity scores were lower than those of doves.⁹ This, however, can be contested in that doves may very well have low conceptual complexity scores as well (Foster and Keller, 2014: 209). Previously, Maoz and Astorino (1992) argued that changes in complexity scores led Sadat to seek increased cooperation with Israel in the 1970s. They contend that “complexity is considered one of the personality variables most relevant to political behavior” (Maoz and Astorino, 1992: 650).

Hypothesis 3: Hawks’ conceptual complexity is lower than doves’.

According to Foster and Keller (2014), this disposition to resort to force may be a combined outcome of complexity and distrust. In their study of diversionary use of force, Foster and Keller claim that whereas conceptual complexity itself cannot suggest a hawk–dove distinction, leaders with low conceptual complexity and high distrust of others would be more likely to use force. Hence, one may expect that between hawks and doves these two traits, or the interaction between the two, should differ.

In the context of Israel specifically, Aronoff (2014: 13) proposes cognitive openness or flexibility as one of the key traits that distinguishes hawks and doves. She argues that “rigid leaders” will prefer the status quo “especially… during times of change” and with “fewer signals, cognitively flexible leaders will be able to trust the other side.” Similarly, Ziv (2014) considers cognitive openness and complexity as important elements in determining Peres’s transformation. Both Aronoff’s and Ziv’s analyses support the explanatory power of cognitive openness or flexibility in explaining change in policy.

Task focus

The task focus trait reflects whether a leader’s orientation is towards the completion of a task (problem solving) or the maintenance of group spirit and morale (building relationships).

For leaders who emphasize the problem, moving the group (nation, government, ethnic group, religious group, union, etc.) forward toward a goal is their principal purpose for assuming leadership. For those who emphasize group maintenance and establishing relationships, keeping the loyalty of constituents and morale are the central functions of leadership (Hermann, 2003: 198).

To Hermann (2003), this is a trait where there may be a difference between hawks and doves. In fact, this is the only instance where Hermann mentions hawks and doves in her discussion. Similarly, Snyder and Diesing (1977) also anticipate differences in task orientation of hawkish and dovish leaders. The expectation is that hawks are concentrated on finding solutions to security problems at the expense of maintaining or improving relations; doves, on the other hand, are concerned with their relations with their opponents, and seek accommodation and thereby exhibit sensitivity to opponents’ objectives and fears. Notwithstanding, one can argue that doves may be equally focused on problem solution. Doves’ pursuit of non-confrontational policies, one may argue, is similarly motivated to find a solution to the same problem.

Hypothesis 4: Hawks are more problem-oriented than doves.

Research design

Do hawks and doves as shorthand labels correspond to distinct leader personalities? This article contextualizes its discussion of hawks and doves in the example of Israel, where this dichotomy has long defined the country’s domestic and foreign matters.¹⁰ Israel offers a suitable context to inquire if this dichotomy translates into hawkish and dovish leadership traits. In a high security environment, where Israeli leaders make foreign policy choices, they are often framed in these terms (e.g. Aronoff, 2014; Ziv, 2014).¹¹ In fact, beyond its leaders, Israel’s politics is rather simplified to this dichotomy with specific associations between hawks and the Likud Party (the right) on the one hand and between doves and the Labor Party (the left) on the other (Maoz, 2006: 18; Peleg, 2004:108; Sasley and Waller, 2017: 248). This association is so established that some simply adopt the two words, assuming the common notion “Likud is hawk, Labor is dove,” without further discussion (Naor, 2005).

To understand if Israel’s “hawks” and “doves” are significantly different between themselves, this article reports leadership trait scores for all seven Israeli prime ministers who served in the office since the end of the Cold War. This article follows recent research (i.e. Aronoff, 2014) about Israel’s political leaders in its classification of Israeli prime ministers as hawks and doves (see Table 3). This categorization also corresponds to the widely accepted, popular images (domestically and internationally) of Israel’s prime ministers. Records of these leaders, respectively, correspond to either aggressive or accommodationist foreign policies in office. On the key issues that have dominated Israel’s foreign and defense policies, Israel’s hawks (Shamir, Netanyahu, and Sharon) represented a bulwark against any compromise – or, at best, were the recalcitrant partners in peacemaking; and, Israel’s doves (Rabin, Peres, and Barak) were willing to act towards peace at the expense of their lives or office.

Table 3.

Israel’s prime ministers in the post-Cold War era.

	Leader	Tenure^a
Hawks	Yitzhak Shamir	October 20, 1986–July 13, 1992
	Binyamin Netanyahu^b	June 18, 1996–July 6, 1999, andMarch 31, 2009–Present
	Ariel Sharon^c	March 7, 2001–April 14, 2006
	Ehud Olmert	April 14, 2006–March 31, 2009
Doves	Yitzhak Rabin	July 13, 1992–November 4, 1995
	Shimon Peres	November 4, 1995–June 18, 1996
	Ehud Barak	July 6, 1999–March 7, 2001

Tenure reflects official tenure for each leader. To ensure contextual consistency, Shamir’s scores derive from June 1990 until the end of his tenure.

As there is no temporal continuity in Netanyahu’s terms in office, separate profiles are provided for Netanyahu’s 1996 and 2009 tenures.

Since Ariel Sharon was incapacitated on January 4, 2006 and Ehud Olmert functioned as the acting prime minister until the elections were held, Olmert’s spontaneous remarks were coded from January 2006 until he left office in March 2009.

The leadership trait scores are generated by Social Science Automation’s ProfilerPlus program (Levine and Young, 2014), following the coding procedures for LTA. Israeli leaders’ scores (see Table 4) display their averages calculated from respective scores for each verbal act (i.e. an interview or a press briefing). Since this study aims to match hawkish and dovish metaphors with leader characteristics, it is appropriate to analyze elites’ foreign policy statements only during their tenure in office and not for the entirety of their political careers.¹²

Table 4.

LTA Profiles of Israel’s prime ministers on seven personality traits^a.

Trait	Shamir	Rabin	Peres	Netanyahu96	Barak	Sharon	Olmert	Netanyahu09	World mean(SD)	Middle East mean (SD)
Belief in ability to control events	.292	.349	.341	.395	.373	.372	.407	.347	.35(.05)	.33(.06)
Conceptual complexity	.532	.604	.569	.568	.588	.554	.541	.580	.59(.06)	.56(.08)
Distrust of others	.146	.127	.195	.176	.114	.242	.158	.205	.13(.06)	.16(.07)
In-group bias	.120	.153	.133	.169	.144	.118	.128	.155	.15(.05)	.15(.06)
Need for power	.256	.241	.236	.279	.269	.221	.245	.238	.26(.05)	.27(.06)
Self-confidence	.530	.408	.372	.444	.357	.507	.411	.519	.36(.10)	.31(.13)
Task focus	.626	.634	.608	.617	.659	.617	.610	.510	.63(.07)	.58(.06)
n	84	133	28	187	95	59	39	35	284	46
# words	58736	113425	24455	183566	86306	69340	49534	68899	n/a	n/a

Note: n = These are the number of interviews for the Israeli leaders, and the number of leaders included in the world and Middle East columns.

World and Middle East means and SDs obtained from Margaret Hermann (email communication). All scores are calculated by the ProfilerPlus program.

The Israeli leaders’ trait scores are calculated from their spontaneous foreign policy remarks during each leader’s tenure as prime minister. Spontaneity here means that leaders’ statements were made either in an interview or in a press conference setting where a leader responded to questions from media members. In selecting leaders’ spontaneous foreign policy utterances, this study follows Hermann’s principle that these offer the most unfiltered access to political elites. Electronic databases such as LexisNexis, Factiva, and Foreign Broadcasting and Information System, and news organizations’ webpages (CNN, PBS) provided access to these statements. All the text in these sources were in English, as spoken by the leaders or translated into English. For LTA, a response/record of at least 100 words is expected to produce a meaningful result; an accurate LTA profile requires the analysis of at least 5000 words.

Findings and discussion

Table 4 displays Israel’s post-Cold War prime ministers’ leadership trait scores. First, a summary of these results is in order: among the Israeli leaders, Netanyahu has the highest or lowest scores for five traits, Shamir and Barak for four traits each, and Sharon for three traits. A number of observations where Israel’s leaders differ from the world leaders are noteworthy. First, while Olmert has a high belief in ability to control events, Shamir is low in this trait. Second, Shamir also has low conceptual complexity but the highest self-confidence – Sharon and Netanyahu also have high self-confidence. Peres, Sharon and Netanyahu2009 have high distrust of others; and, finally, Netanyahu2009 has low task focus. When the Middle Eastern leaders are the norming group, the only change to these observations is that Barak and Rabin have high task focus scores.

These results reveal some confirmations and puzzles in relation to the hawk–dove typology. While all Israeli prime ministers exhibit low complexity, only Rabin is moderate in this trait. Two hawks, Sharon and Netanyahu2009, have the highest distrust scores, and Peres also joins the two hawks – Peres’s score arguably reflects his relatively short term as prime minister immediately after Rabin’s assassination. Finally, two task focus scores contradict the associated hypothesis: a dove, Barak, has the highest task focus, and a hawk, Netanyahu2009, has the lowest.

In Table 5, an ANOVA test of hawks’ and doves’ LTA scores shows that there are statistically significant differences between four of the seven traits.¹³ As predicted, distrust (H1), complexity (H3), and task focus (H4) distinguish hawks from doves. In addition, while not expected here, self-confidence differs between hawks and doves – the former with higher self-confidence. Contrary to expectations, in-group bias (H2) is not a trait that matters in this typology. On average, hawks have lower conceptual complexity and higher distrust of others than doves (both significant at .000 level). In this sample of Israeli prime ministers, an average hawk profile is much more self-confident than a dove’s (again, significant at .000 level). While task focus also differs significantly between the groups, the hypothesis (H4) is not confirmed: contrary to expectations, hawks have a relationship focus compared to doves. An average dove is more problem focused than a hawk.

Table 5.

Israel’s hawks and doves: LTA scores.^a.

	Hawks	Doves	p value	F
Belief in ability to control events	.363(.007)	.357(.008)	.580	.306
Conceptual complexity	.559(.005)	.595(.006)	.000	19.11
Distrust of others	.183(.009)	.130(.009)	.000	18.13
In–group bias	.148(.007)	.147(.007)	.917	.011
Need for power	.260(.005)	.251(.007)	.264	1.25
Self confidence	.481(.009)	.385(.011)	.000	42.854
Task focus	.608(.008)	.640(.009)	.006	7.60
n	365	256
# of words	380541	224186

Results of unpaired t-test; standard deviations are in parentheses.

This table excludes Olmert from analysis, because Kadima represented a middle point between Likud and Labor and, thereby, between hawks and doves. Olmert’s scores have a negligible effect on the average hawk profile. The same results hold when Olmert is included in the hawks’ group; the same test reveals task focus has slightly increased statistical significance (p = .005, F = 8.10).

Whereas this article does not aim to profile each Israeli leader included in this analysis, it is incumbent to briefly capture how the hawk–dove traits are compatible with the leaders’ records. To start with, in terms of complexity, Shamir, who is described as an “unyielding hawk” (Ziv, 2011), has the lowest average score among his peers. To Aronoff (2014: 31), Shamir is a cognitively rigid individual, who “viewed ideas and people in categorical negative and positive terms, was often unreceptive to new or disconfirming information.” Shamir, Aronoff argues, never associated Israel (which he would identify as good) with any wrong-doing (2014: 33). Another archetypical hawk, Sharon also has a low average complexity score. Sharon never considered Arafat would change (Aronoff, 2014: 86), but rather showed a rigid, static understanding of the Palestinian leader: Sharon said, “I know who is Arafat. I never changed my mind. Maybe I changed my words, but I’ve not changed my mind” (Margolick, 2002). In another example, after Sharon announced the Gaza disengagement plan, he reduced options ahead to “either disengagement or their Geneva” (Schiff, 2010: 105). In contrast, Israel’s doves recognized shades of gray, exhibiting higher complexity. Rabin has the highest average complexity score among his peers. While Rabin viewed the Palestinian issue in zero-sum terms earlier, he moved to a mutually beneficial perspective during his premiership (Aronoff, 2014).

Another key trait, distrust is also illustrative of remarkable differences between Israel’s hawks and doves (as expected in H1). Here, Sharon emerges as the most distrustful leader in Israel. Sharon’s words mark his wariness of the other – Palestinians in particular, and Arabs in general. As prime minister, Sharon continued his skepticism about the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and, was prudent about the future:

There is no peace between nations or peoples. And the main problem is that the Arabs are not ready yet – I don’t know if it will be in the future, I don’t know – but they are not ready to recognize the birthright of the Jewish people to have an independent Jewish state in the homeland of the Jewish people (Bennett, 2004).

One prominent Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, reported that in his and Sharon’s last conversation (mid-2005), Sharon told him: “I don’t trust any Arabs” (Aronoff, 2014: 97). Erakat’s account of this exchange illustrates Sharon’s categorization of all Arabs as untrustworthy. If Sharon is on the one end of distrust, Barak is on the opposite end. Aronoff (2014) writes that Barak left the military since he expected peace with Israel’s neighbors.

These findings also invite a rethinking of other possible explanations and deviations from the hypotheses. Leadership studies, and LTA specifically, offer more to explore. While the individual traits in the LTA framework offer explanations of leaders’ behavior, they may also be utilized to further investigate the hawk–dove dichotomy in the combinations of traits, which can help flesh out how hawkish and dovish leaders differ among themselves (see Hermann, 2003).¹⁴ Leaders’ responses to constraints, openness to new information, and motivation towards the world are three options in LTA. First, leaders’ reactions to constraints can be assessed by their belief in ability to control events and need for power scores. When both traits are high, a leader is expected to challenge constraints; otherwise, any combinations of high and low in these two traits suggest leaders will respect constraints in varying ways. For instance, citing Hagan (1994), Shannon and Keller (2007) claim militant, radical leaders (read: hawks) would be more likely to challenge constraints than moderate, acquiescent leaders (read: doves). Second, complexity and self-confidence together indicate leaders’ openness to new information: leaders with high scores in both or a higher score for complexity than self-confidence are open to information, yet low scores in both or lower scores for complexity than self-confidence predict leaders who are closed to information.

Israel’s prime ministers are more likely to respect constraints. With low-leaning average scores in both traits, Peres belongs to this group; Shamir’s significantly low belief in ability to control events and low-leaning need for power also places him in this group. Others, Rabin and Netanyahu2009, can fluctuate between respecting and challenging constraints as all have average scores in belief in ability to control events but lean low in need for power. Netanyahu1996 and Barak share similar tendencies in their reactions to constraints, with Netanyahu more firmly belonging to a subgroup Hermann (2003) describes as “constraints challengers” who “are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens” (188). Finally, Sharon and Olmert also share similar qualities in “challenging constraints less successfully because they are too direct and open in use of power, and are less skillful in manipulating others to realize desired influence” (Hermann 2003: 188).

When considering openness to information, in comparison to world leaders, most Israeli prime ministers have a lower average complexity (Barak at the mean, Rabin slightly above) and all are moderately self-confident (the lowest average score belong to Barak, who is at the mean). In combination, all but Shamir have higher scores for complexity than self-confidence – hence, they are open to contextual information. Shamir’s relatively equal scores indicate he will be closed to new information, for he has low complexity and high self-confidence compared to the world leaders (Hermann, 2003: 193).

Lastly, many Israeli prime ministers profiled here exhibit higher distrust and lower in-group bias. This combination – leaders’ motivation towards the world, Hermann summarizes – is when leaders’ “focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant” (2003: 200). There are some nuances to this trend: Barak has significantly low distrust and low-leaning in-group bias, and Rabin’s average scores in both traits make it difficult to situate him in Hermann’s classification. One other exception is Netanyahu; his profile in his first term in office reveals high scores in both traits. As such, for Netanyahu1996 the world is made up of ‘evil adversaries’ and his motivation toward to the world is “eliminating potential threats and problems” (Hermann, 2003: 200). Netanyahu2009 appears to moderate his in-group bias in coming close to the world leaders’ average but is more distrustful – still, this change may suggest he may occasionally move to the subgroup with most of Israel’s leaders.

Against the hawk–dove dichotomy, in the aftermath of 2003 elections, McMahon (2005: 201) writes that Labor and Likud pursue similar policies with respect to the Palestinian issue and “merely employ different means.” The findings of this article, however, suggest that Israel’s hawkish and dovish leaders do differ in terms of their personality traits. In addition, Hermann’s leadership trait analysis promises a useful approach to understanding these differences. Hence, the findings here offer a solid preliminary ground to exploring this dichotomy further. This article confirms complexity and distrust as distinguishing traits between hawks and doves; it offers some puzzles in other traits and proposes further considerations in light of its findings. First, despite the association between distrust and in-group bias, the latter trait does not appear to differ between Israel’s post-Cold War hawks and doves. Is in-group bias a trait that separates hawks from doves? Second, the reverse association of task focus to hawks and doves is intriguing. As discussed earlier, hawks’ problem orientation and doves’ relationship focus are theoretically sound expectations. Notwithstanding, this contrary but statistically significant finding among the Israeli leaders invites further discussion – including compatibility of these traits with hawks and doves as proposed here. Finally, another puzzle to pursue is the difference in hawks’ and doves’ self-confidence. Why are hawks more self-confident than doves? One possible path to explore is the relationship between complexity and self-confidence; are hawks more likely to be closed to information?

Conclusion

This article offers a confirmation of the hawk–dove typology, and an invitation to qualify this dualistic view of political leaders. This article finds that there are some key differences between hawks and doves in post-Cold War Israel when capturing traits of each individual leader. Hawks share lower complexity, higher distrust and self-confidence than doves; they also differ from doves in having a lower task focus. The LTA approach here illustrates that we can move past the simplified dichotomy, and refocus conversations about leaders on their traits and then furthermore on their responses to constraints, openness to new information, and motivation towards the world.

Following the traits highlighted in this article, there are multiple routes to investigate for capturing nuances between hawks and doves. First, beyond the dichotomy, LTA and other approaches to political personalities offer tools to trace how leaders may change their behavior over time in different contexts (Maoz and Astorino, 1992: 649). Another fruitful line of inquiry may be how leaders’ traits correspond with public opinion and social trends. In the case of Israel, Rynhold (2007: 430) argues that the prominence of post-materialism in the country was important for the peace process. He elaborates how “low threat perception and lower levels of support for ethno-nationalism … strongly correlated with dovishness in Israel.” These changes, then, would point to lower distrust of others and in-group bias scores; would Israeli leaders exhibit a similar change before, after, or in sync with Israeli society? Tracing such changes is possible by utilizing a thorough analysis of leaders’ statements and matching public opinion trends. Rynhold claims, for instance, that Sharon (an archetypical hawk) adapted to the aftermath of Oslo – a time Israeli society predominantly demanded a peace process – by endorsing a Palestinian state and withdrawing from the Gaza Strip.¹⁵ Given existing accounts of hawks’ conversion to doves (Aronoff, 2014; Ziv, 2014), can leadership traits help trace such a shift in Israel’s – or other countries’ – leaders? For example, Aronoff (2014: 185) proposes a similar future research agenda, when she asks if leaders with a static view of their opponents would respond to domestic and foreign pressure for tactical changes, and if leaders who change their views are less motivated by international pressures.

The findings of this article relate to many different political contexts, as the hawk–dove dichotomy is widely used across the world. A cursory search for these terms would return debates about hawks and doves in the context of multiple conflicts and wars (e.g. the Vietnam war, the Iraq war), and in elections. For instance, Indonesia’s presidential candidates in 2014 were framed in these terms (Wijaya, 2014). In India, Narendra Modi was long considered a hawk when he became the country’s prime minister (Schaffer and Schaffer, 2016: 268).¹⁶ Recently, in the United States, the press highlighted the hawkishness of John Bolton and Michael Pompeo – without references to their individual traits – when they were appointed as national security advisor and secretary of state, respectively. In any conversations such as these, the public would benefit from qualifying the label hawk, seeking clues in the political personalities of these leaders to understand their decision-making and policy choices. Other approaches to political personality (operational code, for instance) may well offer additional insights to this end. Indeed, foreign policy analysis and conflict studies scholarship can capitalize on this opportunity to expand this widely accepted metaphor in policy-making and scholarship to meaningful constructs.

Lastly, this article also relates to the broader field of personality research and its connection to political ideology. The correspondence of hawks and doves with Israel’s right and left suggests a fruitful avenue for future research. This article’s findings encourage further study of this association. As discussed earlier, while LTA (and other dominant approaches to studying elites in foreign policy) has not engaged with this before, given other work (mainly at the mass level) on the association between personality traits and ideology (e.g. Jost, 2006), this would be a good avenue for future research. Indeed, the Big Five literature, a prominent line of personality research (see, among others, Caprara et al., 2010; Jost, 2006; also, for a review, Feldman, 2013) already provides some evidence for the relationship between personality and ideology.¹⁷ For instance, similar to this article’s findings about conceptual complexity, openness to new experience consistently distinguished left from right (for example, Carney et al., 2008). Future research can also pursue the opportunity to bridge the findings here with the literature on the Big Five.

In conclusion, the findings of this article are encouraging about the value of unpacking these commonly used shorthand labels with political leadership approaches. They are also useful in highlighting, most notably, the significance of complexity and distrust in understanding hawkish and dovish leaders. If certain personality traits seem to make some leaders hawkish and others dovish, there is then reason to revisit the use of these shorthand labels in analyses of foreign policy. Future research would gain from questioning research that uses hawks and doves dichotomously, and from exploring ways to operationalize individual-level measurements.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback. Thanks are also due to Juliet Kaarbo, Cristian Cantir, Akan Malici, Mark Schafer, Steve Walker, Lawrence Rubin, Norrin Ripsman, Patrick James, and Kerem Ozan Kalkan for their feedback at various stages of this manuscript. Thank you to Social Science Automation for making ProfilerPlus available. The author recognizes Carly Goldstein, Kinsley Cuen, and Derek Dzinich for their research assistance. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual meetings of the Association for Israel Studies, and the International Studies Association Midwest.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

ORCID iD

Baris Kesgin

Author biography

Baris Kesgin is Assistant Professor Political Science at Elon University. He specializes in foreign policy analysis and political leadership – more specially, of Israel and Turkey. His most recent research appeared in International Area Studies Review, Journal of International Relations and Development, Political Psychology, and Turkish Studies.

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