Feminist Social Justice Orientation

Abstract

This article underscores several themes evident in Yoder, Snell, and Tobias’s research; these include the conceptualization of feminism and social justice as inextricably linked, the conceptualization and operationalization of optimal functioning at intrapersonal, interpersonal, and collective levels, and potential connections and disconnections between empowerment and liberation from oppression. In addition, selected patterns of findings from Yoder et al.’s study are elaborated on in the context of prior research on feminism in order to probe potential connections and disconnections among empowerment, oppression consciousness, and optimal functioning. This analysis culminates in the following question: Is feminist social justice orientation, with its potential accompanying sense of discontent, itself a form of optimal functioning? This question is posed, with an invitation to critically evaluate it and its implications, and with the hope of informing future scholarship, practice, and training in feminist social justice orientation and optimal functioning.

Keywords

feminism social justice multiculturalism feminist identity

In their thoughtful research on the association between feminist beliefs and optimal functioning, Yoder, Snell, and Tobias (2012) make a number of valuable contributions to theory and research on feminism, social justice orientations, and optimal functioning. In this article, I aim to unpack several themes evident in Yoder et al.’s research that I believe contribute to social justice and counseling psychology theory and research in important ways; these include conceptualization of feminism and social justice as inextricably linked, conceptualization and operationalization of optimal functioning at intrapersonal, interpersonal, and collective levels, and potential connections and disconnections between empowerment and liberation from oppression. In addition, I elaborate on selected patterns of findings from Yoder et al.’s study in the context of prior research on feminism in order to probe potential connections and disconnections among empowerment, oppression consciousness, and optimal functioning. Finally, I raise the following question: Is feminist social justice orientation, with its potential accompanying sense of discontent, itself a form of optimal functioning? I invite critical evaluation of this question and its implications and hope that such critical evaluation can inform future scholarship, practice, and training in feminist social justice orientation and optimal functioning.

The Fusion of Feminism and Social Justice

A laudable theme advanced by Yoder et al.’s (2012) research is that feminist, multicultural, and social justice commitments are inextricably linked. This theme is reflected in the title of the article and in the authors’ framing of the relevance of their research to counseling psychology. Indeed, there have been many efforts to make explicit the intersections of feminist psychology with multiculturalism (e.g., Landrine, 1995; Landrine & Russo, 2010) and more recently with social justice commitments (e.g., Goodman et al., 2004). Nevertheless, some scholars have lamented the perceived divide between feminist and multicultural scholarship and practice; one noted manifestation of this perceived divide is the tendency to neglect a feminist lens when issues of ethnicity, race, and racism are in focus and to neglect a multicultural lens when issues of gender and sexism are in focus (e.g., Silverstein, 2006).

Increasing attention to intersectionality perspectives in psychology (e.g., Cole, 2009; Shields, 2008) is one promising manifestation of bridging the perceived divides among feminism, multiculturalism, and social justice. Intersectionality perspectives highlight the fact people’s experiences are not divided into purviews of feminism, multiculturalism, and social justice. Rather, class, ethnicity, gender, race, sexual orientation, and other dimensions of identity and oppression exist concomitantly in people’s experiences. And as Silverstein (2006) noted, “[F]eminism and multiculturalism are inextricably linked because the goal of both is social justice” (p. 22). Silverstein’s call is a reminder that as a social justice framework gains ground within counseling psychology, we may do well to explicitly acknowledge and credit what we know about feminist and multicultural theory, research, practice, training, and activism. That is, before we proliferate new “social justice” terms, constructs, measures, and so on, it may be helpful to consider and credit existing bodies of feminist and multicultural scholarship that can inform our work in this area. To this end, Yoder et al.’s (2012) research is a valuable example of framing feminism as integral to, rather than separate from, social justice.

It might be helpful to consider a few examples of how the large body of research on feminist philosophies, attitudes, self-labeling, and activism can inform research, practice, and training in social justice orientation and commitment. As one example, theory and research suggest a diversity of feminist philosophies, including perspectives that emphasize working for social change within existing social systems (i.e., liberal feminism), advocate for dismantling oppressive social systems (i.e., radical feminism), focus on economic inequalities as the source of other forms of injustice (i.e., socialist feminist), focus on valuing women’s cultures and experiences (i.e., cultural feminism), or emphasize the intersectionality of racism and poverty with sexism (i.e., woman of color feminism, womanism), although empirical data suggest that people’s attitudes reflect fewer philosophical distinctions (Henley, Meng, O’Brien, McCarthy, & Sockloskie, 1998; Henley, Spalding, & Kosta, 2000). In parallel fashion, different philosophical approaches to social justice may exist and translate into different emphases in activism (e.g., working within existing systems for change or dismantling those systems altogether, focusing on cultural diversity). Thus, what we know about the diversity of feminist philosophies may inform efforts to operationalize social justice philosophies and activism.

As another example, research on the paradox of rejecting feminist self-labeling but endorsing feminist attitudes (i.e., “I’m not a feminist, but …”; e.g., Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004) can inform research on social justice attitudes, commitment, and social action. Specifically, available research suggests that many individuals who endorse feminist attitudes may not identify themselves as feminist and that feminist self-identification may be a key correlate of feminist activism above and beyond feminist attitudes (e.g., Eisele & Stake, 2008; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder, Tobias, & Snell, 2011; Zucker, 2004). In parallel fashion, endorsing pro social justice attitudes may not necessarily translate into engagement in social justice activism. As such, research on factors that impede (e.g., identity discordance; Suter & Toller, 2006) or promote (e.g., sense of common fate, positive evaluations of feminists; Nelson et al., 2008; Reid & Purcell, 2004) the translation of feminist attitudes into feminist identification and activism may inform efforts for training social justice advocates. Similarly, theoretical models of how social justice self-efficacy and outcome expectations may be translated into social justice interests and commitments (Miller et al., 2009; Miller & Sendrowitz, 2011) may inform efforts to train feminist activists.

Underlying these examples is the point that we can frame feminist and social justice activism as one and the same. An important caution, however, is that the fusion of theory, research, training, and practice related to feminist and social justice activism is grounded in the premise that the most complete form of feminist social justice activism aims to ameliorate ableism, ageism, classism, heterosexism, racism, sexism, transphobia, and other forms of injustice (some of which are likely not yet on our collective or individual radars) and to recognize the coexistence and intersections of these oppressive forces.

Optimal Functioning at Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, and Collective Levels

Another admirable contribution of Yoder et al.’s (2012) research is the illustration of conceptualizing and operationalizing optimal functioning at different levels or spheres. Consistent with prior conceptualizations (e.g., Prilleltensky & Prilleltensky, 2003), Yoder et al. included intrapersonal, interpersonal, and collective spheres of functioning. At the intrapersonal level were their eudaimonic and liberation in the personal sphere constructs, assessed with indicators of positive self-appraisal (e.g., self-acceptance, self-esteem), personal agency (e.g., autonomy, instrumentality), and personal growth and empowerment. At the interpersonal level were Yoder et al.’s liberation in the relational sphere constructs, assessed with indicators of egalitarian role expectations and sexual assertiveness in intimate relationships. At the collective level were their liberation in the collective sphere constructs, assessed with indicators of collective self-esteem and justice entitlement. Yoder et al.’s focus on optimal functioning is consistent with calls for greater attention to human strengths and well-being in counseling psychology (e.g., Lopez et al., 2006). Yoder et al.’s approach also builds on these calls in two important ways.

First, Yoder et al.’s (2012) approach underscores the fact that focusing solely on customarily examined intrapersonal factors such as self-esteem or personal agency provides a limited (and culturally specific) perspective on positive functioning. Rather, Yoder et al.’s approach is a useful model for including relational and collective aspects of optimal functioning, along with more traditionally examined intrapersonal (and individualistic) indicators. Second, Yoder et al. provide a rationale for connecting optimal functioning with social justice orientation (another interesting example of such a connection is Ponterotto’s, 2010, multicultural personality theory). Specifically, Yoder et al. include a sense of empowerment and liberation from oppression in the personal, relational, and collective spheres as part of their conceptualization of optimal functioning. Thus, a commendable aspect of Yoder et al.’s conceptualization is that it takes optimal functioning beyond intrapersonal eudaimonic aspects and connects it with perceptions of justice and power at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and collective levels.

In addition to these important contributions, the multisphere conceptualization of optimal functioning has some implications that may be useful to explore. One implication of this conceptualization is that indicators of optimal functioning within a particular sphere might be expected to correlate more strongly with one another than with indicators in other spheres. Clarity and distinctiveness of the spheres of well-being was not a focus of Yoder et al.’s (2012) research as they were interested in examining the full set of well-being indicators in the canonical correlation; nevertheless, their data offer some directions for consideration and reflection with regard to the spheres of optimal functioning.

Visual inspection of the zero-order correlations among the 13 well-being indicators suggests that many were correlated with one another in expected directions (notable exceptions to this pattern were action identification, personal entitlement, which was included to separate exaggerated entitlement from optimal functioning, and justice entitlement, which I will discuss in further detail). However, the zero-order correlations also indicated some curious patterns. For example, some of the eudaimonic well-being indicators yielded as strong or stronger correlations with some of the personal liberation indicators as they did with one another (e.g., correlations of autonomy and self-acceptance with personal empowerment, correlation of self-acceptance with self-esteem). Similarly, the two relational liberation indicators of egalitarianism in intimate relationships and sexual assertiveness yielded as strong or stronger correlations with the three eudaimonic well-being indicators (e.g., autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance) and with personal liberation indicators (e.g., self-esteem, agency, personal empowerment) as they did with one another. Finally, in the collective liberation sphere, the two collective self-esteem indicators were associated more strongly with many of the eudaimonic, personal liberation, and relational liberation indicators than with the third collective liberation indicator, justice entitlement. In fact, the strongest correlation of justice entitlement was not with any other well-being indicator but with feminist identity development revelation attitudes, a point discussed in further detail later in this article. Taken together, these patterns suggest the possibility that many of the eudaimonic, personal liberation, and relational liberation indicators, as well as the two collective self-esteem indicators, might “hang together” as a single set, rather than as separate, interrelated spheres of optimal functioning. Thus, one direction for building on Yoder et al.’s research might be to directly test these and other potential alternative models, using exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses for example, to clarify the distinctions and connections among the various spheres of well-being and liberation. Beyond such pragmatic conceptual and psychometric questions, Yoder et al.’s (2012) conceptualizations and findings raise a more fundamental and intriguing question: What exactly is liberation as optimal functioning?

Connections and Disconnections between Empowerment and Liberation from Oppression

To answer this question, we can return to Yoder et al.’s (2012) insightful conceptualization of optimal functioning as including (a) liberation to be empowered and (b) liberation from oppression. A review of Yoder et al.’s measures clarifies how this definition was operationalized in the different spheres of functioning. Specifically, the measures of intrapersonal and interpersonal functioning appear to assess sense of agency, assertiveness, and to some extent the expectation of equality in relationships; these factors appear to be connected by the thread of personal empowerment. But these measures seem less explicit in assessing liberation from oppression, that is, recognition of the oppressive patterns and structures that one is embedded in and efforts to dismantle these patterns and structures. By contrast, optimal functioning in the collective sphere included an explicit measure of recognition of oppression along with measures of social identity importance and social identity appraisal. Specifically, optimal functioning at the collective level was assessed as a sense of being a good member of the social group “women” (membership esteem), the importance of being a woman to self-concept (identity esteem), and perceiving that women are oppressed in our society (justice entitlement).

Yoder et al.’s (2012) findings reveal some intriguing complexities regarding this operationalization of optimal functioning in the collective sphere. First, the two social identity indicators were correlated minimally or nonsignificantly with justice entitlement; thus, the three indicators of optimal functioning in the collective sphere did not appear to “hang together” particularly strongly. In addition, interpretation of these correlations may be complicated by the possibility that the meaning of membership esteem and identity esteem could vary depending on individuals’ views of justice entitlement. That is, a feminist lens regarding women’s oppression may define being a good woman and being woman centered in one’s self-concept as challenging the status quo (which is perceived to be oppressive to women). An antifeminist lens, however, might define being a good woman and being woman centered as a commitment to upholding prescriptive traditional gender roles and values (which are not perceived to be oppressive to women).¹ As such, the very meaning of membership and identity esteem might vary for those who hold a feminist social justice orientation and those who do not. Second, as stated previously, the strongest correlate of justice entitlement was feminist identity revelation attitudes that reflect an awareness and acknowledgment of sexism. In fact, justice entitlement was more strongly and consistently related to the feminist beliefs indicators than to the other optimal functioning indicators. By contrast, membership and identity esteem both were correlated negatively with feminist identity revelation attitudes, indicating that these markers of collective self-esteem were associated with lower awareness and acknowledgment of sexism.

Thus, interpretation of the associations between the optimal functioning indicators and the feminist beliefs indicators may be informed by the context that the well-being side of the canonical correlation may have reflected greater emphasis on personal empowerment than on liberation from oppression. This may be evidenced most clearly by the fact that the well-being indicators across spheres were generally unrelated to justice entitlement, which was perhaps the clearest indicator of the liberation from oppression aspect of optimal functioning. This pattern suggests a potential distinction between liberation to be empowered and liberation from oppression aspects of optimal functioning.

Feminist Social Justice Orientation as Optimal Functioning in a Context of Oppression?

Turning then to the relations between indicators of feminist beliefs and indicators of optimal functioning, the pattern of zero-order correlations in Yoder et al.’s (2012) study revealed generally small or nonsignificant relations between the two variables sets. Notable exceptions were that revelation was correlated negatively and synthesis was correlated positively with many of the well-being variables, a pattern that is consistent with prior findings (Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006). In the canonical correlation, synthesis and revelation were also the highest feminist beliefs loaders on the first and second functions, respectively. To interpret this pattern of zero-order and canonical correlation results, it is helpful to consider what we know about the meaning of revelation and synthesis scores.

Across studies, revelation is found to correlate positively with self-labeling as a feminist, with endorsing cardinal beliefs of feminism (e.g., existence of unequal treatment of girls and women relative to boys and men in society), and with reported engagement in feminist activism, whereas synthesis (and in some cases active commitment) is found to be unrelated to these variables (Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006; Yoder et al., 2011). Given the theoretical definition of synthesis as a marker of feminist identity, findings that synthesis is unrelated to critical indicators of feminist consciousness and activism are perplexing. In a study designed specifically to clarify this perplexity, Liss and Erchull (2010) found that synthesis scores tapped a mix of non- or antifeminism and gendered empowerment. On the non- or antifeminism side, synthesis scores were unrelated to feminist self-labeling, feminist attitudes, or perceptions of sexism; were correlated negatively with feminist identity revelation scores; and were correlated positively with gender inequality justification, individualism, and feminist identity passive acceptance (i.e., denial of sexism and unexamined acceptance of traditional gender roles). On the gendered empowerment side, synthesis scores were correlated positively with feminist identity active commitment, endorsement of the need for women’s collective action, and belief in the equal rights and roles of women and men. This pattern of relations led the authors to conclude that synthesis scores may reflect “a state where women feel empowered but remain unaware of social injustice” (Liss & Erchull, 2010, p. 93).

Such a state may also describe the first canonical correlation function that emerged from Yoder et al.’s (2012) data; many of the feminist beliefs and well-being indicators loaded on this function, but notable negative or low loaders were the two clearest indicators of awareness of oppression: revelation and justice entitlement. By contrast, the second function was composed exactly of these two indicators of awareness of oppression as the highest loaders. This pattern further underscores the potential distinction between a sense of empowerment and a social justice orientation and, by extension, may draw a distinction between the liberation to be empowered dimension (perhaps reflected in the first canonical function) and the liberation from oppression dimension (perhaps reflected in the second canonical function) of well-being noted by Yoder et al.

To get a clearer picture, it might be helpful to closely review the actual content domains reflected in the feminist beliefs variables that loaded on each of the canonical functions. To this end, the items from each of the feminist beliefs variables that yielded a structural coefficient greater than 0.50 on each of the three canonical functions are presented in Table 1. The variables are presented in descending order according to their structure coefficients (i.e., for each function, the first variable listed yielded the highest structural coefficient; the items within variables are not presented in any particular order). A review of these items suggests that the feminist beliefs set loading on the first function reflect a female- and femininity-focused view of empowerment along with commitment to collective action; many of the well-being indicators, other than justice entitlement, had high or moderate loadings on this function. The second function includes items that reflect a clear awareness of and discontent with oppression, endorsement of feminist principles, and commitment to collective action; the only high loading well-being indicator on this function was justice entitlement. The third function includes items that reflect an acceptance and appreciation of prescriptive traditional gender roles; the highest well-being loader on this function was self-esteem. Thus, this third function, which is not a focus of the present discussion, may reflect a status-quo-accepting and self-accepting contentment without a sense of empowerment or liberation from oppression.

Table 1.

Items of Feminist Beliefs Measures Loading on the Three Canonical Functions

Function 1	Function 2	Function 3
Synthesis	Revelation	Passive Acceptance
• I feel like I have blended my female attributes with my unique personal qualities.	• Gradually, I am beginning to see just how sexist society really is.	• I don’t see much point in questioning the general expectation that men should be masculine and women should be feminine.
• I am proud to be a competent woman.	• I feel angry when I think about the way I am treated by men and boys.	• One thing I especially like about being a woman is that men will offer me their seat on a crowded bus or open doors for me because I am a woman.
• I have incorporated what is female and feminine into my own unique personality.	• Men receive many advantages in society and because of this are against equality for women.	• I like being a traditional female.
• I enjoy the pride and self-assurance that comes from being a strong female.	• I never realized until recently that I have experienced oppression and discrimination as a woman in society.	• I think that men and women had it better in the 1950s when married women were housewives and their husbands supported them.
• As I have grown in my beliefs I have realized that it is more important to value women as individuals than as members of a larger group of women.	• I feel like I’ve been duped into believing society’s perceptions of me as a woman.	• If I were married to a man and my husband was offered a job in another state, it would be my obligation to move in support of his career.
Active Commitment	• My female friends are like me in that we are all angry at men and the way we have been treated as women.	• I think that most women will feel most fulfilled by being a wife and a mother.
• I am very committed to a cause that I believe contributes to a more fair and just world for all people.	• In my interactions with men, I am always looking for ways I may be discriminated against because I am female.	• I think it’s lucky that women aren’t expected to do some of the more dangerous jobs that men are expected to do, like construction work or race car driving.
• I want to work to improve women’s status.	• Regretfully, I can see ways in which I have perpetuated sexist attitudes in the past.
• I am willing to make certain sacrifices to effect change in this society in order to create a nonsexist, peaceful place where all people have equal opportunities.	Feminist Perspectives
• It is very satisfying to me to be able to use my talents and skills in my work in the women’s movement.	• Whether one chooses a traditional or alternative family form should be a matter of personal choice.
• I care very deeply about men and women having equal opportunities in all respects.	• People should define their marriage and family roles in ways that make them feel most comfortable.
• I choose my “causes” carefully to work for greater equality of all people.	• The workplace is organized around men’s physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women.
• I feel that I am a very powerful and effective spokesperson for the women’s issues I am concerned with right now.	• Using “man” to mean both men and women is one of many ways sexist language destroys women’s existence.
• On some level, my motivation for almost every activity I engage in is my desire for an egalitarian world.	• It is the capitalist system which forces women to be responsible for child care.
• I owe it not only to women but to all people to work for greater opportunity and equality for all.	• Capitalism forces most women to wear feminine clothes to keep a job.
	• Rape is best stopped by replacing the current male-oriented culture of violence with an alternative culture based on more gentle, womanly qualities.
	• Putting women in positions of political power would bring about new systems of government that promote peace.
	• Women of color are oppressed by White standards of beauty.
	• Women of color have less legal and social service protection from being battered than White women have.
	Active Commitment (see Function 1)

Items are those from feminist beliefs measures that yielded a structural coefficient greater than 0.50 on each of Yoder et al.’s (2012) canonical functions.

So what does it mean that the function most clearly reflective of an awareness of oppression does not include any indicators of feeling good? Again, prior research on feminist identity may provide some insight in this area. As Yoder et al. (2012) describe, there is evidence that high feminist consciousness may buffer and low feminist consciousness may exacerbate the effects of sexism (e.g., Klonis, Endo, Crosby, & Worrell, 1997; Moradi & Subich, 2002); but feminist consciousness, and particularly revelation attitudes, has also been linked with greater psychological distress (e.g., Fischer & Good, 2004; Moradi & Subich, 2002). Such distress is consistent with the definition of revelation as a state in which women become aware of sexism, may feel angry about sexism, and may feel guilty about their own participation in perpetuating sexism (Downing & Roush, 1985). Indeed, Fischer and Good (2004) found that the link between revelation and psychological distress was mediated partly by feelings of anger.

But do such associations with distress mean that feminist consciousness is bad for optimal functioning? A valuable contribution of Yoder et al.’s (2012) study is that the answer to this question might vary depending on how we conceptualize optimal functioning and feminist consciousness. They argue and provide evidence that if optimal functioning is conceptualized to include liberation, then we will see positive associations between some formulations of feminism and optimal functioning. And the interpretation of their data offered in this article is that this might be the case, particularly when we consider empowerment aspects of feminist beliefs and liberation. But what about the absence of most well-being indicators from Function 2, which reflected the clearest oppression consciousness indicators?

Here, we might consider pushing the edges of Yoder et al.’s (2012) argument a bit further. In a context where liberation from oppression is an ongoing (and difficult) process rather than an achieved reality, perhaps recognition of and discontent with oppression indicate optimal functioning. Conceptually, it seems reasonable that recognizing social injustice in one’s intrapersonal processes and interpersonal relationships and in society at large would be a difficult emotional experience. It also seems reasonable that working against deeply rooted systems of injustice, what Johnson (2001) described as choosing not to take paths of least resistance, could feel isolating and exhausting at times. Indeed, experiences of anger, isolation, and exhaustion emerged in Hercus’s (1999) qualitative study with feminist activists. Perhaps such feelings indicate full engagement with oppressive contexts. Perhaps optimal functioning, in the context of oppressive conditions, might actually be discontentment rather than contentment within personal, relational, and collective spheres that perpetuate those conditions; such discontent may be necessary for a commitment to disrupt those conditions. By extension, in the context of oppression, might a sense of personal, relational, and collective contentment, numbness, and inaction be warning signs of nonoptimal functioning? For example, might such reactions suggest disconnect born of privilege or limited awareness, internalized oppression, a reality of limited opportunity or exhausted resources to engage, or a need for respite from engagement?

Yoder et al. (2012) ask the core question of whether a feminist social justice orientation is related to optimal functioning. These authors’ insightful inclusion of oppression consciousness indicators on both the well-being side (i.e., justice entitlement) and the feminist beliefs side of the canonical correlation hints at an alternative way to frame this question: Might the feminist beliefs variables themselves be considered indicators of liberation from oppression? Said more broadly, in a context of ongoing oppression, might a feminist social justice orientation, and its associated sense of discontent, indicate optimal functioning?

Reframing “negative” emotional responses (e.g., anger, sadness, guilt) to oppression as indicators of optimal functioning in the face of injustice might be helpful in considering additional indicators of liberation from oppression. Perhaps liberation from oppression at the intrapersonal level might include efforts to be mindful of and reduce the internalization of oppressive forces such as ableism, classism, heterosexism, racism, and sexism. Perhaps liberation from oppression at the interpersonal level might include working to recognize and reduce oppressive attitudes and behaviors across familial, friend, intimate, and other relationships. Perhaps liberation from oppression at the collective level might reflect feminist social justice consciousness and activism itself! And perhaps, at each of these levels, liberation from oppression might include engagement with the difficult emotional work that is a real reflection of recognizing oppression (Fischer & Good, 2004; Hercus, 1999)—that is, discontent with oppressive patterns in intrapersonal, interpersonal, and collective spheres.

How might psychology and psychotherapy theory, research, practice, and training be reshaped if we considered this possible frame in our thinking? What are the costs and benefits of such a conceptualization for individuals, communities, and societies? I invite critical evaluation of these questions and their implications and hope that such critical evaluation can inform future scholarship, practice, and training in feminist social justice orientation and optimal functioning.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I thank Esther Tebbe for assistance and feedback on this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Bio

Bonnie Moradi is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Florida. Her research focuses on experiences of prejudice, discrimination, and objectification, as well as on collective identity. This research examines the nature of these experiences, their associations with health and well-being for women, racial/ethnic minority, sexual minority, and other minority populations, and the intersections of minority stressors and identities across populations.

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