Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are “Close Cousins” or “Distant Relatives”

The Similarities and Differences Between Terrorism and Hate Crime

Some past research has highlighted the similarities between terrorism and hate crime. For example, one of the earliest forms of terrorism in the United States was racially and politically motivated violence of the postbellum Ku Klux Klan, which ushered in early legislative attempts to address the common phenomenon of racially motivated terrorism. Examining the Klan’s use of violence to block African Americans’ political involvement, Law (2009) calls the Klan the “terrorist wing of the Democratic Party” (p. 132), highlighting political motivations of the Klan’s reign of terror. Arguing that early efforts to combat political violence coincided with tackling racially motivated violence, Shimamoto (2004) remarks that the Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 were the first measures taken by the United States to handle terroristic racially motivated violence, so as to preserve the rights of targeted citizens much like hate crime legislation. Thus, the line between hate crime and terrorism proves blurred historically as early American terrorism was both politically and racially motivated.

Hamm (1993) notes the similarities between the language of terrorism and hate crime definitions as stated by the U.S. government. Hamm (1993) cites the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition of a terrorist incident as a “violent act or an act dangerous to human life in violation of the criminal laws . . . to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives” (pp. 106-107). The most recent language of federal hate crime legislation defines hate crimes as offenses motivated by “prejudice based on race, gender and gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” (U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, 2011b). Given the statutory language, Hamm (1993) argues that skinhead violence can be classified as hate crimes or terrorist acts, evidencing the similar nature of such acts.

Definitions of hate crime and terrorist acts reveal a number of shared traits. Both involve acts of violence against persons and property. Hate crime and terrorism definitions both focus on classifying civilian populations, or subgroups thereof, as victims (Shimamoto, 2004). Many definitions of terrorism rely on the political, social, and/or religious nature of the goals of terrorist perpetrators (Hoffman, 1998). Like terrorism, hate crimes express a number of socio-political objectives by targeting individuals based on their perceived group membership. Biases often prove intricately related to socio-political and/or religious views. Both acts serve as tactics in the arsenal of hate groups, a number of which are also labeled as terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan (Atkins, 2006; J. Levin, 2013). Similarly, McDevitt, Levin, and Bennet’s (2002) typology of hate crime offenders includes the “mission” category made up of members or supporters of organized hate groups. “Mission” offenders are often racist White supremacist extremists who believe that they must purge the world of evil by eliminating the “other” group that threatens their group. B. Levin (2012) notes that these “hard core hatemongers are believed to be responsible for about 33%-40% of hate motivated homicides” (para. 7).

Hate crimes and terrorist incidents act as message crimes, instilling fear and psychological harm, as well as behavioral modification. Noting the close relationship between hate crime and terrorism, Krueger and Malečková (2002, 2003) describe the goal of hate crimes to terrorize a larger group beyond the immediate victim, who is selected on the basis of her or his group identity. Hate crimes constitute not only an attack on a single person, but also they send an anti-“other” message to the target’s larger community. Hate crimes thus present unique harms that distinguish them from ordinary crimes as they align more closely with terrorism. Several studies (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; Lim, 2009; McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001) also show that victims of hate crime suffer greater psychological and emotional harms, including depression, increased fear of victimization, anger, and stress. For example, Iganski and Lagou (2009) find that both racial minority (and the larger minority communities) and White victims of racially motivated crimes avoid certain places and are more likely to have moved (i.e., changed residences). Increased avoidance behaviors and other behavioral changes also follow in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, such as those of 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings (Gigerenzer, 2004, 2006; McArdle, Rosoff, & John, 2012; Prager, Beeler Assay, Lee, & von Winterfeldt, 2011; Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005).

Hate crimes and terrorist acts can be defensive or retaliatory. Defensive hate crimes are those in which offenders “defend their turf” and send a message to the larger community to which the victim belongs (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; McDevitt et al., 2002). Interviewing White youth in Brooklyn, Pinderhughes (1993) finds that youth committed racially motivated attacks to defend their turf as they believed that the government was taking their jobs and giving them to racial minorities while Whites suffered unemployment and homelessness. Retaliatory hate crimes occur in response to some precipitating event, specifically a perceived or actual hate crime against a member of the offender’s ingroup (McDevitt et al., 2002). One study of hate crimes in New York City, for example, found that “cross-sectionally, antiwhite incidents correlate with the number of antiblack incidents, and temporally these two monthly time series seem to follow a tit-for-tat pattern” (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998 in Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998, p. 399). Terrorist acts can also be conceptualized as defensive or retaliatory. For example, the Troubles in Ireland exemplify both models with republican dissidents “defending” Ireland from the British or acting in retaliation with tit-for-tat attacks by republican dissidents and loyalists or British forces (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).

Although many scholars argue for the similarities between the two, others note how each are unique. In investigating the association between hate crimes and terrorism, Deloughery et al. (2012) address the claim that hate crime acts as a “poor man’s terrorist attack” that eventually escalates to more serious acts of terrorism (p. 665). Unlike most terrorist attacks that require some level of planning and resources, hate crimes are usually committed on the spur of the moment. ¹ Therefore, hate crimes present an avenue for extremists to pursue their socio-political objectives without the necessity of planning. Hate crimes also pose less danger of arrest. Hate crimes are underreported and under-investigated and prosecuted (Freilich & Chermak, 2013; R. D. King, 2007; R. D. King, Messner, & Baller, 2009). Terrorist attacks garner media, government, and law enforcement attention and pose a greater threat of apprehension. Hate crimes thus present an effective route for upholding ideological beliefs while minimizing the costs of resources and risks.

Hate crime and terrorism further differ in certain ways. Hamm (1993) argues that the distinction between hate crime and terrorism is nuanced, remarking that only extreme hate crimes driven by socio-political goals should be considered terrorism. Deloughery et al. (2012) find that hate crimes constitute more of a “downward” offense with a majority party attacking a member of a minority, whereas terrorism proves to be an “upward” crime with a less powerful group attacking a more powerful one. Although this may be a valid distinction, it fails to acknowledge the nature of a terrorist group’s social, political, or religious objectives. Michael (2003) comments that “terrorism is almost always linked to a wider social movement. . . . Klan terrorism in the South was part of a broader pattern of white resistance to the civil rights struggle” (p. 105). Shimamoto (2004) also argues that both terrorism and hate crime attack fundamental notions of democracy and the state. Therefore, the argument remains that hate crimes attack society at large by attacking its norms, targeting dearly held values of equality, liberty, and basic human rights. Such a conception of hate crimes aligns them with the “upward” nature of terrorism, refuting that hate crimes are only a downward crime.

Other differences between hate crime and terrorism pertain to offender and incident characteristics. J. Levin and McDevitt (2002; see also Phillips, 2009) find that the majority of hate crimes are actually committed by groups of thrill-seeking youth who lack firm ideological beliefs or hate group affiliation. ² In addition to this thrill nature and the peer dynamics, these incidents usually involve alcohol or drug consumption and are unplanned (J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002; McDevitt et al., 2002; Messner, McHugh, & Felson, 2004). It must be noted though, that thrill-seeking hate crimes still send a message to the targeted group and often are an outgrowth of societal cultural norms. Byers, Crider, & Biggers (1999) shows that many in their sample of thrill offenders expressed negative views of their Amish victims. These thrill hate crime offenders also thought that the larger community agreed with them that Amish persons were inferior and not a part of society. Although thrill-seeking hate crime offenders are not political extremists and are far from being firmly committed terrorists, they still may be motivated by quasi-political motives. Thrill-seeking offenders, in other words, often commit these attacks to send a message that reflects both their personal biases and what they believe to be their society’s cultural norms.

Another difference is that offenders typically do not claim responsibility for the attack or publicize it as terrorists often do, but they do not necessarily need to publicize their crimes themselves (LaFree & Dugan, 2004). As message crimes, hate crimes themselves issue a warning to the victim’s larger group. Such crimes often garner enough media attention to get their objective publicized. Despite important differences between hate crime and terrorism, their similarities provide the groundwork for further investigation of the relationship between the two phenomena. See Figure 1 for summary of similarities and differences between hate crime and terrorism.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

The Similiarities and Differences Between Hate Crime and Terrorism (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Deloughery, King, & Asal, 2012; Hamm, 1993; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Law, 2009; Lim, 2009; Messner et al., 2004; McDevitt et al., 2001; McDevitt et al., 2002; Michael, 2003; Phillips, 2009; Shimamoto, 2004).

General Hate Crime Escalating to Extremist Hate Crime

The theoretical basis for investigating the relationships between hate crime, extremist hate crimes, and terrorism relies on intergroup conflict and related theories, including normative support and social identity theory. Several studies (Grattet, 2009; Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; R. D. King & Brustein, 2006; R. D. King & Sutton, 2013; C. J. Lyons, 2007) investigate the role of intergroup conflict and hate crime. Green, Strolovitch, and Wong’s (1998) “defended neighborhoods thesis” draws on realist group conflicts theories. In brief, realist group conflict theories posit that White intolerance manifests when racial and ethnic minority groups move into their areas, thereby representing a threat to their political and economic interests as a competing force for resources (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998). Several studies (Grattet, 2009; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; C. J. Lyons, 2007) support the “defended neighborhoods” thesis, evidencing that racially/ethnically based hate crimes are highly correlated with the influx of minorities into former almost all-White areas.

The following section examines how the presence of general anti-“other” hate crimes can result in fatal hate crimes by far-rightists. Normative support proves to be a very significant factor in influencing the use of violence in intergroup conflict. Louis and Taylor (2002) explain how group norms shape individual members’ perceptions, specifically perceptions of intergroup conflict. Senechal de la Roche (1996) explains that solidarity is integral for collective violence, permitting violent expression of group grievance. As such, lynching varied with local solidarity in the American South with close-knit communities seeing increased lynchings. Gurr (1968) explains that experimental evidence demonstrates that highly cohesive groups are much more likely to express hostility against “outsiders” (p. 272). Regarding the importance of normative support for violence in enabling terrorists, M. King, Noor, and Taylor (2011) note how Milgram’s experiments demonstrated that individuals are susceptible to accepting violence when surrounded by others who were compliant with engaging in violence. M. King et al. (2011) find that jihadi terrorists receive normative support from their families, as well as the larger community. Ingroup identification provides a mechanism for individuals to positively see themselves. Social identity theory dictates that people derive self-esteem through their group membership and by viewing their group positively compared with other groups; furthermore, such group identification strengthens individual conformity to group norms (Cohrs & Kessler, 2013; Federico, 2013; Louis & Taylor, 2002; P. A. Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010). P. A. Lyons et al. (2010) find that the interaction of ingroup identification and mean and high-level group narcissism among U.S. citizens was associated with negative attitudes and behaviors toward Arab immigrants.

The research demonstrates that extremists are more likely to resort to violence against a perceived threat when they receive normative support from their ingroup. Hamm (1993) finds that skinheads are synanomic, which he defines as “hyperactively bonded to the dominant social order and to one another” (p. 212). As a result, far-right extremists should be more likely to not only be more aggressively bonded to their goals of carrying out their socio-political objectives in sustaining “traditional” values, but also their ingroup (White, heterosexual, working-class men). Furthermore, far-right extremists should prove to feed off of the normative support of their ingroup in exercising violence against outgroups.

In sum, there are two causal mechanisms that could explain how regular hate crimes committed by non-extremists lead to fatal ideologically motivated attacks committed by far-right extremists. First, regular hate crimes often attract attention from the media, the larger community, and committed far-rightists. These regular hate crimes may encourage far-rightists to conclude that “regular” persons in the general community share their racial and extremist grievances. For example, Green and Rich (1998) investigated the association between White supremacist rallies and demonstrations and cross burnings on the county level in North Carolina. They found that in counties where White supremacist rallies occurred, the likelihood of subsequent cross burnings increased. The authors concluded that White supremacist rallies could encourage individuals traveling to the event by drawing attention to racial grievances, and therefore facilitating action in the form of racial intimidation. Deloughery et al. (2012) similarly explain that anti-minority hate crimes can highlight growing anti-minority sentiment to which extremists may respond with more serious violence. Our argument is that regular hate crimes committed by non-extremists could (perhaps unintentionally) highlight these same racial grievances that then encourage far-right extremists to commit fatal acts of ideologically motivated hate crimes.

Second, these regular hate crimes are often fiercely denounced by government officials, minority communities, and advocacy groups (Jenness & Grattet, 2004; J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002). Simi and Futrell (2010) have explained that far-rightists commonly feel stigmatized by mainstream society. Many therefore retreat to “free places” where they are better able to subscribe to and act upon their extremist beliefs, and interact with others who think like them. It is possible that these denunciations of regular hate crimes aggravate the feelings of persecution held by many far-rightists that is reinforced by others who share their views. This in turn could create a backlash effect that results in some far-rightists committing fatal hate crimes. As the far-right movement often attracts violent individuals (see, for example, Ezekiel, 1995; Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, & Parkin, 2015), we wonder, in other words, whether some far-rightists engage in fatal bias-motivated violence in response to the condemnation of regular anti-minority hate crime, which presents an attack on their grievances and ideology.

Based upon both of these possible causal mechanisms, we hypothesize that places experiencing hate crimes in general are more likely to experience fatal hate crimes by far-right extremists.

Extremist Hate Crime Escalating to Extremist Terrorism

In terms of extremist hate crime escalating to terrorism in the intergroup context, Michael (2003) discusses Sprinzak’s theory of “split-delegimitization” as applied to right-wing terrorism, which asserts that “outsiders” as well as the state simultaneously come under attack (p. 95). Michael (2003) contends that this theoretically supports the evolution of right-wing terrorism with attacks escalating from those against the “outsiders” to the state due to the state’s perceived alliance with the “outsiders” (p. 95). Supporting the theoretical escalation, Michael (2003) looks to Hewitt’s (2000) descriptive data on American domestic right-wing terrorism, which evidences a demonstrable escalation in violence against the state. Hewitt’s (2000) data show that the majority of the first wave of far-right attacks from the 1950s to the 1970s was against people based on their race or ethnicity, followed by civil rights workers. The second wave from the 1970s to the present shows that the far-right has increasingly targeted the government, including attacks against law enforcement, politicians, and government facilities. Examining the life course of American far-right groups, Kerodal, Freilich, Chermak, and Suttmoeller (2015) empirically test and find support for Sprinzak’s theory, uncovering that the far-right initially attacked non-government targets but began to equally strike both non-government and government targets after becoming disillusioned with the government. Such findings support the idea that the far-right may move from simply engaging in hate crimes against minorities to anti-government attacks as well, signaling an escalation in their activities. Deloughery et al.’s (2012) case study of Timothy McVeigh’s horrific anti-government bombing attack of the Federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 demonstrated that increases in anti-minority hate crimes were a way to express right-wing grievances and can act as a warning or a signal that some extremists will subsequently potentially “upgrade” to (anti-government or American society at large) terrorism (p. 668). As a result, we hypothesize that counties experiencing fatal hate crimes by far-rightists would also see far-right terrorism with these extremists employing violence against both minority and government targets and American society at large.

Extremist Hate Crime as Response to Terrorism

Regarding extremist hate as a response to anti-American terrorism, a review of the literature on group grievance, social control, and retaliation is useful. Black (1983) posits a theory of crime as social control, in which individuals use crime as “self-help” to express their group’s grievance against a particular subgroup to maintain social control. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) define group (or political) grievance as a mechanism for radicalization and as the “threat or harm to a group or cause the individual cares about can move the individual to hostility and violence toward perpetrators” (p. 21). Terrorist attacks perceived to attack “traditional” or “American” values thus present extremists with a group grievance that manifests in violent retribution. Vicarious retribution occurs when an ingroup member views an entire outgroup responsible for a harm against a fellow ingroup member and thus attacks an outgroup member for retribution (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006). Several scholars (Lickel et al., 2006; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011) explain that a popular mechanism for both radicalization and vicarious retribution is dehumanization of the “enemy.” Lickel et al. (2006) comment that intergroup conflict sees dehumanization of the outgroup, which facilitates vicarious retribution as outgroup members are seen “as being interchangeable and therefore equally deserving of retaliation” (p. 378). Retaliatory hate crimes involve individuals who seek revenge by targeting innocent bystanders whom they perceive as representative of a larger enemy. Several studies (Byers & Jones, 2007; Deloughery et al., 2012; Disha et al., 2011; R. D. King & Sutton, 2013; McDevitt et al., 2002) demonstrate the prevalence of hate crimes following terrorist attacks. Hate crimes targeting perceived Middle Eastern victims occurred not only after 9/11 and the Boston Marathon, but also immediately at the start of the Iran hostage crisis in 1979 (J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002). Retaliatory hate crimes thus act as micro-level manifestation of broader conflicts on the international scale.

The synanomic nature of far-right extremists thus explains why they are likely to respond to terrorist attacks against “traditional” or “American” values with hate crimes against outgroups they perceive as a threat or as responsible for precipitating terrorist attacks. As a result, extremists prove more likely to exercise hate crime as a form of social control. Furthermore, normative support exists for retributive violence in the course of intergroup conflict (Lickel et al., 2006). Therefore, extremists feed off of normative support to not only engage in hate crimes in general, but also specifically as a form of vicarious retribution. Retaliatory hate crimes following terrorist attacks thus express group grievance, as well as social control, by those ultra-committed to upholding the dominant social order. We hypothesize that counties that experience terrorist attacks by non-right-wing groups would be more likely to see an increase in fatal hate crimes by far-right extremists.

Revisiting Deloughery et al. (2012): Are Hate Crimes Only Distant Relatives?

Using HCSA and Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data, Deloughery et al. (2012) examine the temporal proximity of hate crimes and terrorism and find that (a) hate crimes do not necessarily lead to future right-wing terrorism, (b) hate crimes are more often a response to terrorism, and (c) anti-minority hate crimes prove especially prevalent after non-right-wing terrorist attacks that seem to attack traditional “American” values. As a result, they conclude that hate crimes and terrorism are more akin to “distant relatives” as hate crimes are not indicative of future terrorist attacks. One limitation acknowledged by the authors is the absence of a measure for ideological strength or offender affiliation. The majority of hate crime offenders consist of thrill offenders, who lack firmly committed extremist ideological beliefs (J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002; McDevitt et al., 2002). Therefore, HCSA data does not allow researchers to identify which offenders subscribe to extremist views which undermines our ability to study this phenomenon. Offenders who subscribe to extremist right-wing ideology, however, prove more likely to resort to both ideologically motivated hate crimes and terrorist acts than non-ideological offenders. This study extends Deloughery’s important work in two ways: by utilizing fatal bias-motivated homicides committed by far-rightists as contained in the ECDB and by examining the county-level association of hate crime and terrorism.

Finally, based upon the prior literature we also examine four additional hypotheses (for a total of seven). Research establishes that intergroup conflict occurs when minorities pose a threat to the interests of the dominant group (Blalock, 1967; Green, 1998, Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998, R. D. King & Brustein, 2006). Greater rates of minority presence are said to lead to White intolerance, and in turn violence against minorities, as their presence poses a threat to White economic interests (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998). Previous studies (Disha et al., 2011; C. J. Lyons, 2007) find that greater racial/ethnic minority presence explains interracial violence. Intergroup conflict theories also posit that ethnic heterogeneity can also lead to greater conflict (Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney, 1996; Shanahan & Olzak, 1999). Another important predictor in studies examining intergroup conflict is demographic change. Green, Strolovitch, and Wong’s (1998) defended neighborhoods thesis holds that demographic change over time with minority growth in areas contributes to White violence against “invading” minorities. We hypothesize that those counties with greater minority presence as well as greater ethnic heterogeneity will be more likely to see far-right activity. We further hypothesize that demographic change (i.e., minority presence increasing over time) will be associated with far-right activity as well.

The literature on intergroup conflict often relies on measures of economic competition. Theoretically, poor economic conditions foster increased racial competition for resources, which, in turn, fosters increased intergroup conflict leading to violent outcomes such as hate crimes and terrorist incidents (Corzine, Huff-Corzine, & Creech, 1988; C. J. Lyons, 2007; Olzak, 1989, 1990; Soule, 1992; Tolnay & Beck, 1995; Tolnay, Deane, & Beck, 1996). Relatedly, deprivation frameworks in criminology such as the classic strain theories maintain that poorer locations usually provide fewer opportunities for success. Some persons use crime as an alternative way to achieve financial success as the legal opportunities are closed to them (Merton, 1938). Often, persons in these areas are socially isolated from mainstream society. These areas may also attract offenders from other locations who exacerbate this locale’s crime problem (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). Significantly, economic deprivation has also been seen as linked to far-right extremism (Lipset & Raab, 1977). Freilich et al. (2015; see also Pridemore & Freilich, 2006), for example, discuss how far-right extremists residing in poorer locations might conclude that their ideological opponents are responsible for their economic deprivation. These far-rightists may therefore then attack these opponents. We hypothesize that counties experiencing both higher rates of unemployment and poverty, as well as increased rates in both of these domains over time, will see higher numbers of far-right activity.

Analytical Approach

The current study investigates “spaces of hate” (Disha et al., 2011, p. 40), testing the association between hate crimes and terrorist acts at the county level. We focus on the dependent variables of fatal hate crimes committed by far-rightists (ECDB) and far-right terrorist acts (GTD). We use the total counts at the county level over the 20-year period (1992-2012) for these two types of events in 3,137 U.S. counties. Given the rare event nature of extremist activity (specifically homicides and terrorist acts by far-rightists), both dependent variables are skewed with many counties failing to experience either type of extremist activity. With the skewed distribution and overdispersion, we conduct a series of negative binomial regressions to test the associations between hate crime and terrorism, as well as county-level demographic and economic characteristics. ⁸