Using Behavioral Strategies to Cope With the Threat of Terrorism: A National-Level Study

Abstract

Although the risk of dying in a terrorist attack in the United States is almost non-existent, recent polls indicate that Americans rank terrorism as a top national concern, prioritizing it over other issues such as the economy, health care, and the environment. The current study examines how Americans are impacted by the threat of terrorism today. Analyses of original national survey data suggest that Americans currently engage in behavioral coping in response to the threat of terrorism, and their coping responses vary by levels of worry about terrorism, political orientation, emotional vulnerability, and the association that they make between Muslims and terrorism. The observed behavioral adaptations have implications for community engagement, the economy, and psychological well-being on an individual level.

Keywords

fear of terrorism coping behaviors behavioral adaptations anti-Muslim attitudes macro-level stressors

Social scientists have characterized American society as one of emotional overreactions and excessive fear. Americans tend to fear major negative events, and overestimate the likelihood of their occurrence (Best, 2018; Glassner, 2010; Stearns, 2010). This is particularly the case for rare events such as being the victim of terrorism or violent crimes (Quillian & Pager, 2010). For example, a 2018 Pew Research Center poll found that Americans ranked terrorism as a top national concern, giving it priority over other issues such as the economy, health care, social security, and the environment (Pew Research Center, 2018), and a 2018 national survey found that 45% of Americans are afraid or very afraid of the possibility of a terrorist attack (Haner et al., 2019b).

It is true that there has been some surge in terrorist activity in the United States and across the world during the past five to ten years. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) launched approximately 150 attacks in 29 countries (excluding Iraq and Syria) and killed at least 2,000 people (Gilsinan, 2019). Eighty-two casualties of ISIS-inspired attacks occurred in the United States (Glenn & Rowan, 2019). Similarly, in recent years Americans witnessed a surge in terrorist violence by far-right extremist groups. According to a 2019 Global Terrorism Index report, far-right terrorist attacks increased by 320% over the past five years in North America and Western Europe (Bergengruen & Hennigan, 2019). In fact, statistics indicate that right wing terrorists, including white supremacists, killed more people on U.S. soil than jihadists have since 9/11 (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2019).

Despite this notable terrorist activity, the total number of deaths from terrorism have actually declined for the fourth consecutive year in 2019, and the actual risk of dying from terrorism in the United States is almost non-existent. According to the Global Terrorism Database, between October 2001 and August 2019, 220 Americans lost their lives because of terrorism related incidents. Using these figures, we can estimate the likelihood that an individual will die in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil (over the course of their lifespan) is approximately one in 364,000. Thus, statistically speaking, terrorism is not a significant threat for Americans. In comparison, a person’s chance of dying from a lightning strike (one in 160,000) or being killed by hornets, wasps, and bees (one in 63,335) across the same period of time is even greater than the risk of dying from terrorism (National Safety Council, 2020). This pattern echoes trends identified in the fear of crime literature. Although rates of violent crime in the United States have fallen significantly over the last 25 years, Americans tend to believe that crime is on the rise (Gramlich, 2018; Saad, 2019).

Several scholars have identified increasing levels of fear among the American public and have connected these fear responses to the proliferation of emotionally laden news media and political campaigns (e.g., Best, 2018; Furedi, 2018; Gadarian, 2010; Glassner, 2010; Jackson, 2013; Stearns, 2006, 2010). With a focus on terrorism in particular, Altheide (2017) argues that “tying terrorism coverage to an expansive discourse of fear has contributed to the emergence of the politics of fear, or decision makers’ promotion and use of audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk, and fear in order to achieve certain goals” (p. 133). Indeed, as described by Best (2018), politicians have taken advantage of Americans’ obsession with “American nightmares,” convincing the public that they should be afraid of social problems that pose little actual threat.

In this social reality, how do Americans cope and carry on with their daily lives while experiencing these excessive fears? Watching, reading, and listening to media coverage of terrorist attacks can make people feel vulnerable and develop psychological distress symptoms. For example, previous research found an increase in post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression among individuals following terrorist events (Antonius, 2016; Maguen et al., 2008; Schuster et al., 2001).

Additionally, consistent with the evidence from the fear of crime literature, fear and worry about terrorist attacks has been found to prompt several behavioral adaptations in individuals’ daily lives, even if they had not been directly victimized themselves (Denovan et al., 2017; Henson & Reyns, 2015; Huddy et al., 2002). For example, shortly after 9/11, many individuals avoided travelling by air, spent more time close to home, avoided large public events, and were less likely to use public transportation to visit New York City (Greenberg et al., 2004; Huddy et al., 2002). Taken together, these observations suggest that, in response to terrorism-related fear, individuals often develop behavioral coping strategies; they amend their lifestyles and daily routines to minimize the risk of becoming a victim of a future attack (Blalock et al., 2009; Eisenman et al., 2009; Goodwin et al., 2005; Lee & Lemyre, 2009; Maguen et al., 2008; Torabi & Seo, 2004).

In this context, through a national survey, we explore two issues: First, we examine the extent to which Americans cope behaviorally with the threat of terrorism. Second, drawing on the previous research in the fear and coping literature, we examine patterns in behavioral coping by social statuses (e.g., gender, age, political orientation). In doing so, we seek to better understand how the lives of Americans in the general population have been impacted by the threat of terrorism and the potential consequences for the nation as a whole.

Reacting to Terrorism

Terrorism-Related Fear

Research on the psychological impacts of terrorism has tended to focus on the mental health consequences experienced by individuals directly exposed to a terrorist attack or the reactions of general populations shortly following a notable attack (e.g., Boscarino et al., 2006; Galea et al., 2006; Johnson & Hobfoll, 2010; Neria et al., 2006; Richman et al., 2008). Although fear of terrorism is prevalent in the United States, limited research has been conducted on its correlates within the general population. Notably, the two studies that have surveyed terrorism-related fear in the absence of a recent terrorist event in the United States have sought to apply insights from the fear of crime literature, and the vulnerability perspective in particular, to the case of terrorism (Haner et al., 2019b; Nellis, 2009). An additional two studies of German samples have done so as well (Andersen & Mayerl, 2018; Brück & Müller, 2010). Overall, the evidence of whether factors that predict fear of crime operate similarly for the fear of terrorism is mixed. However, this literature offers a foundation upon which we can build our examination of behavioral responses to the threat of terrorism.

The vulnerability perspective contends that fear of crime is greater among individuals, who, by their personal characteristics, are believed to be at greater risk for victimization than others (Lane et al., 2014; Wyant, 2008). Accordingly, the most consistent individual-level predictors of fear of crime are gender and age. Women as well as elderly individuals express greater fear of crime relative to men and younger individuals, even when their actual risk of victimization may be low (Hale, 1996; Henson & Reyns, 2015; Lane et al., 2014; Warr, 1984, 2000). Furthermore, this research suggests that women’s heightened fear of crime is largely due to fear of sexual assault (Ferraro, 1996; Fisher & Sloan, 2003) or physical assault more generally (Hirtenlehner & Farrall, 2014). Non-Whites and persons from lower socioeconomic statuses have also tended to report greater fear of crime, though the research findings have been less clear for these variables than those for gender and age (Lane et al., 2014; Rader, 2004).

Consistent with the vulnerability perspective, in a 2006 survey of residents of New York City and Washington, DC, Nellis (2009) found that women reported greater fear of terrorism than men, and in a 2018 national survey of Americans, Haner et al. (2019b) also found women to be more fearful of terrorism than men. Neither survey found a correlation between age and fear of terrorism. However, the Haner et al. (2019b) survey additionally found that fear of terrorism was more prevalent among non-Whites, conservatives, individuals expressing strong Christian religiosity, individuals who were less educated, and those who expressed emotional vulnerability (Haner et al., 2019b). Thus, in addition to supporting the fear of crime literature, with women being more fearful of terrorism (Lane et al. 2014; Wyant, 2008), Haner et al.’s (2019b) findings also suggest that the political rhetoric that has emphasized the threat of terrorism to Americans may resonate more with some groups more than others (Best, 2018; Gadarian, 2013).

A recent survey of residents of Kaiserslautern, Germany was more critical of applications of the fear of crime literature to the case of terrorism. Andersen and Mayerl (2018) found that none of the vulnerability factors they examined—including gender, age, and socio-economic status—predicted fear of terrorism. The researchers argued that the rationale that women’s greater fear of crime is due to concern about sexual assault does not relate to concerns about terrorism. Instead, the study focused on the influence of attitudes toward Muslims on fear. Indeed, structural equation modeling revealed that, net of vulnerability characteristics, holding prejudicial attitudes toward Muslims was the strongest influence on fear of terrorism. These findings highlight the strength of the cognitive association that has developed between terrorism and Islam, largely based on political rhetoric and media coverage, which makes the case of terrorism distinct from other types of violent crime. Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that vulnerability factors may play a role in the fear of terrorism; however, the current political climate and public perceptions of minority groups—Muslims, in particular—must be considered.

Furthermore, the literature on social stress highlights an additional factor that distinguishes the threat of terrorism from the threat of crime more generally—the different levels of social reality at which stressors can occur. Whereas the threat of many crimes operates as a meso-level stressor, happening within a local context such as a neighborhood, terrorism is a macro-level stressor that can affect communities or the nation as a whole (Richman et al., 2008; Wheaton et al., 2013). As a macro-level stressor, the threat of terrorism is present at a level of social reality above the individual (Wheaton, 1994, 1999; Wheaton et al., 2013). Although with potential geographic variation, Americans face a similar risk of victimization by a terrorist attack (Mueller, 2009), terrorism as a stressor will not produce stress in all individuals equally. Thus, if terrorism is seen as more threatening by some groups than by others, those groups may also be more likely to respond by coping in some way to minimize the threat (Lee & Lemyre, 2009; Nellis, 2009).

Coping With the Threat of Terrorism

According to Pearlin and Schooler (1978), individuals engage in coping to avoid the harm caused by stress. As many of the factors that produce stress are social in origin, the study of coping behaviors can contribute to our knowledge of society’s impacts on the individual (p. 2). Thus, by examining the coping behaviors in which people engage to protect themselves from terrorism, we can more fully understand the impacts that terrorism has on the American public and their consequences for social life more generally. Although the stress and coping literature has tended to focus on broader classes of coping strategies, such as emotion-focused or problem-focused coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Thoits, 1995), empirical studies of populations exposed to terrorist attacks have reported a number of distinct behavioral responses.

Consistent with the coping strategies identified in the fear of crime literature, these strategies, referred to as constrained behaviors, can be classified as avoidance behaviors—those involving a restriction of what one does, or protective behaviors—those involving actions taken (Lee et al., 2009; May et al., 2010; Rader & Haynes, 2014; Stein et al., 2013). For example, an in-depth interview study of Israelis found that almost all participants dramatically altered their daily behaviors following terrorist attacks, staying home more frequently, and avoiding leisure activities (Herzenstein et al., 2015). As with the generalized fear of terrorism observed in surveys, research also reports the use of coping strategies in the general U.S. population, among those not exposed to a terrorist attack directly. These coping strategies include behavioral disengagement (Liverant et al., 2004), reducing travel (Gigerenzer, 2006; Greenberg et al., 2004), and avoiding crowds, tall buildings, public transportation, and air travel (Malik et al., 2018; Nellis, 2009). Notably, a 2017 Gallup poll conducted after the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester found that the percentage of Americans who are less willing to attend public events due to risk of terrorism (38%) was at its highest level since 2001 (Reinhart, 2017). The poll also identified heightened levels of other avoidance behaviors, with large percentages of Americans indicating that they were less willing to travel overseas (46%), fly on airplanes (32%), and go into skyscrapers (26%) (Reinhart, 2017). Again, these findings suggest that the level of generality of terrorism as a stressor is sufficient to affect the nation as a whole, and, by the long term behavioral strategies observed, one that appears to be chronically present (Pearlin et al., 1997; Wheaton, 1994, 1999; Wheaton & Montazer, 2010). These levels of avoidance behaviors in response to the threat of terrorism suggest a significant impact on the U.S. population.

Variation in Responses to the Threat of Terrorism

As noted above, empirical research on the fear of terrorism, as well as the fear of crime more generally, offers insight into potential patterns in terrorism-related fear and coping strategies. According to Rader (2004), fear of crime, perceived risk of victimization, and constrained behaviors are interrelated components of the threat of victimization; fear may be both a cause and consequence of behavioral coping (May et al., 2010; Rader & Haynes, 2014). Most research on constrained behaviors, however, has examined fear and vulnerability factors as predictors of avoidance or protective behaviors (Rader, 2017; Rader et al., 2007). Consistent with the vulnerability perspective, this research has found that constrained behaviors are more common among women and older individuals, as well as those who have greater levels of fear of crime (Beaulieu et al., 2007; Lane, 2009; Lane et al., 2014; Rader et al., 2007).

Likewise, in a survey of Los Angeles residents, Eisenman et al. (2009) found that terrorism-related avoidance behaviors were more common among women, non-Whites, and persons with mental illness (psychological vulnerability), and in her survey of residents of New York, NY and Washington, DC residents, Nellis (2009) found that women engaged in more terrorism-related avoidance behaviors than men. Nellis’ (2009) analyses also revealed heightened avoidance behaviors among political conservatives, emphasizing the political nature of terrorism-related concern (Altheide, 2017; Gadarian, 2013; Jackson, 2013). Combined with insights from Andersen and Mayerl’s (2018) study, which identified attitudes toward Muslims as a key predictor of fear of terrorism, this research highlights the importance of considering the current social and political climate surrounding the issue of terrorism.

Furthermore, the threat of terrorism is a macro-level stressor that occurs at the level of the nation. At the national level, the Trump administration has succeeded in bolstering fears about the threat of outsiders, particularly Muslims (Brown, 2016; Schmuck et al., 2017). We expect that those who believe this concern—that is, conservatives who are politically aligned with the Trump administration as well as those holding prejudicial attitudes toward Muslims—will respond behaviorally to the perceived threat of terrorism (Brown, 2016; Das et al., 2009; Gadarian, 2013; Giner-Sorolla & Maitner, 2013; Nellis & Savage, 2012; Powell, 2018).

The Current Study

In an effort to understand how Americans have altered their lifestyles in response to the present-day threat of terrorism, we examine specific types of avoidance and protective behaviors utilized by a national sample. We also seek to determine the extent to which behavioral responses to the threat of terrorism vary by gender, age, existing emotional vulnerability, political orientation, and attitudes toward Muslims. Thus, we seek to illuminate the social structure of coping strategies in response to a chronic macro-level stressor (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978; Wheaton et al., 2013). We ask whether the lives of some segments of the U.S. population have been more affected by terrorism than those of others, in ways that may ultimately be detrimental to their well-being (Maguen et al., 2008; Rader & Haynes, 2014).

Based on the literature reviewed above, we have developed six hypotheses. First, we expect that concern about terrorism will predict the intention to engage in behavioral coping.

Hypothesis 1: Fear of terrorism will be positively associated with behavioral coping responses to the threat of terrorism.

Second, although Andersen and Mayerl (2018) rightly point out that the theory that fear of sexual assault drives the fear of crime among women may not apply to the case of terrorism-related fear, the empirical examinations of fear of terrorism in U.S. samples have found significant gender differences (Haner et al., 2019b; Nellis, 2009). Therefore, we also expect to see greater intended behavioral responses to terrorism among women compared to men.

Hypothesis 2: Women will report greater intention to engage in behavioral coping responses to the threat of terrorism than men.

Also following the vulnerability perspective, we expect:

Hypothesis 3: Age will be positively associated with behavioral coping responses to the threat of terrorism.

Hypothesis 4: Psychological distress will be positively associated with behavioral coping responses to the threat of terrorism.

Finally, taking into account the social and political climate surrounding the topic of terrorism, we expect:

Hypothesis 5: Political conservatives will report greater intention to engage in behavioral coping responses to the threat of terrorism than non-conservatives.

Hypothesis 6: The tendency to associate Muslims with terrorist activity will be positively associated with behavioral coping responses to the threat of terrorism.

Although the extant research does not offer a theoretical rationale to expect differences in these social patterns in coping based on the coping strategy, we explore whether such differences exist in order to gain a more complete understanding of the specific impacts of the threat of terrorism on the U.S. population.

Methods

Sample

In July of 2018, we employed the international research data and analytics group, YouGov America, Inc. to distribute an original opt-in online survey to a national sample of 1,068 Americans based on their sampling pool of over 2 million U.S. participants in exchange for earning “big brand” gift cards (YouGov’s reward system; YouGov, 2018). YouGov conducts polls on various issues from marketing to current affairs, and their methods are now a standard in research on public opinion across disciplines (see, e.g., Haner et al., 2019a; Pickett, 2016; Schachter, 2016; Thielo et al., 2019).

To produce a nationally representative sample, YouGov uses a three-phase sampling strategy, which first constructs a pseudo sampling frame from high quality, large scale, commercially available probability surveys, such as the American Community Survey (ACS). Second, respondents are matched to this pseudo sampling frame based on their demographic and behavioral characteristics. Third, using propensity score weighting, YouGov adjusts biases within the sample (Rivers, 2006, for a full discussion of YouGov methodology, see Thielo, 2017). Research suggests that these methods produce samples that are more generalizable than other probability sampling techniques (Vavreck & Rivers, 2008).

In this study, the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) was used to construct the pseudo sampling frame in which respondents were matched based on gender, age, race, and education. Propensity weighting of respondents included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, region, and political party. Through matching and weighting, YouGov reduced the sample to 1,000 respondents. Listwise deletion within the multivariate models further reduced the analytic sample to 949 respondents.¹

Although we must acknowledge selection biases with opt-in surveys, these surveys tend to have more generalizability than state or local opinion polls. Indeed, in a comparison of data from two national full-probability face-to-face surveys and an online survey using a national opt-in pool, Simmons and Bobo (2015) determined that the demographic compositions, attitudinal responses, and multivariate analysis results were remarkably comparable across the survey modalities.

Table 1 reports the characteristics of our sample. In this final weighted sample, our respondents were 51.4% female, 64.2% White, with 28.5% holding a college degree or higher, and, on average, 47 years old. This distribution corresponds well with the sample from the 2016 American Community Survey, which was 51.3% female, 64.5% White, and 30.9% with a college degree or higher.

Table 1.

Sample Characteristics (means or percentages) (N = 949).

Variable	Percent	Range	Mean	SD
Vulnerability
Female	51.41
Age		18–90	47.40	18.10
CES-D		1–4	1.70	0.54
Political orientation
Conservative	32.70
Republican	26.10
Perceived threat
Fear of terrorism		1–4	2.45	1.03
Worry about terrorism		1–3	1.77	0.74
Attitudes toward Muslims
Perceived dangerousness of Muslims		1–3	2.31	1.08
Control variables
White	64.20
Education		1–6	3.26	1.58
Married	43.90
Fulltime employment	58.48
Religiosity		1–4	2.84	1.16

In addition, our sample was 35% Democrat and 26% Republican, which corresponds with the Pew Research Center’s estimates that the U.S. population consists of 33% registered Democrats and 26% Republicans (Pew Research Center, 2018).

Dependent Variables

We examine two types of behavioral responses to the threat of terrorism: avoidance behaviors—behaviors that individuals are less willing to do due to the risk of terrorism, and protective behaviors—behaviors that individuals have taken to address fears about terrorism. First, to measure the avoidance behaviors, the survey asked respondents, “As a result of the events relating to terrorism in recent years, would you say that now you are less willing to (1) attend concerts, sporting events, or other public events; (2) fly on airplanes; (3) go into skyscrapers; (4) travel overseas; and (5) use public transportation.” The subjects responded to each item separately with a “yes” or “no” to indicate whether they were less willing to take the action as a result of events relating to terrorism in recent years. In addition to examining responses to each item separately, we created an overall count of avoidance behaviors reported by summing responses to these five items. The mean of the count measure is 1.17 and variance is 2.57. The Cronbach’s alpha for the avoidance items is .827.

Second, in a section about concerns relating to the emerging threat of terrorism, the survey measured protective behaviors by asking, “Have you done any of the following because of your fears: (1) voted for a particular party or candidate and (2) purchased a gun.” We coded the responses dichotomously with 1 = yes and 0 = no. We treat each behavior separately in the analyses in order to assess the population’s specific behaviors.

These avoidance and protective behaviors replicate those included in previous research on the fear of terrorism (Nellis, 2009) and are consistent with the measurement of constrained behaviors in the fear of crime literature (May et al., 2010; Rader & Haynes, 2014). Nevertheless, they are self-report measures rather than observations of actual behaviors taken or avoided. While the protective behavior items ask participants to indicate whether or not they have actually done the behavior, the avoidance items may be interpreted as unwillingness to engage in future behaviors.

Independent Variables

Structural vulnerability

Following the fear of crime literature, we include the structural vulnerability characteristics of gender and age in our models. We coded self-identified females as 1 and males as 0. Age is measured in years. In addition, because stressors are related to each other, it is possible that someone affected by other stressors may be more vulnerable to stress in general (Maguen et al., 2008; Wheaton & Montazer, 2010). Therefore, as an indicator of potential emotional vulnerability to stress we include the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D), an averaged 20-item measure that asks respondents to indicate the frequency of a series of feelings on a scale of 1 (rarely or none of the time) to 4 (most or all of the time) (Björgvinsson et al., 2013; Radloff, 1977). The Cronbach’s alpha for the CES-D is .836.

Political orientation

Conservative political ideology is measured dichotomously with 1 = conservative or very conservative, 0 = other to avoid the exclusion of respondents who selected “not sure” on this item (n = 113 cases), which is consistent with previous literature (see, e.g., King & Wheelock, 2007; Shelley et al., 2017).² We coded membership in the Republican political party as 1 = Republican, 0 = other.³

Perceived threat

Both fear and worry about terrorism may indicate the experience of stress related to the threat of terrorism and are likely to influence behavioral responses to terrorism (Malik et al., 2018; Nellis, 2009; Richman et al., 2008). Following recommendations from the fear of crime literature, we treat fear and worry separately in the analyses (Clay-Warner, 2014; Ferraro & Grange, 1987; Lupton, 2000; Warr & Stafford, 1983; Williams et al., 2000). We assess fear of terrorism with responses to the question, “How afraid are you of a terrorist attack?” The response scale ranged from 1 (not afraid) to 4 (very afraid). We measure personal worry about terrorism by responses to the question, “How much, if at all, do you worry about being the victim of a terrorist attack?” Responses ranged from 1 (do not worry at all), 2 (worry a little), and 3 (worry a lot). Note that in the sample, fear and worry about terrorism are correlated at r = 0.679. This finding suggests that although those who reported fear of terrorism are also likely to worry about it, this was not the case for all respondents.

Attitudes toward Muslims

We also included a measure to assess beliefs about the connection between Muslims and terrorism. Respondents rated their agreement with the statement, “Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorist activity than non-Muslims” on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). This measure of attitudes toward Muslims has been used in other recent studies of terrorism-related fear (Bader et al., 2020; Haner et al., 2019b).⁴

Control variables

Race is measured dichotomously with 1 = White, 0 = non-White; education is measured ordinally from 1 = no high school to 6 = post-graduate degree; marital status is measured with 1 = married, 0 = not married; fulltime employment is measured dichotomously with 1 = yes, 0 = no. We measure Christian religiosity by Christian respondents’ rating of the importance of religion on a scale from 0 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). Non-Christian respondents received a code of 0 on the Christian religiosity measure.

Analytic Strategy

After presenting descriptive statistics for our sample, including frequencies or means and standard deviations for all variables, we present the frequencies of behaviors individuals are less willing to do as a result of terrorism (i.e., avoidance behaviors) and actions taken to address fears about terrorism (i.e., protective behaviors). We then test our hypotheses with a series of multivariate analyses. First, as an overall assessment of extent of avoidance behaviors, we examined the count of behaviors that respondents are less willing to do out of fear of terrorism. As the overall avoidance measure is a count variable with many respondents falling into the “no” category (zero behaviors), a negative binomial regression model was estimated for this analysis to account for overdispersion. We do not repeat the same analysis for a count of protective behaviors as a whole because, as noted, weapons behaviors constitute a distinct type of protective behavior, differing in magnitude and potential consequences from the other protective behavior we assess, voting for a specific candidate (Rader & Haynes, 2014). Second, to determine if there are patterns in coping responses by type of behavior, we use logistic regression to estimate each coping strategy as a binary outcome (1 = yes, 0 = no).

We examined the independent variables for multicollinearity and did not identify it as a concern. With the exception of three relatively strong correlations, between fear and worry about terrorism (r = 0.679), conservative and worry about terrorism (r = 0.486), and conservative and Republican (r = 0.551), no correlations were stronger than .330. The variance inflation factors across the regression models ranged between 1.10 and 2.07 (Fox, 1991; Wooldridge, 2009). The logistic regressions use robust standard errors, which we obtained in Stata/SE 16.0.

Although we present directional hypotheses, it is necessary to note that our cross-sectional data do not enable us to make causal interpretations of the relationships we examine. While we can be confident that many of our independent variables precede behavioral responses to the threat of terrorism (e.g., gender, age, political orientation), the order of association is less clear for the attitudinal items. As noted, with regard to fear of crime, Rader (2004) argues that fear, perceived rick of victimization, and constrained behaviors are reciprocally related dimensions of the threat of victimization. In a similar way, fear of terrorism may influence behavioral coping and vice versa. Following the threat of victimization research, we model fear and worry as independent variables in the regressions of behavioral coping, with the understanding that engaging in coping behaviors may generate worry and fear of terrorism as well (May et al., 2010; Rader et al., 2007).

Results

We begin by examining the overall frequencies of avoidance and protective behaviors in response to terrorism. As shown in Table 2, the overall pattern of responses to the avoidance behaviors, with between 13% and 35% of the sample responding affirmatively, indicates that Americans have restricted their normal behaviors in response to the threat of terrorism. While only some respondents are less willing to enter skyscrapers (13.3%), a larger portion of the sample indicated that they are now less willing to travel overseas due to the risk of terrorism (35.3%). Over a quarter of the sample is less willing to attend concerts, sporting events, or other public events, 22.5% are less willing to fly on airplanes, and 20.8% are less willing to use public transportation. The results strongly suggest that the threat of terrorism has affected the lives of a significant number of Americans. These findings also have implications for social and community engagement as well as the environment and public services in the case of public transportation use.

Table 2.

Dependent Measures (N = 949).

	Yes (%)
Less willing to do action due to terrorism
1. Travel overseas	35.3
2. Attend concerts, sporting events, or other public events	26.2
3. Fly on airplanes	22.5
4. Use public transportation	20.8
5. Go into skyscrapers	13.3
Actions taken to address fears
1. Voted for a particular party or candidate	49.2
2. Purchased a gun	13.7

The two protective behaviors that we examine are qualitatively different: voting for a candidate and purchasing a gun. Unlike other protective behaviors, weapons behaviors can increase the likelihood of an event turning into a criminal situation (Rader & Haynes, 2014). The response patterns reported in Table 2 reflect this difference in coping strategies. Nearly half of the sample reported that they voted for a particular candidate to address their fears of terrorism. In contrast, 13.7% of the sample indicated that they purchased a gun. Keeping in mind that these are actions taken to address fears of terrorism, this number is not insignificant.

Taken together, the frequencies reported in Tables 2 suggest that the threat of terrorism is a stressor for Americans in the general population, one in response to which many have altered their behaviors.

Next, we examine patterns in coping responses using multivariate models. First, we test our hypotheses on a general level, by examining the overall extent of reporting of avoidance behaviors. Table 3 presents the negative binomial regression of overall intended avoidance behaviors with the significant findings bolded. This analysis reveals four key predictors of avoidance coping. First, consistent with Hypothesis 1, a one unit increase in worry about terrorism is associated with a 47% increase in the expected count of intentions to engage in avoidance behaviors. However, fear is not a significant predictor in the model. Second, of the vulnerability characteristics examined, we see that a one unit increase in emotional vulnerability is associated with a 2% higher expected count of avoidance behaviors, but gender and age are not associated with increased avoidance behavior. Thus, we find preliminary support for Hypothesis 4 but not for Hypotheses 2 or 3.

Table 3.

Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Number of Avoidance Behaviors (N = 949).

	Avoidance behaviors
	b	( SE )	exp(b)
Vulnerability
Female	0.155	(0.094)	1.167
Age	0.005	(0.003)	1.005
CES-D	0.020***	(0.004)	1.021
Political orientation
Conservative	0.387**	(0.123)	1.473
Republican	0.013	(0.121)	1.013
Perceived threat
Fear of terrorism	0.056	(0.061)	1.058
Worry about terrorism	0.384***	(0.086)	1.469
Attitudes toward Muslims
Perceived dangerousness of Muslims	0.286***	(0.050)	1.331
Control variables
White	0.011	(0.106)	1.012
Education	−0.046	(0.032)	0.955
Married	0.078	(0.095)	1.081
Fulltime employment	−0.144	(0.104)	0.866
Religiosity	0.035	(0.046)	1.036
Model χ2	224.95***

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The statistically significant coefficients are indicated with bold text.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Third, Table 3 shows a political influence on individuals’ intended avoidance behaviors. Being politically conservative is associated with a 47% increase in the expected count of avoidant behaviors, which offers support for Hypothesis 5. Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 6, increases in the perception of Muslims as dangerous are associated with a 33% increase in the expected count of intended avoidance behaviors. Thus, the overall analyses presented in Table 3 show support for four of our six hypotheses. The results suggest that worry (but not fear) about terrorism corresponds to greater engagement in behavioral coping (Hypothesis 1) as does the tendency to associate Muslims with terrorist activity (Hypothesis 6). In addition, they reveal the political component of behavioral coping, with political conservatives reporting greater intention to engage in coping in response to the threat of terrorism than non-conservatives (Hypothesis 5).

We follow these analyses with a more detailed examination of the specific behavioral coping strategies. Table 4 presents the binary logistic regressions of each of the avoidance behaviors, and Table 5 presents the regressions of the protective behaviors. The goodness-of-fit Pearson chi-square values for the models ranged from 805.8 to 896.2 with p-values from .630 to .992, which show no evidence to reject the model null hypotheses that the fitted models are correct.

Table 4.

Logistic Regression Predicting Behaviors Individuals are Less Willing to Do Due to Risk of Terrorism (N = 949).

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5
	Attend public events			Fly on airplanes			Enter skyscrapers			Travel overseas			Use public transportation
	b	(SE)	OR	b	(SE)	OR	b	(SE)	OR	b	(SE)	OR	b	(SE)	OR
Vulnerability
Female	0.364*	(0.175)	1.439	0.259	(0.185)	1.300	0.476	(0.250)	1.610	−0.113	(.163)	0.892	0.550**	(0.212)	1.734
Age	0.004	(0.005)	1.004	0.011*	(0.005)	1.012	0.015*	(0.006)	1.015	0.013**	(0.004)	1.014	0.007	(0.006)	1.008
CES-D	0.478**	(0.150)	1.611	0.519**	(0.157)	1.680	0.858***	(0.197)	2.360	0.401**	(0.146)	1.493	0.742***	(0.171)	2.100
Political orientation
Conservative	0.543*	(0.230)	1.722	−0.185	(0.238)	0.830	0.400	(0.311)	1.491	0.729**	(0.214)	2.074	0.384	(0.275)	1.469
Republican	0.125	(0.214)	1.133	0.396*	(0.230)	1.486	0.052	(0.286)	1.053	0.087	(0.205)	1.091	0.238	(0.255)	1.269
Perceived threat
Fear of terrorism	0.076	(0.119)	1.079	0.349**	(0.122)	1.419	0.229	(0.160)	1.260	0.070	(0.106)	1.073	0.264*	(0.139)	1.303
Worry about terrorism	0.672***	(0.155)	1.959	0.355*	(0.159)	1.427	0.389*	(0.209)	1.476	0.326*	(0.150)	1.386	0.540**	(0.180)	1.717
Attitudes toward Muslims
Perceived dangerousness of Muslims	0.095	(0.098)	1.100	0.238*	(0.103)	1.270	0.324*	(0.132)	1.383	0.275**	(0.089)	1.320	0.265*	(0.114)	1.304
Control variables
White	0.171	(0.196)	1.187	−0.130	(0.204)	0.878	−0.308	(0.252)	0.734	0.408*	(0.187)	1.504	−0.195	(0.213)	0.822
Married	0.115	(0.173)	1.123	−0.062	(0.180)	0.939	−0.668**	(0.240)	0.512	0.226	(0.158)	1.254	−0.036	(0.201)	0.966
Education	−0.115*	(0.059)	0.891	−0.072	(0.060)	0.929	0.028	(0.082)	1.028	−0.145**	(0.053)	0.864	−0.033	(0.069)	0.966
Fulltime employment	−0.018	(0.186)	0.982	−0.294	(0.195)	0.744	−0.383	(0.242)	0.681	−0.148	(0.172)	0.861	−0.135	(0.215)	0.873
Religiosity	−0.029	(0.081)	0.970	0.103	(0.089)	1.110	0.115	(0.114)	1.121	0.040	(0.073)	1.041	0.110	(0.094)	1.120
Psuedo R²	0.100			0.120			0.147			0.120			0.151

Note. Behaviors are measured dichotomously with 1 = yes, 0 = no. Standard errors are in parentheses. The statistically significant coefficients are indicated with bold text.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 5.

Logistic Regression Predicting Actions Taken to Address Fears about Terrorism (N = 949).

Variables	Model 1		Model 2
	Purchased a gun		Voted for a candidate/party
	b (SE)	OR	b (SE)	OR
Vulnerability
Female	−0.341(0.220)	0.710	−0.362* (0.148)	0.695
Age	−0.018* (0.007)	0.981	0.010* (0.004)	1.010
CES-D	0.428* (0.212)	1.534	0.311* (0.139)	1.370
Political orientation
Conservative	0.660* (0.297)	1.936	1.071*** (0.207)	2.920
Republican	−0.037(0.271)	0.962	−0.168(0.200)	0.844
Perceived threat
Fear of terrorism	0.044(0.152)	1.050	0.198* (0.104)	1.219
Worry about terrorism	0.179(0.192)	1.200	−0.013(0.142)	0.986
Attitudes toward Muslims
Perceived dangerousness of Muslims	0.619*** (0.127)	1.860	0.005(0.083)	1.010
Control variables
White	−0.058(0.258)	0.942	0.524** (0.169)	1.690
Married	0.315(0.231)	1.370	0.338* (0.145)	1.402
Education	0.018(0.076)	1.018	0.104* (0.050)	1.111
Fulltime employment	0.235(0.243)	1.264	0.137(0.163)	1.148
Religiosity	0.106(0.111)	1.112	−0.013(0.069)	0.986
Psuedo R ²	0.125		0.099

Note. Actions are measured dichotomously with 1 = yes, 0 = no. Standard errors are in parentheses. The statistically significant coefficients are indicated with bold text.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

In each model of Table 4, the coping strategy is coded as 1 if the respondent is less willing to do the behavior and 0 if the respondent is not less willing to do the behavior. Overall, the results offer at least partial support for each of our six hypotheses and reveal five key patterns in avoidance coping responses to the threat of terrorism. First, personal worry about terrorism, net of fear of terrorism and other predictors, significantly predicts each avoidance coping strategy. As suggested by the negative binomial regression, this finding indicates that fear and worry may be distinct emotional stress reactions to the threat of terrorism; worry is associated with each avoidance behavior, while fear of terrorism only predicted two of the five avoidance behaviors (flying and using public transportation). Whereas fear is an emotional response to an immediate threat, worry typically involves ruminating about bothersome issues (Haner et al., 2019b; Jackson & Gouseti, 2014; Kemper, 1978). Thus, those who worry may be more inclined to respond with action or avoidance. These findings offer support for Hypothesis 1; however, worry about terrorism, rather than fear, is consistently positively associated with behavioral coping (avoidance behaviors) in response to the threat of terrorism.

Second, the vulnerability characteristics identified in the fear of crime literature—gender and age—predict some avoidance behaviors, which offers support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. Women are less willing to attend public events (Odds Ratio [OR] = 1.439) and to use public transportation (OR = 1.734) than men, while older persons are less willing to fly on airplanes, enter skyscrapers, and travel overseas than younger individuals.

Third, consistent with Hypothesis 4, emotional vulnerability consistently predicts each type of avoidance behavior. Individuals experiencing psychological distress are less willing to engage in a number of behaviors due to the threat of terrorism. This finding highlights the influence of existing stress exposure in the stress process (Wheaton & Montazer, 2010). Individuals having a greater stress response to begin with appear to be more responsive to the macro-level stressor of terrorism.

Fourth, net of the other predictors and control variables, conservatives have over twice the odds as non-conservatives of avoiding travel overseas (OR = 2.074), and have greater odds of being less willing to attend public events (OR = 1.722). In addition, Republicans are more likely to limit travel via airplanes compared to non-Republicans (OR = 1.486). Thus, there are political influences in the stress response to the threat of terrorism, which offers support for Hypothesis 5.

Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 6, individuals who hold negative attitudes toward Muslims are more likely to avoid nearly all of the behaviors examined (four out of five). More specifically, perceiving Muslims as dangerous increases the odds of being less willing to do the following: fly on airplanes (OR = 1.270), enter skyscrapers (OR = 1.383), travel overseas (OR = 1.320), and use public transportation (OR = 1.304). That the associations between linking Muslims with terrorist activity and these avoidance behaviors are significant even though fear and worry about terrorism as well as the other predictors are included in the model highlights the strength of the conflation of Muslims with terrorists that has happened among some segments of the U.S. population. Notably, 42% of the sample agrees or strongly agrees with the statement, “Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorist activity than non-Muslims.” This suggests that a sizable portion of the U.S. population directly associates Muslims with terrorist activity.

We see a similar pattern of results in the logistic regression of protective behaviors on the predictors. As reported in Table 5, emotional vulnerability significantly increases the odds of purchasing a gun (OR = 1.534) and voting for a candidate or party (OR = 1.370) to address fears about terrorism. There is also a clear influence of political orientation on protective behaviors, with the odds of purchasing a gun for conservatives being almost twice the odds for non-conservatives (OR = 1.936), and the odds of voting for a candidate in response to terrorism-related fear for conservatives being nearly three times those for non-conservatives (OR = 2.920). There is variation, however, in the effect of perceived dangerousness of Muslims. Whereas greater agreement with the statement that Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorist activity than non-Muslims corresponds to an increased odds of purchasing a gun in response to terrorism fears (OR = 1.860), it does not increase the odds of voting for a candidate (OR = 1.010, n.s.).

The results reported in Table 5 also illustrate variation in the effects of fear and worry about terrorism on protective behaviors. These emotions do not influence the odds of purchasing a gun out of fear of terrorism, net of attitudes toward Muslims and other predictors. Furthermore, whereas worry about terrorism predicts all avoidance behaviors examined, it is fear of terrorism that significantly impacts voting for a particular candidate or party.

In addition, men are more likely than women to vote for a candidate to address terrorism-related fears, and age is negatively associated with purchasing a gun but positively associated with voting for a candidate. Thus, unlike the case with avoidance behaviors, being a woman is not associated with a greater tendency to engage in the protective behaviors examined here. While the positive association between age and voting also reflects national voting trends, with older Americans being more likely to vote in elections in general than younger persons (Misra, 2019), older individuals may also use their vote to address terrorism-related fear.

Discussion

The current study examined the behavioral coping strategies that individuals employ to deal with the threat of terrorism. Our data from a 2018 national survey of American adults provided us with the opportunity to assess reactions to terrorism among the general population outside of the context of a specific terrorist attack as well as identify social patterns in coping responses. The analyses provide five key contributions, which we outline below.

First, we illustrate the nature of terrorism as a macro-level stressor to which Americans have responded by engaging in both avoidance and protective behaviors. Perhaps of greatest impact to individual and societal well-being, we found that over a quarter of the sample reported being less willing to attend concerts, sporting events, or other public events, 20% reported hesitancy to use public transportation, and more than 1 in 10 respondents reported that they purchased a gun to address their fears of terrorism. These behaviors have implications for community engagement, the economy, and psychological well-being on an individual level. In particular, avoidance behaviors such as these may lead to feelings of social isolation, psychological symptoms, and a lowered quality of life (Lee & Lemyre, 2009; Maguen et al., 2008). Furthermore, arming oneself as protection from terrorism is also concerning as weapons behaviors can escalate events into dangerous situations (Lane et al., 2014).

Second, we reveal the significance of holding attitudes that equate Muslims with terrorists for behavioral coping responses. The belief that Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorist activity than non-Muslims predicted the overall use of behavioral coping strategies and four out of the five avoidance behaviors examined as well as both protective behaviors. This effect is quite consistent and demonstrates the power of negative attitudes toward a religious group, even though much of today’s terrorism in the U.S. is politically motivated. Nevertheless, concern about Muslims as a “dangerous” group is associated with socially isolating behaviors. Such avoidance behaviors may further limit opportunities for positive social interactions that could reduce prejudice toward Muslims. Thus, the coping behaviors selected by those with negative attitudes toward Muslims, then, may exacerbate fear and misunderstanding.

Third, we distinguish between the emotions of fear and worry and their connections with coping strategies. Although previous research on the fear of crime has tended to treat these emotions as interchangeable (Clay-Warner, 2014), our findings suggest that fear and worry are indeed distinct constructs. Worry, as personal concern about a future risk, predicts each behavior that may limit an individual’s exposure to the contexts that are perceived as dangerous, whereas fear, as a primary emotional reaction to immediate threat, predicts limiting travel by airplane or public transportation as well as voting behavior in response to terrorism. Our findings are consistent with the fear of crime literature in that personal worry about victimization is associated with avoidance behaviors. Additional research may determine whether this distinction between fear and worry generalizes to other avoidance and protective behaviors, as conceptual clarity will benefit the development of theory and measurement strategies.

Fourth, our analyses demonstrate that there is a political component to one’s choice of terrorism-motivated coping strategies. Relative to non-conservatives, political conservatives had a greater odds of limiting attendance at public events, traveling overseas, purchasing a gun, and voting for a candidate, while Republicans showed a greater tendency to avoid airplane travel. As noted in prior studies on the fear of terrorism, the increased reactivity (or non-reactivity) in response to terrorism-related concerns among conservatives suggests the partisan impact of Donald Trump’s emphasis on the gravity of terrorism’s threat and its connection to Muslims (Altheide, 2017; Best, 2018).

Finally, we build upon the fear of crime literature to provide insight into the role of vulnerability factors in coping with the threat of terrorism. As we note, fear of terrorism can be distinguished from fear of crime in that the threat of terrorism occurs at a more general level. Whereas the threat of crime is typically present as a meso-level stressor, terrorism threatens large regions or entire nations. Subgroups thought to be vulnerable to frequent criminal victimization may not feel the same sense of vulnerability to victimization by terrorism. This may be particularly true in the case of gender, where women’s fear of crime is considered to have arisen from risk of sexual assault (Andersen & Mayerl, 2018). Although our analyses suggest some gender and age vulnerability to the threat of terrorism, this pattern was less consistent than typical findings reported in the fear of crime literature. We did, however, find a clear pattern of emotional vulnerability with regard to the threat of terrorism. Our analyses show that coping responses to the threat of terrorism are more common among individuals who report higher levels of psychological distress. Stressors are related to each other and stress experiences tend to co-occur (Wheaton & Montazer, 2010). It is likely that individuals who are already experiencing other stress reactions are more susceptible to terrorism-related stress and employ coping strategies in response. Additionally, distressed individuals may be more prone than those with greater psychological well-being to use avoidance coping strategies more generally (Maguen et al., 2008). Although these associations have been identified in previous research, our cross-sectional data do not enable us to confirm the temporal ordering of the link between psychological distress and the coping behaviors observed here. As psychological distress may follow from stress experiences, it is also possible that distress is a reaction to the experience of terrorism as a macro-level stressor. Future research should examine the psychological outcomes of terrorism-related stress experiences as well as the efficacy of various coping behaviors in mitigating those outcomes. Relatedly, individual characteristics such as self-esteem and mastery may influence psychological responses to stressors and choice of effective coping responses (e.g., Thoits, 1994). Such characteristics may be considered in subsequent studies.

In addition, Rader (2004) argues that fear of crime, perceived risk of victimization, and constrained (avoidance and protective) behaviors are interrelated components of the threat of victimization. Our cross-sectional data limited our analyses; however, future panel data collection may be utilized to assess the potential reciprocal relationships between these variables and gain a fuller understanding of the threat of terrorism. Furthermore, variables not included in our survey may play a role in perceptions of the threat of terrorism. These include prior victimization and experience with terrorism victimization, geographic location, and political media consumption (Malik et al., 2018; Nellis, 2009; Nellis & Savage, 2012; Rader, 2017; Shechory-Bitton & Cohen-Louck, 2018). Notably, the implications of the use of avoidance strategies should depend on the context in which one lives. Certain behaviors may be more or less restrictive for a person, depending on place of residence and daily routines. For example, avoiding skyscrapers may be particularly disadvantageous for an individual living in a metropolitan area but may be inconsequential for someone in a rural area. Thus, future studies might focus on contextual factors, including how specific contexts could affect which avoidance behaviors are more possible and salient for respondents. Nevertheless, our study has the advantage of a national-level dataset, and our analyses do suggest patterns in the perceived threat of terrorism and responses to those perceptions. This knowledge contributes to our understanding of how Americans have been coping with the threat of terrorism as well as inequalities in the impact of terrorism on the American population.

In sum, it appears that the threat of terrorism is a chronic macro-level stressor that continues to influence the lives of Americans. The consequences of the perceived risk of terrorism are diverse and significant. In this way, these responses are important considerations when examining how various threats affect our everyday lives. Although behavioral adaptions were more common among individuals with certain characteristics and perspectives, the avoidance and protective behaviors examined have the potential to impact society as a whole. That our analyses of a stressor that poses little actual risk to the American public suggest the significant use of behavioral coping strategies also calls attention to the impact of macro-level occurrences on the public as a whole. Future research may apply a similar approach to examine the consequences of other macro-level stressors, including those that may present risk to the population, such as the 2019 to 2020 coronavirus disease pandemic.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Melissa M. Sloan

Notes

Author Biographies

Melissa M. Sloan is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Social Sciences at the University of South Florida. Her research interests include the sociology of emotion, with a particular focus on fear of terrorism and psychological well-being, and the interdisciplinary research process.

Murat Haner is a Research Administration Faculty Fellow, Criminology Program Coordinator, and Instructor in the Department of Criminology at the University of South Florida. He is author of The Freedom Fighter: A Terrorist’s Own Story. His current research focuses on public opinion on policy issues, including gun control, police use of force, and terrorism.

Francis T. Cullen is Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus and a Senior Research Associate in the School of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati. He is a past president of the American Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. His interests include redemption as a correctional theory and the organization of criminological knowledge.

Amanda Graham is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Georgia Southern University. Her research interests focus on policing, police legitimacy, scale development, and measurement. Recently, she has written on the impact of race on procedural justice and support for body-worn cameras.

Ebru Aydin is a master student in the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, Sweden. Her research interests focus on counter terrorism, public safety, and Muslims.

Teresa C. Kulig is an Assistant Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Her current research interests are on theories and measurement of victimization, the nature of human trafficking, and the social construction of crime.

Cheryl Lero Jonson is an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Xavier University. Her research interests include correctional policy, offender reentry, and the prevention of gun violence. She is completing work on Shooter in the School: Preventing, Responding, and Surviving.

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