Perceived Immigrant Threat and Punitive Attitudes: The Moderating Effect of Economic Insecurity

Abstract

One of the strongest predictors of punitive attitudes is out-group prejudice. Two limitations of this literature are a relative lack of research examining (a) these relationships outside the United States and (b) the theoretical mechanisms involved. The current study tests the direct and moderating effects of group threat and economic insecurity on punitive attitudes among German citizens. Findings show the direct effect of group threat on punitive attitudes was significant and positive in three OLS regression models measuring different perceptions of threat by immigrants. The direct effect of economic insecurity on punitive attitudes was non-significant, but economic insecurity had a significant moderating effect on out-group prejudice and punitiveness in all three models.

Keywords

punitive attitudes group threat economic insecurity Germany

Introduction

The United States has experienced significant increases in punitiveness, or public support for harsh criminal punishment, throughout the past several decades. Given the important role public opinion has in driving criminal justice policy (Ramirez, 2013), studies have explored a variety of predictors of punitive attitudes in the United States. The United States is not alone, however, in taking this punitive turn. Many European jurisdictions found that “law and order” messages resonated with constituents over the same time period (Hutton, 2005). Throughout the world, there is some evidence of increasing dependence on incarceration as a means of crime control (Makin, 2013; Shammas, 2016). This highlights the need to investigate predictors of punitive attitudes outside of the United States. It is unclear whether predictors of support for harsh punishment might vary across culture, as some studies outside the U.S. have found conflicting results. For example, fear of crime and police legitimacy have been consistently found to be associated with punitive attitudes in studies conducted in the United States and Australia (Costelloe et al., 2009; Kornhauser, 2013) while a Russian study found only age and hostility to immigrants to be significant predictors (Wheelock et al., 2011).

Out-group prejudice, whether measured as racial prejudice against a particular group or hostility to immigrants in general, is among the most salient predictors of punitive attitudes (Unnever & Cullen, 2010b). American studies generally measure out-group prejudice in the context of racial prejudice against African Americans (Brown & Socia, 2017; Cohn et al., 1991; Johnson, 2001, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007), while studies in Europe typically measure anti-immigrant sentiment (Cochran & Piquero, 2011; Ousey & Unnever, 2012; Wheelock, et al., 2011), but the relationship appears stable across different contexts. One proposed explanation for this relationship is grounded in group threat theory. This theory was originally intended to explain racial prejudice (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958), but later adaptations (e.g., Quinney, 1977) proposed that one way the majority might respond to group threat is to control out-group populations through the criminal justice system.

A better understanding of this relationship is particularly relevant in Europe today, as increasing anti-immigrant sentiment has been evident throughout the European Union (García-Faroldi, 2017). Right-wing groups running on anti-immigration platforms have been gaining popularity in countries such as France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, and Norway (Rydgren et al., 2013), and if the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and punitive attitudes found in previous research holds, this could propel mass incarceration and growth in the crime control industry throughout Europe.

One of the proposed mechanisms for a group threat response is economic threat, which involves economic insecurity and its impact on the strength of prejudiced attitudes toward out-groups (Isaksen et al., 2016; Kuntz et al., 2017) or support for strict enforcement of immigration laws (Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013). Some research has examined economic threat and its impact on specific punitive attitudes within the United States, namely support for the death penalty (Hogan et al., 2005; Johnson, 2001), but there remains a gap in the literature addressing how economic insecurity may condition the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and punitive attitudes. This paper aims to address this gap, and to further contribute to the limited number of studies examining sources of punitive attitudes in the European context.

Literature

Research on the demographic correlates of punitive attitudes has yielded rather consistent results. Supporters of harsh punishment are disproportionately white (Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Cochran & Chamlin, 2006; Johnson, 2001, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007), male (Applegate et al., 2002; Cochran & Sanders, 2009; Robbers, 2006; Stack, 2000), Protestant (Grasmick & McGill, 1994; Young, 1992), politically conservative (Longmire, 1996; Young, 1991, 1992), and married (Bohm, 2014; Fox et al., 1990–1991). The empirical record is thus quite clear as to how punitiveness is distributed across identifiable social groups.

Another body of research has explored personality characteristics that are predictive of punitive attitudes. Findings suggest that supporters of harsh punishment are disproportionately authoritarian (Carroll et al., 1987; Gerber & Jackson, 2016; Hagan, 1975; McKee & Feather, 2008; Ousey & Unnever, 2012; Stack, 2003) and autocratic (Valliant & Oliver, 1997). Results regarding the relationship between extraversion and capital punishment support are mixed, with some finding a positive association (McKelvie, 1983; McKelvie & Dauossis, 1982; Robbers, 2006) and others finding no significant relationship (Lester et al., 1990, 1997). Several findings suggest people who score high on a neuroticism scale are more likely to support the death penalty (Lester et al., 1990; Robbers, 2006). Lastly, openness (i.e., interest in theoretical and philosophical debate and alternative thinking) and agreeableness (i.e., high levels of interpersonal skill and sympathy) have been found to be significantly and inversely related to support for harsh punishment (Robbers, 2006).

This literature on the correlates of punitive attitudes is relatively well-developed. Why people support harsh punishment for crimes is another matter, however. Given the influence of public opinion on sentencing and other criminal justice policies, identifying the underlying sources of punitive attitudes is crucial. Research on the theoretical mechanisms that give way to punitiveness is somewhat scant. Some scholars have put forward theoretical statements on the likely causes of support for harsh punishment, and there have been a few attempts to empirically test these statements. Below we review a typology of theoretical models created by Cochran and Piquero (2011), Kornhauser (2013), Unnever and Cullen (2010b) and others, as well as the extant research on each. Cochran and Piquero (2011), Kornhauser (2013), Unnever and Cullen (2010b) and others have offered typologies of theoretical models. They identify four general theoretical orientations in the attempt to explain the sources of punitive attitudes.

First, support for harsh punishment may be caused by citizens’ perceptions about the prevalence of crime and criminal justice institutions’ ability to effectively control crime. That is, citizens who feel that crime rates are high and lack confidence in criminal justice institutions’ ability to effectively control crime will be more likely to support harsh punishment. Doing so may mitigate their fear and increase the utility of criminal justice institutions (Simon, 2007; Unnever & Cullen, 2010b; Zimring et al., 2001). Research in this area has yielded mixed results. Some studies show a significant and positive association between punitiveness and the perceived prevalence of crime (Hogan et al., 2005; Soss et al., 2003) and general concerns about crime (Costelloe et al., 2009; Hogan et al., 2005). Johnson (2009) showed that anger about crime could predict support for punitive criminal penalties net the effects of other covariates. Prior victimization and fear of crime has been linked to support for the death penalty (Applegate et al., 2002) and general punitiveness (Costelloe et al., 2009). Conversely, Kleck and Jackson (2017) found that fear of crime had no significant effect on general measures of punitiveness, such as support for longer prison sentences. Some studies have shown distrust of courts is significantly and positively associated with support for harsh punishment (Cochran & Piquero, 2011; Zimring et al., 2001), but not among Blacks (Messner et al., 2006). Other studies have found no significant relationship between trust in the courts and punitiveness, particularly when controlling for other covariates (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010a, 2010b).

Second, the social discontent model posits that puitiveness may be caused by citizens’ concerns over the state of society in general (Scheingold, 1984; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). That is, people may support harsh punishment as a means to maintain social order, security and morality (Gaubatz, 1995; Scheingold, 1984; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010b). Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) tested the social discontent model by exploring sources of support for California’s habitual offender laws. They found that support for these laws was not tied to concerns over rising crime rates or the effectiveness of courts. Rather, they found that concerns over social conditions and moral consensus acted as the foundation for these graduated sentencing policies. Support for this model has also been found in Greece and the United Kingdom (Jackson et al., 2011).

Third, the personal discontent model posits that support for harsh punishment is a response to dissatisfaction with one’s own life circumstances, particularly economic insecurity. That is, punishing criminals harshly may provide a sense of compensatory satisfaction or an expression of resentment and blame for those who are struggling in their personal lives (Greenberg, 1999). Research on the impact of economic insecurity on punitive attitudes has yielded mixed results. Some studies suggest economic insecurity is unrelated to support for harsh punishment (Johnson, 2001; Useem & Piehl, 2008). Other studies have found a significant and positive relationship between economic insecurity and punitiveness, albeit only for particular demographic groups (Costelloe et al., 2009; Hogan et al., 2005). Regarding life dissatisfaction more generally, some studies found being dissatisfied predicts support for harsh punishment (Useem & Piehl, 2008). Cochran and Piquero (2011), however, found that dissatisfaction was negatively associated with punitiveness. They suggested that punitiveness may be a threat response whereby citizens who are generally happy with their life seek to maintain the status quo via harsh punishment for crimes.

Fourth, the group threat and racial animus model posits that punitiveness is a function of out-group prejudice. This model contains the most consistent and robust predictors of punitive attitudes, and the current study explores this model for that reason (Devers et al., 2012; Kornhauser, 2013; Ousey & Unnever, 2012; Wheelock et al., 2011). We thus cover the extant literature on the group threat and racial animus model in detail below.

Group Threat and Racial Animus

Group threat has been measured in the punitiveness literature primarily via racial prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment. Findings show that citizens who harbor negative attitudes toward people of other racial groups or immigrants are significantly more likely to support harsh punishments for crime than those with more tolerant attitudes toward others. This relationship between out-group prejudice and punitiveness has been observed across different methodological designs, geographic locations, and time periods (Brown & Socia, 2017). In fact, racism, particularly White racism, is one of the most robust predictors of capital punishment support among a host of covariates (Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Borg, 1997; Soss et al., 2003; Unnever et al., 2008). In one of the most notable studies on the topic, Unnever and Cullen (2007) explored whether White racism could account for the gap between White and Black support for capital punishment. They found that one-third of the racial divide in support for capital punishment could be attributed to White racism. The association was so robust that support among non-racist Whites was similar to Blacks.

Theoretical explanations of the observed relationship between out-group prejudice and punitiveness commonly involve group threat theory. Group threat theory posits that racial prejudice is a defensive response to perceived threats to the group in power from minority groups. Perceived threat to social standing, economic resources, or other privileges enjoyed by the “in-group” can result in defensive actions to maintain the status quo (Blumer, 1958). Much of the research on group threat and punitiveness focuses on racial animosity toward Blacks in the United States (Brown & Socia, 2017; Cohn et al., 1991; Johnson, 2001, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007). Both symbolic and traditional measures of racism have been found to be related to punitive sentiment (Cohn et al., 1991; Green et al., 2006; Johnson, 2001, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007) even in studies that have found other common covariates non-significant (Johnson, 2001). Studies that have incorporated various other minority groups have also found that animosity toward out-groups is related to support for harsh punishment in the United States (Chiricos et al., 2004; Welch et al., 2011)

There are at least two shortcomings in the literature on group threat and punitive attitudes thus described. First, there is a lack of research examining the relationship between group threat and punitiveness outside the United States. Second, research has yet to systematically test many of the theoretical mechanisms in group threat theory. The group threat framework, which posits that punitiveness is a defensive response to perceived threats from other social groups, implies that other factors may condition the observed effect of perceived threat on support for harsh punishment. We address these shortcomings in detail below.

In the first shortcoming, most of the research on punitiveness, particularly as it relates to prejudice and group threat theory, has been conducted in the United States. It is questionable whether findings in the United States can sufficiently generalize to other countries, particularly due to the tendency among researchers to examine group threat in the context of prejudice toward African-Americans (Ousey & Unnever, 2012). The unique history of United States race relations and the legacy of African American slavery raise the possibility that these findings are uniquely American. Further, many studies of punitive attitudes in America operationalize punitiveness through support for the death penalty, which may not necessarily tap into general punitive attitudes. Johnson (2001) reported that when analyzing support for the death penalty and belief that courts were not harsh enough, these two variables returned very low correlation rates – leading them to the conclusion that these needed to be analyzed as separate dependent variables. It is pertinent to continue to add to the limited knowledge of out-group prejudice and punitive threat response relationships in other parts of the world

To be sure, there have been several notable studies over the past decade that have tried to address the dearth of research on group threat and punitiveness cross-nationally. Cochran and Piquero (2011) tested the generalizability of prior punitiveness research by using Germany as a case study. They identified a variety of factors commonly linked with support for harsh punishment, including anti-immigrant attitudes. Many of the variables that represent significant predictors of punitiveness in prior research were found to be non-significant. Examples include political conservatism, fear of crime, and some demographics, such as gender and marital status. Significant predictors included distrust of the judicial system and anti-immigrant attitudes. Anti-immigrant sentiment was among the most robust predictors of the variation in punitive attitudes in their model. This study did not include race of respondent as a control variable, however. This seems notable given the central role of racial attitudes.

In a similar vein, Kornhauser (2013) tested whether significant predictors of punitiveness in prior research could also account for support for harsh punishment in Australia. To do so, he included a variety of individual variables and coalesced them into four general theoretical models similar to those described above, that is, concerns over crime and trust in the government, discontent with society and social cohesion, personal dissatisfaction with life, and racial animus. They found support for each model except personal dissatisfaction. Of all the variables in their model, the most robust predictor of punitiveness was anti-immigrant sentiment. This study also did not control for the potential confounding effect of respondents’ race.

Wheelock et al. (2011) extended this line of research to Russia. In this study, data from both the United States and Russia were included in different regression models to allow the authors to directly compare the two countries. They found many differences among the factors that significantly predicted punitive attitudes in Russia compared to the United States. They note that, in the United States, punitive attitudes are often linked to education level, political ideologies, and religion. Among Russian citizens, punitive attitudes were largely shaped by age. In both countries, however, perceptions of group threat were significantly and positively associated with punitive attitudes. Furthermore, their findings suggest that the specific type of threat that is perceived is important. Perceived threat to public safety was not significantly related to punitiveness. Perceived threat to economic resources was significant. In explaining these findings, they note that punitiveness is best understood in the context of group threat theory as a “mechanism to alleviate economic-based threat posed by minority groups” (p. 955).

In perhaps the most comprehensive analysis to date, Ousey and Unnever (2012) explore the relationship between macro-level (i.e., size of minority populations) and micro-level (i.e., individual intolerance toward immigrants) group threat concepts in accounting for punitiveness. They argue that, in addition to the lack of research outside the United States, there is a lack of research testing the theoretical mechanisms underlying the group threat framework. To address both shortcomings, they test whether the effect of population size on punitiveness is mediated by prejudice toward immigrants across 27 European countries. They found support for a macro-micro level link in accounting for punitive attitudes. They explain that larger proportions of ethnic minorities at the country level contributes to an increase in negative attitudes toward immigrants, which in turn leads to higher levels of support for harsh punishment. In discussing their findings, they call attention to the need for more research on the theoretical mechanisms by which group threat affects punitive attitudes and that future research “should focus on more precisely measuring whether dominant groups perceive particular out-groups as threatening” (p. 591, emphasis in original). This study also did not include race of respondent as a control variable.

The second shortcoming of the literature on group threat and punitiveness is that, except for the work of Ousey and Unnever (2012), there is no research we are aware of in the literature on punitive attitudes that tests interactions implied by the group threat framework. There are several variants of group threat theory in the research literature, but the common tenet is that people who perceive out-groups as a threat will be more inclined to support harsh punishment for crime as a mechanism to control or mitigate the threat posed by these “others.” What is key to the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis is that the threat posed by out-groups is not necessarily crime or safety (King & Wheelock, 2007; Wheelock et al., 2011). That is, perceived threat is not narrowly defined as the potential of out-groups to commit crimes and victimize other citizens. The group threat framework includes perceptions of threat to a variety of resources. Members of dominant groups may believe out-groups pose threat to their disproportionate control of economic, political, or social power. Threats to any of these resources can trigger punitiveness as a threat response. This framework implies a variety of factors may condition the relationship between out-group prejudice and punitive attitudes. There are a host of factors that may theoretically interact with perceptions of threat to shape punitiveness as a threat response. It’s beyond the scope of this paper to tease out various potential moderating variables. However, there is one conspicuous potential moderator that has been a common feature in punitiveness research – economic insecurity. Considering that punitiveness is best described as a response to perceived economic threats (Wheelock et al., 2011), the extent to which people feel economically secure may condition the group threat-punitiveness relationship.

Extant research on the direct effect of economic insecurity on punitiveness described above in the “personal discontent model” has yielded mixed results. Nonetheless, we contend that it may moderate the effect of perceived threat from out-groups on punitive attitudes in a way that is consistent with group threat theory. Two competing hypotheses regarding how economic insecurity may moderate the group threat-punitiveness relationship can be drawn. In the first, feeling economically secure may mute the effect of perceived threat on punitiveness. That is, perceptions of out-group threat would be less likely to trigger a punitive threat response among people who feel more secure in their current economic situation. Theirs is a more stable condition and thus less susceptible to the treats posed by others. Their counterparts who struggle financially and feel ill at ease with their financial situation stand to be impacted the most by out-group threats. The second hypothesis is that economic security might inflate the likelihood that perceptions of out-group threat triggers punitive attitudes. In this condition, people who perceive out-groups as threatening and who are more financially secure would be most likely to support harsh punishment. The theoretical rationale for this potential outcome is based on the straightforward notion that people who are financially secure have more to lose. Indeed, they are advantaged by the unequal distribution of wealth and economic power, and thus any threat to the status quo is a threat to their privilege and must be controlled. Conversely, those who feel insecure about their financial situation are already constrained and thus the risk posed by out-groups will have a less drastic effect on their lives compared to those who are more affluent.

The study presented here was designed contribute to the literature on group threat theory and punitiveness by addressing the limitations discussed above. Using data from the 2010 iteration of the European Social Survey, we test the direct and interaction effects of perceived threat from immigrants and economic insecurity on support for harsh punishment among German citizens.

Data and Methods

Data for the current study come from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a cross-national survey conducted across Europe biennially since 2001. The ESS samples residents aged 15 and over using strict random probability sampling procedures. Respondents are interviewed face-to-face. Data in the ESS include measures of respondents’ attitudes and perceptions of a variety of social and political issues, occupational and demographic characteristics, and structural and cultural factors. Eight iterations of the survey are currently available. The total number of countries included in each iteration vary from 22 to 31. We selected the fifth iteration of the ESS, administered in 2010, and extracted data gathered in Germany for inclusion in the analysis. This yielded a final sample of 3,031 German citizens. We analyzed data collected in 2010 because it was the last iteration of the ESS that included all the variables of interest in the current study, most notably the dependent variable. Our decision to focus on Germany was based on the following.

First, Germany has comparatively high levels of foreign-born inhabitants relative to the United States, where much of the research regarding group threat has been concentrated. The foreign-born population is estimated to be over 20% of Germany’s total population (Brzoska, 2018) compared to approximately 14% of the United States population (United Nations, 2019). Further, since the survey data analyzed for this paper were collected in 2010, 5 years after Germany relaxed immigration policy (Clarence, 2009), it meets the criteria for testing prior speculation related to group threat being exceptionally strong in areas experiencing an increase in minority groups (King & Wheelock, 2007). This change to immigration policy may be particularly relevant to this study, due to previous research suggesting that perceived immigrant population size is more important than actual size in influencing prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups in Germany (Semyonov et al., 2004). As German population statistics continue to trend toward higher immigrant populations, having accepted the second most immigrants among European countries in recent years (Bertoli et al., 2016), understanding potential consequences to this influx is timely.

Though Germany is not considered to be particularly punitive in criminal justice practice, a test of public support for punitive sentiment can serve as a basis for testing the applicability of group threat theory. It is also of note that while Germany may not be viewed as punitive in criminal justice practice in comparison with other countries, such as the United States, research suggests that Germany has seen a slight increase in punitive practice over time. Harsher sentencing has been observed, with longer sentences for violent crimes and sex crimes becoming more common, and conditions within German prisons have become increasingly focused on security rather than rehabilitation (Kury et al., 2009). As Kury and their colleagues (2009) point out, however, this punitive turn is rather limited as there has been an overall decrease in incarceration in Germany, as well as healthy support for rehabilitative ideals. However, an investigation of group threat theory is particularly important when viewing German prison statistics. According to the World Prison Brief, Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research (2018), the percentage of foreign-born prisoners in Germany was 31.3% as of 2015. For comparison, England, which has a considerably higher incarceration rate, reports only 11% foreign-born prisoners.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a measure of respondents’ attitudes about the punishment of criminal offenders. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement: “People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days.” Responses ranged from “agree strongly” (1) to “disagree strongly” (5). We reverse coded this item so that higher scores represent more punitive attitudes.

Independent Variables

Group threat

Our measures of whether respondents believe out-groups pose threats derive from three items that tap attitudes toward immigrants. The first question asked respondents whether Germany is “made a worse or better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries” (0 = “worse place to live” to 10 = “better place to live”). The second asked whether respondents believe it is “generally bad or good for Germany’s economy that people come to live here from other countries” (0 = “bad for the economy” to 10 = “good for the economy”). The third asked whether respondents believe “Germany’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries” (0 = “cultural life undermined” to 10 = “cultural life enriched”). Responses for each item were reverse coded so that higher scores represent higher levels of perceived threat from immigrants. Since these items tap different perceived threats, each item was maintained as a separate variable.

Economic insecurity

Past research has shown subjective measures of how respondents perceive their economic security are superior to more objective measures of the state of the economy (Kuntz et al., 2017; Wheelock et al., 2011). Thus, the measure of economic insecurity used in the current study derives from a single item that asked respondents how they feel about their household income nowadays. Responses range from 1 = “living comfortably on present income” to 4 = “finding it very difficult on present income.”

Control Variables

We include control variables for the major covariates of punitiveness observed in past research. First, we control for the various demographics associated with punitive attitudes discussed in the literature review. These include age as measured in years, gender (1 = male, 2 = female), household income (measured in deciles), and education (dummy coded for six levels of education). Much of the extant cross-national research on punitiveness has not controlled for race or ethnicity. We were able to do so by including a variable that asked respondents whether they belong to a minority ethnic group (1 = yes, 2 = no).

We also control for social and political attitudes associated with punitiveness. These include political cynicism, measured as respondents’ trust in politicians (0 = no trust at all, 10 = complete trust). A variable for social cynicism is included that measured whether the respondent believes people look out for themselves (0) or mostly try to be helpful (10). To control for political ideology, we include a variable that asked respondents to rate themselves on an 11-point political spectrum from “left” (0) to “right” (10). Separate measures of religious affiliation and religious salience are included. Religious affiliation was measured using an item that asked respondents if they are religious (1 = yes, 2 = no) whereas salience is measured by how often respondents attended religious services (1 = attend services daily to 7 = attend services never). We also include a measure of life satisfaction (scored 0 to 10, higher scores represent more satisfaction). Lastly, authoritarianism was measured by asking respondents to rate their level of agreement using a Likert-type scale with the statement “all laws should be strictly obeyed” (1 = agree strongly, 5 = disagree strongly).

Variables are also included to control for the potential confounding effects of attitudes toward crime and criminal justice. In keeping with past research (see Cochran & Piquero, 2011), two measures are included for judicial distrust and police distrust. Each item asked respondents how much trust they had in each institution (0 = no trust at all, 10 = complete trust). Two variables are included to control for the effects of prior experience with crime and fear of crime. First, respondents were asked whether they or a member of their household had been the victim of a burglary or assault in the past 5 years (1 = yes, 2 = no). Second, respondents were also asked how safe they do or would feel walking alone in their local areas at night (1 = very safe to 4 = very unsafe).

Modeling

The purpose of the current study was to explore the main and interaction effects of group threat and economic insecurity on punitive attitudes. We base our modeling strategy on Ousey and Unnever’s (2012) seminal cross-national study on group threat and punitiveness. They used OLS regression models to explore relationships between independent variables and a Likert-type dependent variable. In the current study, three hierarchical OLS regression models were similarly imposed on the data for the different group threat variables, that is, that immigrants (a) make Germany a better or worse place to live, (b) are good or bad for the economy, and (c) undermine or enrich Germany’s cultural life. In the first step of each hierarchical model, economic insecurity and one of the above measures of group threat were entered as separate variables to measure main effects. In the second step, product terms were created and entered using mean-centered variables for economic insecurity and group threat to measure the interaction effect.

Results

Table 1 presents basic descriptive statistics for the sample. The mean value, standard deviation, and range are provided for each variable.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics.

	Mean (M)	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent variable
Punitiveness	3.66	.977	1	5
Independent variables
Immigration good	5.07	2.26	0	10
Immigration economy	4.89	2.38	0	10
Immigration culture	4.31	2.46	0	10
Economic insecurity	1.88	.76	1	4
Demographics
Age	47.61	18.44	15	97
Gender	1.49	.50	1	2
Income	5.47	2.74	1	10
Education	3.19	1.21	0	5
Minority	1.96	.196	1	2
Social and political attitudes
Political cynicism	3.29	2.20	0	10
Social cynicism	5.01	2.10	0	10
Political ideology	4.54	1.78	0	10
Religion	1.45	.497	1	2
Religious salience	5.79	1.32	1	7
Life satisfaction	7.11	2.15	0	10
Authoritarianism	2.24	8.8	1	5
Institutional distrust
Judicial distrust	5.54	2.46	0	10
Police distrust	6.76	2.22	0	10
Crime
Victim of crime	1.90	2.95	1	2
Fear of crime	2.02	.78	1	4

Regarding the dependent and independent variables, the descriptive statistics show respondents were generally supportive of harsher punishment. On a one-to-five range with higher values representing more punitive attitudes, the sample mean was 3.66. The descriptive statistics do not show the sample as being overly high or low in their perceptions of threat from immigrants. The sample does, however, tend to feel secure in their personal economic situation. On a one-to-four range with higher values representing more economic insecurity, the sample mean was 1.88.

Table 2 presents beta values, standard errors, and t-values for the three hierarchical OLS regression models. Model 1 tests the main and interaction effects of economic insecurity and whether immigrants threaten the quality of life in Germany. Model 2 tests the main and interaction effects of economic insecurity and whether immigrants are a threat to the economy in Germany. Model 3 tests the main and interaction effects of economic insecurity and whether immigrants are a threat to German culture.

Table 2.

Hierarchical OLS Regressions Predicting Punitive Attitudes From Group-Threat and Economic Insecurity.

Step and variable		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3
Step and variable		B	SE	t-Value	B	SE	t-Value	B	SE	t-Value
1	Age	−.009**	.001	−2.79	−.004	.001	−1.78	−.013*	.001	−2.47
	Education	−.101***	.018	−8.12	−.098***	.018	−7.47	−.122***	.018	−8.15
	Minority	−.202**	.107	−3.29	−.194**	.107	−2.88	−.233**	.108	−3.20
	Political cynicism	−.039**	.011	−3.09	−.043***	.011	−3.66	−.056***	.011	−3.63
	Political ideology	.048***	.011	3.97	.059***	.011	4.29	.061***	.011	4.12
	Religion	.116**	.047	2.71	.091*	.047	2.29	.105*	.047	2.28
	Authoritarianism	−.177***	.023	−7.79	−.174***	.023	−7.80	−.181***	.023	−7.73
	Judicial distrust	−.074***	.011	−6.04	−.072***	.011	−5.92	−.079***	.011	−6.30
	Police distrust	.055***	.011	4.93	.055***	.011	4.91	.064***	.011	5.37
	Fear of crime	.128***	.027	4.40	.156***	.027	5.01	.138***	.027	4.58
	Economic insecurity	.046	.033	1.03	.048	.033	1.31	.064	.033	1.35
	Immigration good	.100***	.010	9.31
	Immigration economy				.109***	.009	8.68
	Immigration culture							.094***	.009	7.14
	R ²	.212			.208			.197
2	Product term	−.036*	.011	−2.41	−.039*	.011	−2.08	−.046***	.010	−4.02
	R ²	.213			.209			.202
	F-value		27.237***			27.269***			25.588***

Note. Control variables that were non-significant in all three models are not included in this table. These are gender, income, social cynicism, religious salience, life satisfaction, and crime victimization.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Results show the main effect of group threat on punitiveness was significant and positive in all three models. That is, believing that immigrants are a threat to the economy, culture, and quality of life in Germany are associated with support for harsher punishment for crimes. Conversely, the main effect of economic insecurity on punitiveness is non-significant in all three models.

Regarding the interaction of group threat and economic insecurity, the product term showed a significant albeit modest effect. This holds true for all three models that measure different perceptions of threat. These results suggest that although economic insecurity has a non-significant direct effect on punitiveness, it does have a significant conditioning effect on the impact of perceived group threat on punitive attitudes. However, the R-squared scores in all three models show that a modest amount of the variation in punitive attitudes can be explained by the interaction of the independent variables.

A second stage of the analysis was to illustrate the nature of the interaction between group threat and economic insecurity in accounting for punitive attitudes. The charts in Figures 1 to 3 show the relationship between perceived group threat and punitive attitudes for different levels of economic insecurity. These results show virtually the same conditioning effect of economic insecurity across all three types of perceived group threat. Specifically, there is a clear and positive relationship between perceived threat and punitiveness for those who were living comfortably, coping, and finding it difficult on their present income. This holds for perceived threats by immigrants to the quality of life, economy, and culture in Germany. The major distinction lies with the fourth category – those finding it very difficult on their present income. For these most economically insecure respondents, the relationship between perceived group threat to quality of life and the economy, and punitiveness was muted. In the model for perceived immigrant threat to culture in particular, the relationship between group threat and punitiveness was practically non-existent.

Figure 1.

The interaction between immigrant threat to quality of life and economic insecurity.

Figure 2.

The interaction between immigrant threat to the economy and economic insecurity.

Figure 3.

The interaction between immigrant threat to culture and economic insecurity.

Discussion

This study contributes to the small body of research regarding out-group prejudice and punitive attitudes outside the United States. Though there are exceptions (Cochran & Piquero, 2011; Ousey & Unnever, 2012; Wheelock et al., 2011), much of the literature regarding punitive attitudes and out-group prejudice has focused on prejudice toward African Americans in the United States (Brown & Socia, 2017; Cohn et al., 1991; Johnson, 2001, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007), and further understanding of this relationship in the European context is timely given that increasing anti-immigrant sentiment has been evident throughout the E.U. (García-Faroldi, 2017). Given the dearth of research in this area outside the United States, a discussion of the findings for the covariates in the current study is warranted.

Many of the predictors of punitive attitudes in the extant literature were significant here as well, such as fear of crime, education, age, and minority status. However, some of the findings reported here conflict with past research. Gender, for instance, has been a significant demographic predictor of punitive attitudes, especially among studies that have measured support for the death penalty (Cochran & Sanders, 2009). Gender had a non-significant relationship with punitiveness in the current study. This could be due to a variety of contextual factors given that much of the existing research was conducted within the United States. Outside the United States, gender has had a non-significant effect on punitiveness in studies utilizing German (Cochran & Piquero, 2011), Australian (Dodd, 2018), and Russian samples (Wheelock et al., 2011). Thus, the relationship between gender and punitiveness may be geographically dependent. These findings may also be due to potential differences between predictors of support for general punitive measures and support for the death penalty as shown by Johnson (2001). Studies in the United States more commonly use support for the death penalty as a measure of punitiveness compared to studies outside the United States.

The current study also sheds light on the relationship between race and punitive attitudes in the European context. The findings showed minority status was a significant predictor of punitive attitudes. As Ousey and Unnever (2012) point out, a significant limitation to many studies that analyze European survey research is the data do not often include racial/ethnic variables. To be sure, some studies outside the United States have included minority status. For example, Peshkopia and Stephen Voss (2016) found ethnic minorities in Albania to be less likely to support the death penalty than members of the majority. The relationship between race/ethnicity and punitiveness does, however, remain an understudied topic in the European context. Our findings suggest that race and ethnic status is a relevant demographic predictor of punitive attitudes outside United States’ samples.

The few studies that have examined the relationship between economic insecurity and punitive attitudes have found conflicting results, with some finding a negative relationship between economic insecurity and punitive attitudes (Lehmann & Pickett, 2017), some finding a positive relationship only among White men (Costelloe et al., 2009) or minorities (Hogan et al., 2005) and others finding no relationship (Johnson, 2001). The findings reported here could help explain the lack of consensus regarding economic insecurity and punitiveness in the existing literature. The results of the current study show economic insecurity does not have a significant direct effect on punitiveness. Economic insecurity did have a significant conditioning effect on the relationship between group threat and punitiveness, however. These findings provide a potential explanation for the lack of consensus among extant studies. The mixed results observed in past research may be due to economic insecurity having highly dependent effects on attitudes toward punishment. Here we find that economic insecurity interacts with perceptions of threat by immigrants. It seems plausible that economic insecurity may interact with a host of other variables in shaping attitudes toward harsh punishment for crimes.

The significant interaction between perceived immigrant threat and economic insecurity also lends support for group threat theory. One of the potential mechanisms for threat response in the literature, economic concerns, was found to condition the threat response. Further, these findings held across all measures of anti-immigrant sentiment—questions that asked about perceived cultural, economic, and overall threats by immigrants to the country. The similarities in the conditioning effect across all three measures suggests that economic insecurity conditions the relationship between threat and punitive response regardless of the particular nature of the threat.

The findings also describe the nature of the conditioning effect. The graphs provided show the conditioning effect operates primarily among the most economically insecure respondents. Perceptions of immigrant threat are positively associated with punitiveness among the three groups who were more secure in their present income. However, this relationship is muted among the most economically insecure, for whom immigrant threat and punitiveness are not related. It could be that this is finding indicates those with the least to lose are least concerned with immigrants as a potential economic threat and, therefore, no punitive control response is warranted. Further research may need to take an intersectional approach to investigations of group threat theory, taking both class and race/ethnicity into account. There is also the potential that those with the most uncertain economic situations are fundamentally different from other groups in some way. They may, for instance, not perceive the criminal justice system as a tool at their disposal for controlling out-groups due to their own place within the majority-group hierarchy.

One intriguing possibility lies within the theoretical framework of contact theory (Allport, 1954). Researchers have found a significant wage gap between native born Germans and immigrants in Germany based on data collected from 1994 to 2015 (Ingwerson & Thomsen, 2019). It could be that those with the least economic security are most likely to be in regular contact with immigrants. Contact theory proposes that interaction between majority and minority group members reduce prejudice levels provided that these interactions occur in certain conditions, namely that the contact is voluntary, with the participants somewhat equal in socioeconomic status, and that the contact is taking place in a cooperative rather than competitive environment (Allport, 1954). Given that immigrants are less likely to obtain full time work and more likely to work contract jobs (International Labor Organization, 2016) it is possible they are more likely to have work contacts with others who are economically insecure. The work environment is one which the stipulations of contact theory may best apply, as regular voluntary contact with immigrants of similar social status is likely to occur and cooperative efforts are certainly needed at work.

Group threat theorists have posited that in times of economic turmoil, anti-immigrant sentiment would increase (Quillian, 1995), with some support found when measuring subjective rather than objective measures of economic struggles (Kuntz et al., 2017). Our research suggests that the threat response may not come in the form of criminal justice control for those who feel most economically insecure, however. Future research might apply contact hypotheses to further investigate the finding that those who perceive their financial situation as dire were less likely to link immigrant threat and punitiveness. Measures could be included to determine, for instance, the demographics of respondents’ workplaces or friendships with minority group members to test if this does in fact relate to reduced prejudice or punitiveness.

Though this study makes significant contributions to the literature surrounding punitive attitudes, it is not free from limitations. One notable departure from Cochran and Piquero’s (2011) analysis of punitive attitudes in Germany is that the dataset used in the current study did not allow for separation of East and West Germans in the sample. Though previous research has found significant differences between East and West Germans regarding attitudes toward crime and justice (Albrecht, 2008; Cochran & Piquero, 2011), our findings show that the relationship between punitiveness and group threat holds among the full sample. Another limitation of the ESS dataset is that there is no distinction made between feelings toward non-E.U. and E.U. immigrants, which could contribute additional insight. Stansfield and Stone (2018) suggest that this could be an important distinction in researching attitudes toward immigrants in England, as there may be additional hostility toward immigrants from outside the E.U. Further research should aim to include this distinction when possible. Furthermore, the low R-squared scores in all three models show that the interaction of the independent variables in the current study can explain only a small portion of the variation in punitive attitudes. Future research is needed to provide a more comprehensive account of punitiveness.

The findings of the current study offer several general policy implications. First, our findings show that public opinion of criminal punishment is based, in part, on prejudice. Sentencing policies and trends should be extricated from this prejudice. Federal and/or local governments should consider appointing committees of experts to steer criminal justice policy, particularly those involving sentencing. This may seem undemocratic, but there are precedents for such initiatives, especially in Europe. Many European countries that have abolished capital punishment over the past several decades did so without popular support.

Second, our results show perceptions of immigrant threat do not manifest in support for harsh punishment among those who are least secure in their economic position. We surmised that these results may be explained by proximity, that is, that those with the least economic security will have the most contact with immigrants and their prejudices will thus be less likely to trigger the threat response of harsh punishment. The most logical implication of these findings is to create and support policies that promote diversity and a more equal distribution of wealth and income. There is a seemingly endless array of specific policies that have been proffered to promote racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic equality, and it is beyond the capacity of this manuscript to detail this literature. That said, policies for promoting equality commonly include passing local ordinances or national laws that require employers to pay a living wage, increase social services and jobs programs for the poor, and provide universal healthcare. Some policies to promote equality also include measures to strengthen social capital and local economies in impoverished areas. Such policies commonly involve creating tax incentives to businesses that open in poor communities and redirecting tax dollars to their schools to equalize funding for education. In sum, our findings show that the social and economic distance between more affluent members of society and immigrant classes cause prejudices to trigger support for harsh criminal penalties. Closing these gaps should thus counteract the psychosocial process in which prejudice otherwise translates into punitiveness.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Adam Trahan

Kelly Pierce

Author Biographies

Adam Trahan is associate professor in the criminal justice department at the University of North Texas. He earned a BA and MA in criminal justice and criminology at Sam Houston State University, and a PhD in criminal justice at Indiana University, Bloomington. His primary research interests include capital punishment, punitive attitudes, and diversity issues.

Kelly Pierce is a PhD student at University of Cincinnati. She obtained a BS in sociology and an MS in criminal justice at the University of North Texas. Her primary research interests include punitive attitudes, incarceration, developmental criminology, and prisoner reentry.

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