Abstract
Generation can be seen as a crossroads where multiple socioeconomic influences intersect with individual life courses. Conceptualized as a process, performed dynamically and relationally, rather than a static category, generationing builds self-identities and concepts of how the social order is expected to work. In this article the authors ask how the multilayered processes of generationing, as experienced by those in mid-life, are affected by the shock of the 2008 economic crisis in the United States and in Canada, two countries very differently touched by the crisis. The US has suffered greatly with home foreclosures, bankruptcies, continuing high unemployment and spreading poverty. Canada, by contrast, has had negligible levels of home foreclosures, few bankruptcies and lower unemployment. The data are qualitative interviews conducted specifically with those in mid-life in working and middle classes in comparable medium-sized cities in the two countries, from fall 2008 through spring 2010. The authors’ findings suggest that the shock of the economic crisis has deeply transformed the lives of those in the middle of generations and all those whose lives are linked to theirs, as well as the processes of generationing, particularly in the US, with implications for families, for societal cohesion and social order.
Generation can be seen as a crossroads phenomenon, where multiple socioeconomic influences intersect with individual life courses and opportunities (Biggs, 2007; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Mannheim 1997 [1952]; Ortega y Gassett, 1963–1969). Research on the impacts of economic shocks often look at effects on individuals, cohorts or nuclear families, but less often on the processes of generationing, the ways in which we do generation in extended families and societies (McDaniel, 2004). This can be misleading about impacts on particular generations because the linking of lives is not considered (Biggs and Lowenstein, 2011; Biggs et al., 2011). As a relational process, generationing builds our self-identities, our concepts of how the social order works and provides meanings in our lives. Generationing processes mesh well with a life course perspective that sees human lives developing relationally over time, with linked lives and society mutually influential (Bengtson et al., 2002).
Here, we ask how the mid-life generation in particular and the multilayered processes of generationing, as perceived by them, are affected by the 2008+ economic crisis in the US and in Canada, two countries very differently touched by the crisis. We rely on in-depth structured interviews with individuals in mid-life (age 45–64) in two socioeconomic classes (working and middle class) in comparable medium-size cities in the two countries. Our specific focus is on how those in mid-life, caught in the demands of older and younger generations, see generationing processes affected by the current economic recession. Our interest is not in comparing the effects of the Great Recession on different generations. Instead, our interest is in how those whose lives are situated between and linked to younger and older generations may be differentially impacted, in ways not seen previously. Interviews were conducted from fall 2008 when the housing bubble burst and financial markets in the US began to crumble, through spring 2010. This is a period in which the economic crisis deepened, affecting more people, and spread beyond the housing and financial sectors in the US to affect jobs and threaten entitlements such as pensions as well as life savings, and indeed to affect the world economy.
Context and literature review
The 2008 global economic crisis is seen by many analysts as the worst and deepest downturn in the post-Second World War era (Elsby et al., 2010; Leicht and Fitzgerald, 2006). The effects have been sharply felt in the US as well as in Europe, Latin America, in parts of Asia, still struggling to recover from the 1990s crisis, and in Africa. This study focuses specifically, however, on the US and Canada. A record rise in long-term unemployment resulted in persistently high numbers of chronically unemployed workers, still plaguing the US (Kalleberg, 2009, 2011). Housing foreclosures skyrocketed, with streets and sometimes entire neighbourhoods left like ghost towns. Poverty and inequality, already high in the US relative to other OECD countries, worsened (Hacker, 2006). Canada, as is shown in Table 1 and as we discuss below, was far less impacted.
Canada and the US in the Great Recession.
Sources: Statistics Canada and US Federal Reserve.
Our theoretical framing relies on two pillars in sociology: the life course perspective and structures of social inequality. The life course perspective, increasingly popular in sociology, sees human experiences, both individual and societal, as part of larger sets of processes extending from birth to death. 1 Life course patterns are affected by social structures and changes as well as by human agency, as Riley (1979) and Elder (1974) point out. New life course patterns are created by social change and, in turn, create social change.
Here, we see the life course perspective as a tale of path dependency, gravity and shocks (McDaniel and Bernard, 2011). Path dependency is evident in findings that early transitions into adult statuses, e.g. having children early, beginning work with limited education, experience life-long adverse circumstances (O’Rand, 1996). Those who enter adult statuses later with more resources, experience less life course adversity (Mayer, 2004, 2009). Path dependency makes early life course transitions hard to overcome.
Gravity is the power of social disadvantage (unequal access to resources, living in poverty, marginalization) to pull individuals down regardless of their efforts to make good life choices, consistent with Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) reproduction of advantage and disadvantage. Escaping the pull of gravity with enabling contexts such as education is possible but not always likely, as Bourdieu points out. As inequalities increase and enabling contexts shrink, gravity takes a greater toll on life chances.
Shocks, either individual or societal, can strike unexpectedly and affect anyone. Resources, preparation and social supports can help to weather shocks. With the economic crisis of 2008 as deep and long-lasting as it is, the potential exists for transformative life course impacts, such as those that occurred in the Great Depression (Elder, 1974). The consequences of the current economic crisis as a life course shock interests us here, with particular focus on how those in mid-life experience and perceive shifts in generationing with those with whom their lives are linked. Our focus is on the generational transformative life course impacts in comparative context, as perceived by those in mid-life. We are not focused here on the comparative effects of shocks on different generations, which would be a different study.
Interest in the effects of economic crises and long-term unemployment on individuals and societies has a long history in sociology. The Marienthal study of an unemployed town is a classic (Jahoda et al., 1933; Neurath, 1995). Prolonged unemployment left people no longer utilizing opportunities, with the entire community affected. Recent Eastern Europe experience with economic crisis is related to reduced life expectancies (Cockerham, 1997). The Asian Tiger economic woes in the early 1990s (see Yu, 2010), and the Argentine economic crisis of 1999–2002 (Fiszbein et al., 2003; Leccardi and Feixa, 2011) have been deleterious for individuals and societies. Seldom has research focused on how generational relations are impacted and transformed. Even more seldom has the focus been on the perceptions of those in mid-life caught in the multiple processes of their own ageing, and the demands of younger and older generations. More often, impacts of shocks on different generations are compared and contrasted, which is not our focus in this study.
The structures of inequality have long enticed sociologists, with early interest in class broadening to include disadvantage, family structure, gender, ethnicity and race (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Recently, interest has turned to the inequalities associated with immigration status and disability. Receiving less attention is inequality by age or generation. Age and generational relations may be increasingly important to social inequality in times of economic challenge (McDaniel, 2008; McMullin, 2010) as a result of the path dependency effects over life courses. Little is known about generational processes when shocks affect generations differently but lives are linked, so that the effects felt in one generation touch others. It is found, for example, that the young have been particularly affected by economic downturns, but less is known about how those in mid-life, with lives linked to young and old, are affected.
Generational ‘equity’, which cohort benefits or not from public transfers (Kotlikoff and Burns, 2004), has been promoted, largely in the US. Critiques of generational accounting suggest that its focus on the intergenerational misses intra-generational inequities by class, race, or immigration status (Williamson and Rhodes, 2011). The focus on public transfers overlooks other intergenerational exchanges. Generation and cohort, Williamson and Rhodes (2011) suggest, is an overlooked dimension of inequality.
Canada and the US experienced the economic crisis of 2008+ in sharply different ways. While the US suffered greatly, in Canada, the recession was barely felt. Reasons for this are beyond the scope of this article. The contrasting experiences of two neighbouring countries (see Table 1) yields a natural comparative design. In 2008 as the crisis hit in the US, Canada was the only country among six peer OECD countries where growth occurred (Conference Board of Canada, 2011). Unemployment, which has hovered around 10% in the US since 2008, excluding rising numbers of discouraged workers, has been 6% in Canada (Conference Board of Canada, 2011). The biggest differences are those which affect people’s lives on the home front. While the US experienced significant numbers of bank failures, millions of home foreclosures and even more millions in mortgage arrears and ‘under water’ in their homes (drops in housing prices leaving homeowners owing more on their homes than the homes are worth), Canada sailed through without a single bank failure, very low rates of foreclosures, few homeowners in mortgage arrears and no drop in housing prices. Two very different worlds emerge for Americans and Canadians in this economic recession.
Differences are particularly striking if we compare those in mid-life in the two countries. In Table 2, it is shown that although unemployment is lower among mid-lifers in the US than in Canada, labour market participation is higher in Canada. Huge contrasts are apparent among those in mortgage arrears and in changes in home foreclosure rates.
Mid-life people.
Source: Trawinski (2012).
Source: Bank of Canada (2011).
The depth of economic challenges in the US is further evidenced by tracking the effects of the economic recession from November 2008 to 2010 (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010). Thirty-nine percent of American households had either someone unemployed, negative equity in their homes, or were in arrears on house payments. On average, expectations about stock markets and housing were pessimistic, particularly long-run expectations. Among the employed, fears of unemployment have lessened somewhat since 2008 but remain considerable.
Methods and data
For this study, we focus on mid-life Canadians and Americans (age 45–64), in working and middle classes, from fall 2008 through spring 2010. Our interest is in those in the middle of life courses, linked lives and generationing processes, rather than on comparative analysis of how different generations are faring. Our respondents were recruited in two comparable cities in the two countries (see Table 3).
Our sample cities in 2008/2009.
This is measured differently in the two countries, so are not exactly comparable.
Both cities are located centrally in each country and in 2009, had metropolitan area populations nearing 750,000, comparable unemployment rates, and minority populations of 12–22%. Median household income in each city was relatively comparable (US$58,000, CAN$64,000). We did purposive sampling of respondents in middle- and working-class neighbourhoods in each city. We located middle-class respondents through speakers’ clubs in higher income neighbourhoods in both cities. Working-class respondents were recruited at drop-in and community centres in lower income neighbourhoods. 2 Characteristics of our respondents are summarized in Table 4.
Respondents.
Initial contact with potential respondents was made in person by the researchers or research assistants at the community centres or speakers’ club meetings to explain the study, answer questions and discuss the ethics of participation. Telephone interviews were pre-arranged with interested respondents at those meetings. Creating this initial rapport was integral to our ability to conduct the in-depth structured interviews by telephone, with the informed consent of the respondent. Our choice to conduct telephone interviews was deliberate and corresponded with our use of a structured interview guide designed to collect demographic information and respondents’ reflections through both closed and open-ended questions. We asked about household and family structure, general health and well-being of themselves as well as younger and older relatives, personal and household income, exchanges of instrumental and emotional support with other generations, and expectations of their own future well-being and income security as they age, as well as the relative prospects for their younger and older generations. Because we established rapport with respondents prior to the phone interview, we see no negatives associated with our mode of data collection.
Our interviews ranged from 60 to 150 minutes. We digitally recorded the interviews and transcribed them verbatim. Using NVivo software, we undertook an inductive analysis of the interview data with major themes emerging across respondents’ accounts. Here, we use pseudonyms to maintain confidentiality. In total, we interviewed 15 Canadians (9 middle class, 6 working class) and 17 Americans (11 middle class, 6 working class). We make no claims that our findings are generalizable to classes or countries.
Findings
In the analysis, dominant themes emerged from the interview data: respondents’ concern about security in later life, relative comparisons of generations in their later years and intergenerational support for younger generations and older generations.
Uncertain future: Insecure later years in the Great Recession
Both Canadians and Americans in mid-life in our interviews express worries about their later years in light of the current economic situation. US respondents are particularly concerned. Except for two middle-class respondents who are financially secure, respondents in our research are not sure whether they can retire when planned. Other recent research confirms this (AARP, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Zick et al., 2012). The economic recession has created huge uncertainty and insecurity around retirement funds and employment security for our respondents.
Insecure employment is also a serious concern. Among our respondents, three men (a middle-class American, a middle-class Canadian and a working-class Canadian) had been laid off in the past year (see note 2). One working-class American man mentioned that his wife had lost her job too. At the time he was laid off, Ronald, a 48-year-old middle-class Canadian, was not worried because he believed that he would find another job quickly. However, after months of unemployment, he began to worry about his retirement. When looking to the future, he considers that ‘it might be a possibility that I simply don’t retire’.
Even among the employed, fear of job loss is one of the biggest concerns among our respondents, particularly Americans whose health insurance is tied to their employment. Many express uncertainty about whether their jobs will continue until retirement: I’ve got a lot of time invested but can never be overconfident. I feel secure but not totally secure. Comfortable, but not totally relaxed. I can lose my job tomorrow just like anyone else. (47-year-old working-class American man)
As more employers contract out, reduce work hours and benefits and lay off workers, especially in lower paying services and manual labour jobs, working-class respondents express high anxiety. This is consistent with the findings of Kalleberg (2011) as well as Leicht and Fitzgerald (2006).
The economic downturn means deep concerns about financial preparedness for retirement. Our interviews reveal that retirement prospects are distinctly classed: middle-class people are relatively confident, while working-class respondents are scared. Middle-class Canadian and American respondents mention preparing for retirement through saving and investing in Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) in Canada and 401Ks in the US, paying off mortgages, contributing to employer-based pension plans and doing home renovations. Canadian middle-class respondents are relatively optimistic about retirement. Eric, a 54-year-old middle-class Canadian with a good pension, is developing hobbies for his retirement. Another middle-class Canadian in her late fifties is looking forward to retirement and is renovating her house for a live-in caregiver, if need be.
The economic situation puts growing pressures on the future financial security of our mid-life middle-class respondents in Canada, with generationing implications. Increasing living costs and decreasing investment returns are among their biggest concerns. For instance, although Debra has been putting money into RRSPs for 30 years, she is not confident about her financial readiness for retirement: We’ve tried our best. Whether it’s going to be the way we want it, we don’t know. I don’t know how long, how great it [her retirement savings] is going to be. It depends how much everything goes up and how much you’re going to make on your investments and that kind of thing, so those things are variables, you know? (57-year-old middle-class Canadian woman)
American middle-class respondents express much deeper pessimism about their country’s economy and their retirement. In addition to job insecurity, increasing living costs and decreasing returns on investments, American middle-class respondents express specific worries about housing price declines, health care costs and whether Social Security will be there for them. Compared to their Canadian counterparts, American middle-class respondents more often expect to have to delay retirement. Robert, for example, in his early fifties, fears that he will not be able to retire ‘because the costs of living versus resources available, [retirement] won’t be adequate’. Lori, mid-forties, explains that she has no expectation of having ‘golden years into retirement’. Although Lori and her husband have retirement savings, recent stock market losses makes them uncertain about their later years, and wondering if they may have to rely on their children.
Working-class people are much less financially prepared for retirement and are more concerned. When asked about retirement, working-class respondents in both countries say they take it ‘one day at a time’ or ‘from paycheck to paycheck’, with no extra money to put aside. They are ‘scared’ or ‘not confident at all’ about the future even though retirement is something they dream about. Tracy, a 63-year-old Canadian caretaking coordinator, wants to retire from her current job, which requires her to get up at 4:30 a.m. to start her shift at 6 a.m. When asked about retirement, although she has ‘a fear of unknown’ because of her finances, she excitedly describes her retirement dream: I’ve got it marked on my calendars how many months left I’ve got. Ah visiting my family more often, staying longer on my visits. I’ve got a son in [a smaller nearby city] and two daughters in [rural area in another province], a sister in [a large city], so yeah, [I’ll] travel. (63-year-old working-class female Canadian)
Working-class respondents are very concerned as well about their physical ability to work as they age. They are worried about their ‘body breaking down’ (51-year-old working-class American man), which they know will reduce their employment possibilities. For working-class respondents, both men and women, delaying retirement is anticipated yet their physical ability to stay on the job is a huge concern: [My husband] and I both have physical jobs, wearing on us, [I am] exploring career change before I’m too old to be competitive in the job market. (48-year-old working-class American woman)
Are we better or worse off? Comparing the anticipated later years of older and younger generations
A key innovation of our study is to ask respondents how they see their own later years relative to those of their older relatives at present, and the anticipated later years of their younger relatives. This reflects how people do generationing, and how their perceptions of relative well-being across generations from past years into the distant future connect them to aspirations across generations. The findings are revealing. Canadians and Americans we interviewed in mid-life differ substantially. We also find class differences.
Working-class respondents in both countries report that they will be financially worse off than their older relatives are now. Among American working-class respondents, their parents’ generation is seen as privileged with better opportunities for good jobs, affordable housing, workplace pensions and dependable government programmes, including Medicare/Medicaid and Social Security: [My parents] have had a pretty good life and things came pretty easy for them . . . they lived in a time when there seem to be more opportunities. . . . My parents were considered as middle class and we aren’t exactly where they were. (48-year-old working-class American woman)
Canadian working-class respondents, on the other hand, have more mixed views. Some expect to be financially worse off than their parents, and express concern about the economy and diminished social programmes. Others are more optimistic about their future. Interestingly, the optimistic respondents are immigrants. Andrew, for example, an immigrant whose parents remained in their home country, comments that ‘Canada has a much better [system] than the third world countries so I think I’m fortunate so far and better than them.’ Matthew, a university graduate, also an immigrant but with parents living in Canada, thinks he will be more fortunate than his older relatives as he grows older: The way I see it myself as more educated and I can read and I have interest in reading, going out, going to the gym, you know, so these activities will give me more versatile time. I can spend my retirement the way I want and my parents don’t have that. Because for them they can only listen, watch TV but [in] their own language. For me that is not a problem. (53-year-old working-class male Canadian)
Middle-class American respondents show more confidence than working-class respondents that they will be in better positions in their later years than the preceding generation. Middle-class Canadian respondents, in contrast, show similar mixed views on their later lives relative to their older relatives as working-class Canadians. Nancy, for example, explains that her uncle and aunt invested well and live next to their daughter, who provides support whenever they need it. However, she still expects that she will be better off than her older relatives because of her financial preparedness and healthier lifestyle: We just do more with our lives. They don’t do much with their lives . . . it’s just a whole way of living um we travel um we just are more knowledgeable on so many levels, especially with technology the way it is. Um . . . financially we’re better than they were so we do more things. (56-year-old middle-class Canadian woman)
Nancy’s generation is seen by her as both living in a different sociohistorical moment, and engaging more with the life course ageing process.
‘Active ageing’ is mentioned frequently by our mid-life respondents in both classes and both countries. They believe that their human agency – active and healthy lifestyles including healthy eating, regular exercise, openness to new experiences – will make their later years qualitatively different, even though they might be financially worse off than their parents. Such attitudes, they believe, will contribute to this generation’s more enjoyable later years, even as the economy suffers. This may well be the hope that they can master their own futures.
With respect to the younger generation and how they will traverse their life courses, mid-life Canadian and American respondents both raise serious concerns, especially about the financial insecurity of younger relatives. Although middle-class respondents express worries, working-class respondents have great fears about their children’s futures. Working-class American respondents in particular express high anxiety when asked about whether their younger relatives would be better or worse off than they are in later years. They see shifting economic and political contexts as unfavourable to younger generations, including the economic recession, diminishing social programmes, lack of good jobs and workplace pensions. Although to a much lesser degree, Canadian working-class respondents share concerns about how the changing economy and diminishing public programmes will challenge younger generations’ futures even though they try to prepare, and the mid-lifers try to help. As Andrew says: It’s going to be really harder, tougher for [children’s generation]. I don’t think they’ll be as fortunate because I think things deteriorate. Programmes like I mean, financially, financial programmes, they’re always cutting back so they might not be that fortunate. I think the younger generation might have to save more for their retirement and not depend on [a] government programme. (55-year-old working-class Canadian man)
Interestingly, the more optimistic Canadian working-class respondents about their children’s future are again immigrants, who expect that their children’s later years will be better because ‘they are young and they have their whole future in front of them’ (Craig, 54-year-old working-class male Canadian). Canadian immigrant respondents more often hold onto the promise of a ‘better life’ in their own and their children’s future, even in economically challenging times. The shock of the economic crisis for Canadian immigrants is mitigated by their confidence in their own agency. They also have more cohesive generationing processes, which we explore in the next section.
Middle-class American and Canadian respondents share working-class respondents’ anxieties about the younger generation’s future. While some respondents are optimistic about their children’s future because of their education and values, others raise anxious voices when talking about the younger generation’s life course prospects. Michael, a 55-year-old American with two daughters, is one of those. The highest earner among our respondents, Michael considers himself as in ‘the top 1–2%’ and has been assiduously preparing for his retirement by saving, investing and building a second home in Mexico. With respect to his children, however, he is not at all confident about how they will do as they age: It’s a black hole – it’s very concerning, we have a dysfunctional government. They [younger generations] are getting less health care, it’s more costly, their jobs are dead-end. . . . Most companies will hire and fire at will, they tend to abuse the newbies and over-pay executives in a grandiose fashion. . . . It’s a pretty disturbing environment, I look forward for our daughters, it’s not a pretty sight. (55-year-old middle-class male American)
Distrust in government, high anxiety and insecurity about health care and Social Security are revealed by American respondents in both classes. American respondents express open hostility towards government, particularly when reflecting on the future of the next generation. As Brenda, a 53-year-old working-class American, puts it: ‘I have no faith in government no matter who is in office.’ Other middle-class American respondents express huge concerns about both government and economic challenges as the younger generation ages: It is a mystery. There are too many variables as far as how the government helps us with health care and we’re going to have to teach the kids not to rely on [their] employer because our economy is going away from being stably employed by one employer for your entire career. (45-year-old middle-class American woman) I’d be concerned about them [my children]. I’m very concerned about how the government is managing social security and health and its 40 years out impact [i.e. long-term viability]. Their long-term prognosis is something I’m more concerned about than my own. (54-year-old middle-class American man)
Health insurance concerns Americans most when considering their own and the younger generation’s later years. Given employer-based health insurance in the US, Americans rely on being employed in good jobs with benefits, and when older, having access to Medicare. American respondents are obsessed with worry about health insurance in the face of job losses. As one middle-class respondent sums it up: ‘continuing to work [is] not only for income but for [the] group health insurance plan’. With the prolonged shock of a challenging economy, along with precarious employment, mid-life American respondents are highly anxious about whether their health insurance will continue and whether Medicaid for those with low income and Medicare for those above 65 will still be available to them. They are even more pessimistic that these will be there when the younger generations reach their later years. Although a couple of American middle-class respondents favour ‘less government’, American respondents, on the whole, support public health insurance and Social Security. This is one example: I know we didn’t pay for people’s health care in the past, but our society has changed to a point where it needs correction to re-evaluate needs to make us a country that is productive and caring for one another to an extent that is reasonable. Now it is more backbiting and more difficult. (62-year-old middle-class American woman)
Canadian respondents, by contrast, strongly believe (and hope) that universal public health insurance will continue as they and as the younger generation age. A number of respondents express concern, however, that coverage might be reduced. As Canadian respondents describe it, universal health insurance is taken for granted by Canadians. It is ‘just so much part of our culture’ (57-year-old middle-class Canadian woman). Many Canadian respondents show pride in the health insurance system in Canada, while contrasting it with the American system.
Canadian respondents’ concerns for their future ageing centre around sustainability of pensions and changing eligibility for Old Age Security. 3 Working-class Canadian respondents express fear about the government’s plan to increase the minimum age of eligibility, and reduce benefits. Andrew, a 55-year-old working-class Canadian, worries whether support programmes for seniors will be there when he reaches retirement age since the government is ‘cutting back on everything’. His future, he says, depends on the sustainability of old age programmes. Although Canadian respondents all also mention concern about public programme cutbacks, they are, interestingly, more likely than the American respondents to see the current economic crisis as the problem, specifically increasing living and housing costs, than the government per se.
Generationing through difficult transitions
Family is the centre of financial, emotional and instrumental support for all American and Canadian mid-life respondents regardless of class, age, gender, or marital status. Generations are interdependent in giving and receiving support at difficult life course transitions. The processes of generationing emerge clearly in the interviews. Canadian and American respondents in mid-life provide significant financial support to younger generations but rarely receive such support from younger or older relatives. At the same time, mid-lifers are deeply worried about their own later years. Many working-class American respondents report that as a consequence of the economic recession, they receive help from their own and their spouse’s siblings or same-generation relatives.
In future financial difficulties, all respondents expect to receive support from family, younger, older and same generation. Only a few expect to receive help from friends or colleagues. Financial generational support is from those in mid-life to their adult children, and instrumental support flows from those in mid-life both down to younger generations and up to older generations. Our findings suggest that Canadian and American mid-life respondents, as givers more than receivers of support, are ‘pressed and stretched’ in generationing to help their adult children and elderly parents (McDaniel, 2012), even while they are deeply worried about their own later years. This suggests that generationing processes may contribute to dragging multiple generations down as they try to help each other, even when the helping generation may themselves be in trouble as they age. Embeddedness in generationing has impacts on those in mid-life, even if they themselves are not directly impacted by the shock of the economic recession.
Co-residency of adult children with their parents is a common pattern in our research, consistent with recent growth in multigenerational households. The trend of young adults living with parents (Parker, 2012) has accelerated with the economic crisis, particularly in the US, with numbers increasing from 46.5 million to 51.4 million between 2007 and 2009. The increase among those aged 25–34 living in this type of household outnumbered any other age group. In 2010, 21.6% of young adults lived in multigenerational households, up from 15.8% in 2000 and 11% in 1980. Among our respondents, multiple generation co-residency is common among both middle-class and working-class American respondents. Of course, some children may be minors given the age span of our mid-life respondents. Canadian respondents, however, of similar ages are less likely to live with their children.
Co-residency of generations can provide temporary shelter at difficult life course transitions. Laura, a 51-year-old working-class American, provides support for her son who is recovering from a serious car accident, for example. Although her son’s monthly income is higher than hers, she provides shelter, food, utilities and groceries so that her son can ‘walk out of here debt free, medical bills gone. . . [and] be able to function as an adult’.
Returning to the parental home during a life transition, such as work relocation, schooling, or union dissolution, helps adult children financially and emotionally. It can offer a refuge for those who have a parental home to which to return. Eric, a 54-year-old middle-class Canadian, for instance, housed his adult daughter and son-in-law for a year after they married. When they moved, Eric provided the down payment and continues to support the young couple and their baby.
Intergenerational co-residency has become routine, however, for many adult children in the US and Canada who delay finding their own homes. Many European countries also see delayed launching among young adults (Ward et al., 2006). In addition to longer education and training prior to entering the labour market, rising housing costs, unemployment or precarious employment, and reduced access to social protection benefits reinforce the reduced independence of young adults (Youth Forum, 2004). Parents typically do not ask for rent or contributions for food from their adult children. Canadian and American mid-life respondents of both classes report helping adult children with tuition fees and living expenses. Especially working-class respondents experience economic strains from supporting their adult children. Andrew, in his mid-fifties, has four adult children, and three of them still reside in their parents’ house even though all are employed. One of his sons lives in a different city where he is in medical school. Andrew describes the financial burden of paying tuition and living costs for his adult children: I’ve been helping my kids with their tuition to go to school; living expenses and you know different things. I provide food and room and board for them and you know, they’re adults. . . . I’m always dishing out money for phone bills and stuff like that. . . . And my son I’ve been paying his tuition in med school every month, you know. So it’s just been taking quite a bit of strain on our family. (55-year-old working-class Canadian man)
Mid-life parents are often the sole financial contributors to their children’s early adult transition, even after they move out of the parental home. Nancy is a middle-class Canadian whose three children all moved away from home. Although two of her children are now financially independent, she is still provides support for her daughter who lives in a larger city where she is struggling: I have a daughter who lives in an expensive city like [a big Canadian city] (laughs) who still hasn’t gotten . . . the job she wants in her career and therefore cannot afford all her expenses so we have to help her with the rent and things like that, schooling and different classes she takes. (56-year-old middle-class Canadian woman)
As more children delay taking a job and gaining financial independence from parents, they stretch the mid-life generation, which may compromise their own later years. During the recession, household debt rose to a record high level in both countries with American household debt-to-income ratio reaching over 160% and Canadian over 140% by 2009 (Lascelles, 2011).
Middle-class parents provide financial support to adult children in extensive ways. While children’s education costs, rent and basic living expenses are commonly supported by both working- and middle-class parents, middle-class parents more often give their children extra financial support which enhances their life course chances. A number of our middle-class respondents indicate that their generationing includes help to younger generations with house purchases. Greater middle-class Canadian intergenerational support with a home purchase may explain why fewer middle-class Canadians co-reside with their adult children. For some middle-class parents, inheritance is another way of transferring their privilege to the younger generation. While concerned about their own uncertain future and that of their children resulting from the shock of the economic recession, several middle-class respondents express hope that their inheritance will provide their children with a more secure future as they age. As noted earlier, Michael, a 55-year-old middle-class American, is seriously worried about the potential negative impact of the current economy and political situation on his daughters’ future. To help his daughters prepare for their later years, he plans to leave as much inheritance as possible to them: ‘My only hope for my kids is that I can give them enough money to get them going. That’s [a] pretty sad commentary.’
Grandparenting is another dimension of generationing. Ronald and Carol are two Canadian respondents who currently provide regular babysitting for grandchildren: Ronald (48-year-old, middle-class) and his wife babysit their daughter’s infant once a week. Carol (56-year-old, working-class) babysits her grandchildren every second week. Anticipatory generationing in grandparenting was also found. Cheryl’s (56-year-old, middle-class) two children are not yet married, but she anticipates providing childcare for their future children. Unlike Canadian respondents, no American respondents mention grandparenting when describing their intergenerational support.
Co-residency of mid-lifers with older generations is rare for both Canadian and American respondents. Only one Canadian respondent (immigrant) lives with his older mother in a three-generation household, with his wife and three adult children. Other respondents’ older relatives live independently or in retirement homes. Among those with living parents, our mid-life respondents report that their parents live where their siblings or extended family members are located. The siblings or other family members then provide instrumental support while our respondents tend to provide emotional support. Only one female Canadian respondent (immigrant) mentions that she provides financial support to her mother in a different country.
As older generations age, a number of respondents anticipate demand for more hands-on support. Providing daily living and personal care or housework for older generations is significantly gendered, as extensive previous research has found. While female respondents more frequently provide instrumental support to older generations, largely in response to deteriorating health, male respondents are more likely to provide support through regular phone calls, visits, or advice. When older generations experience lessened physical mobility, their mid-life daughters or daughters-in-law help them. Lori, a 45-year-old middle-class American, is concerned about her mother since her father is an alcoholic. When her mother had joint surgery, she took her to hospital and cared for her when she came home. Some respondents report providing intensive personal care for their ageing parents in their last years. Eric, a 54-year-old middle-class Canadian, is the only male respondent who reported caring for his older parents. He describes his family’s involvement in care provision for his dying mother as filling in gaps in decreasing care programmes: My mother required 24-hour care and there was a point when my dad had to go into the hospital. . . . They were already at the maximum for homecare and so we had to fill in the blanks. And then she got so worried about my dad going in the hospital, it killed her. There are limits to homecare and then after that you’re going to have family help.
More female respondents report providing care intra-generationally as well, such as for a spouse, aunt, sister, sister-in-law, during difficult times when they need help. Carol is a 56-year-old Canadian mother of one with her mother in a different country. She sends money to her mother and provides ongoing support to her 82-year-old aunt in the same city. Carol checks on her to ‘make sure that she’s OK, that she’s in the apartment and that she’s OK and didn’t fall down’. Like Eric, she comments on her aunt’s limited homecare and the need for extra help from family: ‘She has homecare now, [but] whenever she has a problem . . . whenever she’s not there they call and say we have to go, you know, find her.’ Cuts to ancillary health services have deepened in the economic recession, as governments plead poverty.
Mid-life Canadian respondents express worry about diminishing social/community support. More middle-class than working-class respondents point to the need for better services for older people, including affordable seniors’ housing, transportation, homecare, meals on wheels, caregiver support and emotional/social support. American respondents less frequently comment on the need for community services. Only two middle-class American respondents, although highly sceptical about the possibility of having more public programmes given the economic recession, mention that these would be helpful. American respondents, while relying on familial support, have few expectations about support beyond basic health and social security programmes, which they fear losing. When asked what kind of public support she would like, Tammy, an American middle-class woman in her early sixties, comments: ‘Just that I would like to be assured that when I get to that age that Medicare will still be there.’ Brenda, a 53-year-old American working-class respondent, shares her anxiety: ‘They [the government] are not ready to do more. Who knows what the government will be able to do? They might take Social Security totally away.’ Our interview data suggest that for Americans more than Canadians, the economic crisis has resulted in fears of losing existing government programmes as they age. As they and their governments face deep economic strains, mid-life respondents restructure their generationing to cope.
Discussion and conclusion
We set out to ask about how the multifaceted processes of generationing, as seen by those in the middle of linked lives, are affected by the shock of the economic recession of 2008+ in two neighbouring countries with differing experiences of the recession, in two socioeconomic classes. Our objective is to focus on those in the middle as they look upward and downward generationally, to past and future generations. Our goal is to take an in-depth look at life in the middle of generations in the Great Recession. Our sample is small and not generalizable statistically. We see our findings, however, as having a resonance across countries as intergenerational families attempt to cope with the shock of the global economic crisis.
We focus our analytical lens on how generations connect across and within by generationing, which can result in generations not affected directly by the recession being affected indirectly by their linked lives. Alternatively, generations seriously impacted by the shock of the economic recession, particularly middle-class youth, may be insulated by the processes of generationing. Working-class youth are far less insulated by generationing processes, thus widening existing inequalities further.
Our generational life course analytical approach is innovative in allowing us to examine prospective and retrospective life courses of generations, as perceived by, and linked with, those in mid-life. We examine generational processes in linked lives contextualized sociohistorically, with the past shaping life courses of older generations, the present in shaping anticipatory ageing of those in mid-life, and the future in projecting life courses for younger generations.
We find generational disjunctures, even as generationing processes work to connect and lift up middle-class generations impacted by the economic crisis. This is vivid throughout our interviews, but particularly apparent for younger middle-class generations in the US who are helped considerably by generational transfers. Deep concerns are raised by those in mid-life about younger generations for whom support other than generational is diminishing. Mid-life respondents work hard to mitigate the effects of the economic recession on younger generations, even when they themselves worry deeply about their own futures. Not surprisingly, working-class mid-life respondents report the greatest fears for themselves as they age, and for younger generations. They have added worries about the demands of physical work as they age. Middle-class mid-life respondents also experience impacts on generationing processes as they lose jobs, savings, investments and sometimes their homes. Canadian mid-life respondents appear like a shadow of Americans – less hard hit by the recession, but still very worried about the future of themselves as they age, about younger and older relatives and about generationing processes. The exception is Canadian immigrants, who hold out hope that they and their children will have brighter futures than older generations.
The implications of our findings are many. The US mid-life working class show the opposite of attenuation of economic vulnerability, as found in Europe (Vergolini, 2011), as a result of the 2008+ economic recession. Instead, economic vulnerability appears to be deepening as generations rely more on transfers of financial, instrumental and emotional support, either by mid-lifers to younger relatives, or among mid-life peers, i.e. intra-generational transfers. The generational compact of each generation working hard for the benefit of younger generations seems to be falling apart, most apparently in the US. Older generations, for whom concern is often expressed, are actually doing better than mid-life and younger generations. This is the case both for working- and middle-class respondents.
Our findings hint that the biggest concern across class among our mid-life respondents is for the precarious life courses of young generations as they age. In the immediate term, the later life prospects of those now in mid-life do not appear good, partly because they are heavily supportive of youth. Although healthier than older generations, the mid-life respondents we interviewed feel they will be more insecure and more embedded in generations as they age. Working-class mid-lifers are of particular concern as the negative impact of the economic crisis, as a life course shock, is likely to negatively shape their later years.
Generationing processes are found to work on two levels. The first is transfers from mid-lifers to younger generations, which seem more generous in Canada than in the US. This could be a function of the differential impacts of the recession in Canada, leaving mid-life Canadians with more resources. Mid-life Canadians express anxiety and worry, however, about their ageing. Among the US mid-life respondents, more ‘huddling together’ of adult children with mid-life parents is reported, which may be a function of uncertain housing markets, labour markets and the future generally. Second, generationing manifests in more reliance on families as risk insurance as state supports diminish, particularly in the US. Our findings suggest that universal health care and other social programmes help mid-life Canadians better weather the recession. Given limited public support, the shaky economy makes generations of American families more interdependent.
The exception to changing generationing processes are immigrants in both countries, whose reference point for weathering the economic shock of 2008+ seems to be the home country, where circumstances are much worse. Their relative optimism and willingness to invent new life courses for themselves and their younger relatives shine through.
Our study’s qualitative approach limits the generalizability of our findings. We attempt instead to take a more in-depth look with our two-class/two-country sampling. Future research could examine more closely the effects of growing inequalities on beliefs in concepts such as intergenerational mobility or that hard work will pay off for future generations. Life course choices as generationed, shaped by expectations about older and younger generations, are also subjects for future research.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This is a substantially revised paper initially presented at the ISA Forum of Sociology, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1–4 August 2012. We thank the Canadian Embassy (Washington, DC) as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding support. We thank our research assistants Kendra Monk and Jennifer Givens who helped enormously with the research. We also thank Cheryl Athersych for research assistance. We particularly thank respondents who took the time to share their lives with us. All names here are fictionalized to ensure confidentiality. We are also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers and the editor, Eloisa Martin, for their helpful suggestions.
Funding
The research was supported by a grant from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, DC while the lead author was on faculty at the University of Utah, 2007–2009. A subsequent phase of this research is now funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant #410-2010-0814).
Notes
Author biographies