Governing Turkey’s information society

Abstract

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French

This article analyses the information society developments in Turkey. Utilizing analytical insights of Foucault’s governmentality to move beyond state-centric approaches and to focus on the practical, productive and imperfect operations of power, it identifies four main actors of governance through which the rationalities and practices of information society are developed and disseminated: the Justice and Development Party, the European Union, global development organizations and information society experts. The article demonstrates that despite their different and sometimes competing backgrounds and projections, each actor promoted neoliberal governmentality and maintained that Turkey’s information society strategy should be regarded as an opportunity for further liberalizing the economy and mobilizing citizens of Turkey with digital and entrepreneurial skills. While Turkey’s information society strategy has certain technical inefficiencies and limitations in its reach, it clearly demonstrates the political ambitions of integrating Turkey into global capitalism, and the contemporary governmental phase in Turkish modernity in which local and global actors have started playing important roles. Such decentralization of governance does not mean that authoritarianism in Turkey has ended. In fact, neoliberal rationalities have intersected with the existing authoritarian ones to produce globalized yet compliant citizens who are under digital surveillance. The case of Turkey demonstrates that rather than being a linear process, governmentality advances through complex local and global articulations and may coexist with authoritarianism and surveillance.

Keywords

Authoritarianism governmentality information society neoliberalism Turkey

Introduction

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey has witnessed an accelerated development of information society initiatives. While some researchers have focused on the implications of these developments for increasing national welfare (Arifoğlu, 2004), bringing e-democracy (Uçkan, 2003) and enhancing the surveillance capacity of the state (Topal, 2005), others have studied managerial/technical problems faced in the implementation (Naralan, 2009), the role of international organizations (Yıldız, 2007) and the dependency relationships they impose (Geray and Özdemir, 2011). However, little attention has been paid to the ways in which the rationalities and technologies of information society have developed to direct the governance of citizens of Turkey.

This article utilizes the analytical insights of Foucault’s governmentality to move beyond monolithic approaches to the Turkish state and to analyse information society developments as the ‘conduct of conduct’, or as the practices that attempt to shape the behaviour of citizens from a distance. While politics in modern Turkey has conventionally been analysed with reference to the military-bureaucracy elite who controlled the state and directed the modernization process from the top down (Kasaba, 2008: 2), the developments during the last decade, where local and global actors have begun to exert a powerful influence over Turkish politics, suggest that a new multi-level approach is required.

Governmentality analysis, with its emphasis on the practical, productive and imperfect aspects of power, offers analytical categories for understanding the interactions among the diverse actors who shaped the information society policies of the Turkish state. First, in contrast to state-centric approaches, governmentality focuses on the practical and complex interactions among state and non-state, local and global actors through which specific forms of knowledge are developed and particular techniques are employed for governing the conduct of individuals. Understood in this way, the activity of ‘government’ is not solely a state monopoly, nor is it simply imposed by global governance institutions; rather, it is dispersed among multiple actors, including individuals themselves (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 2007, 2008; Rose and Miller, 1992). This emphasis on subjectification ties in with the second aspect of governmentality analysis, in which power is understood as productive rather than coercive. That is, rather than repressing individuals, power operates by making citizens responsible for their own governance (Foucault, 2008; Rose, 1999). Finally, contrary to the omnipotent readings of power, governmentality analysis takes into account the imperfect, contingent and contested aspects of power (Foucault, 1977, 2002 [1972]).

In this article, I demonstrate how in Turkey actors from local, global, public and private contexts – mainly the AKP, the European Union (EU), global and private development organizations and information society experts – make up an assemblage whereby the rationalities of information society are developed and directed for the purposes of governing citizens of Turkey. I argue that these rationalities are underpinned by neoliberalism, which on the one hand aims to restructure the economy and the state according to free-market norms, and on the other hand attempts to shift the responsibility to individuals. The neoliberal reconfiguration of society urges ordinary citizens to develop digital skills so that they can cope with the powers of globalization by themselves, without requiring assistance from the state. However, the fact that such rationalities have developed does not mean that they have fully succeeded. Contrary to much governmentality scholarship, the case of Turkey demonstrates that the establishment of governmental rationalities has only been partial. Equally problematic in this context would be to regard authoritarianism as incompatible with neoliberalism – an assumption widely shared in the literature (Walters, 2012: 71–73). The case of Turkey demonstrates how neoliberalism merges with existing authoritarian rationalities where citizens are expected to be not only entrepreneurial but also submissive.

My claims are based on an extensive review of state policy documents, strategy plans and audit reports; reports produced by the EU, global organizations¹ and national NGOs;² reports, meeting transcripts and meeting videos of national informatics-related gatherings;³ and other publicly accessible material such as announcements, speeches and newspaper reports. These materials were acquired between 2007 and 2012 from the website of the Information Society Department (BTD) and websites of the other involved institutions. Printed materials were also collected from the library of the Informatics Association of Turkey (TBD). In total, 37 reports, 16 complementary materials (government circulars, project websites, meeting video records) and numerous newspaper reports, speeches and announcements were reviewed. Fourteen of these reports were prepared by the State Planning Organization (now the Ministry of Development) and its unit the BTD; six by the EU; five by global development organizations; and 12 by the national NGOs and informatics-related initiatives. Most of these materials were produced between the early 2000s and 2012.

This article is divided into three main sections. First, the article develops the analytical framework for understanding how information societies are governed through practical, productive and imperfect operations of power. Second, it examines the context of Turkey from this angle, paying particular attention to the role that internal and external actors have played in building and governing Turkey’s information society. The final section concludes by stressing the need to develop alternative ways of thinking about and acting upon the information and communication technologies (ICTs) in Turkey, beyond the existing arrangement.

Governmentality and information society

Much has been written about the information society. Theorists have studied its characteristics through the lenses of post-industrialism (Bell), post-Fordism (Harvey), post-modernity (Lyotard), simulation and hyper-reality (Baudrillard), network society (Castells) and surveillance society (Lyon), among others. While each theory has made important contributions to the understanding of a particular aspect of the information society, Castells’s network society thesis has established itself as the main reference point in the literature with regard to the impacts of ICTs on globalization, the economy and state governance. Castells’s main claim is that the ICT revolution has led to the rise of the network society, which operates through a globally connected, flexible, knowledge-based economy.

According to Castells, the emergence of the networked economy has had a major impact on nation-states. Under the pressure of globalization, nation-states now have little say about welfare distribution or monetary policies, which are, to a large extent, globally determined. However, as Castells reminds us, this should not mean that state interventions in the economy have disappeared. What we see is, rather, a new way of intervening that is aimed at ‘connecting the nation to the global context’ and ‘adjusting domestic policies to the imperatives of global competitive pressures’ (2010: 316).

Although Castells demonstrates the macro-level techniques of states in the information age, his analysis does not pay much attention to the processes whereby these techniques are developed by multiple institutions and directed towards the micro-level production of subjectivity. In the contemporary context, not only the technological but also the cultural visions of states are being shaped by the interactions among institutions at the local and global levels. Rather than epochal arguments on network society, I argue that the practical interactions among diverse institutions that make up the network, and their competing or compatible visions of societies and subjectivities, should be taken into account – moving beyond technological determinism and focusing on the complex interactions between technology and culture. I propose that the governmentality approach, with its emphasis on the practical, productive and imperfect operations of power, could shed new light on the study of how information societies are governed.

First, governmentality prioritizes the study of practices of power over theories of power. While theorists studied the emergence of information societies with reference to changes in modes of production, effects of globalization or innovations in ICTs, governmentality utilizes a ground-level approach and focuses on the heterogeneous processes through which the rationalities and technologies of the information society are developed and directed to govern individuals. This emphasis on practice opens the way for understanding ICT governance not simply as a state activity or as something imposed by globalization but as a complex and decentralized process ‘exercised … through a profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, social life and individual conduct’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 174). So, rather than presenting meta-theoretical claims about the nature of the ICTs (whether they opened up a new era; whether it is globalization, modes of production, technical innovations or cultural values that trigger their development; whether they produce technocratic societies or e-democracy, etc.), governmentality focuses on the practical and multi-level aspects of governance that shape ICT developments.

Second, the Foucauldian understanding of power as productive rather than coercive is central to the analysis – for governmental rationalities and practices can only succeed to the extent that they mobilize a kind of subject, who has a certain level of autonomy so that he/she can undertake the activities of self-government by himself/herself (Foucault, 2008). This is most obviously the case in contemporary neoliberal regimes where individuals are expected to become active, self-entrepreneurial agents who organize their lives through continuous investments in their human capitals. A number of studies have demonstrated that today the shrinking role of the state in providing social security goes hand-in-hand with establishing the legal framework for free-market competition and production of entrepreneurial subjects, through which responsibility is being shifted from the state to individuals (e.g. Cruikshank, 1999; Ilcan, 2009; Rose, 1999). Neoliberalisation is, therefore, not the end of government; rather, it is the dispersion of the activity of government throughout society, via the mobilization of entrepreneurial subjects. Now the individual, not the state, becomes responsible for risks such as poverty, crime, unemployment and illness.

Taken together, the focus on practical and productive aspects of power demonstrates how information society discourses and practices develop via the activities of multiple actors of governance on the one hand, and produce entrepreneurial subjects, equipped with the latest digital skills, on the other. This analysis also enriches the critical scholarship in this field, which, to a large extent, either criticizes the digital divide or highlights the intensification of surveillance. While these critical studies are important in demonstrating the effects of information society policies on different groups, they offer limited analysis of the multiple facets of governance that operate through and within different agencies and subjects. The dissemination of neoliberal values via information society techniques cannot simply be explained by the capture of key institutions by neoliberal experts or as a form of ideological domination imposed by the global ruling elites. What is happening is the diffusion of an ethico-political rationality, developed by diverse yet connected actors, aimed at organizing citizens around certain ethical ideals and providing them with certain pathways for new ways of being in the information society.

It is, however, important not to regard these governance attempts as totalized or completed, for their success is usually partial. This ties in with the third characteristic of the governmentality approach put forward previously: the operations of power are imperfect. Contrary to the somewhat popularized reading of Foucault as a theorist of omnipotent and uninterrupted power,⁴ Foucauldian methodologies in fact point out that regimes of governance are not only historical, but also marked by discontinuities, interruptions and mutations (Foucault, 1977, 2002 [1972]). While these regimes may present themselves as omnipotent, even natural and eternal during certain periods, history is full of failed attempts at governance. This understanding of power has obvious implications for resistance, for it invites us to seek alternatives beyond the existing governance regime.

Despite all these creative ways of thinking that the governmentality approach introduces, and despite its call to focus on the contextual and contingent manifestations of power, the governmentality literature is still westo-centric (Walters, 2012: 68–70). Indeed, Foucault’s own analysis focuses only on European history and briefly on postwar USA. Much of governmentality scholarship, too, has analysed western contexts (Bröckling et al., 2011: 10).⁵ While these studies have made important contributions to understanding how techniques of power operate, little emphasis has been placed on the complex ways that governmentality advances through local and global articulations.

The case of Turkey demonstrates that rather than being a linear process, governmentality advances through complex and sometimes competing interactions among local and global actors whereby issues as diverse as the local articulation of religion (Islam) and the activities of global development organizations could have an effect. Equally important in this context is not to regard such government attempts as finalized or fully successful. The gap between the political will and actual reality has often been wide in Turkey (due to competing rationalizations, contestations, local/regional crisis or simply bureaucratic inefficiencies), which compels researchers to analyse government attempts with caution.

There is yet another assumption in the governmentality literature that needs to be stressed, one which is defined as ‘liberal bias’ (Walters, 2012: 71–73, cf. Dupont and Pearce, 2001: 132–133). That is, much research on governmentality only emphasizes the productive and decentralized aspects of neoliberalism and understates the authoritarian aspects of governance. This oversight is surprising, given the great deal of authoritarianism exercised over minorities and working classes in the West. In reality, neoliberalism always bears an authoritarian potential for certain groups. This has been obviously the case in Turkey where large-scale authoritarianism exists under a neoliberal format (see e.g. Gambetti, 2009). While neoliberal-decentralized models have begun to establish themselves in the economy, the authoritarian tradition in Turkish politics also continues and usually gets reinforced by the ongoing security approaches to the Kurdish question,⁶ Islamization of the society and curtailment of social and political rights. Despite some improvements in the last decade, the restrictions on civil society and pressures on the working classes and dissidents (who may at certain points include groups as diverse as Kurds, leftists, journalists, unionists, environmentalists, students or ordinary citizens voicing their dissent, usually all categorized as ‘terrorist suspects’) persist (see e.g. Amnesty International, 2012: 341–345).

Governing Turkey’s information society

Inspired by the global ICT revolution, Turkey’s information society policies were introduced in the 1990s and developed through interactions among global and local actors. The first ‘know-how’ was provided by the World Bank in its 1993 report, which was followed by the National Informatics Infrastructure Main Plan in 1997. In 1998 the E-Commerce Coordination Council was established to promote e-business, and the Public-Net Council was established to develop network infrastructure in public institutions. However, due to political and economic instabilities which culminated in the 2001 economic crisis, the information society policies could not be properly implemented during this period.

It was only after 2002, with the AKP forming a single-party government, that information society developments gained momentum in Turkey, with more concrete outcomes. Although Turkey had already joined the e-Europe+ Initiative in 2001 as a candidate country, the harmonization of Turkey’s ICT strategy with that of the EU began in 2003 with the launch of the e-Transformation Turkey Project. With this development, the EU began to exert a strong influence over Turkey’s ICT policies. Turkey’s follow-up strategy plans in 2004, 2005 and 2006 largely followed the EU standards of information society. The foundation of the Information Society Department (BTD) under the State Planning Organization in 2003 was another turning point. The BTD began to coordinate the information society strategy policies at the highest level.

During this period, alongside the EU, the influence of global and private development organizations was also evident. The OECD (2007) provided guidance and auditing services, and the Peppers & Rogers Group was involved in designing Turkey’s 2006–2010 Strategy Plan. No less significant in this context was the influence of national civil society organizations and industry associations. These entities had continual contact with the government officials and public sector ICT specialists at such venues as the annual National Informatics Assemblies, KAMU-BIB (Public Information Technology Managers Union) meetings and informatics conventions. Moreover, representatives from these organizations participated as advisors at meetings of the e-Transformation Turkey Executive Committee, from 2003 until the committee’s deactivation in 2009. The committee was the highest level policy-making, assessment and steering body for information society strategies.

At the time of writing, the BTD has identified future development themes and selected McKinsey Consulting Firm to prepare a substantive plan that will last until 2020. Like the previous ones, this plan will take into account the ICT policies of the EU and other international organizations (such as the OECD) as well as the suggestions of national informatics associations when defining the specific action items (Ministry of Development, 2012: 23; TBD, 2012).

Transforming ordinary citizens of Turkey

The 2006–2010 Information Society Strategy is the most comprehensive plan developed so far. There are a total of 111 action items structured around seven main themes: social transformation; ICT adoption by businesses; citizen-focused service transformation; modernization in public administration; a globally competitive IT sector; competitive, widespread and affordable telecommunications infrastructure and services; and improvement of R&D and innovation (DPT, 2006). The plan has neoliberal and global orientations for it prioritizes better integration of the Turkish economy into global capitalism through free-market competition and ICT reforms. Such orientations are also evident in how the plan describes the ideal citizens of Turkey and the ways in which these citizens should be cultivated. For instance, the plan outlines how an ordinary family that consists of ‘1 pensioner, 1 civil servant, 1 housewife and two students’ would be transformed into ‘2 SME owners, one individual entrepreneur and a promising scientist’ by 2010 (DPT, 2006: 57). In literary language, the plan depicts how the father of the family, formerly a civil servant, develops a ‘networked enterprise’; how the daughter becomes the owner of a global company through conducting e-business; how the son pursues his computer science degree, and so on. Similar discourses, expressed in such terms as ‘reaching above the contemporaneous civilization level’ and ‘our young and dynamic people, who are open to new challenges’ (Akparti, 2008) often find their way into the speeches of government officials too.

The ways in which these information society discourses and policies have been put into play share strong similarities with what has been theorized as neoliberal governmentality – understood as a decentralized and productive regime of governance that operates through cultivating entrepreneurial values in individuals so as to make them responsible for their own governance (see Cruikshank, 1999; Ilcan, 2009; Rose, 1999). By adopting neoliberal governmentality, the Turkish state aims to mobilize e-citizens who can actively engage with ICTs. Here the state’s role is either defined indirectly (e.g. providing e-government and e-learning infrastructures and supporting innovation) or defined in a way that would ensure free-market competition (e.g. removing the obstacles to global trade and liberalizing the telecommunications sector). Either way, the main emphasis is on citizens improving themselves, investing in their human capitals and seeking new opportunities.

However, the fact that neoliberal governmentality has established itself at the ideological level does not necessarily mean that it will fully succeed. Here we should remind ourselves of another aspect of the governmentality approach which suggests that regimes of governance might be interrupted or have limited successes. This has been obviously the case in Turkey’s information society policies. The BTD (2010) announced that only an average of 49.65% of the planned projects of the 2006–2010 Strategy Plan were finalized by the end of the 2009. Moreover, the e-Transformation Turkey Executive Committee has not met since July 2009. This creates further doubts about the future of Turkey’s ICT policies (TBD, 2012).

As of 2010, while the ICT adoption rates in businesses (91%) have come closer to the EU-27 average (94%) and the rates in online availability of government services (i.e. e-government, 89%) have even exceeded the EU-27 average (82%), the Internet and computer usage rate among citizens (39%) is still much lower compared to the EU-27 (71%). ICT adoption in public schools also remains low (i.e. approximately one computer per 30 students). In line with the growth in the Turkish economy, the ICT market reached US$25 billion in 2010 and US$33 billion in 2012. However, compared to EU and OECD countries, the significance of the ICT sector in Turkey’s economy remains limited. For instance, the added value of the ICT sector to the private sector in Turkey is 5.5%, whereas the OECD average is over 8%;. Above all, the digital divides also remain. ICT usage is significantly lower in rural areas, among women, among people with low education levels and among unemployed (BTD, 2011; TUBISAD, 2012).

While liberalization of the telecommunications market has been achieved, this initiative has failed to create a competitive environment. In 2008, the European Competitive Telecommunications Association ranked Turkey last among 20 countries based on the level of competition. The broadband connection rates are also significantly lower in Turkey (11.6%) compared to the EU-27 (30%). In the context of research and development (R&D) and innovation, there has been no major progress either. The percentage of R&D expenditures in the national GDP reached 0.85% by 2009, but it was still much lower than the EU-27 average of 2%. The national innovation capacity also remains limited. The EU’s Innovation Union Scoreboard ranked Turkey last in 2011 with a performance index of 0.2, whereas the EU-27 average was 0.5 (BTD, 2011; TUBISAD, 2012).

Therefore, despite the strong momentum in the last decade, Turkey is still far from reaching the goals of a digital-entrepreneurial society. Yet the fact that these governance attempts do not fully succeed should not discount their sociological significance. As the communication scholar Mosco (2004) points out, discourses that overstate the transformative role of technology have always been a central part of national programmes which claimed that ICTs (telegraphs, radios, televisions and finally computers) would revolutionize the world and transform citizens. Even though their reach may be limited, such discourses still represent the political will to organize citizens according to certain ideals in certain periods. In this sense, the contemporary information society initiatives in Turkey clearly mark the political ambitions to integrate citizens of Turkey into global capitalism.

Actors of Turkey’s information society

The rationalities and technologies of the information society in Turkey developed through complex interactions among local and global actors, rather than being simply imposed by the Turkish state. In line with the governmentality analysis that prioritizes the study of multi-faceted and practical aspects of power, below I analyse how local and global actors have interacted to govern Turkey’s information society. I identify four actors of governance: the AKP, the EU, global development organizations and information society experts. While all actors broadly promoted neoliberal governmentality as a productive and decentralized way of governance, they also disagreed on some issues (e.g. censorship and the role of the national ICT sector), which demonstrates the contingent nature of governance.

The AKP

The AKP came to power after the 2001 economic crisis (the most severe economic crisis in Turkey since the 1980s) forming a single-party government in 2002. The party won its third election in June 2011 and increased its share of the national vote to 49.8%. Under the AKP’s rule, the economy has grown and Turkey has established itself as a regional power with regional and global aspirations. The AKP’s ambitious Vision 2023 goals are aimed at making Turkey one of the world’s top 10 economies by 2023.

Since its foundation, the AKP has positioned itself as a party with neoliberal and global orientations in terms of economic policies while having a conservative-Islamic stance towards cultural issues. With this combination, the AKP has differentiated itself from the preceding Islamic parties (such as Refah Partisi, whose understanding of Islam was more local and less market friendly) to become the dominant power in Turkey’s centre-right politics. This combination was driven by internal and external factors. Externally, Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership was a determinant factor. More than any other government of Turkey, the AKP has shown a commitment to Turkey’s EU membership. Although this commitment has been questioned recently due to the reluctance of the EU leaders to support Turkey’s full accession, the EU had a strong influence over the AKP’s neoliberal economic policies (Öniş, 2009).⁷ Globalization was another external factor in orienting the AKP. The AKP has established itself as the only party that ‘can carry on the transformation of Turkey in a globalizing world’ (Keyman, 2010: 315).

Internally, the AKP has championed a new way of Islamism that is in harmony with neoliberal market values (Atasoy, 2009). In this configuration, Islam is regarded as an ethical principle of personal empowerment that helps individuals to become responsible and active agents. In practice, this means that citizens must be empowered by the Islamic virtues of self-discipline so that they can become economically active. This understanding of empowerment – as a strategy for making citizens active and entrepreneurial – shows strong similarities to its articulation in western settings (see Cruikshank, 1999).

In fact, this Islamic ethic has already played a central role in the success of the Anatolian bourgeoisie, by providing a development path outside the state. Unlike the traditional Istanbul-based bourgeoisie, who until the 1980s had strong ties with the state bureaucracy and benefited from the state-led development model, the Anatolian bourgeoisie had loose links with the state. Their success largely depended on export competitiveness. Consequently, the Anatolian bourgeoisie largely developed on their own, through free-market competition upheld by the Islamic virtues of self-reliance (Atasoy, 2009).

In the hands of the AKP, which has close ties with the Anatolian bourgeoisie, this successful combination of Islam with neoliberalism in the context of business practices has turned into a nation-wide political project that is believed to have brought prosperity to the whole country. The AKP’s strong efforts for Turkey’s EU membership can also be understood within this framework. The AKP regarded neoliberal reforms promoted by the EU as opportunities for increasing the competitiveness of the economy and empowering individuals, consistent with the Islamic virtues of self-development. With external support from the EU and internal backing from new entrepreneurs and conservative middle and working classes, the AKP managed to accomplish more free-market reforms than any previous government, and established neoliberal hegemony through mass privatizations, flexible regulation of the labour market, removal of constraints on local and global capital flows, commercialization of public services, and so on. The conservative working classes, in fact, ended up benefiting little from these processes of neoliberalization. But the AKP has succeeded in keeping their consent through philanthropic Islamism combined with neoliberal-Islamic ethic that is centered on individual responsibility.

The AKP’s information society strategy has developed within this framework. Despite the contingent aspects of the plans discussed above, under the AKP’s rule the political will for e-transformation has reached a new level with concrete outcomes. The AKP has employed ICT reforms as tools to fully integrate the Turkish economy into global capitalism, disseminate entrepreneurial values throughout the society, and bring Turkey closer to full EU membership. Adopting neoliberal governmentality, the AKP has aspired to build active, mobile individuals equipped with the latest digital and entrepreneurial skills so that these people can compete with the powers of globalization by themselves while the economy continues to be liberalized. The AKP’s Islamic background, far from being an obstacle, facilitated this orientation. If Islam was a method for self-development, then it was totally compatible with new technologies, which were also tools to empower individuals. President Erdoğan’s speech at the 2003 Informatics Gathering was illustrative of this mentality:

Turkey is a responsive, ambitious country that can adapt to new technologies quickly. Our people, if they do not lose their intrinsic values, can very easily apply these values to the new fields that are opened by technology. (TBŞ, 2004: v; my translation, emphasis added).

The ideal digital citizen for the AKP is someone who is entrepreneurial and global but also somewhat submissive and compliant. Authoritarian characteristics of the AKP’s rule, which were already evident in its other policies, appeared in the field of ICTs too. For instance, in 2011 the government attempted to establish a large-scale censorship filter in addition to the existing practice of arbitrarily censoring selected websites. The scope of this filter was later reduced due to strong opposition from civil society and political groups; but the problems with Internet censorship continue. Censorship and auto-censorship in the media has also intensified (Arsan, 2011), which raises serious doubts about the freedom of expression in Turkey.

Other authoritarian developments included intensification of digital surveillance at many levels. As a result of the government’s counter-terrorism measures, surveillance over (mostly leftist and/or Kurdish) dissident political groups, journalists and civil society organizations has particularly intensified (see, for example, Amnesty International, 2012: 341-345). Space forbids a detailed review here, but examples include surveillance of the Internet and social networking websites, phone surveillance, surveillance with listening devices and surveillance of financial transactions.⁸ The existence of such surveillance technologies as population databases, electronic identity cards, CCTV cameras, drones and other police devices, combined with ongoing authoritarianism and the lack of necessary legal protections and accountability, presents a bleak picture for the future in terms of state surveillance (see Arslantaş-Toktaş et al., 2012; Topak and Topal, 2009). Under constant pressure from the EU, the Turkish government did draft a law on data protection, but it has been pending since 2008. In fact, it is questionable whether even with the law the above stated cases of authoritarian surveillance would disappear, since, as in the EU, the law can be suspended when there is a ‘security threat’. What is more important in this context is to have a democratic definition of what constitutes a ‘security threat’. At a broader level, these developments demonstrate how in Turkey authoritarianism has coexisted with neoliberal governmentality and how it has been resisted (albeit to a limited degree so far).

The European Union

Although Turkey’s accession negotiations to the EU have not progressed much in the recent years, the EU has played a crucial role in the development of Turkey’s information society policies. First, as discussed above, the EU had a major impact on the AKP’s general orientation towards neoliberalism. Second, the EU influence took on a more direct form after Turkey’s enrolment into e-Europe+.

EU information society initiatives started with the EU Commission’s White Paper in 1993, which was followed by the Bangemann Report in 1994. These two papers presented competing approaches. While the White Paper supported a neo-Keynesian model, Bangemann supported a neoliberal one, stressing the importance of the private sector and liberalization of telecommunications. In the end, it was the Bangemann Report that established itself as the hegemonic one, determining the future path of the EU’s information strategies and shaping the Lisbon Agenda and e-Europe Initiative in 2000 (Gómez-Barroso et al., 2008).

Launched in 2001, the e-Europe+ Initiative incorporated candidate countries into the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda. Turkey became a part of e-Europe+ and started to harmonize its information society strategy with that of the EU. Thus, e-Transformation Turkey (2003) and other subsequent plans followed EU standards and were monitored by the EU. Space forbids a detailed review here, but broadly speaking the EU welcomed the technical and neoliberal reforms, but it also raised concerns about the inadequate level of privacy regulations and freedom of expression in Turkey.

EU influence was also exerted through the exchange of ICT policy experts, involvement of Turkey in EU-funded harmonization projects (such as the IDABC) and performance assessments (such as the e-Government Factsheets). These practices operated as ‘technologies of performance’ (Miller, 2001) in that they made Turkey’s information society developments calculable, and therefore governable at a distance. Through calculating and monitoring the performances of member and candidate countries, the EU established the ‘norms’ of the information society and signalled those who ‘deviated’ from these norms. Turkey, whose level of ICT developments was below the EU average, was regarded as ‘abnormal’ and put under close inspection. This inspection functioned as a power-at-a-distance as it pushed Turkey to improve itself to meet the EU criteria.

Global and private development organizations

Alongside the EU, global development organizations (the World Bank [WB] and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) and private organizations (Peppers & Rogers and McKinsey) have been involved in governing Turkey’s information society. In line with Ilcan and Phillips’s argument on global organizations, these entities sought to ‘manage the objects of development, prescribe proper conduct and cultivate active agents and citizens’ (2008: 711). These organizations exerted influence by providing funding, technical and managerial guidance, and monitoring (Yıldız, 2007). The OECD’s (2007) extensive research report is an example of technical and managerial guidance and monitoring. The report documented certain inefficiencies better than internal auditing mechanisms, and is therefore cited by the BTD in its publications. The BTD’s new major plan (2013–2020) will also take into account the OECD standards when defining the action items. The WB, too, in its 1993 and 2004 dated reports, evaluated developments in Turkey and provided recommendations, thus attempting to influence Turkey’s governmentality from a distance. No less significant in this context is the role of private organizations. Peppers & Rogers, for instance, was involved in drafting Turkey’s 2006–2010 Strategy Plan, which was later steered by the BTD. McKinsey was selected to develop the new major plan (2013–2020). The influence of these firms is typical of contemporary development organizations, which use ‘bench-marking’ to compare the efficacy of policies internationally and to establish ‘best practices’ so as to govern from a distance (see Larner and Le Heron, 2004).

The WB’s influence requires further attention here, because in addition to guidance and monitoring, the WB provided a substantial amount of funding at the early stages of Turkey’s ICT developments. Between 1993 and 2003, the WB gave US$2.52 billion, which constituted 40% of the total amount (US$6.3 billion) spent on e-government related projects (Dener, cited in Yıldız, 2007: 48–49). The WB funding had a significant influence, for it depended on meeting certain criteria that reflect the WB’s ideological commitment to the worldwide dissemination of neoliberalism (Woods, 2006). Thus the development strategies that are planned or supported by the WB can be regarded as ‘power/knowledge techniques’ (Escobar, 1995) that aim to regulate how developing countries should proceed within a neoliberal setting. The WB’s human capital building strategies are also aligned with neoliberalism in that they attempt to mobilize entrepreneurial subjects who can cope with the structural problems that neoliberal globalization itself creates. In the context of Turkey, the WB (2004) defended this neoliberal point of view and stressed that information society reforms should be regarded as opportunities to cultivate entrepreneurial citizens, remove restrictions on global trade and so on.

However, the WB’s influence in the early years was reduced later on. While the WB also attempted to impose certain dependency relationships through prioritizing foreign ICT companies over national ones (Geray and Özdemir, 2011), the government of Turkey continued to promote the national ICT sector. For instance, the government announced that the TL7 billion (US$4.5 billion) Fatih Project, which involves the distribution of tablet PCs and electronic white boards to public schools by 2013, would be undertaken by the national ICT sector (Fatih Projesi, 2012).

Information society experts

National ICT-related NGOs and industry associations have played important roles in disseminating information society rationalities in the local context. The TBD (Informatics Association of Turkey), TBV (Turkey Informatics Foundation) and TUBISAD (Turkish Informatics Industry Association) took leading roles in organizing meetings between information society experts (from public and private sectors and universities) and government officials, producing reports and preparing policy suggestions. In 2011, these organizations, together with the Turkish Electronic Industrialist Association (TESID) and Electronic Devices Manufacturers Association (ECID), joined forces and formed the Digital Turkey Platform.

These organizations have had ongoing contact with the policy makers and bureaucrats at various levels and influenced their orientation. In addition to their involvement as advisors in the e-Transformation Turkey Executive Committee from 2003 until its deactivation in 2009, the TBD’s annual National Informatics Assemblies and Kamu-BIB meetings have been particularly influential. Out of the 111 action items in Turkey’s 2006–2010 Information Society Plan, 77 were first presented at Kamu-BIB meetings and 98 mirrored the discourse of the TBD (TBD, 2007: 33–34). In his speech at the 2012 National Informatics Assembly, the director of the TBD pointed out that the macro-policies related to informatics in Turkey have always been first verbalized at their meetings. In his speech to the assembly, the Minister of Transport and Communication confirmed that the government takes into account the final reports of these meetings when designing the ICT policies. The director of the BTD added that the new information society plan will be in line with the suggestions of the Digital Turkey Platform as it will place special emphasis on the development of the national ICT sector (TBD, 2012).

What differentiated the information society experts from the government was their liberal-democratic stance towards cultural issues. For instance, they (particularly the TBD and TBV) advocated for better protection of privacy rights and raised concerns about the now abandoned censorship filter. In contrast to global governance organizations, they also placed a strong emphasis on the development of the national ICT sector, and their agenda has significantly influenced the government’s orientation. However, their neoliberal stance was clearly visible in their emphasis on the necessity of free-market competition, flexibility in the labour market, reduction of taxes in the ICT sector and so on. The 2012 report of the Digital Turkey Platform, prepared by information society experts from universities and the private sector, praises the government’s neoliberal economic policies over the last 10 years and its ambitious goal of making Turkey one of the world’s top 10 economies by 2023. The report highlights the government’s successful ICT projects (such as the e-government portal, the Fatih Project and ongoing incentives to promote the national ICT sector), but it also points out the need for a more comprehensive approach in order to fully meet the goals of the information society and Vision 2023 (TUBISAD, 2012).

In this and previous reports produced by information society experts, there is a clear projection of a digital-entrepreneurial society that is to be built through the mobilization of digital citizens. The ‘worth’ of an individual is defined through such traits as interactivity, flexibility and entrepreneurialism, while neoliberal norms of competition and human capital investment are presented as the true ways to achieve personal and national prosperity.

Writing on intellectuals in knowledge societies, Osborne (2004) argues that today intellectuals act increasingly as mediators; that is, they propose practical and innovative ideas for specific projects, rather than seeking to develop big, abstract theories for totalizing political programmes. Information society experts in Turkey largely fit this description. These experts get together to produce practical knowledge about specific technologies and projects. They come from diverse backgrounds – private industry, the public sector and the academy – and so their unity is strategic and project oriented. However, this does not mean that these intellectuals had nothing to do with the production of totalizing narratives about the society. The ways in which these experts project a digital-entrepreneurial society can easily be construed as part of a broader social ordering programme, albeit a quite different one from the social engineering projects that characterize the history of Turkey. Rather than acting like what Bauman (1987) termed ‘legislators’ and trying to over-code the society from the top down, information society experts seek to govern at a distance – through disseminating the norms of the information society and preparing the state, companies and individuals for governmental reforms. Rather than imposing disciplinary grids over society, the experts aim to mobilize citizens who can actively govern themselves based on information society criteria.

Conclusion

This article has examined the information society developments in Turkey. Utilizing the analytical insights of governmentality to move beyond state-centric approaches and to focus on the practical, productive and imperfect operations of power, it has demonstrated that the AKP, EU, global development organizations and national information society experts formed an assemblage through which the rationalities and practices of information society were developed and disseminated. The article has argued that, despite their different and sometimes competing backgrounds and political projections, all of these actors sought to mobilize active, agile subjects via information society reforms and promoted neoliberal norms of free-market competition, flexibility and mobility.

These rationalities eventually found their ways into the Turkish state’s information society programmes, making digitization and entrepreneurialization national projects. While Turkey’s information society programme had certain contingencies and limitations in its reach, it demonstrates the political ambitions of integrating Turkey into global capitalism, and the contemporary governmental phase in Turkish modernity in which local and global actors have started playing important roles. However, the decentralization of governance does not mean that the authoritarian tradition in Turkish politics has ended. In fact, at the hands of the AKP, neoliberal rationalities have combined with authoritarian ones to produce globalized yet compliant citizens who are under digital surveillance. With regards to governmentality literature, the case of Turkey demonstrates that rather than being a linear process, governmentality advances through complex local and global articulations and may coexist with authoritarianism.

The above stated actors of governance, despite their particular differences, have so far largely shaped the direction of ICT policies in Turkey. But there is nothing that necessitates that they will keep on doing so. In fact, by understanding governance as contingent, non-natural and incomplete, Foucauldian epistemologies urge us to focus on alternatives. Although Foucault himself was not clear about what shape these alternatives might take (despite his later call for the development of a new ethics and aesthetics of existence), a complementary perspective developed by Hardt and Negri (2000) indicates that ICTs can support the development of new forms of political subjectivities.

It is not hard to find the relevancy of this argument in the context of Turkey. One example is the Tekel workers’ struggle in 2010. The workers used ICTs to resist flexibilization and privatization, resembling how ICTs have been used by the Zapatistas in Mexico. Another example is the anti-censorship demonstrations in 2011, which showed that many people in Turkey are deeply concerned about their rights to use ICTs freely. Within that context, new civil society associations, such as the Alternative Informatics Association and hacker-activist groups such as RedHack, emerged and began to raise awareness on censorship and surveillance. New alternatives can also develop from ‘inside’. That is, the same ICT infrastructures that are designed for hegemonic aspirations can be utilized differently by people. For instance, the Fatih Project in public schools might foster critical thinking among students rather than making them compliant (albeit multi-skilled). Although oppositional discourses have been largely absent from governance processes so far, these brief examples demonstrate that they hold the potential to challenge the existing paradigm. Rather than resorting to anti-technological or anti-developmental programmes, future research should further address the ways in which these oppositional discourses and practices challenge, interrupt or subvert the present ICT governance regime in Turkey.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

During my employment (2006–2009) at the Informatics Institute at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, I had the chance to informally interact with researchers from technical backgrounds working on e-government related projects, which helped to develop some of my thoughts on these issues. Many thanks to my friends and my supervisor at the Institute. Some of the departure points of this article were first presented in outline form in my MA thesis entitled E-governmentalization of the state in 2009, written at the Department of Sociology at Middle East Technical University, Ankara. I would like to thank my supervisor Çağatay Topal for his initial comments. I also would like to thank Suzan Ilcan, David Lyon, Frank Pearce, the editor and the anonymous reviewers of Current Sociology for their comments on later versions of the article; their insights have helped to improve the manuscript. Finally, I would like to acknowledge with appreciation the BTD and TBD personnel for directing me to the relevant sources and allowing me to use their libraries. I am responsible for the content, argument and any errors of the article.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Author biography

Özgün E Topak is a PhD candidate and instructor in sociology and a member of the Surveillance Studies Centre at Queen’s University, Canada. His research interests include sociology of information and communication technologies, migration and social theory.

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