Diagnosis of the times vs description of society

Introduction

Diagnosis of the times has become a common practice today, it appears. In the wider sense of the term, diagnosis of the times is about identifying cultural traits that characterize our times, predict developmental trends in society or postulate possible or preferable futures. During the past few decades, the practice of diagnosing the times has become widespread both as a specific research area and as a more common practice within human and social sciences and beyond. It has been established as a specific research area notably by the emergence of modernity theory in sociology (Bauman, 1992; Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1991) and the formalization of future studies within business and marketing (Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, 2005). Yet, diagnosis of the times has also become a more common practice as researchers in human and social sciences are normally able, if asked, to diagnose the times by predicting developmental trends of society or cultural trends of the times based on existing research. Even in ordinary life and work life it is not uncommon to be faced with questions such as: ‘Where do you see yourself in five years?’

The assumption of this article is that this preoccupation with questions of today and tomorrow is neither accidental nor a superficial trend in our times. It seems to be a consequence of the acceleration of the pace of change in society in general – from the radicalization of individualization processes to the shift from industrial to knowledge economy in western societies (Florida, 2002; OECD, 1996). The reason is that the pace of change generally challenges existing knowledge and experience, which then become less useful as tools of guiding long-term action and decision-making. In times of change, diagnosis of the times can function as a tool of finding one’s bearings by identifying developmental trends and grasping emerging social and cultural patterns. Today, the acceleration of the pace of change appears to be a global phenomenon and a condition of many societies, for example and not least the emerging markets. As far as that is the case, the type of knowledge provided by the diagnosis of the times ought to be increasingly relevant for most societies today, even though the trends and patterns to be diagnosed may differ according to the society in question. Diagnosis of the times appears not least to have increasing global relevance in the case of the educational system, as it is the task of any educational system to prepare the younger generations for living and working in the society that will emerge in the decades to come (ACTS 21, 2012; DeSeCo, 2005).

Though such diagnosis appears to become increasingly important and widespread, researchers seldom reflect methodologically upon their own practice of diagnosis, just as there is a striking absence of methodological reflection on the analytical strategy of diagnosis of the times in general (Reese-Schäfer, 2002). The reason is, apparently, that researchers do not see a need for this kind of methodological reflection because they understand diagnosis of the times as something other: either it is regarded as a kind of popular communication or dissemination of research, an often necessary ‘journalistic treatment’ of one’s research in order to make it more topical and relevant for the broader public (Beck et al., 2001a), or diagnosis of the times is considered as a particular kind of description of society that concerns fundamental transformations in society, such as modernity, individualization (Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1991) and the emergence of the knowledge society (Florida, 2002; Gibbons et al., 1994).

The hypotheses are, however, that diagnosis of the times is not reducible to a description of society, and diagnosis and description are in fact two fundamentally opposite analytical strategies. To diagnose the times does not mean to describe the existing society, but to diagnose transformations in the conditions of the times. The object of this type of diagnosis is thus indications in contemporary times (tendencies) of transformations of the field of possibility for contemporary times (conditions), whereas the object of description of society in social sciences is the actual social institutions and structures and the actual social actors.

I start by tracing the origin of diagnosis of the times back to 18th-century philosophy and by presenting the social-analytical diagnosis of the times as initially developed by Lars-Henrik Schmidt. In order to methodologically reflect upon and illustrate the difference between diagnosis and description, I argue that diagnosis of the times is often confused with descriptions of society, as appears to be the case of Ulrich Beck. Moreover, I argue that researchers attempt to substantiate their diagnosis with descriptions, as appears to be the case of Richard Florida and others. Finally, the article presents examples drawn from my own research of the social-analytical diagnosis of anorexia and creativity in education in order to further illustrate the diagnosis of tendencies and conditions.

Diagnosis of tendencies and conditions

Even though diagnosis of the times is mainly associated with sociology, this particular kind of analytical strategy can be traced back to the emergence of two kinds of philosophical reflection. On the one hand, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind (1755) and his diagnosis of how the process of civilization has corrupted the original state of man by enslaving him to artificial needs; in civilization man no longer lives ‘within himself’, but ‘outside himself’. Axel Honneth argues that this enquiry into the negative consequences of the process of civilization is a historically new kind of philosophical enquiry – an enquiry into the nature of diagnosis of social pathologies. Rousseau hereby becomes the founding father of the tradition of social philosophy, according to Honneth (1994).

On the other hand, diagnosis of the times can also be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s What is Enlightenment? (1784) and his diagnosis of man’s emergence or departure from his self-imposed immaturity; that is, the individual’s inability to use one’s own understanding without guidance from another. Michel Foucault argues that Kant’s enquiry marks a new way to reflect on contemporary times. Unlike his other writings on history, Kant does not attempt to define the purpose of history, nor does he seek to understand the present on the basis of a totality. What Kant deals with is ‘the question of contemporary reality alone’ (Foucault, 1984: 34). However, because there is nothing outside the whole of contemporary reality, it is only possible to determine the nature of this reality negatively, that is, through historical displacements and breaches in and of the times. In the words of Foucault: ‘He [Kant] is looking for a difference: What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?’ (Foucault, 1984: 34).

Together these philosophical reflections constitute a diagnosis of the times as an analytical strategy. This is not least the case in the diagnostic practice of Friedrich Nietzsche, in which the traces of Rousseau and Kant seem to converge and culminate. An obvious example hereof is Nietzsche’s diagnosis of his time as nihilistic, which is both a determination of the difference that introduces today with respect to yesterday by virtue of the determination of ‘the death of God’ and a criticism of the negative consequences thereof by criticizing that people live on as if nothing had happened (Nietzsche, 1882). As indicated by this example of a nihilism diagnosis, the determination of the difference that introduces today is a determination of the general condition that is often experienced as a shift in ‘normal difficulties’ (Ziehe, 1996), which are difficulties that everybody in a given age faces and must deal with. In Kant’s diagnosis, the normal difficulty lies in the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from others, while in Nietzsche’s diagnosis, it lies in modernity’s unavoidable experience of the absence of an ultimate meaning of existence. Yet, criticism of negative consequences stemming from the difference that introduces today is the determination of specific distortions or pathologies of existence that might strike particular individuals or groups as a consequence of the new general conditions. In Rousseau’s diagnosis, the criticism is in the nature of the human’s alienation from him or herself, while in Nietzsche’s diagnosis, it is in the nature of the human’s inability to create his or her own values.

It is important to stress that diagnosis of the times is not identical or reducible to diagnosis of normal difficulties or social pathology, as diagnosis of the times has a different object and broader scope. Diagnoses of difficulties and pathologies can be included as elements in the more general diagnosis of the times, but the primary purpose of the latter is not primarily or only to reach an understanding of these phenomena, but to interpret difficulties and pathologies as signs or indications of displacements of the historical conditions of contemporary times. However, the very nature of these conditions makes normal difficulties and social pathologies some of the prime indicators of a diagnosis of the times. Similarly, it is no coincidence that the ‘founding fathers’ of this tradition diagnosed alienation, immaturity and nihilism in and of their time.

The negative consequences of the times become the prime indicators because conditions of the times are, by definition, indefinite and indeterminate. Historical conditions are the result of transformations of contemporary reality. The boundaries that constitute this reality – reality in the sense of that which we take for granted and the extent to which things are possible in our time – are neither manifest nor possible to determine positively. On the contrary, the boundaries of contemporary reality, understood as the conditions of our time, are mostly manifest in the instances of negative transgression thereof, as is explicit by the inability to cope with these conditions. Thus, diagnosis of the times is a delicate matter of interpreting a ‘double negativity’ in the sense of, first, interpreting the negative consequences of the time and then interpreting these consequences as indicators by means of which the conditions of the time can be negatively determined. In this way, diagnosis of the times requires interpretation and creation of fundamental concepts and theoretical frames, and as such it remains a philosophical endeavour.

The problem is how to go about this endeavour. Though the tradition of diagnosing times from Nietzsche onwards has been developed in both philosophy and sociology, and for a large part coincides with the traditions of modern continental philosophy and social theory, there is a striking absence of reflection upon this part of the theoretical practice. ¹ Symptomatically, most of the recent literature on diagnosis of the times is secondary literature written about, not by, diagnostic thinkers (e.g. Kneer and Nassehi, 1993; Reese-Schäfer, 1996, 2002; Schimank and Volkmann, 2000). Honneth and Foucault are of course exceptions. Another less known exception is the Danish thinker Lars-Henrik Schmidt, who differs from most diagnostic thinkers because of his intention to conduct a systematically methodological reflection on the diagnosis of the times, which constitutes the very analytical strategy of his social-analytical perspective (Schmidt, 1992).

Schmidt defines social-analytical diagnosis as the ‘reading of tendencies’ (tendenslæsning) as well as the ‘grasping’ (fatning) of conditions. He defines the former by differentiating the reading of tendencies from two other forms of time analysis, namely trend analysis and prognosis (Schmidt, 1992: 119; 1999: 18). Diagnosis of the times is not identical to analysis of trends or the megatrend of future studies or futurology, which are analyses of, for example, changes in lifestyle or consumer habits. Rather, diagnosis of the times is to diagnose the more fundamental changes that constitute inert currents under the more transient and superficial fluctuations of time. Correspondingly, diagnosis of the times does not aim to predict the future outcome of events such as a prognosis does. In other words, diagnosis does not extrapolate or project existing developments, nor construct possible future scenarios on the basis of existing data, but it reads tendencies. The difference is interpretation. A diagnosis reads something out of the time; it looks for what is taken for granted and what is not questioned (Schmidt, 1990: 27–28).

In addition, diagnosis of the times is also about constructing a new story or perspective for the times. This is an active form of interpretation. To make a diagnosis is to construct a perspective that grasps the time by juxtaposing and joining tendencies in a different way; it is about making ‘a construction that establishes simultaneousness’ (Schmidt, 1990: 28; my translation). The idea is to establish different forms of simultaneousness to test the extent to which it is possible to think differently in and about the times. Diagnosis of the times is, in other words, a kind of criticism. In fact, the development of social-analytics in the late 1980s was Schmidt’s attempt to rethink criticism with respect to the altered condition of criticism. Today, it appears to be a condition that criticism can no longer be sheer negativity or function as mere negation of positivity. Instead, criticism must also involve a ‘demonstration of positivity as a condition for the subversion of the positive’ (Schmidt, 1992: 21; my translation). Put differently, it is not sufficient to criticize the existing reality. In order to be effective, criticism must also demonstrate how things could be conceptualized differently, thereby paving the way for the subversion of existing and predominant ways of acting and thinking. Diagnosis of the times is a kind of criticism that attempts to construct new concepts and perspectives that can function as demonstrations of positivity.

By the same token, diagnosis of the times differs from the type of social philosophical criticism that operates on the foundation of an explicit normative basis, as is the case of critical theory from Horkheimer to Honneth. Rather, it is more like the types that operate without a normative basis wherefore criticism is the essence of problematizing notions that are taken for granted, as is notably the case in the genealogical analysis of Foucault (Kristensen, 2008). Yet, diagnosis of the times and genealogical analysis differ in regard to critical practice, as genealogical analysis suggests the possibility of thinking and acting differently by demonstrating that things used to be different by presenting the genealogy of predominant ideas, whereas diagnosis of the times seeks to demonstrate that things can be different by presenting new concepts and perspectives that offer alternative conceptualizations (Hammershøj, 2008).

Hybrids of diagnosis and description

As the history of ideas and social-analytical reflections demonstrates, diagnosis of the times is a specific approach that differs from the prevailing description of society, not only in terms of analysis strategy (diagnosis vs description) and forms of knowledge (philosophical vs scientific reflection), but also in terms of object (time vs society). Thus, the object of a diagnosis is constituted by indications in the times (tendencies) of transformations of the field of possibility for the times (conditions). The object of scientific description of society is, however, not constituted by indications of transformation of conditions of the times, but by the existing society: it is the actual societal institutions and structures as well as the social behaviour of actual agents that constitute the object of the scientific description of society.

In fact, the very nature of this object constitutes the historic division of method and theory in social sciences. Method, on the one hand, concerns the pure and secure way of collecting and processing data with the intention of eliminating sources of errors and optimizing validity. Theory, on the other hand, concerns the conceptual framework for systematizing explanations and synthesizing comprehensions of the social reality. Even though the relation between method and theory has been and is constantly the object of debate – currently, for instance, the relation is queried by social constructivist and post-structuralist analysis strategies (which are present variations of the critical point that understanding the matter in question depends on and is affected by how it is observed) – the object of descriptions of society remains the same, namely the existing society. It makes no difference whether social constructivism and post-structuralism define this object as the ‘construction of the social’ and the ‘emergence of the social’ respectively (Esmark et al., 2005a, 2005b), because these analytical strategies also aim at describing and observing actually occurring constructions and appearances and not diagnosing indications of transformations of conditions of the times.

It seems all the more important to reflect on the difference between diagnosis and description, as it is in danger of being blurred and dissolved by recent developments in the history of diagnosis of the times. The tradition of diagnosis of the times has evolved at the intersection of philosophy and sociology; emerging in philosophy and developing further in sociology, from classic sociological diagnoses of the dissolution of the social bond (largely influenced, by the way, by Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism [Honneth, 1994: 30]), to modern diagnoses of the mass society (not least critical theory) and current sociological diagnoses of individualization and transformation of modern institutions (for example, modernity theory) (Reese-Schäfer, 1996, 2002; Schimank and Volkmann, 2000). In the course of these developments a displacement has occurred in the form of knowledge of this tradition of diagnosis from philosophy to sociology and its cognate disciplines (social psychology, intellectual history, cultural theory, etc.).

The displacement has been particularly apparent the last couple of decades in which sociological discussions of post- and late modernity as well as the information or knowledge society have dominated. This has to a large extent resulted in a repression of the philosophical aspects of diagnosis of the times, including the question of interpretation. Furthermore, it has resulted in diagnosis of the times being represented as simply another type of sociological research. Thus, in the literature diagnosis of the times is represented as either a form of communication of research to the public or as a kind of level in between general sociological theory and specific empirical social research (Reese-Schäfer, 1996: 379; Schimank and Volkmann, 2000: 15, 17).

By the same token, this type of diagnosis presents itself as a scientific description of society and is exposed to the double criticism of resting on insufficient empirical evidence and being light-sociological theory only. This is, however, not a just criticism provided that what is attempted is not a description of society, but a diagnosis of the times. The problem seems to be that it is not always obvious to the practitioners of such diagnoses whether they are practising the one or the other. Instead, it is characteristic of these sociological diagnoses that they lack reflection on their own analytical practice. If asked, they more often than not take refuge in sociological methodology (typically accompanied by statements such as: ‘I am only describing’). Moreover, it is typical for practitioners of sociological diagnosis that they mix and confuse diagnosis of the times with description of society or attempt to substantiate their diagnosis by describing the existing society.

An example of the latter is Richard Florida’s diagnosis of the emergence of a new ‘creative class’ in knowledge society (Florida, 2002). His point of departure is the assumption that a shift in economy is occurring and as a consequence the primary source of economic value is no longer industrial production, manual work or capital, but creation and innovative use of knowledge. According to Florida’s diagnosis, this has huge implications on work and the place of work. However, he does not reflect on the interpretation that in fact forms the basis of his diagnosis both in regard to selection of cases or phenomena that function as indicators of these transformations and in regard to the understanding of the nature of the transformations of work and place (for example the presumably apt thesis that creativity will flourish in cities with a great degree of diversity). Instead, Florida proceeds as if these tendencies were quantitative facts and as if his diagnostic thesis is sheer comprehension of these facts. For that reason, he has attempted to substantiate his diagnosis by using sociological quantitative and qualitative methods: ‘I have interviewed and conducted focus group interviews with people across the United States and elsewhere … . And with teams of colleagues and graduate students, I have delved deeply into statistical correlations to develop more substantial evidence of the fundamental trends and patterns’ (Florida, 2002: 12).

Another example of the attempt to substantiate diagnosis of the times by virtue of description of society is Michael Gibbons and colleagues’ diagnosis of a shift in the production of knowledge from Mode 1 to Mode 2. According to their diagnosis, the shift in knowledge production can be seen in an increase in the number of places in which knowledge is created, and thereby an increase in sensitivity towards broader implications of the knowledge produced. Moreover, it can be seen in the emergence of an additional criterion to those of traditional scientific excellence such as the criteria of effectiveness and usefulness by which knowledge production to a higher degree becomes a matter of problem solving (Gibbons et al., 1994). As in the case of Florida, Gibbons and colleagues do not reflect on the diagnostic nature of their interpretation of these shifts in knowledge production. Instead, they take refuge in the attempt to substantiate their diagnosis by referring to empirical evidence: ‘It is our contention that there is sufficient empirical evidence to indicate that a distinctive set of cognitive and social practices is beginning to emerge and these practices are different from those in Mode 1’ (Gibbons et al., 1994: 3). This argument is problematic because it lacks reflection on how evidence of what has come (empirical observations of transformations) can substantiate diagnosis of what will come (new conditions of knowledge production). This is yet another example of the question of interpretation being ignored.

An example of diagnosis of the times being confused with description of society can be found in the modernity theory of Ulrich Beck. Beck differs from other modernity theorists by reflecting methodologically on his practice of diagnosis and standing by the speculative character of his analysis insofar as he characterizes it as theory-orientated and experimental in method (Beck et al., 2001b: 50). As observed in the literature, diagnosis of the times always entails some degree of speculation (Reese-Schäfer, 1996: 382; Schimank and Volkmann, 2000: 17), which is the direct consequence of the philosophical and interpretative character of diagnosis. In the preface of Risk Society, Beck makes the following statement: ‘What follows does not at all proceed along the lines of empirical social research. Rather, it pursues a different ambition: to move the future which is just beginning to take shape into view against the still predominant past. … To that extent, this book contains some empirical orientated, projective social theory – without any methodological safeguards’ (Beck, 1986: 9).

In this way, Beck’s analytical strategy appears to be a hybrid of a diagnosis of the times and a description of society. He intends to diagnose indications of the transformations of contemporary reality but confuses it with a ‘projected description of society’ by which he, so to speak, takes the position of a future sociologist in order to describe future society.

However, such projected descriptions of society fall into two categories. First, if it is a projected theoretical description, it is a question of comprehending the principles or leading ideas of future society’s structures and functionality – such as the principles of the incipient modernity, which Beck identifies as individualization, reflexivity, risk and globalization (Beck, 1986; Beck et al., 2001b). Second, if it is rather a projected empirical description of, for instance, the future world of work, there is a number of probable possibilities that the description of the area in question is to build scenarios for the future – for example scenarios for the future world of work, which Beck terms knowledge-based, globalized, sustainable and/or self-enterprising work (Beck, 1999).

The assertion that Beck’s diagnostics are similar to projective description is furthermore supported by the fact that the form of criticism in his diagnoses is similar to the form of criticism in the empirical and theoretical descriptions of society in social science.

The form of criticism in empirical description constitutes prescription of action that proposes alternative organization or practice. In projective description, however, prescription is based on scenarios rather than empirical description, wherefore the aim is not to propose new ways of doing things, but rather to propose visions for the future – as, in relation to the above-mentioned scenarios, when Beck develops visions of civil work in Europe and post-national civil society (Beck, 1999).

Looking at the form of criticism in theoretical description, we see it takes the form of calling attention to inconsistencies in and inadequacies of theoretical concepts and notions. In projective description, however, this form of criticism suggests that the concepts of contemporary sociology are outdated and antiquated – as when Beck criticizes zombie-categories: ‘the living-dead categories, which haunt our heads and text books and govern our view on disappearing realities’ (Beck and Wills, 2000: 14; my translation).

In this way, Beck’s projected description of society practises a projected version of criticism of social science, as opposed to diagnosis of the times which practises a form of criticism of social philosophy, as will be elaborated upon below. The reason is that Beck’s projective description of society is in the form of conceptualizing and predicting the social reality of the future and not diagnosing the historical transformations of the field of possibilities of the times, which is diagnosis of the times. In other words and to specify further, Beck’s projective description of society is a hybrid in the sense that it intends to diagnose new tendencies but it confuses the construction of diagnostic concepts with the conceptualization of ideas and visions of future society.

In their methodological reflections on reflexive modernization, Beck and colleagues confirm the hybrid nature of the projective description of society. In these reflections, diagnosis of the times is perceived as merely a component in the general development of an up-to-date theory of society. On the one hand, Beck and colleagues reiterate the intention of a diagnosis of the times in the form of a theory-oriented ‘experimental approach’ in search of the novel, of discontinuities and breaches of a new era (Beck et al., 2001b). On the other hand, they claim that the theory of reflexive modernization deals with the rare task of connecting the three tasks of sociology, namely development of fundamental disciplinary concepts, development of the method of empirical research and finally development of ‘the intellectually demanding interpretation of situation and diagnosis of the times [Zeitdiagnose] by which sociology fits into the public debate’ (Beck et al., 2001a: 63). In this way, the theory of reflexive modernization differs from other theories of society as it attempts to connect sociological description of modern society with diagnosis of the times: ‘The theory’s component of diagnosis of the times experiments with the hypothesis of a transformation of structure, which leads from the first to the second modernity. It consequently forces the theory of society to a new definition of the unity of modern society, as the concept covers both – the first and second modernity – and must be made transparent’ (Beck et al., 2001a: 64).

So, according to Beck and colleagues, the component of diagnosis of the times serves and supports the theoretical description of modern society by indicating transformations, facilitating theory development and communicating research to the broader public. Diagnosis of the times is reduced to a sheer projective description of society in this hybrid perception and is not conceived as an independent approach or as the main approach.

The methodological reflections of Beck and colleagues appear to define projective description of society as a hybrid of diagnosis and description; their intention is to diagnose tendencies of the times but they confuse the construction of diagnostic concepts with the development of theoretical concepts of emerging societal structures. The former is critical diagnosis with a view to make new ways of thinking and acting possible, while the latter is affirmative description with a view to explain and comprehend emerging societal structures. However, this circumstance does not rule out the possibility that the theoretical concepts of the projective description of society practically and contrary to the intended, so to speak, might function as diagnostic concepts and make new ways of thinking possible, as in the case of Beck’s concepts of risk, reflexivity and individualization. In fact, this circumstance might very well be the cause of the great interest in Beck’s work.

Examples of social-analytical diagnosis of the times

The tendency to confuse diagnosis of the times with description of society or communication of research is apparently due to the fact that diagnosis of the times originates from the intersection of philosophy and sociology. Diagnosis is thus usually perceived as either the one or the other, not as an original approach in itself. From the point of view of sociology, diagnosis of the times is regarded a form of philosophy, and from the point of view of philosophy it is regarded a form of sociology. However, it is not possible to reduce diagnosis of the times either to sociology, as it includes philosophical interpretation and criticism, or to philosophy, as it includes diagnosis of actual tendencies in the times.

According to social-analytics, on the contrary, diagnosis of the times is an original approach in itself, as I have tried to demonstrate. In order to further illustrate the approach of diagnosis of the times, I will present a couple of examples of my own attempts to carry out social-analytical diagnosis of the times. More specifically, the purpose is to illustrate the main traits of diagnosis of the times; that is, interpretation of tendencies of the times and construction of diagnostic concepts in accordance with and by virtue of the emerging conditions of the time.

The first example is the attempt to diagnose the social pathologies of contemporary western societies in general and the case of anorexia in particular (Hammershøj, 2009a). This diagnosis illuminates the problem of determining whether a configuration of phenomena constitutes a tendency or just an accidental trend, that is, whether it is an indication of transformation of the conditions of the times or not. One sign of phenomena being a tendency and an indication of transformation is that the phenomena in question are new and inexplicable. This is exactly the case with the phenomenon of anorexia. First, the rise in cases and some of the forms of eating disorders are actually historically new: anorexia was once a very rare disorder. In the first modern study of the disease, published in 1973, Hilde Bruch writes that anorexia nervosa ‘is rare indeed, but the medical interest in it has always been great, quite out of proportion to its infrequent occurrence’ (Bruch, 1973: 4). Around 1980, however, there was a veritable explosion in the number of cases and a new eating disorder, bulimia, appeared (Gordon, 1990). From being very rare, anorexia became one of the most common mental disorders. Second, there is no consensus on how to understand these disorders. In other words, it appears to be difficult to conceptualize the causes and dynamics of these disorders using psychological and psychiatric explanations. Cultural and sociological studies have suggested that anorexia should be regarded as an ‘ethnic disorder’, particular to western societies, and points to growing demands on women and to an increase in ambivalence as causes of anorexia, or suggest the anorectic person is ‘the unwitting carrier of pervasive cultural crisis’ (Gordon, 1990: 52).

However, these cultural and sociological analyses have not been able to explain why the anorectic does not just flee from these demands and ambivalences, but instead reacts by embarking on a starvation project. According to the approach of diagnosis of the times, a new diagnostic conceptualization of anorexia must be constructed, and in this case it builds upon the social-analytical diagnostic perspective of self-Bildung. Self-Bildung is an up-to-date interpretation of the neo-humanistic concept of Bildung in which the formation of the personality is brought about by the ‘elevation into the universal’ or the ‘transcendence into the social’ (Schmidt, 1999), and the diagnosis is that today this process to a higher degree takes place on the terms of the individual (Hammershøj, 2003; Schmidt, 2011). In the perspective of self-Bildung, anorexia can be understood as the negative consequence of self-Bildung and more specifically diagnosed as ‘frantic self-Bildung’. In this diagnosis the most striking characteristic of the anorectic is that the person certainly has a project of self-realization. What, however, makes the anorectic’s self-realization project a frantic endeavour, is that the person’s transcendence of him- or herself is directed at the person’s own body instead of the social. It is a futile attempt to ‘create oneself from oneself’. In this perspective, anorexia is not merely a refusal to eat, but in a wider sense a refusal to transcend into the social (Hammershøj, 2009a). The diagnostic concept of frantic self-Bildung is in addition a form of criticism as it suggests that prevention and perhaps even treatment ought to be in the forms of promoting sociability.

The second example of social-analytical diagnosis is the attempt to diagnose creativity as an increasingly significant activity in the knowledge society and for work and education in the future (Hammershøj, 2009b). In this case the tendency diagnosed is characterized by being generally taken for granted in that few would question the significance of creativity for the future and as creativity is presumed to become the primary source of economic value in the knowledge society (Florida, 2002). At the same time, though, the phenomenon of creativity in itself appears incomprehensible. In fact, the concept of creativity remains one of the most unclarified concepts we have, and by the same token, the increasing interest in creativity has been denoted ‘high expectations of a weak concept’ (Hentig, 1999).

So, in the case of creativity, diagnosis of the times is mostly in the nature of constructing a new concept of creativity. Once again drawing on the self-Bildung perspective, the idea is that creativity can be understood as a question of Bildung in the sense of an interplay between the sensuous forces of transcendence and judgement. This concept of creativity is a form of criticism in the way that it makes different ways of thinking and acting possible. This applies not least to the question of promoting creativity in general and in education in particular. In the perspective of creativity as a question of Bildung, the fostering of creativity is conceived as a cultivation of the sensuous forces. In addition, a framework has been developed for a creativity programme in the form of a ‘negative’ educational journey (Bildungsreise) inspired by Dante’s Divine Comedy and on the lines of the classical notion of the four stages of the creative process (Hammershøj, 2009b, 2012).

Conclusion

The main purpose of the article has been to contribute to methodological reflections on diagnosis of the times. I have attempted to do so by first tracing the genealogy of diagnosis of the times, second expounding social-analytic’s methodological reflections of diagnosis of the times, third carrying out a critical analysis of sociological diagnosis that confuses diagnosis with description of society, and fourth presenting specific examples of social-analytical diagnosis of the times.

The conclusion of this methodological reflection is, first, that diagnosis of the times originates from two kinds of philosophical reflection; that is, diagnosis of the negative consequences of the civilization processes and of the difference that introduces today with respect to yesterday respectively, and that diagnosis exists in the intersection of philosophy and sociology. Second, I have shown that diagnosis of the times differs from description of the times in the social sciences in that the object of diagnosis is indications in the times (tendencies) of transformation of the field of possibility for the times (conditions). In this way, diagnosis of the times is both about interpreting tendencies and constructing diagnostic concepts with a view to make new ways of thinking and acting possible by virtue of the new conditions.

In other words, the most notable characteristic of diagnosis of the times is that it is criticism demonstrating positivity with the intention of subverting the positive.

In fact, it is by these very means that diagnosis of the times can function as a tool for finding one’s bearings. The subversion of the positive functions as a tool for general reorientation by exposing the transformation of the conditions of the times, and the demonstration of positivity functions as a tool for specific orientation by suggesting new diagnostic concepts and ways of understanding and dealing with the tendencies in the times. Such tools of orientation and reorientation are critical in times of change, and therefore diagnosis of the times is increasingly important today.