Multiculturalisms: An overview of multicultural debates in western societies

Multiculturalism as a normative issue

A large part of the multicultural debate in the 1990s was monopolized by political philosophy in the effort to develop a coherent theory of justice able to include a relevant space for group rights and the recognition of cultural difference. As political theory, multiculturalism challenges a liberal philosophy of universalism that conceives human beings as rational agents of free will, whose freedom may be granted only through identical, individual rights. It stresses the importance of the recognition of difference both at the philosophical level – its importance for personal identity, self-fulfilment and social participation – and at the political level – its importance for giving a voice, in the public space, to marginalized groups, overcoming previous injustice and exploitation.

Countering the liberal idea that emphasizes unity and sameness, a communitarian perspective valorizes difference and group membership. It states that recognition of individual rights is not enough because it presupposes an incoherent notion of the individual as existing outside and apart from social relations, rather than embedded within them. An appropriate recognition of both individual and group difference establishes the basis for full development of individual capacities and for fair and democratic participation in social life (Honneth, 1996; Taylor, 1994). People can build an independent and self-confident identity only through dialogue with others, feeling part of a particular, distinct community. Individual agency depends on belonging to particular social and cultural groups that provide individuals with meaning. When the specificity of this community is ignored, glossed over, assimilated into a dominant or majority identity, or misrecognized, a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion (Taylor, 1994: 25).

Liberal universalism and cultural neutrality are contested too. Different cultures represent different systems of meaning and visions of the good life and no single one of them may claim to give appropriate answers to the totality of human existence. No culture is perfect and no culture has the right to impose itself on others (Hollinger, 1995; Parekh, 2002; Rorty, 1989). Consequently, diverse cultural identities should be presumed to be of equal worth and the traditional liberal principle of identical liberties and opportunities for all citizens should be replaced with a regime of special rights for minority cultural groups (Song, 2010).

Defenders of liberalism (Barry, 2001; Huntington, 1996, 2004; Schlesinger, 1998) observe that liberal democracy requires a common cultural basis and a strong feeling of civic engagement in order to function. They sustain that the politics of difference contrast with the politics of solidarity because recognition of group rights fragments society, promotes ‘parallel lives’, withers loyalty to the nation-state, reduces individual freedom and undermines a politics of redistribution (for a similar criticism from a progressive point of view, see Gitlin, 1995).

A significant attempt to overcome a rigid contraposition between individual and collective rights has been proposed by Willy Kymlicka (1995). Endorsing the liberal values of freedom of choice, personal autonomy and equality, he stresses the importance of culture and cultural membership. Cultural membership matters and cannot be easily expunged from liberal theory because culture provides its members with a meaningful way of life and defines the range of options from which individuals can choose. It also provides the necessary environment for developing individual self-confidence and self-respect. A fair society should recognize the importance of minority cultures and allow its members to protect their culture against majority practices and rules. Nevertheless, not all the claims of cultural protection can be accepted on a liberal basis. Kymlicka distinguishes between ‘external protections’ – the demand by a minority culture to protect its distinctive existence and identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society – and ‘internal restrictions’ – the demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political liberty of its own members in order to maintain internal status quo, to prevent group fragmentation or to contrast internal dissent. While ‘external protection’ claims are fully compatible with liberal principles and should be accepted because they help to enhance individual freedom and social justice, ‘internal restriction’ requests must be rejected.

Jürgen Habermas (1994) shares the idea that the protection of collective identities does not necessarily conflict with the right to equal individual liberties. He sees the possibility of linking the two apparently irreconcilable principles when attention for the ‘contents’ of multicultural policies is replaced by a ‘proceduralist’ conception of rights according to which the democratic process has to safeguard both private and public autonomy at the same time. Safeguarding the private and individual autonomy of citizens with equal rights must go hand in hand with activating their autonomy as citizens participating in public life. Rather than concerns about which kind of policy to promote, it is preferable to focus on the ‘conditions’ for a free, public discussion in which all citizens, from their specific cultural location, have a say in the definition of the common binding rules. A fair multicultural society does not depend on some specific, real and well-defined set of juridical norms and policies. Instead, it is the result of ‘constitutional patriotism’, a public agreement on the rules for claiming recognition and taking decisions affecting all members of the society. Seyla Benhabib (2002) further develops the centrality of deliberative democracy for multicultural debates. She considers one of the most widespread criticisms against the communitarian perspective – namely its tendency to reify culture, conceived as fixed, stable and characterized by well-defined boundaries – and argues that the principles of liberalism and the acceptance of cultural and religious traditions may be easily arranged if three conditions are met. Society and groups who claim cultural recognition must grant their members: ‘egalitarian reciprocity’ (members of minorities must not, in virtue of their membership status, be entitled to lesser degrees of rights than the majority); ‘voluntary self-ascription’ (an individual must not be automatically assigned to a cultural, religious, or linguistic group by virtue of his or her birth); ‘freedom of exit and association’ (individuals must have unrestricted freedom to choose which group they belong to and to move from one belonging to another).

Multiculturalism as an (anti) ideology

An original and important theoretical contribution to the ‘multicultural debate’ comes from a strong criticism of universalism. Since the 1960s and especially the 1970s, de-colonization movements and post-colonial theory have denounced the universalism of those in power whose celebration of alleged universal values, in fact, conceals practices of domination and exploitation (Wieviorka, 2013). Feminist theory, radical social theory and postmodernism have played a relevant role in the debate. Although in different ways, all these theoretical perspectives defied universalism giving priority to situation, socio-historical variability and contingency, they stimulated an open war over the ‘canon’ (Derrida, 1972; Rattansi, 1999) and a radical deconstruction of – white, male – domination; they also contributed to an acute critique of patriarchal societies (Narayan and Harding, 2000) and Eurocentrism (Shohat and Stam, 1994).

Criticism of universalism also entails criticism of fixed identity and exclusive belonging. A constructivist point of view is supported against an essentialist standpoint that conceives identity and difference as the deepest and more authentic nucleus, which is the basis for the existence of the individual and the group. Identity and difference are seen as products of continuous mediation, comparison, adjustment, translation and conflict between differentiated possibilities (Amselle, 1990; Hannerz, 1992; Young, 1995). Current economic and cultural globalization as well as migratory phenomena contribute to undermining the idea that individuals and groups are characterized by single and permanent identities, and that the nation-state can be synonymous with universal values (Beck, 2006).

Ethnic difference, in particular, is seen as a result of power and violence, the outcome of hierarchy and conflict that distinguish imperial and colonial power (Gilroy, 2006). Western societies – and not only western societies – are and have always been ‘multicultural’. Current political multiculturalism – as well as its critics – focuses on ethnic and religious difference, depicting it as a ‘natural given’; in so doing, it neglects the power and the violence that produce such a difference (Gilroy, 2005).

While liberal multiculturalism defends ethical universals – freedom, autonomy, tolerance – and communitarianism emphasizes group membership, critical multiculturalism (Goldberg, 1994; May, 1999) is about empowering the disempowered, contesting dominant groups, challenging their ‘canon’ and transforming their institutions and discourses. It highlights differences ‘within’ groups, not only difference ‘between’ groups (Yuval-Davis, 1999). It is not about the ‘recognition of difference’, as a pure acknowledgement of the existence of reified and stereotyped ‘others’ which should be ‘included’; instead, it critically focuses on the social and political construction of white male supremacy and the dispensation of white male hegemony. The deconstruction of dominant positions, rather than the recognition and the inclusion of the dominated, becomes the focus of analysis (McLaren, 1997). What is really at stake in the multicultural debate is neither the recognition of identity nor the endorsement of collective rights but the unmasking of the foundation of (white, male) domination (Hage, 2000). Multiculturalism, in this case, unveils racism and counters the invisible and taken-for-granted presuppositions that define the setting for the entitlement of rights, power and privileges; it also constitutes a readjustment of unequal relations of power and exploitation between dominants and the dominated (Hall, 2000).

Put into its precise historical perspective, multiculturalism is not the result of the encounter between ‘pure’ and ‘well-defined’ culturally different groups; instead, it is the attempt to redefine power relations between mixed and changing forms of political identification (Gunew, 2004). The binary contrast between the particularism of ‘minority’ demands for the recognition of difference versus the universalism of the ‘majority’ civic rationality is rendered impracticable by the post-colonial experience. It becomes evident that there are – and there have always been – many relevant differences ‘within’ any group, and, therefore, also the alleged ‘authenticity’, ‘homogeneity’ and ‘unity’ of the ‘autochthonous’ is challenged (Hall, 2000). Rather than attesting the different nature of different cultures, multiculturalism highlights the character of social construction of any culture and identity; it shows that culture and identity are more the result of history and power than of biology or fate.

Multiculturalism as a feature of current global societies

In its descriptive terms, multiculturalism refers to some peculiar characteristics of current societies. It focuses not only on the way in which cultural differences are produced and reproduced, but also on the questions and tensions these processes generate, including the proposals for political and institutional procedures for dealing with them (Wieviorka, 1998).

Managing cultural difference is hardly a new phenomenon. In the past, societies we now call multiculturalist were usually defined as ‘multinational’, ‘multi-ethnic’ or just ‘plural’. Nevertheless, multiculturalism highlights specific aspects and poses specific questions. The point is that multiculturalism does not simply refer to the mundane fact that complex modern societies are characterized by cultural diversity; instead, it refers to the fact that the meaning attributed to cultural diversity in western societies has radically changed since the second half of the last century. Rather than being the simple result of a ‘quantitative’ increase of ‘difference’ or a ‘demographic fact’, it represents the effort to find a new cultural, legal and political accommodation of cultural difference, replacing older forms of social (gender, ethnic and racial) hierarchy (Kymlicka, 2012). Therefore, it is difficult to understand multiculturalism without putting cultural difference in its appropriate context. Cultural, economic and political factors – and their combinations – have been indicated as causes of a significant change in the notion of cultural difference following the Second World War (Semprini, 1997). Cultural factors refer to the role of the ‘new social movements’ (Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1997; Wieviorka, 1996) and their struggle against assimilation and the melting-pot ideology (Rex, 1996). Multiculturalism is part of a larger human rights revolution involving ethnic and racial diversity (Baumann, 1999; Kymlicka, 2012). Economic factors include the success of market ideology and the crisis of the Fordist model of production (Constant, 2000; Goldberg, 1994). Political factors embrace the end of the Cold War (Beck, 2006) and the subsequent crisis of nation-states (Habermas, 2001) – crisis that is also connected to the intensification of globalization processes, the changes in the characteristics of migration flows and the effort of the nation-states to control their boundaries (Bloemraad et al., 2008).

The sociological perspective insists on the social construction of identity and difference, countering essentialism and reification. It aims to show the inconsistency and pitfalls of considering national, ethnic and religious cultures as finished objects whose features have been defined through long historical processes and have now to be preserved unchanged. In this way, culture finishes to act as a deterministic device that influences and even shapes the actions and thoughts of all its alleged members, depriving them of agency (Baumann, 1999; Phillips, 2007). Without a sociologically informed concept of cultural difference, multiculturalism ends up fostering new forms of discrimination, only superficially masked by respect and recognition of difference. An all-too-quick reification of the identities of a given group has often frozen existing group differences, strengthening the position of specific elites within communities and reproducing ancient hierarchies.

Yet, the essentialist view of culture cannot easily be dismissed because culture constitutes a political tool in arguing for rights and exemptions, recognition and group privileges. Effective social use of cultural difference requires a dual competence (Baumann, 1999): the capacity to produce and to overcome distinctions according to situations and personal and collective aims. Cultural difference needs a certain degree of credibility and stability in order to be effective, but risks losing this effectiveness if it cannot be adjusted to the specific situation in which it is used. Dual competence not only depends on the will or the sensitivity of the individual, but it also suffers under structural constraints and conditions of power which transcend the rational abilities and strategies of the person involved.

Multiculturalism poses the tricky question of combining difference and identity, reification and ongoing production, ‘drawing together on the same terrain those formal incommensurables of political vocabularies – liberty and equality with difference, “the good” with “the right” ’ (Hall, 2000: 235). Accepting and taking this ambivalence seriously may result in a more complex, fragmented and heterogeneous civil sphere (Alexander, 2001, 2013; Kivisto, 2010) that makes the expansion of democratic participation possible. Rather than being solved in the abstract, at the level of a new theory of justice, ambivalent requests coming from multicultural debates may be negotiated and reconciled in practice (Werbner, 2005; Wieviorka, 2013).

From this perspective, analysis focuses on the meaning and practice of multiculturalism, both at the level of state policies and of local relationships. Analysis draws attention to how cultural difference becomes a political tool for claiming rights and inclusion or, vice versa, it turns into a justification for exclusion. Multiculturalism is conceived as an ongoing political accomplishment, a practical resource that can be used either in defence of (cultural, human) rights or in defence of communal solidarity.

Conservative, right-wing criticism

Conservative critics accuse multiculturalism of giving exaggerated support to minority group identities and cultures, in so doing weakening the original local culture. They often depict ‘a zero-sum war’ between cultures (Auster, 2004; Huntington, 1996), with multicultural policies favouring illiberal, anti-modern and anti-democratic minority groups while blaming the majority group of being ethnocentric and racist. Uncritical acceptance of habits, customs, values and languages far from, if not opposed to, those of the majority is diminishing western identity, its institution and its beliefs. Cultural pluralism, so the criticism goes, reinforces aggressive minority groups and neglects the value of the specific and unique history of liberal, democratic western culture, condemning it to extinction. The majority group must take pride in its own culture and enhance it by making the most of national belonging and internal cohesion. It must expect minority groups to observe majority rules and values and show willingness to assimilate before it grants them recognition and respect.

Islam is often the specific target of this criticism. Muslims are seen to be particularly reluctant to integrate and to adopt western values, embracing fundamentalism and trying to impose their own laws and way of life. The retreat from multicultural policies and the rebalancing of tolerance are regarded as the necessary response to a clash between an aggressive, separatist and integralist Muslim identity and the liberal values of freedom of expression, separation of church and state, women’s and gay rights.

‘We must defend our identity’ arguments have been criticized for considering identities and cultures as homogeneous and fixed, neglecting internal difference and conflicts. Reified cultures are presented as incommensurable and unavoidably destined to clash. In this way, a new form of racism is fostered (Back et al., 2012; Gilroy, 2012; Kundnani, 2012; Poynting et al., 2004) in which the focus moves from the biological notion of ‘race’ to ‘race as culture, ethnicity and religion’ – a new form of racism of which Islamophobia (Modood, 2007; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Romeyn, 2014) is its harshest manifestation.

Is multiculturalism harmful for women?

The alleged contraposition between multiculturalism and women’s rights – although avoiding identity arguments – is also a central point of discussion for part of the women’s movement. Susan Moller Okin (1999) observes that there could be a contradiction between the multicultural idea that all cultures are entitled to equal respect and concern and the protection of women’s rights. Many of the cultures multiculturalism aims to protect do not accept the principle that people are owed equal rights, and they endorse practices that severely penalize some groups within the community. This is particularly true for women that are often – on the basis of alleged cultural, traditional or religious reasons – exposed to unfair treatment: differential nutrition and health care, unequal rights of ownership and political participation, unequal vulnerability to violence and the denial of educational opportunities, to name but a few.

Migrant groups are often more patriarchal than the majority; allowing them to persist with their customs results in the collapse of women’s freedom and the erosion of the hard-fought conquests of the women’s movement. Establishing group rights to enable some minority culture to preserve itself may not be in the best interest of women, even if it benefits men. Actually, women of minority groups ‘might be much better off if the culture into which they were born were either to become extinct (so that its members would become integrated into the less sexist surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women – at least to the degree to which this value is upheld in the majority culture’ (Okin, 1999: 22–23).

Responses to Okin’s remarks stress the pitfalls of a too clear-cut and simplistic division between western liberal society – deemed less patriarchal – and minority cultures. Western liberal regimes are not always ‘less patriarchal’ than other regimes; they are differently so (Honig, 1999). Recognizing the various ways of looking at gender roles in other cultures might heighten western women’s critical awareness of some of the limits, as well as the benefits, of a liberal way of life. The essentialist idea of culture is problematic also because it conceals differences within groups. Condemning practices is not the same as condemning so-called cultural groups, and cultural practices may have different meanings for ‘insiders’ and for ‘outsiders’ (Anthias, 2002). The possibility that women in other cultures may conceive freedom in another way is totally overlooked (Al-Hibri, 1999), with the risk of imposing the point of view of white dominant women as ‘universal’.

National-solidarity criticism

One of the most relevant criticisms blames multiculturalism for weakening social cohesion. Policies that allow minority groups to maintain their own cultures and identities encourage ethnic separatism and promote racial, ethnic and cultural balkanization (Goodhart, 2004; Malik, 2009). The current backlash is justified by the evident failure of multiculturalism policies, especially in incorporating migrants (Brubaker, 2001; Joppke, 2004). Rather than facilitating integration and improving equality, support and recognition of cultural difference of minority groups, these policies have promoted indifference and parallel lives. As a result, social cohesion has withered, eroding the very foundation of social life. Supporters of liberalism stress the importance of a shared sense of belonging in order to feel involved in public affairs, to participate in public life and to manifest solidarity for the less privileged (Barry, 2001). Without a certain degree of nationalism, the idea of belonging to the same community and sharing a language, democracy is at risk. Liberal states have to impose liberal principles and a community cohesion agenda must replace multiculturalism if we want to make a progressive shift towards realistic recognition of the ambivalent task for any liberal democratic state: to grant solidarity among members and encourage recognition of (individual) particularity (Joppke, 2008; Thomas, 2011). In order to promote effective integration of minority groups, the state must promote what is common and shared over what is specific and divisive. Insisting that the minority group share the fundamental principles of the majority’s way of life, its language and its institutions fosters integration and equal social participation (Miller, 2002). Rather than pushing migrant groups to preserve their traditions, state policies should promote the values of freedom and democracy because effective integration requires a genuine willingness to accept and endorse the core values of western societies. Social cohesion (or ‘civic integration’) policies should replace multicultural policies, for a successful incorporation into a host society rests not only on economic and political integration but also on individual commitments to characteristics typifying national belonging: knowledge of the history of the country, language proficiency and explicit endorsement of liberal and social values (Goodman, 2010: 754; Joppke, 2007).

Integration cannot be the initiative solely of the majority. In order to be integrated migrants must show their desire to be so, and accept the sacrifice of giving up aspects of their own culture that do not fit into that of the majority. Making immigration policies more selective, welfare benefits not immediately available to new immigrants and strengthening the symbolic aspects of citizenship (Goodhart, 2004) all help in giving support to redistributive welfare state programmes and allow for effective social equality.

These criticisms have been accused of supporting a regressive step towards coercive and ethnocentric assimilationism (Back et al., 2002). Social cohesion stresses moral and social order and echoes the traditional view of social integration as social control. It reduces community belonging to mechanical solidarity, homogeneity and sameness. Equality and social justice are replaced by an emphasis on belonging, inclusion, governance, absence of conflict and co-responsibility (Eizaguirre et al., 2012). Another important shift occurs (Ratcliffe and Newman, 2011): ethnic and religious difference (and its recognition by the state) are blamed for a lack of integration and social cohesion that, in fact, is mainly due to structural inequality and poverty.

Progressive criticism

The alleged multiculturalist failure to redress socio-economic inequality is the specific focus of progressive criticism. From this point of view, multiculturalism overstressed culture, concealing the real economic reasons for the discrimination and exclusion of minority groups. Under the apparently favourable intention of protecting cultural difference, the reality that minority groups suffer harsh inequality remains hidden. The supposed difference multiculturalism policies aim to recognize and preserve is, actually, negative disparity in education, employment, rates of incarceration and housing conditions. Overcoming social discrimination may require more redistribution than recognition or, at least, a mix of the two (Fraser, 2007).

Integration requires social cohesion as well as policies against discrimination and poverty. Discriminated people cannot be empowered by protecting their culture – which often means separation and indifference – instead, they need material help. They ask for participation and inclusion rather than to be left in isolation; their decision to migrate is proof of their desire to leave their traditions behind and embrace the lifestyle of the country in which they settle. Asking them to commit to learning and using the language and adopting the way of life is not an imposition of majority rules; instead, it is a necessary step towards their effective integration.

A more realistic policy is needed in which both protection against discrimination and social cohesion is granted. Rather than policies that promote ‘bonding’ social capital – that is, cohesion ‘within’ defined communities – the state must promote policies that strengthen ‘bridging’ social capital – that is, overlapping networks ‘between’ different communities (Putnam, 2000). The former include assistance in preserving the minority language and traditions; the latter support the learning of the necessary linguistic and behavioural skills for communication and being accepted as part of the community. From this point of view, multiculturalist policies that supported the preservation of minority culture have been deleterious because too much cultural difference erodes the level of bridging capital, hindering immigrants’ civic and political participation.

Progressive criticisms have been accused of promoting a new form of assimilation in which the dominant culture is reified and minorities are required to endorse it and fit in as a condition for their acceptance and participation (Ong, 1999). By relating belonging to social cohesion, the first becomes a prerequisite for the second (Yuval-Davis et al., 2005) transforming integration into a new form of discipline and control that selects immigrants deemed ‘good’ and ‘helpful’ while legitimizing the exclusion of those considered ‘too diverse’ and not willing or able to integrate.

Assessing multicultural policies

The effective consistency of the multiculturalism backlash is hotly debated and the greater part of current empirical research focuses on assessing the magnitude and effectiveness of multicultural policies (MCPs), correlating diverse multiculturalism indices with different outcomes.

An initial direction of analysis agrees with the existence of a retreat from multicultural policies in current western societies but disputes that this is due to a failure of such policies. It focuses instead on growing hostility to immigration and on concerns about unemployment and the economic condition (Lentin and Titley, 2012; Pakulski and Markowski, 2014). Migrants – especially illegal and ‘false’ asylum-seekers – are accused of welfare parasitism, reluctance to integrate and criminality. All this generates a climate of antagonism and hatred for immigrants and legitimizes policies that restrict immigration and immigrant rights. Political leaders exploit this trend and ride the wave of public approval to gain consent, describing multiculturalism as a failure and promoting less tolerant and more assimilationist policy strategies (Lesińska, 2014; Walsh, 2014).

A second important trend of analysis questions the real magnitude of the multiculturalism backlash (Kymlicka, 2012; Rattansi, 2011; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Criticism of multiculturalism succeeds because it depicts multiculturalism in a simplistic and distorted way. Current criticisms target ‘strong multiculturalism’ – institutional recognition for difference in the public sphere, with special provision for language and welfare state benefits for members of minority groups – which has rarely been implemented. Effective multiculturalism policies are closer to a ‘weak multiculturalism’ (Grillo, 2007) which aims to avoid discrimination of minority groups in employment, housing, education, health and welfare. This form of multicultural integration remains a valid option for western societies (Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos, 2015).

Recently, drawing on an updated version of the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) – introduced by Banting et al. (2006) – Banting and Kymlicka (2013) give an accurate assessment of the alleged wholesale dismissal of multiculturalism in favour of civic integration policies. The current version of MPI accounts for the presence or absence of multicultural policies in 21 western democracies in three distinct years: 1980, 2000 and 2010. It scores each country for each point in time, depending on the extent to which it has implemented eight different policies: formal legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; adoption of MCPs in education; inclusion of minority representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media; exemption from dress codes, Sunday-closing legislation, etc.; allowing dual citizenship; funding of minority organizations to support cultural activities; funding of bilingual or mother-tongue education; affirmative action for disadvantaged minority groups. (The index is available at www.queensu.ca/mcp/.)

The diachronic international comparison shows that while a small number of countries, including most notably the Netherlands, have weakened established MCPs during the 2000s, such a shift is the exception. Actually, most countries that adopted MCPs at the end of the 20th century have retained their programmes in the first decade of the new century, and a significant number of countries have added new ones. Based on these data, Banting and Kymlicka affirm that there is no evidence for a multiculturalism retreat nor for a shift from MCPs towards civic integration policies. The latter are often layered on top of existing multicultural programmes, leading to a blended approach to diversity. The authors conclude that MCPs are still important for the promotion of effective and fair minority integration.

A more critical assessment of multicultural policies emerges from Ruud Koopmans’ (2013) analysis. Comparing cross-national differences in multicultural policies on the basis of two indexes – the MPI and the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) – he suggests that multicultural policies have had little effect on socio-economic integration, some positive impact on political integration, and negative effects on socio-cultural integration. In particular, when multicultural policies combine with a generous welfare state they have led immigrants to depend on welfare benefits and hence to social and economic marginalization, lowering incentives to acquire the linguistic skills and interethnic contacts (Koopmans, 2010).

Citrin et al. (2014), correlating MPI with attitudes towards immigration and political support in 16 European democracies that have experienced significant immigration in the past decade, observe that extensive adoption of multicultural policies magnifies the degree to which hostility to immigration is negatively associated with political support. They state that multiculturalism widens the gap in political support between pro- and anti-immigrant opinion groups, furnishing ongoing opportunities for rightist fringe parties to capitalize on anti-immigrant sentiment among the politically alienated.

The hypothesis that public support of cultural difference induces people to distrust their neighbours and engage less in public life (Putman, 2007) has been thoroughly investigated with opposing results. While some studies have found diversity to have negative effects on social cohesion and national identification (e.g. Agirdag et al., 2011; Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006; Laurence, 2011) and on immigrant integration (Wright, 2011), others have not (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2009; Sturgis et al., 2011) or suggest that MCPs increase social trust in more economically equal societies (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010), reduce social distance (Heath and Demireva, 2014) and decrease anti-minority prejudice (Weldon, 2006).

The effects of MCPs on the welfare state have been extensively analysed by Banting and Kymlicka (2006). Their studies suggest that public recognition and support for ethnocultural minorities to maintain their distinct cultural characteristics help to strengthen the welfare state rather than having a corrosive effect. They conclude that there is no evidence of MCPs eroding trust, solidarity, or support for redistribution. Other studies (Bloemraad, 2006; Wright and Bloemraad, 2012) show that MCPs can facilitate immigrants’ collective action and political participation, supporting socio-political inclusion and promoting civic integration.

These differing results in assessing the effects of MCPs suggest the necessity of a more cautious use – and a more precise operationalization – of multifaceted and dynamic concepts such as social cohesion, belonging, identification and integration (Ariely, 2014; Reitz et al., 2009). They also push to further disaggregate multiculturalism and leave adequate room for the variations within and between countries in policies and discourse directed at cultural minorities. Rather than assessing MCPs as a whole, the contradictory results invite analysis of what effects, if any, specific MCPs have on particular outcomes in diverse contexts.

Analysing multicultural attitudes and identity

A second important trend of research concerns the socio-psychological effects of multiculturalism, especially on interethnic attitudes and interactions, multicultural education and multicultural identity (Arasaratnam, 2013). In this case, multiculturalism is mainly conceived in terms of individual attitudes, groups and group identities, rather than state policies (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2006).

Many studies discuss topics that relate to majority and minority group attitudes towards multiculturalism and the variables that influence them. Overall, this type of analysis underlines a difference between majority and minority attitudes towards multiculturalism. Minority group members generally prefer to maintain their own culture and show more favourable attitudes towards multiculturalism than majority group members (Liu, 2007; Verkuyten and Thijs, 2002). Their endorsement of multiculturalism can be seen as both a strategy to improve their social status and a reaction towards perceived discrimination. In contrast, majority group members generally prefer that the minority be assimilated (Zagefka et al., 2007). The more the majority group members identify with their in-group, the more they can be expected to try to protect their group interests and status (Verkuyten and Brug, 2004). Older, less educated people and extrinsic believers – characterized by an instrumental approach to religion – generally show less favourable attitudes towards cultural diversity.

These differences are mainly interpreted into the framework of group threat theory (Evans and Need, 2002; McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995). The (realistic or perceived) threat from a minority and subordinate group is often seen as the single best indicator of negative attitudes towards out-groups (Paxton and Mughan, 2006).

John B Berry (1974, 1980; Berry et al., 2006) elaborates an influential typology for studying acculturation (i.e. the ways people prefer to live in intercultural contact situations), using it to assess personal adjustment (behavioural competence and psychological and emotional wellbeing) and intercultural relation policies in plural societies (Berry, 2013).

Berry’s acculturation model describes four preferences ethnic/cultural minority members might have about how they want to live in intercultural contact situations. Two separate dimensions underlie these preferences: that of maintaining one’s heritage, culture and identity (‘culture maintenance’), and that of having contact with and participating in the larger society along with other ethnocultural groups (‘contact’). These two dimensions of ‘culture maintenance’ and ‘contact’ lead to the four acculturation preferences: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. When referring to strategies of the larger society, the same four preferences may be respectively defined: multiculturalism, melting-pot, segregation and exclusion.

Many studies using this typology consistently show that favourable outcomes in wellbeing occur when people are oriented towards a multicultural strategy: they are interested in maintaining both their original culture and daily interactions with other groups (for a meta-analysis of studies influenced by this model, see Nguyen and Benet-Martinez, 2013). In this case, a strong, positive and significant association emerges with both psychological adjustment (higher life satisfaction and self-esteem; less alienation, anxiety, depression) and socio-cultural adjustment (higher academic achievement, career success, greater civic and political participation; fewer behavioural problems, such as delinquency and risky sexual behaviours). Multicultural policies and programmes that promote the right of all people to maintain their own culture and to participate fully in the life of the larger society, and that push all groups (both the dominant and non-dominant) to engage in a process of mutual exchange and change, provide the cultural and psychological basis to enhance positive intercultural relations (Berry, 2011).

Another important trend of analysis concerns issues of identity development in multicultural contexts (Benet-Martinez and Hong, 2014). Research focuses on how and to what extent multicultural experiences promote the development of identities that are open-ended, adaptive and aware of their socially constructed and contextually dependent character (Brunsma et al., 2013; Kim, 2008). Overall, studies on multicultural identity suggest that persons who have significant exposure to multicultural situations are likely to develop multiple and flexible identities, they are less ethnocentric and more open to effective intercultural communication (Arasaratnam, 2013).

Analysing everyday multicultural practices

Finally, it is worth noting an increasing interest in ‘everyday multiculturalism’ (Wise and Velayutham, 2009) and ‘everyday urban’ (Amin, 2002), i.e. the daily negotiation of cultural difference in urban contexts. In this case, multiculturalism is conceived as neither a social policy challenge nor an attitudinal issue (psychological attitude, individual adaptation). Instead, it is mainly conceived as a social practice: the mundane interaction in everyday life in intercultural contexts.

Everyday multiculturalism refers to both a category of analysis and a category of practices (Semi et al., 2009). The former refers to an analytical perspective that aims to grasp the way in which people produce, reproduce, transform and challenge cultural difference in everyday interactions, stressing the micro and macro conditions that make a specific social construction of cultural difference and identity possible and credible. Difference is viewed as a ‘practice’, an ongoing performance, a political tool, as the local transformation of the reified representations of difference and belonging that are constructed on a global scale (in political discourse and the mass media) in relational tools, resources for action. As a category of practices, everyday multiculturalism focuses on the use of difference in localized spaces, on situations of ‘banal’ daily routines in which knowing how to ‘face’ and ‘use’ difference is a mundane, ordinary and necessary skill.

Analyses focusing on everyday multiculturalism generally use qualitative methodology – ethnographic observation, in-depth interviews, focus groups and visual sociology – to highlight when, how and in which way categorizations, belonging and identities are constructed and deconstructed in daily interactions (Butcher and Harris, 2010; Noble et al., 1999; Sarat, 2002).

Gerd Baumann (1996) has shown how people interacting in multicultural contexts have a dual discursive and practical competence when it comes to culture: they consider it both an essential, constitutive, reified ‘given’ and a processual, ongoing, ever-changing construct. Observing practical uses of difference in multicultural contexts, it is possible to go beyond the attempt to collocate people in fixed and stable categories (multiculturalists vs assimilated vs isolated vs integralists) and to focus on the ways in which people construct, resist, translate and mediate social categories in daily relationships. The way in which people can use cultural difference in specific contexts reflects both structural constraints and agency (Bernstein, 1997; Blockland, 2003). An important aspect of focusing on everyday multiculturalism is the acknowledgement that contemporary multicultural societies are not simply collections of ‘equal diversities’, but reflect the power relations too. Consequently, an investigation of everyday multiculturalism is also an investigation of claim-making, expressions of citizenship and struggles for recognition (Back, 1996; Harris, 2009: 191; Räthzel, 2008; Watson, 2009).

Certain studies highlight the potential for cultural difference to be dissolved in everyday encounters through a process of mixing and hybridization (Wilson, 2011; Wise, 2009; Wulfhorst et al., 2014). They stress the fact that some ordinary situations – everyday encounters at the city market or at the playground, exchange and gift relations among neighbours, etc. – create a feeling of being involved with others that produces tolerance and promotes inclusion. These studies advance a critique of multicultural policies aimed at reducing or stabilizing the minority group members’ identity into narrow categories of belonging that hinder the mundane capacity to mix, change and find new arrangements.

Young people, in particular, show the capacity to use difference in strategic and tactical ways and take for granted the hybrid and fluid nature of belonging, identity and citizenship in contemporary multiple society (Harris, 2013). Dual cultural competence becomes a necessary skill because being autonomous and self-fulfilled in a global society may mean not only claiming mobility rights, multiple belonging, hybrid and changeable identities, but also fighting for the recognition of common cultural roots, shared history and the preservation of specific languages or habits from the tyranny of the dominant group, making use of alleged essentialist and reified identities (Yeĝenoĝlu, 2005).

In this constant shifting between reification, resistance, mediation and challenge, the concept of integration changes: it no longer only refers to being accepted, on an equal basis, by a local or national community; it also means being allowed to participate, without exclusion, in the global flux, claiming the right, if necessary, to freely manifest one’s own differences and expect public recognition. Equality and difference become tools for claiming participation and avoiding exclusion. What is really at stake is not the recognition of strong and stable identities or differences, but inclusion in, or exclusion from, social contexts that may offer relevant material, symbolic, affective or ludic opportunities (Colombo, 2010).

Others studies are more cautious against the tendency to romanticize intercultural encounters (Ho, 2011; Valentine, 2008; Valentine and Sadgrove, 2012); they stress the importance of conflict and pay attention to power and socio-spatial inequality. They criticize multiculturalist policies aimed at promoting intercultural encounters without taking social and political disparity and discrimination into account.

Examination of everyday practices invites analysis beyond the normative debate on the foundations of a fair multicultural society and to focus, instead, on how cultural difference is produced and negotiated and how social relations and identities are shaped and reshaped in the process.