Rethinking social movement micromobilization: Multi-stage theory and the role of social ties

Affinity-initiated model

The dominant model of movement mobilization in recent decades conceptualizes the phenomenon as one in which movement congruent beliefs play a critical role in jumpstarting micromobilization. Movement participation hinges on whether or not individuals initially possess an ideological affinity with a movement. For ease of analysis, I have subsumed the following variations under the term affinity-initiated model: Klandermans and Oegema’s (1987) four-step process, Beyerlein and Hipp’s (2006) two-step process, and various other single-step iterations (e.g., Barkan et al., 1995; Kitts, 1999; McAdam, 1986; Nepstad and Smith, 1999; Passy and Giugni, 2001; Walsh and Warland, 1983; Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991). While there is little consensus as to the specific number of stages involved in the micromobilization process, the assumption among proponents of this model – either explicitly stated or implicitly assumed – is that individuals join a movement initially as a result of movement congruent beliefs and attitudes. Subsequent participation then hinges on translating this ideological affinity into motivation to act, which in turn must be transformed into actual participation.

Single-step model

Much of the extant literature on the micromobilization process rests implicitly on the single-step affinity-initiated model. While useful in its own right, it obscures as much as it clarifies. A number of studies empirically model mobilization as a process involving a single step in which (most often) individuals sharing an ideological affinity with a movement or individuals willing to participate end up either participating or failing to participate. Researchers then focus on factors thought to influence actual participation, among a pool of individuals that support a movement. At best this truncated sampling results in a partial understanding of the micromobilization process, placing a black box around the initial formation of these ideological-affinity pools. At worst it perpetuates and normalizes the inherent limitations of this model. Movement literature is rife with examples of how this strategy has become the norm in much of the micromobilization literature.

McAdam (1986), for instance, identified influential factors that distinguished Freedom Summer applicants who ended up actually participating in the campaign from those who never made it to Mississippi. While a valuable early study in micromobilization, the sampling and methodological approach does not allow McAdam to model micromobilization as anything beyond a single-step process. As Beyerlein and Hipp (2006: 220) rightly point out, this is because ‘studies like McAdam’s (1986) consist entirely of people who are already committed to the goals and tactics of movements.’ While most of this research – including McAdam’s (1986) – does not explicitly argue that micromobilization is a single-step process, the general approach is problematic when viewed in a more cumulative sense. When such approaches become de rigueur, our understanding of the micromobilization process becomes unnecessarily truncated.

As such, we know less about exactly how initial ideological affinity with a movement is generated, only that it is assumed to play some significant role in some early part of the micromobilization process. The result is study after study technically able to address ‘among individuals sharing an ideological affinity with a movement, who participated’ or ‘among movement members, who participated more,’ yet unable to more clearly demonstrate why individuals initially support a movement and how this ideological affinity is translated into motivation to act. While this core body of social movement literature does not preclude the possibility of conceptualizing micromobilization as a process involving more than one step, the sampling and methodological strategies employed do limit the scope of results obtained.

Two-step model

With an eye toward addressing the inherent limitations of treating micromobilization as a single step phenomenon, Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) purposefully used a nationally representative sample of adults in their study of protest in the United States. This allowed them to model movement participation as a two-stage process in which individuals were differentiated based on their willingness to participate and, then, whether or not they actually participated. This strategy helped them identify factors influencing willingness to protest and, separately, factors influencing actual participation.

Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) treat the differentiation of willingness and unwillingness to participate in movement activism as the first stage in what they argue is a two-step process. However, extant theory suggests the most basic step in the process to be the delineation of the mobilization potential, defined as individuals ideologically aligned with a movement (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987; Oegema and Klandermans, 1994). The two-step model proffered by Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) implicitly assumes that the differentiation of ideological affinity is an important precondition for subsequent micromobilization, yet remains silent on the details of how this initial step unfolds. Again, why some individuals end up supporting a movement while others rebuff them remains unexplored. These one- and two-step models fail to consider how individuals pass through subsequent stages of micromobilization when ideological affinity with a movement is the starting point. Doing so, however, is critical because the mobilization potential ‘constitutes a necessary, but not sufficient pre-condition of final mobilization’ (Kriesi et al., 1993: 157).

However, Viterna’s (2013) recent research on female members of El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) provides insight into the development of this initial affinity process. Drawing on literatures rooted in identity theory and symbolic interactionism (MacKinnon and Heise, 2010; Stryker, 1980, 2000; Stryker and Burke, 2000), Viterna argues that because identities are both internally held and externally assigned (see also Brubaker and Cooper, 2000), are defined through social interactions and cultural representations, and play a key role in motivating behaviors, they contribute significantly to participation in social activism. In other words, individuals initially become engaged by developing a ‘participation identity,’ in which an individual ‘perceive[s] participation to be highly congruent with, or even protective of, [his or her] most salient existing identities given a particular arena of interaction’ (Viterna, 2013: 51). Shedding light on the processes by which this occurs, Viterna argues that individuals are most likely to develop a participation identity – and, thus, become willing to engage in activism – (1) when they believe their personal skills and resources allow them to make a meaningful contribution to the movement, (2) when social ties exist between movement members and potential participants, thereby giving potential recruits an opportunity to see that participants are ‘just like me’ (Lamont, 1992; Small et al., 2010; Swidler, 1986, 2001), (3) when social movements successfully frame social movement participation as a way of protecting one’s sacred identities, and (4) when social movements employ narratives that resonate emotionally with potential participants (Viterna, 2013: 52–54; see also Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Through processes both internal and external, potential social movement participants develop the requisite attitudes, identities, and dispositions needed to engage in activism.

Four-step model

Shortcomings of the affinity-initiated models

Extant research using the affinity-initiated model reduces the micromobilization process to an empirical analysis of one or two steps, foregoing analysis or theoretical consideration of other important stages, or (as is the case with the Klandermans and Oegema model, as well as much of the network analyses of mobilization, including, for instance: McAdam, 2000; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993) implies recruitment and network linkages operate as causally necessary factors that come into play only at a specific point in the micromobilization process. Alternatively, I propose that recruitment and network linkages be stripped of any causally deterministic quality and, instead, be treated as mobilizing structures that affect the likelihood that an individual will be selected ‘in’ or ‘out’ at multiple steps throughout this process. Some (Jasper and Young, 2007) have argued that Klandermans and Oegema’s (1987) model overemphasizes social ties’ causally necessary role in micromobilization. In fact, quite often networks may play little role in pulling individuals into social movements (Fisher and McInerney, 2012; Jasper, 1997, 1998; Jasper and Poulsen, 1995; Jasper and Young, 2007; Luker, 1984), despite contrary popular consensus (Jasper and Young, 2007). Focusing on network structure, Centola and Macy (2007) even found that networks composed of too many weak ties could impede the diffusion of collective behaviors with higher adoption thresholds, such as high-risk social movement activism. This is not to say that networks do not matter. Several authors have argued persuasively that they may in many cases (Barkan et al., 1995; Kitts, 1999; McAdam, 1986; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Passy and Giugni, 2001; Snow et al., 1980). However, not every social behavior diffuses the same way through networks (Centola and Macy, 2007) and, often, their causal effects are exaggerated and unclear (Jasper and Young, 2007).

I suggest that Klandermans and Oegema (1987) actually under-theorize the role social ties play in the micromobilization process. Rather than solely conceiving of recruitment and mobilization attempts as a causally necessary precondition for the generation of collective action-awareness (that may or may not translate into motivation), I argue social ties are best conceived of as conduits of processes affecting the likelihood individuals will support a movement, be motivated to participate, and/or actually participate. My approach (a) explicitly acknowledges the probabilistic influence of social ties on micromobilization, following Jasper and Young (2007), rather than tethering them to a strong causal determinism implied in the Klandermans and Oegema (1987) model, and (b) (as discussed below) allows me to more fully theorize social ties’ differentiating capacities by identifying varied ways they might influence differentiation at multiple analytically distinct steps (rather than just a single step) in the micromobilization process. While social ties may play a critical role in generating awareness about opportunities to participate in collective action, I argue they can accomplish much more. In so doing I offer a reformulation and extension – not a wholesale refutation – of the invaluable model developed by Klandermans and Oegema.

Reconceptualizing the role of social ties in micromobilization

For quite some time, ‘structural availability’ – the ‘presence of interpersonal networks which facilitate recruitment to activism’ (Schussman and Soule, 2005: 1086) – has been a central concept in the study of micromobilization. While a number of important factors, such as biographical availability and psychological and political engagement, have been found to be important in micromobilization, social ties hold a preeminent place in this literature.

Rather than suggesting social ties and networks are central to micromobilization because they exist as a kind of necessary hurdle that must be cleared only at a particular point in a prescribed, uni-directional sequence of steps, I argue social ties are of central importance because they act as conduits channeling social process that affect the likelihood individuals are differentiated at multiple analytically distinct micromobilization stages. Below, I suggest how social ties might help differentiate individuals at each of the (now) three steps in my revised version of the Klandermans and Oegema (1987) model.

Participation in what?

While participation remains an important focus of social movement research, there has been little effort to ask, participation in what kind of mobilization exactly? Focusing on identifying analytically distinct micromobilization steps or combinations of steps, as well as thinking about how unique factors and processes differentiate individuals at each of these steps, draws our collective attention to this overlooked empirical question.

First, the processes differentiating individuals at each step in the micromobilization process may vary based on whether or not participation is classified as low-risk/cost or high-risk/cost. Saunders et al. (2012: 266), for instance, suggest that ambiguous and conflicting results surrounding biographical availability’s influence in differentiating participants from non-participants are, in part, ‘artifacts of the different research contexts studied,’ some of which could undoubtedly be classified as high-risk/cost and others as low-risk/cost. In other words, differentiation based on biographical availability may depend on the variable risk and costs associated with the activism. And this may, in fact, hold for a variety of other key factors, such as social ties. Second, by extension, the form of collective action in which individuals are engaged – whether it be rallies or sit-ins, petition signing or street demonstrations – may involve their own unique set of steps. And, again, the specific processes differentiating individuals at each of these unique steps may differ as this form differs. Along these lines, but thinking even more broadly, the general character of the movement may matter. For instance, the emerging consensus on the mobilization of reactive and proactive social movements is that reactive movements are driven largely by threatening contextual shifts, whereas proactive movements mobilize in response to fluctuations in the political opportunity structure and relevant resource and organizational bases (Almeida, 2003; Blee, 2006; McVeigh, 2009; Martin and Dixon, 2010; Van Dyke and Soule, 2002). Proactive movements involve ‘claims making by disadvantaged minorities’ (McAdam et al., 2005: 2), whereas reactive mobilization is aimed at defending the status quo and/or reclaiming real or perceived losses of resources and power among advantaged groups (McVeigh, 2009; Tilly, 1978). However, to fully understand why proactive and reactive movements mobilize differently at the macro-level requires further examination of the sort of micromobilization processes highlighted in this article.

Current micromobilization literature, however, presents roadblocks to addressing these issues. Studies at the intersection of social psychology and collective action, for instance, tend to focus overwhelmingly on protest participation. Or when they do measure a variety of action forms, they lump them together in an index (Wright, 2009). Case-based studies of collective action also tend to focus mostly on protest participation or treat ‘participation’ as a catchall for a variety of distinct forms of collective action. Here, I am not claiming that each different form of collective action does involve a unique set of micromobilization steps, but I am suggesting that this question remains an overlooked one worthy of further investigation.

Finally, the issue, cause, or purpose underlying mobilization may have a significant impact on both the steps involved and the processes of differentiation at each of these. Indeed, this was one, among several, underlying themes of a multinational project – Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation (CCC) – that was the subject of a special issue in the journal Mobilization. In the words of project organizers, ‘the type of demonstration, the mobilization context, and the features of a country determine who shows up, why, and how’ (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2012: 253). In other words, who shows up, why, and how should be treated as variable. A small but growing body of literature confirms this (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). Verhulst (2011), for instance, found that different issues affected not only the kinds of individuals that showed up to participate in protest, but also influenced how individuals were mobilized. Blee (1996, 2011) and Munson (2008) – studying distinct social movements, both of which, however, fell under the larger umbrella of right-wing conservatism – found that more often than not, individuals were initially drawn into these right-wing movements through some form of a social tie rather than because of personal ideology. Such a finding is counterintuitive and stands in contrast with numerous studies of politically progressive mobilization that find the opposite.

This anomalous result may exist for, at least, two reasons. First, it may be due, in part, to the fact that there are far fewer studies of groups on the right, meaning we are less likely to observe a context in which ties are not important. On the other hand, if the issue, cause, or purpose underlying collective action influences the structure of recruitment, this finding may reflect the fact that collective action predicated on right-wing ideology mobilizes differently than politically progressive collective action. More research is obviously needed, but adopting the analytic strategies developed in this article helps reveal such an interesting, understudied research avenue.

Why stop with actual participation?

As Saunders et al. (2012: 263) recently noted, ‘relatively little attention [has been] devoted to understanding the differences among those who protest more and less intensely and/or persistently.’ However, the leading model of micromobilization considered in this article treats participation as a final step in the micromobilization process. But why stop with actual participation? Can this step itself be further refined into a series of micro processes? In this respect, Gould’s (1995) work on the French Commune is, again, instructive. Gould found that informal social ties played an important causal role even after participation had been initiated. That is, social ties affected the character of the ongoing participation – its intensity and sustainability. Munson (2008) hinted that moral shock could play a role in sustaining participation, thereby implying participation could itself be treated as an ongoing process rather than a final end point. Viterna (2013) argues that the same factors shaping initial mobilization should also influence remobilization. Given that emotion, informal ties, and networks shape the intensity and sustainability of participation, initial participation and the inputs predicting it become not simply an outcome to be explained but also an important part of explaining continued participation.

Corrigall-Brown’s (2011: 4) mixed methods research on activists’ trajectories of engagement over time is especially illuminating in this regard. Encouraging scholars to view activism as a ‘process whereby people participate with varying degrees of continuity’ rather than a series of discrete, disconnected episodes, Corrigall-Brown highlights four different trajectories individuals undergo after initial activism: persistence (continue to participate), transfer (hop from one social movement organization to the next), individual abeyance (disengage from a social movement organization only to return to activism at a later time), and disengagement (permanently cease all participation in activism). While some activists persist or transfer – as was the case for many activists exiting the civil rights movement of the 1960s in the United States, only to be quickly drawn into the women’s rights or human rights movements due to shared tactics among the movements (Meyer and Whittier, 1994; Tarrow, 1998) – many display a trajectory of individual abeyance in which episodes of engagement wax and wane yet remain connected over time through individual abeyance structures (Corrigall-Brown, 2011: 8; see also Fendrich, 1993; McAdam, 1988; Sherkat and Blocker, 1997). Rather than conceptualizing these episodes as discrete and disconnected, Corrigall-Brown (2011) suggests they are loosely and coherently bound through networks, ideologies, goals, and tactics developed through initial engagement. By extension, initial participation in activism is not so much a final step but is, in many respects, the beginning of a unique set of outcomes cohered by processes warranting further investigation.

What about feedback effects?

Researchers tend to discuss micromobilization as if the steps outlined in their models are both given and static. Recall that Klandermans and Oegema’s (1987) model operated in a sequential and uni-directional manner. One step follows the next. Yet, conceptualizing micromobilization as an ongoing process may lead one to question this collective wisdom. Consider, for instance, a scenario in which actual participation in movement-related activities strengthens or weakens subsequent willingness to participate and/or movement support. The idea, while under-explored in the literature, is not absent in toto. McAdam (1986), focusing exclusively on high-risk activism, suggested participation might spur deepening ideological socialization and formation of an activist identity, one basis of motivation. Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) assumed a reciprocal relationship existed between participation and willingness to participate and then empirically tested this assumption. Work by Craig Calhoun (1994), James Jasper (1997), and Alberto Melucci (1996) lends weight to the argument that collective identity formation – and, hence, motivation to participate – can be an outcome of participation as much as it can be a critical step toward participation.

Social psychological work on the emergence of crowd behavior and social change also buttresses my call for a more processual approach to micromobilization in which feedback effects may matter. Work by Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009), for instance, highlighted the ongoing interplay between feelings of empowerment – that is ‘confidence in one’s ability to challenge existing relations of domination’ (Drury and Reicher, 2005: 35) – and participation in collective action. Empowerment, they suggested, was both a precursor to and product of collective action. By extension, initial participation in collective action may lay the groundwork for subsequent motivations, such as empowerment, that can, in turn, spur future engagement in activism. Finally, a recent empirical study by Tausch and Becker (2013) underscores my call for more work in this area. Using a two-wave longitudinal study design of student protests against tuition fees in Germany, the authors found that persistent participation in collective action was partially driven by individuals’ emotional reactions to prior experiences of both success and failure within the movement, thus providing some initial empirical evidence for a more processual conceptualization of micromobilization in which analytically distinct stages can operate recursively. Despite such promising work, the overwhelming majority of traditional micromobilization research has been wedded, both in its conceptual and empirical modeling, to the idea that micromobilization is a series of discrete steps arrayed in a uni-directional manner. We would do well to explore alternative possibilities.