Abstract
For analytic theologians, the new Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology series is a welcomed set of monographs, further adding to the depth and range of scholarship in a (relatively) young discipline. William Hasker’s Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, as an included work in this series, makes good on what analytic theologians hoped this Oxford series would contribute, namely, rigorous study and analysis of key theological doctrines. This particular work’s analysis and extensive bibliography (with current secondary sources), falsifies the relatively naïve conception that analytic theology is without intellectual heritage and wide-ranging scholarship. Moreover, Hasker’s work gives theologians and philosophers reason to consider analytic theology as a serious venture, one for which there is an actual need. He argues convincingly that it often won’t do for theologians to parrot accepted platitudes. Honest reflection on some of Christian theology’s doctrines should convince many that further clarification and explication is sorely needed, the Doctrine of the Trinity included.
The Doctrine of the Trinity seems always destined, whilst inviting further reflection, to be an invitation into heresy. Hasker, though, navigates the many pitfalls well, all the while being forthright about the doctrine’s seemingly contradictory premises, his own misgivings and trepidations. Most importantly, though, as an analytic work, Hasker gives a well-reasoned metaphysical account of how such a Trinitarian God might be coherent—that is, beyond simply asserting that, as a matter of Christian faith, it is coherent.
While I happily welcome Hasker’s contribution to the literature on this score, in the end, I don’t find his arguments compelling. His excellent trace of the history and current debate notwithstanding, ultimately, he grounds his argument on what seems, to me, an incoherent metaphysics—the metaphysics of ‘constitution’ (espoused by Lynne Rudder Baker, et. al.). For reasons I cannot explicate here, there seem good reasons to reject the metaphysics of constitution, which was developed to help solve problems of material constitution. I don’t think the view works with respect to material entities. And, if it doesn’t work for the very things for which it is initially intended to explain, I think it unwise to drag it in to explain an already befuddling doctrine.
My disagreement aside, I think this is an insightful, clear, rigorous, and helpful account whose prose and structure encourages the reader, rather than bogging her down in dry, ivory-tower discussion. As such, I highly recommend the book to anyone interested in thinking through Christianity’s Doctrine of the Trinity.