The indeterminacy of ‘temporariness’: Control and power in neo-bureaucratic organizations and work in UK television

Introduction

Although temporary organizational forms have a long history in certain industries, they can also be viewed as part of a wider organizational shift from hierarchical forms, which dominated western economies for the second half of the 20th century, to more responsive forms, representative of a neo-bureaucratic organizational setting (Clegg, 2011; Farrell and Morris, 2003; Townley et al., 2009). Thus, within a broader context of intensified global competition, corporations are concentrating on core activities in leaner organizations by outsourcing non-core activities (‘choose and focus’). This has also been facilitated by far-reaching technological (ICT) developments.

This article reports on the emergence of the neo-bureaucratic organizational form in the UK television (TV) industry in the past 20 years, driven by globalization, deregulation and technological change (Grugulis and Stoyanova, 2012; Sengupta et al., 2009). While the TV industry is not alone in using temporary forms, it is unusual in several regards, not least in the length of duration of the temporary organizations – although longer-term temporary organizations exist in the industry, it is also characterized by extremely short-term arrangements of as little as a few days or a week (Bechky, 2004). Multiple temporary organizational settings are being enacted at any one time by large broadcasting companies at the apex of the neo-bureaucratic form, by independent producers and indeed by the freelancers who proliferate in the industry. This has significant implications for how these temporary organizations are coordinated and controlled, particularly compared with temporary organizations that are more long-standing and durable. These temporary organizational settings are being continuously reinvented and reconfigured, personnel-wise.

The empirical data focus on three aspects of temporary organizing: the structure, process and coordinating mechanisms in this neo-bureaucratic form. This indicates that the structure of the independent organizations in the industry is more complex than previously indicated, and the relationships are not based on spot-market transactions. Rather, large broadcasters use such mechanisms to channel and coordinate this neo-bureaucratic form of organizing through setting norms and expectations (Reed, 2011), by using familiar ‘go-to’ individuals and firms, and using insider knowledge of personnel to ensure ‘quality control’, thus manipulating social capital. Although much has been written on how social capital is used in such forms, and in TV in particular, the focus has largely been on how individual freelancers leverage their social capital to gain work (Tempest et al., 2004). How the large broadcasters and independents use it to regulate and control the form has received little attention. As such, the article makes a number of contributions. First, it adds to the literature, theoretically and empirically, on how these new organizational forms are controlled by large corporations (in this case the broadcasters) through their regulation of the neo-bureaucratic form, through normative and cultural means, in a context where many of the people working in the industry no longer do so in a formal bureaucratic setting. Second, it expores how social capital plays an important role in this temporary organizational setting, as much as a means of coordinating and controlling freelance work as of accessing it. Thus, this temporary organizational form needs to be regarded as inextricably interwoven within a certain organizational and social context (Jones et al., 1997). It further explores how the structures and processes of temporary organizing are used to regulate these forms. In short, the article explores the control regimes used in a ‘neo-bureaucratic’ setting. Third, it adds to our knowledge of ‘temporariness’, arguing that, far from temporary work fitting into neat categories, such notions of temporality are confused, overlapping and complex, and as such, it explores the structure and process of temporary organizing.

To this end, the article is divided into three further sections. The next will outline the emergence of neo-bureaucratic organizational forms with a particular emphasis on power, control and coordination of these forms. It will then describe developments in work and organization in the UK TV industry over the past few decades as context for the emergence of temporary organizations in this industry, reporting on research findings drawn from 75 interviews with industry participants in large broadcasters, independent companies and freelancers. The findings are divided into sections exploring the structure of temporary organizations, the process of temporary organizing, and how temporary organizations are coordinated and controlled through the use of social capital in the industry. A discussion of the findings is then made and conclusions drawn.

Temporary arrangements as ‘new’ organizational forms

There has been increasing interest in temporary organizations as part of a wider discussion of alternative, neo-bureaucratic organizational forms – alternative in the sense of traditional principles of either hierarchies or pure markets. They are, it is argued, premised upon more uncertain markets that, in turn, are predicated upon global competition and pressures to offer a more flexible organizational response. However, such forms have been particularly prevalent in a relatively small number of settings, some long-standing such as project-based work in construction, for example, others in newly emerging high-technology sectors including biotechnology and software engineering (Barley and Kunda, 2004), and yet others in existing, but reformed industries, such as film and TV. As portrayed in the next section, the TV industry has shifted from being one based on traditional hierarchical principles to one based on far greater outsourcing and use of the external labour market – a neo-bureaucratic form that requires new types of control regimes. As Reed (2011) notes, contemporary debates on such neo-bureaucratic organizations have major implications for the control regimes associated with network forms of governance, which have led to more complex logics and modes of control that differ from bureaucratic regimes; the bureaucratic control logics will be replaced by ‘a multidimensional organization control logic and mode that supersedes core control principles’ (Reed 2011: 233). However, Farrell and Morris (2003) argue that these new forms will represent a hybrid form of organizing that also has implications for control (Clegg, 2011; Courpasson and Reed, 2004).

Analytically, it is possible to distinguish, in ideal typical terms, between three distinctive forms of organization – ‘bureaucratic’, ‘neo-bureaucratic’ and ‘post-bureaucratic’ – in relation to three interrelated conceptual components. The latter comprise the structural logics on which the organization’s co-ordination and control systems are designed, the governance mechanisms through which these systems are legitimated and managed, and the cultural frameworks that embed such control systems and governance mechanisms within wider, overarching value orders.

Over the past two decades or so, successive attempts have been made to identify these crucial analytical variations and to develop models that theorize the contrasting ways in which they can be combined to generate distinctive forms of organizing and the conditions under which they are most likely to appear (Alvesson and Thompson, 2005; Farrell and Morris, 2003). Although the logic of ideal typical analysis is based on the search for contrasting generic types that are internally coherent and externally separable, an emerging theme within this type of analysis has been the increasing recognition afforded to ‘hybrid forms’ and their importance for understanding contemporary workplaces (Clegg, 2011; Courpasson and Clegg, 2012; Courpasson and Reed, 2004). The relevance of hybrid organizational forms, combining contrasting, if not opposing, design and control logics, seems to become even more acute under socio-economic and political conditions of enhanced complexity, uncertainty and instability (Johnson et al., 2009; Palmer et al., 2007). Under these conditions, it is argued, institutional elites and their organizational managers have little choice but to construct, operate and legitimate structural designs, control technologies and corporate cultures that are inherently fragmented and unstable. Thus, hybrid forms, such as the ‘neo-bureaucratic organization’, emerge under such conditions and have little or no choice but to follow design and control logics that are meant to contain and channel the underlying structural and cultural contradictions that necessarily confront them.

The key analytical features of the ‘bureaucratic’ organizational form have been a focus for organizational theorizing and research since Weber. However, the need to locate and interpret the former within the latter’s analysis of institutionalized power relations has not been so clearly or consistently recognized (Clegg et al., 2006; du Gay, 2005). Indeed, Weber’s ideal typical specification of ‘legal-rational bureaucracy’ as a distinctive organizational form has all too often been ripped out of his wider socio-political and cultural analysis in ways that have had fateful negative theoretical consequences for social scientific work in this area over an extended period of time (Alvesson and Thompson, 2005). As a result, contemporary research and analysis of changing organizational forms continues to be focused around evolutionary models of structural differentiation and socio-technical development that marginalize, if not ignore, the wider power relations and political processes within which the latter are necessarily embedded.

Unsurprisingly, debates about the ‘post-bureaucratic organization’ identify, or at least envisage, a fundamental set of interrelated technological, economic, political and cultural transformations that undermine, if not emasculate, the material and structural foundations on which the organizational edifice of legal-rational bureaucracy rested (Alvesson and Thompson, 2005; Child and McGrath, 2001). In summary form, these radical changes, it is argued, interact and combine to generate levels of decision-making complexity, environmental uncertainty and political instability that the bureaucratic organization is incapable of coping with – never mind dealing with – in an effective and coherent manner (Mason, 2015). As the design logic, control regime and cultural system defining the latter begin to unwind, fragment and breakdown – admittedly a protracted and complex process for even the most ardent of the ‘post-bureaucratic theorists’ (Castells, 2000) – under the escalating pressures exerted by this conjuncture of radical changes, system-wide transformations kick in that make the bureaucratic form of organization untenable. They also usher in an alternative ‘post-bureaucratic form’ that breaks with the axiomatic principles and core rules on which bureaucratic organization was based. This is the case insofar as the former rests on a design logic, control technology and cultural system diametrically opposed to that sustaining its bureaucratic forebear; the whole organizational edifice has to be subject to root and branch reconstruction rather than selective refurbishment and repair.

Consequently, the post-bureaucratic organization can be represented in an ideal type that transmutes the core elements associated with the classic bureaucratic form to produce an organizational form of an entirely different order and identity. Specialization, standardization and formalization of work practices and relations are superseded by collaborative, flexible and spontaneous modes of working in which improvisation, risk-taking and creativity are regarded as normal, indeed crucial, characteristics of the work environment and culture rather than as threats to an established administrative order that have to be contained, if not eradicated, in order to protect the latter’s coherence and integrity. Within this much more individualized and personalized workplace, control moves away from the direct, intrusive and continuous surveillance associated with bureaucratic organization towards the ‘concertive’ modes of work regulation typical of high-skill, expert-dependent and ‘knowledge-intensive’ working environments (Courpasson, 2000; Ezzamel and Burns, 2005; Reed, 2005; Sewell and Barker, 2006). The latter control regime, typical of the post-bureaucratic organization, integrates highly decentralized project-led and team-based working with concentrated strategic control at the centre through advanced communication and control technologies that make work activities and relations, at all levels below the strategic centre, much more open, transparent and accountable. Finally, this collaborative working environment and concertive control regime are overlaid by a ‘high-trust/soft power’ corporate culture in which individual and collective learning from mistakes and failures are encouraged rather than punished, and ‘the employee’ is treated as a unique individual rather than a number on a spreadsheet (Fleming and Spicer, 2007). The post-bureaucratic organization becomes a contested social and spatial arena within which employees, of all grades and specialities, are encouraged, indeed required, to challenge and contest the policies and practices through which the former becomes a sustainable reality.

The ‘post-bureaucratic organization’ thesis tends to be rather long on theorization and rather short on empirical grounding, never mind ‘verification’ (Johnson et al., 2009). As a result, a number of organizational researchers, particularly those working on public service organizations in which the role of the state, at all levels of political governance, is much more important in shaping workplace cultures and practices, have developed a hybrid model of the ‘neo-bureaucratic organization’ as an ideal type that strives to get closer to the ‘messy reality’ of contemporary organizational life (Clegg et al., 2006; Courpasson and Clegg, 2012; Farrell and Morris, 2003; Hoggett, 2005).

Considered in these terms, the ‘neo-bureaucratic organization’ is seen to retain several of the key structural features of ‘bureaucratic organization’ – such as centralized strategic control, technologically advanced systems of workplace surveillance and regulation, and continuous monitoring of workplace behaviour against corporately determined performance targets – while combining them, however uneasily and ‘messily’, with modes of cultural integration and corporate socialization that decisively break with the logic of bureaucratic management. The latter place much greater trust in horizontal workplace relations and behaviours more appropriate to project-based forms of team-working characterized by short-term timelines and contractually based modes of workload allocation in which a modus vivendi must be struck between centrally determined policies and highly contingent, flexible and temporary patterns of operating. Neo-bureaucratic organization, as an inherently hybridized organizational form, achieves this modus vivendi between corporate control and professional/craft-based modes of working characteristic of creative industries, such as the UK TV industry (Townley et al., 2009), by combining a wide range of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power mechanisms in which the former take on a level of complexity and significance that cannot be accommodated within the structural logic of the bureaucratic form.

As a hybrid form, neo-bureaucratic organization becomes much more dependent on ‘soft power’ mechanisms to integrate employees into a corporate culture that expects them to manage and control themselves in ways that are appropriate to professional-cum-craft-based modes of working in which project-based autonomy and highly specialized technical skills are at a premium. However, it cannot afford to dispense entirely with the ‘hard power’ mechanisms associated with bureaucratic management because this would be too high-risk in a working environment already pervaded by levels of uncertainty and instability characteristic of a vertically disintegrated and horizontally co-ordinated industry in which there is constant political and financial pressure to rationalize, marketize and downsize. Neo-bureaucratic organization facilitates the development and legitimation of ‘polyarchic’ governance regimes (Clegg et al, 2006; Courpasson and Clegg, 2012; Reed, 2012) that combine ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power mechanisms in ways that allow knowledge workers, craft-based professionals and technical specialists a relatively high degree of freedom and autonomy in performing their work roles, while simultaneously ensuring that their capacity to elide and resist managerial control is contained within the limits laid down by administrative elites. Polyarchic governance regimes maintain a flexible and dynamic balance between elite strategic control and professional operational autonomy by maintaining the overall authority of the organization’s upper echelons or managerial oligarchy, while ensuring that middle-ranking experts and specialists receive sufficient encouragement to engage with and be socialized by internal cultural and symbolic mechanisms facilitating corporate identification and integration. In this way, inter-organizational co-ordination and intra-organizational control can be simultaneously achieved by combining selected elements of network-based forms of regulation with hierarchically based forms of managing in order to ensure an always inherently dynamic, shifting and contested balance between corporate power and professional autonomy.

Neo-bureaucratic organization involves the continued centralization of selective ‘hard power’ mechanisms typical of orthodox bureaucratic control, such as intensive and remote performance monitoring, combined with the delegation and devolution associated with certain ‘soft power’ mechanisms, such as those corporate cultural programmes aimed at re-investing work roles with high-level emotional and personal value for individual employees (Fleming and Spicer, 2007; Fleming and Sturdy, 2006). Polyarchic governance regimes provide a regulative architecture within which hard and soft power mechanisms can be brought together insofar as they facilitate a simultaneous ‘hollowing out’ of conventional administrative control systems previously operated by middle- and lower-level management, while ensuring that a more ‘participative’ and ‘open’ form of elite dominance emerges that is politically and ideologically sensitive to the needs of professional and technical groups (Courpasson and Clegg, 2012).

By achieving a viable compromise between strategic elite control and pluralistic stakeholder involvement, particularly in relation to those expert groups of ‘knowledge workers’ on which the organization depends for its creative vitality and commercial success, polyarchic bureaucracies enable contemporary corporate businesses to develop the much higher degree of structural flexibility and cultural sophistication required to survive, if not prosper, within a highly competitive environment. They also provide an overarching framework within which sectors dominated by temporary organizational forms, consisting of a plethora of contracting and sub-contracting agents loosely held together by short-term ties and interests but crucially dependent on a continuing supply of highly skilled and well-motivated craft-cum-professional ‘knowledge workers’, can achieve a sufficient degree of ‘negotiated order’ to become institutionally and economically viable in the longer term. However, these sectors and the organizational forms that populate them have no option but to manage very high levels of inter-organizational strain and intra-organizational stress typical of hybridized environments within which the threat, and indeed, reality of creative and commercial failure is never very far away.

In such a scenario, these forms are more responsive than hierarchies, but have a greater element of control and coordination than markets. They are more open, dynamic and adaptable than hierarchies, and whereas hierarchies rely on command and control, these forms rely on softer controls based on trust, reciprocity and mutuality (Townley et al., 2009) and through normative or culture-based control regimes (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). However, as we shall argue later, these forms are also subject to more diffuse forms of control, particularly through the manipulation of social capital. This is particularly the case in creative industries such as TV, which necessitate a different set of organizational challenges because of the nature of the ‘product’, in which there is an ‘inherent unknowability’ (Caves, 2000).

Whereas the prime advantage of such a move to neo-bureaucratic temporary organizations is to reduce costs in uncertain markets, one of the major potential disadvantages is the ways in which they are controlled and coordinated and hence have increased quality risks. This is the case when relationships are fairly consistent, but in TV and film, transactions are often focused on intermittent projects and reliant on temporary organizing forms that are often taken up and dropped to be resumed at a later date (Bechky, 2006; Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008). As such, these temporary organizations may vary in duration, which contrasts with traditional hierarchical organizations as they are governed through relationships rather than on traditional lines of bureaucratic authority (Jones et al., 1997). These are coordinated across firms and industries, with these forms relying more on mechanisms such as socialization, reciprocity and trust, and reputation (Jones et al., 1997). They also require the development of ‘swift trust’ between various participants in the temporary organizational setting in order to overcome the limitations of working in an organizational ‘one night stand’ (Meyerson et al., 1996).

Bechky (2006) notes that in temporary organizational settings role structure is used to organize (and regulate and control) behaviour – a role-based approach to co-ordination. In the case of the film industry, she notes that role enactments are heavily used in order to structure organization and behaviour, such as thanking, admonishing and joking in order to negotiate order. These relatively ‘soft’ behavioural enactments not only facilitate the completion of projects but are also a function of the ongoing interactions in that film crews may be brought together in some future interactions; in other words, people may well work together in future, therefore maintaining a balance between role performance and relationship maintenance (Bechky, 2006).

Social capital thus plays an important role here. This has been defined in a variety of ways (Adler and Kwon, 2002), but here it will be used to indicate how individuals mobilize their resources within the context of their membership of social and professional networks (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), and, further, the ways by which these ties are used to maintain strong centralized control of neo-bureaucratic forms. For example, Skilton (2008) illustrates the ways in which family and work relationships and ‘similarity’ are used to break into Hollywood film projects, and Uzzi and Spiro (2005) similarly point to the connections of networks in Broadway shows. The role of social capital in both inclusion (and exclusion) has been extensively documented, but less so in how it is used in such a neo-bureaucratic form for industry control and coordinating mechanisms on the part of large broadcasters and independent producers.

Barley and Kunda (2004), in their ethnographic account of Californian software workers, anticipated that freelance workers would have taken such a form of work out of necessity, either because of redundancy or lack of alternative employment opportunities, an essentially negative situation. However, although they found that this was largely true, their sample relished the freedoms of working freelance, although they also perceived this work as unpredictable, uncertain and insecure, and spent considerable time developing and nurturing their social networks – a situation very similar to freelance TV workers in the UK (Hodgson and Briand, 2013). In other words, these freelancers developed their social capital in a situation where work is structured, as it is in film production, by normative control constraints and structures of behaviour (Bechky, 2006). These mechanisms are, therefore, used by workers in temporary organizations to plan and manage their careers and to help in their mobile work life (Jones and DeFillippi, 1996). As Bechky (2006) notes, this is, in turn, rooted in a value-based work ethic that is translated into a strong sense of normative rules or expectations on the part of contractors, as part of a professional craft ethos (and, possibly a self-exploitative one: Reed, 2011), which was also strongly evident in our study.

Core organizations thus ‘manage’ temporary ones through a variety of hard and soft mechanisms (including manipulation of personal ties), and individuals use their social capital to further their position within temporary organizational forms. Tempest et al. (2004), for example, comparing the TV and financial service industries, argue that whereas traditional internal labour markets have ended in both, social capital has become increasingly important in the TV industry for freelance workers ensuring that they recieve employment opportunities. Furthermore, social capital formation is reinforced by spatial agglomeration of individuals and groups in industries, and consequent frequent formal (workplace) and informal (social) interaction, particularly in creative industries (Grabher, 2004).

Individuals thus positively work their social capital within these temporary organizations, aiding recruitment, policing quality standards and ensuring behavioural norms. The major broadcasters and independents, meanwhile, rely on this social capital to coordinate and control freelancers.

The empirical data

The data reporting is divided into five parts. First, the methodology is outlined, and second, it reports on organization and work in UK TV. Third, it then reports on the structure of neo-bureaucratic organizing to indicate the myriad arrangements, both in terms of the duration and types. Fourth, it will report on the process of temporary organizing to indicate both the formal and more informal ways in which the large broadcasters control these forms via the bidding process, and again the complex arena of temporary organizing. Lastly, and relatedly, it will explore how social capital is used by both freelancers and independents to gain access to work, but also how broadcasters and independents control this in terms of maintaining programme quality and industry norms.

Methods and methodology

The research reported on here is a study of the neo-bureaucratic organizing form in the UK TV industry. The data are based on three sources of qualitative data. First, a series of 75 qualitative interviews with managers and professionals were drawn from three sources: the three main UK TV providers, 16 independent TV providers and a group of freelance TV professionals. These were further divided into a set of semi-structured interviews (45) and a set of (30) unstructured preparatory and follow-up interviews, largely (but not exclusively) with freelancers (see Table 1). The formal interviews were with key informants from the industry such as commissioners and senior managers (all of whom were ex-professionals at the major broadcasters), with owners and senior managers at the independents (all but one were TV professionals) and with the freelancers, who were, intentionally, an occupational mixture of producers, directors, presenters, location managers, floor managers, editors, camera operators, wardrobe, and make-up and hairdressing. Age-wise, the respondents provided a mix of ages, with the youngest in their early twenties and the oldest in their sixties, with a mix of males and females. The second source of data was a range of documentary sources from the industry, and the third was the prior experience of the first author as a freelance expert on TV. The independent company managers had all formerly worked for the large producer broadcasters (with one exception) and retained key hands-on experience in executive producer/director roles in productions, meaning that they had both strategic and operational insights. All but six of the freelancers had also formerly worked for the big producers.

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Table 1.

List of interviewees.

Interview	Gender	Job description/employer
1.	Female	Job pitcher, independent
2.	Male	Production manager, independent
3.	Male	Commissioning editor, BBC (ex-ITV)
4.	Male	Producer/director, independent
5.	Male	Freelancer, producer (former senior BBC)
6.	Female	Freelancer, make-up
7.	Male	Video maker
8.	Male	Freelance, special effects
9.	Female	Freelance, producer/director
10.	Female	Freelance, wardrobe
11.	Male	Freelance director
12.	Male	Freelance editor
13.	Female	Freelance editor
14.	Male	Freelance director
15.	Male	Freelance camera operator
16.	Male	Freelance editor
17.	Male	Independent producer/director
18.	Male	Freelance producer
19.	Male	Freelance producer/director
20.	Male	Independent producer
21.	Male	Independent marketing director
22.	Male	Independent owner, producer director
23.	Male	Freelance, music
24.	Male	Freelance programme maker
25.	Female	Freelance, make-up
26.	Female	Freelance, presenter
27.	Female	Freelance, producer and presenter
28.	Male	Freelance, producer/director
29.	Male	COO, independent
30.	Female	Production location manager
31.	Male	Independent owner, freelance camera, editor
32.	Male	Freelance director, floor manager
33.	Male	Freelance floor manager
34.	Male	Independent owner, editor and post-production
35.	Male	Freelance camera
36.	Male	Independent post-production
37.	Male	Independent owner, producer
38.	Male	Freelance editor, director
39.	Male	Freelance producer/director
40.	Male	Freelance camera
41.	Female	Freelance camera
42.	Male	Freelance post-production
43.	Male	Freelance camera
44.	Male	Freelance director/ producer
45.	Male	Freelance TV and video producer

The interview schedules were based on one devised by the first author and another, for the freelancers, loosely based and modified to the one used by Barley and Kunda (2004) for their study of IT freelancers. The former included questions on: the reasons for using independents and freelancers; the numbers of freelancers used; the terms of contracts used with independents and freelancers; the number of pitches for work; and rates of pay. The second set of questions included: the reasons for freelancing; the frequency of work; working conditions; pay; the ways in which they gained work; the time spent on non-productive work, including meetings, networking and other social capital formation functions; and the impact of freelance work on careers (the schedule is available from the authors). The sampling was a combination of using TV industry directories, for example that compiled by the main UK trade union (BECTU, 2014), personal contacts in the industry, and conceptually driven sequential sampling, or ‘snowball’ techniques, based on asking previous informants who in the industry would be particularly worth talking to. This provided for unfolding ideas and concepts to emerge (Starkey et al., 2000).

The semi-structured interviews lasted typically one to two hours (the unstructured ones were more informal and varied in length) and were followed up by email correspondence or telephone interviews for clarifications. Although some of the freelancers worked partly outside the TV industry, as did some of the independents, all of their primary business was in the industry. The formal interviews took place in 2014 and 2015, and the companies were based in a number of locations, in London and elsewhere in the UK. The interviews either took place in workplaces (a minority) or in cafes and coffee bars, often also used as socializing locations.

Organization and work in UK TV

The UK TV sector, and the broader industry, has undergone major, interconnected and overlapping, changes in the past two to three decades, including technological change, globalization, internationalization, deregulation and quasi-privatization, consequent organizational and labour market change and, since 2008, dramatic cost-cutting (authors’ interviews):

The BBC two-to-three years ago faced big cuts … we are facing year-on-year cuts, in terms of departments, factual and management positions. We will cut staff immediately and rapidly move to freelancers. For example, apart from current affairs and news, 35% of work is contracted out, and most of current affairs will be. So there is going to be lots of growth in the freelance market, traditionally there has always been in drama, but this is increasingly going to be across the board. A staff job will be something of the past.

These trends have put cost pressures on programme-making and freelance wages and work intensification, including multiskilling, long hours and reduced ‘fringe benefits’ (Dex et al., 2000; Grugulis and Stoyanova, 2012), made worse by the marginalization of organized labour (McKinlay, 2009).

The BBC commissioner noted that:

The independents have been through a dramatic change with a significant squeeze on them and considerable consolidation. There are three tiers. One are the biggies, two are the mid-size ones and three are the niche providers. But the days of the niche independents is going.

The structure of temporary organizing

The independent sector can be divided into six broad groups:

If this distinction is complex enough, it is further complicated by workers combining working for the major broadcasters or the independents with acting as freelancers ‘on the side’ as an extra source of income. Already we have noted the celebrity-run boutique operations. Formerly, celebrity presenters, for example talk-show hosts or comedians, were contracted to one of the large broadcasters for a show, a season or whatever, but this distinction has now gone. Moreover, people who would normally be associated with one broadcaster, such as news presenters, have set up one-person independents in order to financially benefit from their success based on their celebrity status and gain work on TV programmes outside of their ‘day job’ or on corporate work (filming, presenting awards etc.). Similarly, but at the other end of the financial spectrum, are owners of small independents freelancing on their own behalf, in order to earn extra income or enough income to live on, or to cross-subsidise non-profitable activities, thus emphasizing creative–commodification tensions (Townley et al., 2009). One of our freelance producer/directors, for example, worked for a variety of independent companies as a freelancer as a means of raising money to run a small genre production company making short horror films. In another small independent, involved in web site design, corporate videos, social media and the like, one of the owners also occasionally worked as a camera operator for another larger independent company, in order to ‘pay for my car’. What these anecdotes point to is an extremely complicated set of temporary work arrangements where people play a role in several temporary organizations at the same time, as well as maintaining a permanent job (but that may, in turn, be working on temporary projects).

The process of temporary organizing

The process of the formation of neo-bureaucratic, temporary organizations is best exemplified through a description of how independent TV organizations work, not only vis-a-vis the large producers, but also, in turn, with other independents, in forming a dynamic of temporary organizations and broader temporary work.

Typically commissions fall into three types. First, a commissioner from one of the large broadcasters will ask for a programme idea on a big contemporary theme, much in the way that academic special issues are called on themes. For example, in 2014, there were a series of calls for First World War-related themes. Independents would then bid for them on the basis of a combination of programme ideas, cost and, for certain programmes, the availability of celebrities to ‘front’ the show. Indeed, as indicated earlier, the ‘cult of celebrity’ is important; it is certainly the basis of competitive advantage for the celebrity boutique independents. Moreover, others of the independents buy in celebrities to present programmes. One small independent company had been recently taken over by a ‘super-independent’ and made high-quality nature documentaries, but nevertheless needed celebrities to host these documentaries in order to win these commissions. The second avenue for independents is for them to apply direct to the main broadcasters with ideas for programmes, typically done online. The third types of programmes produced by independents are on-going programmes – for example, children’s programmes, sports series or life-style programmes such as gardening shows or religious programmes. Typically, they are carried out by the large independents who have the facilities (studios, technology and staff) to fulfil the obligations to these series, which may last a year or more.

These are, therefore, a series of temporary organizational forms, both temporally and in structure. Many of the independent organizations are extremely lean, with a distinct hierarchy, based on functions and expertise. For example, the smaller independents have very few permanent staff. Many of the sample independents had a staff of only around five people, who carried out a small range of functions, despite having relatively large financial turnovers, for example, of £3m in one case. As one independent owner noted, ‘This is now the model. We are lean, we have some “go-to” people who work full time, but they are freelancers, and lots of (other) freelancers.’ Another independent senior manager commented, ‘Today you might have more accountants on staff (than TV people). Most companies are run on a few creatives and a load of freelancers.’ Similarly, a very successful independent owner noted that, ‘We employ two people plus the two directors, plus two on six month contracts and two researchers free on a government scheme.’

Thus, activities considered to be a core creative part of the TV programme-making division of labour are nearly always kept in-house, such as executive production and direction, while at the other end of the spectrum, work such as camera, wardrobe, make-up and hairdressing, activities with a more generic skills set, are virtually all contracted out to freelancers (this is also true of the large broadcasters), whereas other occupations vary from independent to independent, based to a certain degree on company size (the larger the independent, the more likely they are to keep a greater number of functions in-house) and on corporate strategy. Of the functions typically outsourced there is again a hierarchy. Companies typically outsource camera work and programme editing, but have ‘go-to’ preferred staff for these and would employ these freelancers on relatively long-term contracts, for up to 40 weeks in the case of the BBC (authors’ interviews), while employing other staff on a day-to-day or weekly basis. Thus, within the same occupations there are differences in the nature and type of freelance work, certainly in the duration of contracts. There are also a few so-called ‘go-to’ creative staff. One of our interviewees was a top 10 ‘go-to’ UK director, whereas another was on a ‘preferred list’ for HBO. An independent, meanwhile, used Andrew Davies, who was regarded as a ‘top 6 bankable asset’.

This has implications for the nature of temporary organizing, for certain freelancers are working across a range of temporary settings, that is, programmes, whereas others are employed on a job-by-job basis (i.e. on one programme). In order to ensure that certain key freelancers are available, reasonably long-term, for work, the large- and medium-sized independents and the large broadcasters often guarantee them a minimum amount of work per time period (nine months). To complicate matters more, the large broadcasters and bigger independents also employ staff on short-term contracts (three to six months or a year), but where this obviously differs from freelance work is that they can only technically work for the broadcaster or independent, whereas the freelancer can work on other projects. There is also a legal distinction in these contracts, albeit that the independents often go close to, or beyond, the legal time limits of employment for the freelancers.

Importantly, the large producers also maintain considerable control over productions even though they outsource to independents. A number of respondents noted that, particularly for high-profile drama series and the like, the broadcasters insist on the independents employing certain named key creative staff (as an informal condition of winning the commission), such as the producer, director, director of photography, designers, editor. These key creative staff themselves will bring in their own chosen freelance staff, such as camera operatives. This was a theme returned to by respondents on a number of occasions.

One independent owner, for example, noted that, ‘The BBC tend to be very directive on senior staff, they say use this series producer and this director ….’ Another independent owner, a former senior BBC manager, noted:

We got stung a bit in 2008, but instead we built up a relationship with key talents and it helped that we had 290 years (total) in the business. We are trying to find the ‘right’ director … often it is about second guessing the commissioners who are very picky about who we use, the BBC and Channel 4. We have a ‘list’ of people, for example Joe is our go-to programme director, he has done some great stuff for us. Also we have a ‘posh’ camera man, Fred, who Huw Edwards likes … the BBC are fairly paranoid, the editor will be heavily involved, and they are heavily involved post-production.

As one highly successful TV director, somewhat counter-intuitively, given the disintegrated nature of the freelance market, further noted: ‘I tend to use people I have known and trust, it’s very much a closed labour market … you have to have ongoing relationships … its about having people around you that you can trust.’

Another respondent, a producer/director with an independent, noted that:

When I was young, I used people who got me out of the shit, I was a bit out of my depth, they got me out of a mess, so I still use them. I have a list of people I can really trust, then a list of people I trust less. And D (a production manager) will bring in his own runner.

Thus, despite outsourcing of programme production-making to independents, the main broadcasters maintain a considerable degree of indirect control over programme quality by this mechanism, and the price of hiring these freelancers is high for the independent as there are a relatively small number of ‘go-to’ script writers, directors, and so forth. The director quoted above was one of these ‘go-to’ staff – one of about six people in the UK. Elsewhere the broadcasters insist on independents using certain executive producers, thus considerably enhancing their financial negotiating position, but cutting the profit margins of the independents. The role of both control and social capital, covered later, is clearly important here.

This director noted that:

UK drama is dominated by three to four people, the drama commissioners from the BBC, ITV, Channel 4, they are gods in TV. I’ve heard them talking about, for example, designers who are very good, but they say don’t use him or her.

He further noted: The BBC have a huge influence on the key creatives, the producer, the director of photography, the designer, the editor … then I do the creative casting decisions (when they will let me).

In a similar scenario, the independents maintain a degree of control and reduce their risk by insisting that certain celebrities are hired to host or front programmes, as alluded to earlier. This is a mechanism introduced both to maintain quality control but also to ensure, as far as possible, that programmes ensure ratings. Similarly, we have seen the emergence of the celebrity-run independents who are, to a certain extent, guaranteed output and programmes on the basis of the celebrity appearing in the programme. One independent manager (co-owned by a celebrity presenter) commented that:

X (the celebrity) is key to us, we are trying to break away from this but our customers won’t allow it. We negotiated a series on the National Trust (without him) and the BBC said OK but at the last minute said he must be in or no deal.

A female freelance producer confirmed this trend. She had worked for 14 years ‘full-time’ freelancing:

I was one (go-to person) and it cascades. A BBC commissioner will say I saw that cameraman’s work at the BAFTAs, he won an award for that documentary on Africa, use him on your programme, and use so-and-so for sound. It’s all about personal connections.

In terms of the thrust of the argument, what we have here is independent companies in a myriad of temporary organizational settings at one time, depending on the duration of the programme(s) or item, varying from a half- or one-hour programme to a series of typically six programmes, to a one-year and beyond series, typically children’s TV or sports (a football season) or to a near one-year series of programmes (the UK’s Question Time). Key freelance staff also work across these temporary settings (or programmes), although certain occupational freelancers are more likely to be engaged solely on a long-term project (the all-year-round ones) or almost solely (on a six-part series). The main broadcasters outsource work either because they have to (because of legislation) or a lack of capacity or skills in-house, or to cut costs, but maintain as much control as possible over the process by using their oligopolistic buying power and asymmetrical power relations to try to control the creative production process. Thus, price and cost controls (the market) and commissioning (hierarchical) controls play a key role in coordination, but trust and social capital are used, not only to access work (the labour market), but also to coordinate projects. It is here that the setting is temporary, not in product markets per se.

Coordinating mechanisms in neo-bureaucratic, temporary organizations: The control of social capital

The research started with the premise, drawn both from the extant literature and the authors’ prior experience in working in the industry, that social capital would be important in the industry generally and in regulating temporary organizing, and this became increasingly apparent as the study developed. Anecdotally, the snowball sampling technique proved highly successful, with a succession of participants saying ‘you should go and talk to so and so.’ Such social capital has been studied in the TV industry both for its positive consequences (e.g. as a way of getting work: Tempest et al., 2004) and negative ones (the exclusion of certain ‘out groups’: Christopherson, 2009; Grugulis and Stoyanova, 2012). What has, perhaps, not been extensively commented on is how powerful this is, how it is based on high trust and reciprocity, on a strong notion of ‘craft professionalism’ (Blair, 2009; Townley et al., 2009), how this is endorsed and enhanced by social and spatial proximity and, finally, how important this is in being used as a control and coordinating mechanism.

Our research evidence points to the crucial role that it plays in embedding these relationships, particularly as they are temporary ones and regulating an otherwise extremely fragmented and unregulated market (media professionals are not accredited). There are also generally no contracts between freelancers and independents, and work is often won on a word-of-mouth basis, in part because the work is often last-minute, but also because it is in a high-trust environment (Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2009). As one of our freelance presenters noted, ‘We just assume that they (the independent) want us next week and we turn up for work and we trust that they will pay us.’

In short, these relationships are core to how these neo-bureaucratic, temporary, organizational forms work. Jones and Lichtenstein (2008) describe how they operate in the film industry, but in UK TV they are more repetitive. Moreover, they are bound by a commonality of experience or a community of practice. Virtually all of the independents are owned and run by practitioners who were formerly employed in mid-to-senior positions by one of the large broadcaster providers and are thus rich in industry experience and contacts. Although two of our very large independents were run by non-industry insiders, even in these cases the independents had bought smaller independents run by insiders or employed ex-insiders. The freelancers were also overwhelmingly ex-industry insiders, also with excellent contacts. As one independent company owner noted, ‘I was an ex-programme commissioner in one of the big three, so when I came out, I had an inside track … and I got lots of work.’

In another case, one of our informants (a female producer/director) had a mother who was formerly a TV weather presenter and a brother who was a well-known sports commentator, and a male producer’s mother was a well-known TV actress. In yet another case, two brothers were freelance floor managers who passed on news of work to each other if one was unavailable. In other words, there were, in some cases, familial ties. The role of spatial proximity was also important, with insiders often socializing together in the same bars, cafes or streets. As the Chief Operating Officer of an independent company noted, ‘It’s far easier to get one (a commission) in Soho, if the commissioning editor uses the same gym as you.’

These forms are also run on trust-based informal lines. Only two freelancers had agents, in one case to collect musical royalties. We have also already noted the lack of written contracts. Thus, industry insiders rely heavily on contacts, but these are also the object of considerable time investment by freelancers and independent owners in cultivating their social networks within the TV industry. One independent company owner reported:

The thing is, if you are known, you are more likely to get more work. The holy grail is to develop a relationship with half-a-dozen executives who trust you and they are likely to go up the greasy pole with Channel 4, Sky, the BBC. It is as much a relationship based on ideas, but you have to deliver.

This investment was unproductive, at least in terms of not being paid for such networking. As one female freelance presenter noted, ‘There’s lots of forward planning, lots of keeping up with contacts, keeping in touch with press releases … it’s a big thing.’ The use of normative, softer cultural controls was also partially evident (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). Certainly, freelance workers had to be seen to ‘fit’, socially and attitudinally, and freelancers had to work for clients, particularly bigger ones, whether they wanted to or not. One floor manager, for example, commented, ‘I have to work for the BBC … but I think that they take the piss, but I still have to work for them … also you don’t want to piss people off so you don’t turn work down.’ However, he said that he received offers of work because he was ‘Seen as a “good lad” (he worked on male-dominated sports programmes), I do what they want and don’t rock the boat.’ Similarly, a female freelance wardrobe artist commented, ‘I’m technically very good, but also I get on with people.’ By contrast, a freelance producer bemoaned the fact that he found it difficult to get work because, ‘My face doesn’t fit. It (a film) was very successful but there was no job for me. I went to Canada. Again I came back but there was nothing for me.’ A female freelance producer, meanwhile, also found it difficult to get enough TV work to make a living. She reported that:

When I worked for ITV, I got offered two programmes which was 12 weeks work, but then I couldn’t do a day, it was not vital, but out of spite they took six weeks off me and didn’t tell me until the last minute, it was very nasty … this is the power of the commissioning editors, they are all-powerful.

Conclusion

The structure of the UK TV industry has shifted from a strict hierarchical form (based on monopolistic producer-provider broadcasters) to a more fluid form comprised of broadcasters, independents and freelancers in a neo-bureaucratic form. This has led to a series of temporary settings ranging from the short term for one-off programmes to much more settled arrangements for long-running series, such as children’s programmes. As such, the TV industry is sometimes an extreme case in its use of temporary organizations and, as part of a dynamic, they are also latent forms (Starkey et al., 2000). Previous research has had a project-based focus, including Bechky’s analysis of film production. She explored the use of soft, norm-led, control mechanisms of projects. The focus here is somewhat different, on the role of actors within these temporary organizations, including large broadcasters, independents and freelance workers in UK TV, and the role of power and control in coordinating this neo-bureaucratic form. Inevitably, given the time constraints of the extremely short-term projects, these tend to be more task-focused, but this is certainly not at the expense of relationship-building, as these temporary forms are not one-offs. The commissioners, independent owners and freelancers tend to know each other well, and may well have worked together in the past for a broadcaster or an independent, or alternatively on previous projects.

The first major conclusion is one about the forms of control in a neo-bureaucratic setting with both the large broadcasters, and the independents to a lesser extent, exercising extremely centralized tight control over these temporary organizations. This is done through the ways the industry is structured (by the large broadcasters), the processes by which temporary organizations are formed (again by the large broadcasters) and the coordination of this through their manipulation of the informal ties (Reed, 2011). More diffuse methods of control are used, but nevertheless they are powerful and pervasive, differing from ‘command and control’ of traditional mechanisms in large integrated broadcasters to more normative ones (Clegg, 2011; Reed, 2011). Furthermore, they are ones based on close personal knowledge. Virtually all of the freelancers are ex-broadcaster employees and are thus well known to commissioning editors, thus maintaining a strong element of quality control and adherence to industry norms (‘insider-outsiders’). This may, however, be historically specific, as large numbers of these staff had left the broadcasters in the late 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, as the industry vertically disintegrated (Townley et al., 2009). In future, the ranks of freelancers are less likely to be drawn from such sources as fewer staff will be employed. The close nature of relations within the industry mean that normative, cultural controls are in place (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002), and the interactive nature of production ensures that ‘soft’ behavioural controls are evident (Bechky, 2006). Witness the ‘ease’ of finding work on the part of the floor manager and the difficulties found in the case the producer, not only based on technical competency but on personal attributes. What emerges, therefore, are ‘polyarchic’ power structures and control regimes (Clegg et al, 2011; Reed, 2011), characterized by a structural polarization between a power elite in the large broadcasters (witness the role of the key commissioning editors) and a supporting cast of freelancers, with the large independents acting in an intermediatory fashion. This allows for autonomy for craft-based professionals, but constrained by the selection process and the expectation that they follow norms. The regimes can be characterized as a form of ‘structured flexibility’, with the broadcasters keeping strict control over the commissioning process and relying further on normative and cultural controls over outsourced and freelance work as exemplified by, for example, freelancers feeling part of an ‘in, or out, crowd’. The broadcasters further maintain this control by insisting that independents, and indeed freelancers, used certain ‘go-to’ creative freelancers from what can be a relatively short list of potential applicants, thus further confirming adherence to industry and corporate norms. The freelancers further exacerbate this by bringing, in turn, their own preferred list of staff, such as camera operators, editors and the like.

These normative ties are reinforced by individual ties, be they the dynastic ties outlined or more commonly work-based social contacts, further strengthened by the networking activities of participants. Independent company owners and freelancers ‘invest in’ socialization (in the form of unpaid work) in order to increase their chances of gaining future work (Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2009). All of these social networks are yet further reinforced by spatial agglomeration of people in the industry being in close and frequent contact with other industry insiders (Grabher, 2004).

Broadcaster control over the form is maintained and sequentially reinforced by these various mechanisms, both in terms of (industry) normative controls and ensuring quality control over programme-making. Finally, this is supported by the notion of craft professionalism, both in terms of pride of work and pride of working in TV, despite the sometimes difficult working conditions and situations outlined (Townley et al., 2009). As Bechky (2006) notes, a value-based work ethic is an important element of this. However, this enacts the tension of working as a craft professional with the language of entrepreneurialism in the new freelance TV environment (Storey et al., 2005) and, probably, self-exploitation (Reed, 2011).

This results in a curious high-trust working environment. Freelance workers bemoan their working conditions and their customers (particularly the BBC), but nevertheless written contracts with freelancers are virtually non-existent and thus they rely on high-trust arrangements that they will be employed, and that they will get paid. It would be wrong, however, to portray this relationship as purely trust-based. They are latent forms in that they are continuously produced and reproduced, and although trust-based are very cost-driven and arms-length in this sense. In short, there is still a structure of authority in these temporary relationships, albeit that it is based on projects (programmes) rather than traditional organization. Further, this is reinforced by a series of controls imposed by the commissioning editors in the large broadcasters. The article answers Reed’s (2011) call for developing a better understanding of how soft forms of power have become core to the fabrication of and implementation of concertive coordination mechanisms within neo-bureaucratic control regimes.

A second, and related, conclusion is that control in this industry is, to a greater extent, defined and shaped by the predominant rationale for the introduction of this form. Although not ignoring the impact of technological change (both in product markets and in the nature of production) and the liberalization of markets, we argue that the prime determinants of these forms are cost-determined, as opposed to other industries such as pharmaceuticals where the primary concern is innovation (see Swart et al., 2005, and Whitley, 2006, for a comprehensive review).

A third conclusion, on the question about the definition of temporariness, is that neat temporal distinctions, such as short- and long-term projects, do not do justice to the myriad arrangements within the industry. Both the independents and freelance workers are involved, simultaneously, in a series of short- and longer-term projects. The independents, for example, may in a given time period be making one-off programmes, short series of programmes and longer-term runs of programmes. Similarly, in any given week, freelancers can operate across a series of organizational settings. For example, one of our freelancers spent three days per week on a three-part series for the BBC, followed by regular Saturday work on a long-running children’s programme, and then Saturday evening on a sports outside-broadcast production that lies somewhere in between the two. To further confuse the myriad of arrangements, small independent owners may themselves be ‘moonlighting’ as freelance professionals in order to make money to cross-subsidise their independent operations.

Fourth, the ties are also a combination of ‘strong’ and ‘weaker’ ones, even within the specific occupational groups (Antcliffe et al., 2007). The large broadcasters and the independents will use favoured staff – for example, editors and camera staff (strong ties) – and further staff in the same occupational group as and when they are needed (weak ties). However, this does not clarify the nature of temporariness per se, other than to point out that there are a myriad of different arrangements occurring at any one time and within the same ‘organization’ (be it an independent company or a freelance professional), and they are short-termedly latent in that they come and go and are then reconfigured quickly in some cases. To paraphrase Meyerson et al.’s (1996) analogy, these forms look more like a casual relationship than a ‘one night stand’.