Management without morals: Construct development and initial testing of amoral management

Abstract

What happens when leaders do not respond to the ethical components of business situations? We study this question by examining amoral management, which entails a lack of response from leaders during ethical situations. Our work helps establish amoral management, a leadership style that is thought to be quite common in practice, in the behavioral ethics literature by first validating an empirical measure. Then, we examine an initial nomological network of amoral management and by demonstrating that it negatively affects employees. Drawing on moral conation theory (Hannah et al., 2011a), we argue that amoral management leads to lower levels of moral courage among employees. Unfortunately, with lower levels of moral courage, employees become more susceptible to engaging in unethical behavior. Interestingly, we find that the negative relationship between amoral management and moral courage is exacerbated under the condition of an ethical environment, which therefore also exacerbates employees’ unethical conduct (i.e., a first-stage moderated-mediation model). We provide theoretical contributions and practical implications regarding amoral management as an important yet understudied ethics-based leadership style, as well as make suggestions for future research.

Keywords

amoral management behavioral ethics moral courage unethical behavior

The ethics literature suggests that people often look outside themselves when seeking guidance regarding ethical and unethical behaviors (Kohlberg, 1969; Treviño, 1986). In organizations, employees typically look to their supervisors for ethical guidance (Brown et al., 2005). However, research has said very little about the effect of supervisors who do not provide guidance when situations are fraught with ethical considerations. In fact, Carroll (2001: 366) lamented that “the media, social activists, and perhaps (even) academics . . . have focused so much on immoral or unethical behavior that we seem to have downplayed the possibility of other ethical types.” Carroll (2001) goes on to argue that not enough attention has been paid to parsing out the distinction between immoral and amoral management and contrasting these leadership types against moral management (e.g., ethical leadership). Indeed, among the four types of leadership presented in the Ethical Leadership Reputation Matrix (Treviño and Nelson, 2017; Treviño et al., 2000), amoral management has been studied the least in spite of its likely commonness among business leaders (e.g., Carroll, 2001; Treviño et al., 2003).

We contend that a leader’s routine failure to respond to ethical situations can be just as important as the existence of other types of (un)ethical leadership. We define amoral management¹ as a leader’s consistent failure to respond to issues that have ethical implications. Managing amorally, whether done so intentionally or unintentionally, does not provide direction to employees in terms of ethical decision making and behaviors (Greenbaum et al., 2015b). Given that employees look to their direct supervisors for ethical cues (Brown et al., 2005), we contend amoral management can produce detrimental effects for employees that will also be harmful for organizations. Although past research has indicated that amoral management is a common business leadership style (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b; Treviño et al., 2003), there has yet to be empirical research on this topic, and we know very little about the implications of this managerial approach in terms of influencing employees’ behaviors. Our lack of understanding of this leadership style can likely be attributed to a lack of a validated measure.

The purpose of this research is to develop and validate an empirical measure of amoral management and then to conduct a test of an initial nomological network of the construct within the bounds of existing behavioral ethics constructs (e.g., moral courage, ethical environment, unethical behavior). With respect to testing an initial nomological network, we use moral conation theory (Hannah et al., 2011a) to argue that amoral management prevents employees from having the moral courage to behave ethically in the workplace. In turn, because moral courage is tied to moral behaviors (Kidder, 2005; Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007), we contend that a lack of moral courage increases employees’ unethical conduct, which can include lying, stealing, and cheating. Thus, we argue that amoral management will lead to employees’ increased unethical behavior owing to a lack of moral courage. Furthermore, when amoral management exists within the context of an ethical environment (i.e., “. . . employees’ perceptions of the organization’s policies, practices, and procedures regarding ethics”; Huang et al., 2019: 496), the negative relationship between amoral management and moral courage is exacerbated owing to the ambiguity surrounding how to handle ethics under an amoral manager who operates under the backdrop of an ethical environment. This would then result in increased unethical behavior.

Through our research, we intend to make multiple contributions to the literature. First, we conceptualize amoral management and develop and validate a corresponding measure. In doing so, we hope future research will be able to provide even more insights regarding the effects of amoral management in organizations. Second, we furnish initial evidence as to the nomological network of amoral management. Specifically, we demonstrate that amoral management results in adverse consequences for the employees who work for managers who adopt this style by increasing employees’ unethical behaviors due to underdeveloped moral courage. Third, our research provides an empirical test of the moral courage component of moral conation theory (Hannah et al., 2011a) and also broadens that theory to consider the contextual influence of an ethical environment. See Figure 1 for our hypothesized model. We also contribute to the literature by expanding moral courage’s nomological network by examining its relationship with an antecedent and an outcome variable. Overall, our contributions demonstrate the damaging effects that could occur if managers are consistently inactive in handling ethical dilemmas.

Figure 1.

Hypothesized theoretical model.

Amoral management defined

When first conceptualized, Carroll (1987: 11) pointed out that amoral management “is not just a middle position on a continuum” from moral to immoral management. Rather, amoral management exists as its own construct whereby attention to ethics is not evident in a leader’s day-to-day management practices. Carroll (2003: 8) referred to it as “a posture or approach that is devoid of ethics”. Carroll (1987: 11) also creatively described it this way: “to the extent that they are present, the managers’ ethical mental gears are in neutral.” Thus, managers may be perceived as managing from a place of amorality because they appear to ignore, or to avoid, the ethical implications inherent in day-to-day business decision making and practices.

Supervisors who employ an amoral management style are not obvious or forthcoming in their consideration of ethics when faced with ethical issues. In this regard, amoral management is different from other types of ethics-based leadership styles, such as ethical or unethical leadership. Ethical leadership connotes a type of leadership style in which the leader actively promotes, in word and deed, a socially salient ethical agenda (see Brown et al., 2005). For example, if a sales manager is faced with an ethically nebulous transaction (e.g., whether to exaggerate a product’s qualities to close a deal), an ethical leader demonstrates and clearly communicates how to handle the transaction with respect to high ethical standards. An amoral manager, on the other hand, would altogether avoid the ethics-related components of the sales opportunity. Unlike both ethical leadership and amoral management, unethical leadership is marked by a leader actively engaging in, and potentially encouraging, unethical practices (see Brown and Mitchell, 2010). In the sales opportunity example, the unethical leader would do whatever it takes to close the sale, including using unethical business practices (Treviño et al., 2003). So, in comparison to both ethical and unethical leaders, in which their stance on ethics is clear, amoral managers come across as unresponsive when it comes to attending to the ethical components of business (Greenbaum et al., 2015b).

To further conceptualize the amoral management construct, we explain both high and low levels of amoral management. First, high amoral management is marked by a consistent or repeated abstention of ethical considerations in the workplace (Carroll, 1987). In this respect, high amoral management is not a one-time occurrence of avoiding ethics; rather, “avoidance” is a regular management practice with respect to ethics, and is likely to continue until leaders change their management styles or are replaced. Conversely, from an employee’s point of view, a manager may be viewed as low in amoral management, for a number of reasons. The “low” amoral manager may come across as ethical or unethical. “Low” amoral management is similar to “low” ethical leadership and “low” unethical leadership in that the low end of each measure may reflect more than one leadership style (Greenbaum et al., 2015b), with the low end not necessarily being the opposite of the high end of the measure (Carroll, 1987). For example, the abusive supervision measure, which arguably represents a form of unethical leadership, includes the item: “my supervisor ridicules me” (Mitchell and Ambrose, 2007; Tepper, 2000). Yet, if supervisors are rated low on this item, it could mean they are nice or they just do not ridicule the respondent. Thus, there is a need, in ethics-based leadership research, to examine all three types of ethics-based leadership constructs (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b).

Finally, regarding motives of amoral managers, Carroll (1987) argues that amoral managers are not always morally unaware. There is a possibility that those who use amoral management are morally aware and/or perhaps even believe they are ethical in terms of their personal moral standards (see also Treviño et al., 2000). Yet, they abstain from providing ethical guidance as perceived by followers (Greenbaum et al., 2015b). Though the amoral manager’s motives are beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that supervisors may manage amorally out of a desire to abstain from providing clear ethical guidance because ethics may be perceived as coming at the expense of bottom-line performance (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b; Treviño et al., 2003). It could also be that managers decide not to provide ethical guidance or set ethical expectations because these practices take time, may not be well received by others, and could potentially hinder their short-term effectiveness (e.g., Bird and Waters, 1989; Kreps and Monin, 2011). Regardless of the manager’s motives, the focus here is on the consequences of managers consistently failing to lead with respect to ethics.

Moral conation theory

Moral conation is “the capacity to generate responsibility and motivation to take moral action in the face of adversity and persevere through challenges” (Hannah et al., 2011a: 664). In a business environment that seems to be perpetually growing in complexity (Donaldson, 2003; Kreps and Monin, 2011), moral conation theory provides a theoretical framework that highlights how individuals process and respond to ethical challenges. More specifically, it explains a person’s ability to carry through with ethical action in the face of situations that have ethical implications. As Hannah et al. note (2011a: 664), “prior theory and research . . . have focused on describing the processes whereby individuals handle moral incidents, but they have not adequately explained the underlying capacities individuals require to effectively enact those processes.” Thus, there are certain capacities that moral actors need to enact moral behavior. This is important because oftentimes moral behavior requires a “conation to resist . . . temptation and to stand up and take action against . . . the wrong thing” (Hannah et al., 2011a: 665).

Thus, individuals’ moral conation abilities are important for motivating their moral behaviors (Hannah et al., 2011a). According to Hannah et al. (2011a), moral conation consists of three primary moral capacities: moral ownership, moral efficacy, and moral courage. The theory explains that individuals identify situations as having moral relevance and then experience one or all of the three moral capacities. Moral ownership is a psychological view that an individual has control over the moral elements of his/her environment (Jennings et al., 2015). Moral efficacy is an individual’s feelings of being capable of acting towards a successful moral end (May et al., 2014). Moral courage is a malleable psychological state, which is relied upon when there are perceived risks of acting, and requires persistence in the face of pressure to do wrong (Hannah et al., 2011b). As such, moral courage may be especially important when considering the risk employees may associate with acting in a way that is not clearly supported or endorsed by an amoral manager. Importantly, each of these components of moral conation can support one another, but they can also exist as distinct moral capacities (Hannah et al., 2011a).

For the purposes of our research, we examine moral conation in the form of moral courage because, in comparison to the other moral conation capacities, moral courage may be the most critical factor in determining whether individuals will behave morally when faced with complex business decisions that may pose financial or career-related risks (Hannah et al., 2011b). Although moral ownership, moral efficacy, and moral courage can support each other (Hannah et al., 2011a), the malleability of moral ownership and moral efficacy are more tied to fluctuations within personal dimensions (e.g., responsibility to act and confidence in one’s ability to do so). In comparison, moral courage is more directly influenced by external forces (Comer and Sekerka, 2018; Hannah et al., 2011a; Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007) and is thought to be the main impetus that is needed to act morally (e.g., Osswald et al., 2009; Verschoor, 2003). Furthermore, of these three types, moral courage may be the most susceptible to the influence of leadership because leaders control valuable resources (e.g., rewards, promotions; Brown and Mitchell, 2010), such that defying the leader may come with enhanced risks. In this respect, the ambiguous stance of amoral managers may result in lower moral courage because employees may feel concerned about acting courageously without the assurance of managerial support.

Moral courage is defined as “(1) a malleable character strength, that (2) provides the requisite conation needed to commit to personal moral principles, (3) under conditions where the actor is aware of the objective danger involved in supporting those principles, (4) that enables the willing endurance of that danger, (5) in order to act ethically or resist pressure to act unethically as required to maintain those principles” (Hannah et al., 2011b: 560). Conceptualizations of courage include an inherent assumption that courage is embodied for the sake of something greater than one’s self—a higher purpose (Gould, 2005). Importantly, moral courage is not a static trait (Hannah et al., 2011b). Rather, it is dynamic and influenced by context, perhaps most notably by leadership (Lester et al., 2010; Walker and Henning, 2004). Therefore, we argue the leader is instrumental in the development of courage in the workplace (Worline et al., 2002). It is worth noting that the possibility exists that amoral management could influence moral ownership and/or moral efficacy as well. Our contention, however, is that among the three moral conation capacities moral courage would be most influenced by amoral management.

Amoral management’s detrimental effect

In organizations, people look to their managers as de facto role models (Treviño, 1986), often with the expectation that those role models should endorse morality (Moberg, 2000). For example, effective managers are often expected to endorse moral standards (e.g., Bies, 2001) and make decisions with ethics in mind (e.g., Brown et al., 2005). Thus, when a manager does not respond to situations that have ethical implications (i.e., amoral management), employees are unlikely to demonstrate a persistence in doing “what is right” (i.e., moral courage) because it is unclear whether the leader will accept or reject such moral persistence.

To stimulate strong motivation in employees, leaders need to come across as clear and unwavering in their behavioral standards and expectations (Bass et al., 2003; Brown and Treviño, 2006). Without strong messages of support from leaders, employees are prone to give up (Buch et al., 2014), especially when a particular type of motivation is difficult to sustain (e.g., Shalley and Oldham, 1985). Moral courage, in particular, is difficult to sustain because it requires a person to ignore the potential risks, or danger, of staying committed to a moral course of action (Kidder, 2005; Koerner, 2014). For example, a powerful customer may make an unethical request that, if not fulfilled, could result in lost revenue. Without active and clear guidance from a manager, employees may not have the moral courage to ignore the danger of lost revenue in order to do what is right. Unfortunately, amoral managers, with their inactive and passive approaches to morality (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b), will not serve as a strong catalyst for employees to persist in upholding morality through moral courage.

Amoral managers not providing direction with respect to ethics can pose problems for the majority of employees who are highly dependent on external sources (e.g., leadership) for ethical guidance (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Kohlberg, 1969). Employees “look up and look around” to understand the handling of ethics (Treviño and Nelson, 2017: 82), but amoral management represents a void of ethical influence that is expected to hinder moral courage. Indeed, we know that moral courage is malleable and thus likely to be influenced by the context in which one operates (Hannah et al., 2011a). Moral courage is also thought to be domain specific, such that people are less prone to demonstrate moral courage when they are in follower roles (Hannah et al., 2011a). This makes the silence or lack of action from the amoral manager on issues that have ethical implications even more problematic. As Osswald et al. (2009: 98) note, “before a person can act with moral courage, she/he has to perceive an incident as a situation of moral courage.” Because amoral managers do not provide ethical guidance (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b), it is quite possible, maybe even probable, that employees will not even realize a situation calls for moral courage. Even if employees recognize that a situation calls for moral courage, amoral managers create in employees a moral deficit because these employees receive no guidance for handling the tension between specific business demands and moral considerations (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b; Treviño and Nelson, 2017). In sum, owing to moral conation theory, employees need to be enlightened to the moral implications of a situation, be motivated to act in a moral direction, and have the courage to carry out a moral action (Hannah et al., 2011a). An amoral manager does not provide such enlightenment for employees (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b), which prevents them from exhibiting moral courage:

Hypothesis 1: Amoral management is negatively related to employee moral courage.

Moral conation in the form of moral courage is instrumental in motivating moral action (Hannah et al., 2011a). Therefore, we expect amoral management to indirectly influence employee behavior (i.e., increased unethical behavior) because of a lack of moral courage. Past research suggests that there is a positive relationship between moral courage and employees’ pro-social behaviors (Hannah et al., 2011b). Thus, conditions that weaken the development of moral courage may then influence the ethicality of one’s behaviors. Because amoral management is expected to curtail employees’ moral courage, we expect these employees will struggle to adhere to moral standards of behavior (Treviño et al., 2006), such as avoiding unethical behavior.

Unethical behavior is behavior that is considered “either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community” (Jones, 1991: 367). At work, these types of behaviors might include discussing confidential information with outsiders, damaging organizational property, taking property from work without permission, or falsifying receipts to receive larger reimbursements (Moore et al., 2012). It could be that in the context of working for an amoral manager, employees are not morally courageous enough to resist the temptation of unethical conduct. Situations that have ethical implications require fortitude, perseverance, and a determined will to act in a particular way (Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007). Indeed, these characteristics are embodied by moral courage, which includes an “endurance of danger” and a “resist(ance) . . . to act unethically” (Hannah et al., 2011b). Yet, amoral managers’ aloofness with respect to ethics prevents employees from embodying ethical endurance, and resistance of immorality, that is captured by moral courage. Accordingly, these employees will not have the fortitude to resist opportunities to engage in unethical conduct:

Hypothesis 2: Amoral management has a positive indirect effect on unethical behavior via moral courage.

The moderating role of ethical environment

Hannah et al. (2011a: 681) note that “moral conation should be tailored to specific contexts”. Moral conation is state-like, and thus susceptible to having relevant sources of information in the environmental context, such as the organization, influencing how it is manifested in the actor. Research has shown that the organizational environment has an influence on (un)ethical decisions and behaviors (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Thus, with moral courage being “contextualized and domain-specific” (Hannah et al., 2011a: 677), we argue for the importance of considering the environmental context in which amoral management could be influencing employees’ moral courage and indirectly their unethical behavior. In light of this, we expect employees’ perceptions of the organization’s ethical environment to moderate the effects of amoral management. An ethical environment contains both formal (e.g., codes of conduct, reward systems, training programs) and informal organizational systems (e.g., behavior of peers, ethical norms, language) that influence employees’ (un)ethical conduct (Treviño, 1986). These systems communicate acceptable behaviors, provide accountability expectations regarding ethics (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), and influence employees’ (un)ethical conduct (Treviño et al., 1998).

Importantly, however, an organization’s ethical environment is not always supported in the ethics-related messages produced by supervisors (Treviño et al., 2003). In this respect, a supervisor’s amoral management is likely to be viewed as especially ambiguous relative to a highly ethical environment. We suggest employees will struggle even more to develop moral courage when the amoral manager’s lack of ethical responsiveness is taking place in an environment that values clear and ethical responses to such situations. Effectively, the ethical environment creates a saliency effect (Taylor et al., 1979) in which the ambiguity of the amoral manager’s approach is made even more apparent for followers.

The development of moral courage, specifically, is highly dependent upon “helping people to understand how to engage in it (moral courage)” (Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007: 146). Thus, moral courage appears to include a learning aspect that is gleaned from role models and the broader environment (Walker and Henning, 2004; Worline et al., 2002). An amoral manager operating in a highly ethical environment produces an especially ambiguous situation for employees, who then are unlikely to persist in “doing the right thing” through moral courage. Indeed, past research suggests that learning suffers when a role model’s leadership style is unclear relative to the standards set by the broader environment (Argyris, 1990; Bandura, 1991; Simons, 2002). Ambiguous situations are even more likely to reduce a commitment to and persistence in pursuing risky or dangerous courses of actions (e.g., moral courage). This is because when faced with a need for courage (and a disregard for danger or risks), people benefit from the extra assurances that their courageous states will be supported by multiple, influential sources (Comer and Sekerka, 2018; Jensen, 2010; Pury et al., 2013). When a management style is ambiguous relative to the broader environment, employees are left feeling even more confused as to the standards and expectations that they should be following to support ethics (Treviño and Nelson, 2017). This will make them even less likely to persist in supporting ethics through moral courage and thereby even more likely to engage in unethical conduct.

A highly ethical environment makes an amoral manager’s ambiguity with respect to ethics more salient and thereby easier for employees to imagine ways in which their amoral managers could be more effective with respect to ethics (e.g., Cha and Edmondson, 2006; Greenbaum et al., 2015a). In the highly ethical environment, employees could more easily conclude that their amoral manager is falling short with respect to ethics (Treviño and Nelson, 2017) and thus is unlikely to take the necessary actions to support employees’ ethical efforts. This is because in a highly ethical environment, where ethical cues are explicit (Kuenzi et al., 2020), the amoral manager comes across as actively, rather than passively, rejecting an ethical stance (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b). The manager should perceive the same ethical cues in the environment, but the manager still adopts an amoral stance. This comes across as a more blatant disregard for ethics (e.g., Simons, 2002; Treviño et al., 2000), in which case the amoral manager is perceived as being even more unlikely to support employees’ morally courageous acts. Thus, in a highly ethical environment, amoral managers are perceived as being even less supportive of employees’ moral courage, which further discourages employees from demonstrating moral courage and corresponding moral behaviors.

The combined effects of environmental standards and managers’ leadership styles and behaviors can indirectly influence employees’ unfavorable attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Cha and Edmondson, 2006; Greenbaum et al., 2015a; Simons, 2002). In this respect, amoral management is made especially ambiguous in a highly ethical environment and is expected to indirectly affect employees’ unethical conduct due to reduced moral courage:

Hypothesis 3: Ethical environment moderates the relationship between amoral management and moral courage such that the negative relationship is stronger when the ethical environment is high as opposed to low.

Hypothesis 4: Ethical environment moderates the indirect effect of amoral management on employee unethical behavior via reduced moral courage, such that the positive indirect effect is stronger when the ethical environment is high versus low.

Methods

The primary focus of this research was to develop and validate a scale for amoral management and provide an initial test of this construct. First, we develop items for amoral management and provide empirical evidence of the scale’s validity in two separate studies (Study 1 and Study 2a). Then, we provide tests of an initial nomological network of amoral management (Study 2b and Study 3). In Study 2b and Study 3, we control for two theoretically and empirically related leadership constructs, laissez-faire leadership, and ethical leadership.

Study 1

Using steps for deductive scale development (Hinkin, 1995, 1998), we created and evaluated a measure of amoral management. The focus of such efforts is to create a scale that is based on an existing conceptualization of a construct. In this case, our definition of amoral management, “a leader’s consistent failure to respond to issues that have ethical implications,” is tied to prior explanations of amoral management (Carroll, 1987, 2001; Greenbaum et al., 2015b). As such, we created items that signal a supervisor’s consistent failure to address the ethical implications of situations at work. Because amoral management is theoretically related to other forms of ethics-based (i.e., ethical leadership, abusive supervision) or other transactional leadership styles, we also strove to create items that are theoretically distinct from those related constructs.

Development of items

Based on the conceptualization of amoral management, one of the study’s authors initially created nine items. These items were generated with the definition and theoretical underpinnings of amoral management in mind and were created to be specific to the workplace. As with past deductive scale development research (e.g., Brady et al., 2017; Ferris et al., 2008), some of the items generated were based off of items in theoretically related preexisting scales. For example, Bass and Avolio’s (1995) laissez-faire leadership measure captures the failure of a leader to respond to issues in the workplace in general. When generating items, the laissez-faire leadership item “avoids getting involved when important issues arise” was modified to “does not get involved when ethical issues arise” to encompass an absence of a response in an ethical context.

After this, the research team discussed the face validity of the nine items. During those discussions, two items were eliminated that were redundant with other items (“does not provide guidance in terms of ethics” and “remains silent on ethical issues”), and one item was removed because the wording was vague (“is vague when it comes to ethical considerations”). Finally, two items were removed because each item simultaneously asked about supervisors in terms of “ethical or unethical,” making them vague (DeVellis, 2012) with regard to assessing unethical or ethical conduct rather than the managers’ lack of ethical guidance more generally (“does not clearly support ethical or unethical conduct” and “is not clearly unethical or ethical at work”). Thus, the final measure asked employees to rate their supervisors on the following four items: “My supervisor . . .” (1) “does not get involved when ethical issues arise,” (2) “is absent when ethical issues arise,” (3) “remains neutral when ethical decisions are needed,” and (4) “sidesteps responsibilities that involve ethical considerations.”

Sample

We collected data from working adults on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. To qualify for the study, participants had to be employed full- or part-time (working at least 20 hours/week) and were paid $1.50 upon completion of the survey. Among survey respondents (N = 223), 70% were Caucasian, 61% were male, the average age was 37.18 years (SD = 9.82), and 91% reported working full time. Finally, on average, respondents reported organization tenure of 6.09 years (SD = 5.32) and a tenure with their supervisor of 4.43 years (SD = 3.59). Respondents indicated how strongly they agreed that their supervisors were amoral managers by rating each item of the 4-item measure on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

First, we randomly split the sample to conduct an exploratory factor analyses (EFA; N = 111) and to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; N = 112). Then, we conducted an EFA (N = 111) with promax rotation to examine the underlying structure of the four items. One clear factor emerged (one eigenvalue greater than 1) that included the four items. The factor explained 84% of the variance. All items had standardized factor loadings greater than or equal to .83. Cronbach’s alpha was .94 and the mean was 3.29 (SD = 1.76).

Next, using the other half of the data (N = 112), we performed a CFA using maximum-likelihood estimation on the four items. The fit statistics showed that the model fit was acceptable: χ²(2) = 6.75; CFI = .99, RMSEA = .15, SRMR = .02 (Bentler and Bonnett, 1990; Hu and Bentler, 1999). Although the RMSEA fit statistic was higher than desirable, this is likely due to inflated estimates that occur with small degrees of freedom (Kenny et al., 2015). All four items loaded onto the intended factor at a significant level (p < .001), with factor loadings ranging from .72 to .97. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .92 and the mean was 3.44 (SD = 1.65).

Study 2a

Sample

To assess our measure’s convergent and discriminant validity, we recruited study participants utilizing an alumni database from a western United States university. An email was sent to alumni with active employment information asking for their participation in a research study about their current workplace. Alumni were asked to anonymously complete a one-time survey in exchange for being entered into a raffle to win one of 10 $25 Amazon gift codes. We received 614 complete responses. We removed careless responders (i.e., attention check items, low response time; Meade and Craig, 2012) for a final sample of 550.

Similar to Duffy et al. (2002), we randomly split the sample, and used one half to validate the amoral management measure (N = 275; Study 2a) and the other half to test the predicted model (N = 275; Study 2b). Because the variables were rated by the same source at the same point in time, we utilized a marker variable approach (e.g., Butts et al., 2009; Jong and Ford, 2020; Mawritz et al., 2020) to assess and treat concerns related to common method variance (CMV). Prior to splitting the data, we chose five items² from the unused measures in our dataset to create a marker variable and then checked the model fit and reliability of the marker variable. This method argues that “strong CMV is present if a randomly selected subset of items from measures representing vastly different constructs displays high reliability and suggests a good-fitting model from a confirmatory factor analysis perspective” (Butts et al., 2009: 127). Results revealed the marker variable had poor reliability (α = .14) and poor model fit: χ²(5) = 25.62, CFI = .65, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .05. While the poor reliability and fit indicate that CMV was likely not a concern, we decided to correct for potential method bias through a data purification technique (Butts et al., 2009). We regressed the study measurement items onto the marker variable and then utilized the unstandardized residuals from these regression analyses as the data in subsequent analyses.

Among Study 2a participants, 94% were Caucasian, 59% were male, the average age was 44.22 years (SD = 11.11), and 90% worked full-time. Participants’ average organizational tenure was 9.37 years (SD = 8.99) and average tenure with their supervisors was 3.50 years (SD = 3.70).

To assess amoral management’s convergent and discriminant validity, the survey included the four amoral management items as well as other related leadership measures, including ethical leadership (Brown et al., 2005; 10 items, α = .95), laissez-faire leadership (Avolio et al., 1999; 4 items, α = .88), and abusive supervision (Mitchell and Ambrose, 2007; 5 items, α = .94). Participants responded to survey items using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The four-item measure of amoral management had a mean of 2.17 (SD = 1.15) and was shown to be reliable (α = .83).

In terms of discriminant validity, there is no theoretical reason to expect amoral management ratings to be related to respondent demographics. As expected, amoral management was not significantly correlated with employee’s age (r = .06, ns), gender (r = −.004, ns), part-time/full-time status (r = .03, ns), or education (r = −.06, ns). Next, we assessed the convergent/discriminant validity of amoral management, specifically focusing on how it compares to other types of leadership. We expected amoral management to be related to the general measure of laissez-faire leadership, as both constructs demonstrate a lack of guidance from one’s leader. Laissez-faire leadership represents the failure of a leader to respond or provide guidance to issues in general, while amoral management specifically assesses a lack of leader response or guidance in ethical matters. Owing to the morality-based nature of amoral management, we also expect amoral management to be related to other ethics-based types of leadership, such as ethical leadership and abusive supervision. We anticipated moderately high correlations (i.e., convergent validity) between our measure of amoral management and measures of laissez-faire leadership, ethical leadership, and abusive supervision.

Consistent with our expectations, amoral management was negatively related to ethical leadership (r = −.61, p ⩽ .01) and positively related to laissez-faire leadership (r = .58, p ⩽ .01) and abusive supervision (r = .41, p ⩽ .01) (see Table 1). The stronger correlation between laissez-faire leadership and amoral management is expected, as a leader who fails to respond in general is also unlikely to respond to situations with ethical circumstances. Yet, unlike a laissez-faire leader, other types of transactional leaders may actually manage and respond to subordinates, but exhibit amoral management—specifically, some leaders may only fail to provide guidance in ethical matters. Thus, we expect a high correlation between amoral management and laissez-faire leadership, but while these constructs are similar, they are also distinct because otherwise “good” or active leaders may still exhibit amoral management. We also anticipated a stronger correlation between ethical leadership and amoral management as both measures examine supervisor moral expectations. With ethical leadership, supervisor expectations regarding workplace ethics are communicated to employees, whereas an amoral manager fails to address ethics. Thus, a strong negative correlation between the two constructs was expected.

Table 1.

Study 2a: Descriptive statistics, composite reliability, and study variable intercorrelations.

Variables	Mean	SD	CR	AVE	1	2	3	4
1. Amoral management	2.17	1.15	.84	.58	(.76)	.58**	−.61**	.41**
2. Laissez-faire leadership	2.62	1.43	.88	.65	.60**	(.81)	−.66**	.47**
3. Ethical leadership	5.64	1.09	.95	.65	−.62**	−.69**	(.81)	−.62**
4. Abusive supervision	1.52	1.06	.95	.79	.45**	.52**	−.64**	(.89)

N = 275. ^*p ⩽ .05, ^**p ⩽ .01. CR = composite reliability, AVE = average variance extracted; the square root of the AVE for the constructs are in diagonal line (in bold).

The original correlations among the variables are below the diagonal; the correlations among the variable residuals after eliminating the variance created by the marker variable are above the diagonal; means and standard deviations of the original variables are reported.

To illustrate divergence among these theoretically related measures, we conducted a series of CFAs and examined chi-squared difference tests. Examining the differences in the CFAs allows us to illustrate that though the constructs are related, they are also distinct (i.e., discriminant validity). Using maximum-likelihood estimation, we examined the fit indices. First, we assessed the fit of a four-factor model, with all items loading on their intended factors (amoral management, laissez-faire leadership, ethical leadership, and abusive supervision); χ²(224) = 593.66; CFI = .93, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .05. As shown in Table 2, chi-squared difference tests revealed that the four-factor model produced a superior fit to the alternative models, providing evidence for discriminant validity. These comparisons help assuage concerns related to the overlap between amoral management and laissez-faire leadership and other ethics-based leadership constructs and provide psychometric evidence of its uniqueness.

Table 2.

Results of confirmatory factor analyses (Studies 2a, 2b, and 3).

Model	χ²	d.f.	$Δ_{χ 2}$ ∆x2	$Δ_{d . f .}$ ∆d.f.	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR
Study 2a
4-factor (1-AM; 2-EL; 3-LFL; 4-AS)	593.66*	224			.93	.08	.05
3-factor A (1-AM, EL; 2-LFL; 3-AS)	873.34*	227	279.68*	3	.88	.10	.07
3-factor B (1-AM, LFL; 2-EL; 3-AS)	794.81*	227	201.15*	3	.90	.10	.05
2-factor (1-AM, LFL, EL; 2-AS)	1142.53*	229	548.87*	5	.84	.12	.07
1-factor (1-AM, EL, LFL, AS)	2014.54*	230	1420.88*	6	.68	.17	.10
Study 2b
6-factor (1-AM; 2-LFL; 3-EL; 4-MC; 5-EE; 6-UB)	681.15*	335			.93	.06	.05
5-factor A (1-AM, LFL; 2-EL; 3-MC; 4-EE; 5-UB)	875.27*	340	194.12*	5	.89	.08	.05
5-factor B (1-AM, EL; 2-LFL; 3-MC; 4-EE; 5-UB)	1040.16*	340	359.01*	5	.86	.09	.06
4-factor A (1-AM, EL, LFL; 2-MC; 3-EE; 4-UB)	1330.42*	344	649.27*	9	.80	.10	.06
4-factor B (1-AM, MC, EE; 2-LFL; 3 -EL; 4-UB)	1263.04*	344	581.89*	9	.81	.10	.07
3-factor (1-AM, EL, LFL; 2-MC, EE; 3-UB)	1536.00*	347	854.85*	12	.76	.11	.07
2-factor (1-AM, EL, LFL, UB; 2-MC, EE)	1623.04*	349	941.89*	14	.74	.12	.08
1-factor (1-AM, EL, LFL, UB, MC, EE)	1938.96*	350	1257.81*	15	.68	.13	.08
Study 3
6-factor (1-AM; 2-LFL; 3-EL; 4-MC; 5-EE; 6-UB)	664.10*	335			.95	.06	.05
5-factor A (1-AM, LFL; 2-EL; 3-MC; 4-EE; 5-UB)	1005.83*	340	341.73*	5	.90	.09	.06
5-factor B (1-AM, EL; 2-LFL; 3-MC; 4-EE; 5-UB)	1038.25*	340	374.15*	5	.90	.09	.06
4-factor A (1-AM, EL, LFL; 2-MC; 3-EE; 4-UB)	1276.49*	344	612.39*	9	.86	.10	.06
4-factor B (1-AM, MC, EE; 2-LFL; 3 -EL; 4-UB)	1289.57*	344	625.47*	9	.86	.10	.08
3-factor (1-AM, EL, LFL; 2-MC, EE; 3-UB)	1562.94*	347	898.84*	12	.82	.12	.08
2-factor (1-AM, EL, LFL, UB; 2-MC, EE)	2985.11*	349	2321.01*	14	.60	.17	.16
1-factor (1-AM, EL, LFL, UB, MC, EE)	3187.02*	350	2522.92*	15	.57	.18	.17

Study 2a: N = 275; Study 2b: N = 275; Study 3: N = 261. ^*p ⩽ .05

A: amoral management; EL: ethical leadership; LFL: laissez-faire leadership; MC: moral courage; EE: ethical environment; UB: unethical behavior.

Lastly, we examined amoral management’s discriminant validity with related constructs using the Fornell–Larcker (1981) criterion. This test calls for a comparison of the square root of each construct’s average variance extracted (AVE) value with its correlation to other relevant constructs (i.e., laissez-faire leadership, ethical leadership, and abusive supervision). To support discriminant validity, the square root of the AVE of amoral management must exceed its correlation with other constructs. Results revealed that the square-rooted AVE of amoral management (√AVE = .76) was greater than the absolute value of amoral management’s correlation coefficients with relevant constructs (see Table 1; laissez-faire leadership: r = .58; ethical leadership: r = −.61; abusive supervision: r = .41). Taken together, our results provided support for amoral management’s discriminant validity.

Study 2b

Sample and procedure

As explained in Study 2a, a larger sample of 550 participants was split in half (e.g., Duffy et al. 2002) to first validate the amoral management measure (Study 2a) and then to test an initial nomological network for amoral management (Study 2b). Thus, Study 2b consists of 275 full-time working adults. Among them, 94% were Caucasian, 56% were male, and their average age was 43.41 years (SD = 10.66). The average organizational tenure was 9.70 years (SD = 8.69) and the average tenure with their supervisor was 3.84 years (SD = 4.19). Respondents also worked an average of 41.96 hours per week (SD = 8.63) in a wide variety of industries such as finance, education, government, and customer service. To address concerns related to CMV, all analyses were conducted using data purified following a marker variable approach (Butts et al., 2009).

Measures

Unless noted, all measures used a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).

Amoral management

Respondents rated their immediate supervisors’ amoral management (α = .87) using the four-item measure that was developed in Study 1 and Study 2a.

Ethical environment

Employees reported their perception of an ethical work environment (α = .92) using the 10-item version of Treviño et al.’s (1998) measure, as used in past research (e.g., Quade et al., 2017; Valentine and Fleischman, 2004). Employees were asked to rate how much they agreed with the following statements with respect to their organization. A sample item is “penalties for unethical behavior are strictly enforced in my work organization.”

Moral courage

Employees rated their own moral courage at work (α = .69) using a 3-item measure developed by Hannah et al. (2011b). They were given the stem, “Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding your behavior in the workplace. At work . . .” A sample item is “. . . I demonstrate courage to do the right thing, even at personal cost.”

Unethical behavior

Employees rated their own engagement in unethical behavior with Moore et al.’s (2012) 7-item measure. On a 7-point scale, respondents were asked to rate the frequency with which they engaged in unethical behaviors at work (1 = never; 7 = very often). A sample item is “discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person.” The alpha for this measure was lower than expected (α = .55). Because the reliability for unethical behavior was lower than desirable, we examined item-to-total reliability statistics but did not identify specific, problematic items that are driving the low reliability. Thus, the lower reliability could be due to the homogeneity of the sample (ethnicity was 94% Caucasian, with 96% having obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher) (e.g., Bernardi, 1994; Callegari et al., 2016). Indeed, homogeneity is a sample characteristic that affects reliability (Xu et al., 2018). As such, homogenous samples may have lower standard deviations on measure items (SD for the unethical behavior items are all below .58), which tends to lower reliability (e.g., Pike and Hudson, 1998). However, because alpha is a characteristic of the sample completing the measure, and not the measure itself, and this measure has proved valid and reliable in prior research (e.g., Bonner et al., 2017; Fehr et al., 2020; Moore et al., 2012; Qi et al., 2020; Quade et al., 2017), we decided to retain the full seven-item measure to test our full model.

Control variables

To demonstrate the incremental validity of amoral management above and beyond similar leadership constructs, we controlled for laissez-faire leadership and ethical leadership. Laissez-faire leadership was measured using a four-item scale (Avolio et al., 1999; α = .91). A sample item is “my supervisor is absent when needed.” Ethical leadership was measured using Brown et al.’s (2005; α = .96) 10-item measure. A sample item is “my supervisor sets an example of how to do things the right way in terms of ethics.”

Study 2b results

The means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations among the Study 2b variables are presented in Table 3. First, we examined the six-factor measurement model (amoral management, moral courage, ethical environment, unethical behavior, laissez-faire leadership, and ethical leadership), using maximum-likelihood estimation and randomly created item parcels for scales with more than eight indicators (Floyd and Widaman, 1995; Landis et al., 2000). We parceled measures with a large number of indicators because when the ratio of sample size to free parameters is not sufficient, parceling is used to improve this ratio (Bandalos and Finney, 2001; Williams and O’Boyle, 2008) and is effective in producing less biased test statistics. We found the six-factor model had good fit (χ²(335) = 681.15; CFI = .93, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05), and chi-squared difference tests provide evidence that the variables are distinct (see Table 2).

Table 3.

Study 2b: Descriptive statistics, and study variable intercorrelations.

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Amoral management	2.37	1.26	(.87)	−.58**	−.28**	.26**	.70**	−.67**
2. Ethical environment	5.12	1.17	−.59**	(.92)	.25**	−.34**	−.54**	.68**
3. Moral courage	5.88	.68	−.27**	.25**	(.69)	−.35**	−.24**	.26**
4. Unethical behavior	1.12	.19	.23**	−.33**	−.35**	(.55)	.29**	−.33**
5. Laissez-faire leadership	2.77	1.56	.71**	−.55**	−.24**	.26**	(.91)	−.68**
6. Ethical leadership	5.44	1.24	−.68**	.68**	.26**	−.30**	−.69**	(.96)

N = 275. ^*p ⩽ .05, ^**p ⩽ .01.

Cronbach’s alpha values for the constructs are along the diagonal (in bold). The original correlations among the variables are below the diagonal; the correlations among the variable residuals after eliminating the variance created by the marker variable are above the diagonal; means and standard deviations of the original variables are reported.

Next, we used the PROCESS Macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2013) to test our hypotheses while controlling for laissez-faire leadership and ethical leadership.² Using 5000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals (CI), we found a negative relationship between amoral management and moral courage (b = −.11, SE = .05, p ⩽ .05), supportive of Hypothesis 1. Moreover, we found the relationship between moral courage and unethical behavior was negative and significant (b = −.08, SE = .02, p ⩽ .01). To test Hypothesis 2, we analyzed the 95% bootstrapped CI for the indirect effects; if the CI does not include zero, mediation is supported. In support of Hypothesis 2, moral courage mediates the positive indirect relationship between amoral management and unethical behavior (b = .01, SE = .01; 95% CI [.0001, .0198]).

Next, supportive of Hypothesis 3, we found a significant interactive effect with amoral management and ethical environment onto moral courage (b = −.05, SE = .02, p ⩽ .05). We then conducted a simple slopes test (Aiken and West, 1991) to test whether the effects were in the expected direction. As expected, when ethical environment was high (+1 SD), the relationship between amoral management and moral courage was negative and significantly different from zero (simple slope = −.17, t = −2.61, p ⩽ .01). Yet, when ethical environment was low (–1 SD), the relationship between amoral management and moral courage was not significantly different from zero (simple slope = −.05, t = −1.05, p = .30). These results suggest amoral management has a significant negative effect on moral courage in a highly ethical environment (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Study 2b: The moderating effect of ethical environment on the relationship between amoral management and moral courage.

Finally, we examined the complete moderated-mediation model by analyzing the 95% confidence intervals (5000 bootstrap samples) for the conditional indirect effects at one standard deviation above and below the mean of ethical environment (see Table 4). Supportive of Hypothesis 4, we found that the conditional indirect effect of amoral management onto unethical behavior via moral courage was significant at high levels (+1 SD above the mean) of ethical environment (b = .01, SE = .01; 95% CI [.002, .028]) and became non-significant at low levels (–1 SD below the mean) of ethical environment (b = .004, SE = .004; 95% CI [–.004, .013]). The index of moderated mediation was significant (b = .004, SE = .002; 95% CI [.0004, .0094]).

Table 4.

Study 2b: Moderated-mediation results – Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with confidence intervals.

	Moral courage		Unethical behavior
	Coefficient	95% CI	Coefficient	95% CI
Constant	−.02 (.04)	(−.105, .065)	−.01 (.01)	(−.026, .016)
Amoral management	−.11 * (.05)	(−.217, −.013)	−.00 (.01)	(−.030, .021)
Moral courage			−.08 ** (.02)	(−.111, −.047)
Ethical environment	.07 (.05)	(−.025, .164)
Ethical environment X amoral management	−.05 * (.02)	(−.099, −.004)
Laissez-faire leadership	−.03 (.04)	(−.109, .045)	−.01 (.01)	(−.008, .034)
Ethical leadership	.03 (.05)	(−.073, .136)	−.03 * (.01)	(−.058, −.008)
	R² = .108**		R² = .189**
Indirect effects of amoral management on unethical behavior (via moral courage) at low and high levels of ethical environment
			Coefficient	95% CI
Low ethical environment (–1 SD)			.004 (.00)	(–.004, .013)
High ethical environment (+1 SD)			.01 (.01)	(.002, .028)
Index of moderated mediation			.004 (.00)	(.0004, .0094)

N = 275. Presented results are unstandardized effects. Bootstrap sample size = 5000.

CI: confidence interval. ^*p ⩽ .05, ^**p ⩽ .01. Two-tailed tests.

Owing to the cross-sectional nature of the data, we also examined potential reverse causality in the model. Following the recommendation of Kline (2011) and the example of previous researchers (e.g., Matta et al., 2017; Mitchell et al., 2019; Ou et al., 2014), we examined Akaike’s Informative Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to compare our hypothesized model to the alternative, reverse causal model, wherein moral courage influences unethical behavior via perceptions of amoral management. Smaller AIC and BIC values indicate a superior model fit and the model “most likely to replicate” (Kline, 2011: 220). Thus, we compared the results for the hypothesized model (AIC = 381.58 and BIC = 428.60) to the reverse causal model (AIC = 467.46 and BIC = 514.48). This test demonstrates our hypothesized model has superior fit as compared to an alternative, reverse causal model.

The results of Study 2b demonstrate that the interactive effect of amoral management and ethical environment affects an employee’s moral courage at work and subsequent unethical behavior. Moreover, these results hold while controlling for two theoretically and empirically related leadership constructs, laissez-faire and ethical leadership, demonstrating the incremental validity of amoral management. In Study 3, we seek to replicate these findings using time-lagged data to provide additional support for the initial nomological network of amoral management.

Study 3

Sample and procedure

Study 3 uses time-lagged data to test our research model. Participants were recruited using Qualtrics Panels (Courtright et al., 2016). In exchange for participating in research studies, members of Qualtrics Panels receive credits, the amount of which is determined by Qualtrics Panels, that they can use to purchase gift cards or other products. The 261 working adults who participated were all full-time employees. Per recommendations by Podsakoff et al. (2012) to reduce method bias, we introduced a 3-week time delay between the collection of the predictor and the dependent variable. In order to ensure anonymity and link responses across the two time periods, each participant was assigned a unique identification number. Again, because the independent and mediator variables were rated by the same source at the same point in time, we utilized the marker variable approach from Study 2, to assess and treat concerns related to CMV (e.g., Butts et al., 2009; Jong and Ford, 2020; Mawritz et al., 2020). As in Study 2, we again chose five items³ from unused measures in the dataset to create a marker variable and then checked the model fit: χ²(5) = 37.30, CFI = .69, RMSEA = .16, SRMR = .08 and reliability (α = .23) of the marker variable. Results revealed that the marker variable was a poor fit and had poor reliability, indicating CMV is likely not a concern; however, we again decided to correct for potential method bias through the same data purification technique used in Study 2a and 2b (Butts et al., 2009). All subsequent analyses were conducted using the purified data.

Among participants, from a wide variety of industries, 49% were female and 82% were Caucasian, and the average age was 57.48 years (SD = 10.57). Average organizational tenure was 17.96 years (SD = 11.51) and the average tenure with their supervisor was 8.09 years (SD = 7.86). Participants reported working an average of 42.01 hours per week (SD = 6.23).

Measures

All measures were the same as those reported in Study 2b. At Time 1, employees rated supervisor amoral management (α = .88), ethical environment (α = .91), and moral courage (α = .79). To demonstrate that amoral management has incremental validity, we again controlled for similar leadership styles in the form of laissez-faire leadership (α = .94) and ethical leadership (α = .97), also measured at Time 1. At Time 2, employees rated the frequency with which they engaged in unethical behaviors (α = .93) in the previous three weeks.

Study 3 results

As in the previous study, we conducted a CFA of the six-factor model (amoral management, moral courage, ethical environment, unethical behavior, laissez-faire leadership, and ethical leadership). Again, to maintain a favorable indicator-to-sample-size ratio (Bandalos and Finney, 2001), we used parcels for measures with more than eight indicators and found good fit for our measurement model (χ²(335) = 664.10; CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05). As shown in Table 2, a series of chi-squared difference tests provide evidence that the variables are distinct.

Descriptive statistics, reliability estimates, and correlations of the focal variables are presented in Table 5. Next, as in Study 2b, we tested our model in SPSS with 5000 bootstrapped samples while controlling for laissez-faire leadership and ethical leadership.⁴ In support of Hypothesis 1, amoral management was negatively and significantly related to moral courage (b = −.20, SE = .05, p ⩽ .01). Additionally, the relationship between moral courage and unethical behavior was negative and significant (b = −.11, SE = .03, p ⩽ .01). In support of Hypothesis 2, we found moral courage mediates the positive indirect relationship between amoral management and unethical behavior (b = .02, SE = .01; 95% CI [.005, .048]).

Table 5.

Study 3: Descriptive statistics, composite reliability, and study variable intercorrelations.

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Amoral management	3.00	1.30	(.88)	−.58**	−.37**	.13*	.63**	−.59**
2. Ethical environment	4.66	1.26	−.55**	(.91)	.29**	−.15*	−.68**	−.79**
3. Moral courage	5.60	.95	−.48**	.44**	(.79)	−.24**	−.24**	.25**
4. Unethical behavior	1.11	.42	.14*	−.12	−.19**	(.93)	.13*	−.16**
5. Laissez-faire leadership	3.13	1.68	.58**	−.71**	−.35**	−.11	(.94)	−.83**
6. Ethical leadership	4.85	1.47	−.55**	.83**	.40**	−.13*	−.85**	(.97)

N = 261. ^*p ⩽ .05, ^**p ⩽ .01.

Cronbach’s alpha values for the constructs are along the diagonal (in bold); the original correlations among the variables are below the diagonal; the correlations among the variable residuals after eliminating the variance created by the marker variable are above the diagonal; means and standard deviations of the original variables are reported.

The results revealed that ethical environment moderated the relationship between amoral management and moral courage (b = −.06, SE = .03, p ⩽ .05). We also conducted a simple slopes test, which revealed that amoral management had a significant effect when ethical environment was high (simple slope = −.27, t = −4.84, p < .001), but had a weaker effect on moral courage when ethical environment was low (simple slope = −.13, t = −2.36, p < .05). In sum, Hypothesis 3 was supported (see Figure 3 for the plotted interaction).

Figure 3.

Study 3: The moderating effect of ethical environment on the relationship between amoral management and moral courage.

The path coefficients for the moderated-mediation model are presented in Table 6. To test Hypothesis 4, we analyzed the 95% confidence intervals (5000 bootstrap samples) for the conditional indirect effect at two levels of the moderator (ethical environment) (see Table 6). Supporting Hypothesis 4, the conditional indirect effect of amoral management onto unethical behavior via moral courage is significant at high levels (+1 SD above the mean) of ethical environment (b = .03, SE = .01; 95% CI [.007, .062]) and becomes non-significant at low levels (–1 SD below the mean) of ethical environment (b = .01, SE = .01; 95% CI [–.0004, .038]). The index of moderated mediation was also significant (b = .01, SE = .004; 95% CI [.001, .017]).

Table 6.

Study 3: Moderated-mediation results – Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with confidence intervals.

	Moral courage		Unethical behavior
	Coefficient	95% CI	Coefficient	95% CI
Constant	−.05 (.05)	(−.158, .051)	.00 (.03)	(−.049, .049)
Amoral management	−.20 ** (.05)	(−.299, −.109)	−.003 (.03)	(−.054, .047)
Moral courage			−.11 ** (.03)	(−.175, −.047)
Ethical environment	.14 * (.07)	(.004, .282)
Ethical environment × amoral management	−.06 * (.03)	(−.115, −.008)
Laissez-faire leadership	.01 (.06)	(−.097, .126)	−.01 (.03)	(−.067, .049)
Ethical leadership	−.03 (.08)	(−.188, .120)	−.04 (.03)	(−.111, .024)
	R² = .163**		R² = .071**
Indirect effects of amoral management on unethical behavior (via moral courage) at low and high levels of ethical environment
			Coefficient	95% CI
Low ethical environment (–1 SD)			.01 (.01)	(–.0004, .038)
High ethical environment (+1 SD)			.03 (.01)	(.007, .062)
Index of moderated mediation			.01 (.00)	(.001, .017)

N = 261. Presented results are unstandardized effects. Bootstrap sample size = 5000.

CI: Confidence interval. ^*p ⩽ .05, ^**p ⩽ .01. Two-tailed tests.

As in Study 2b, we examined the AIC and BIC to compare our hypothesized model to the alternative, reverse causal model (moral courage influencing unethical behavior via perceptions of amoral management). In comparing the results for the hypothesized model (AIC = 884.49 and BIC = 930.82) to the reverse causal model (AIC = 1004.78 and BIC = 1051.11), we note the hypothesized model provides superior fit and thus is more likely to replicate.

Discussion

Theoretical contributions

Our research contributes to the literature in three primary ways. First, with the exception of theoretical work (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b; Treviño et al., 2003), research on either amoral management or ethically neutral leadership has been considerably limited. In fact, Treviño et al. (2003: 22) noted that “future research should consider this ethically neutral category,” and yet nearly two decades later, we still know very little about this type of management. This is due in large part to the lack of a validated measure of the construct. Hence, we contribute to the literature by creating and validating a measure of amoral management that can be used in future research to deepen our understanding of why amoral management exists and its effects on organizational life. We believe our research serves as an important first step in further understanding amoral management as a common leadership approach with respect to ethics (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b; Treviño et al., 2003), but one that is poorly understood in terms of its potential benefits and damages. By controlling for laissez-faire leadership and ethical leadership in our analyses, we provide empirical evidence of the practical importance of studying amoral management above and beyond similar constructs.

Second, our work contributes to the literature by establishing an initial nomological network of amoral management grounded in extant behavioral ethics constructs (e.g., decreased moral courage and increased unethical behavior). Additionally, we demonstrate that an ethical environment amplifies these negative outcomes. When the organization has policies, practices, and procedures that support ethics (i.e., a highly ethical environment) (e.g., Kuenzi et al., 2020), amoral management is even more damaging to employees’ moral courage and subsequent unethical behavior. This is because employees will have a hard time harnessing moral courage, owing to the heightened ambiguity of amoral management in the context of an ethical environment. This highly ethical environment creates a saliency effect (Taylor et al., 1979), in which case amoral managers appear to be making an active choice to avoid ethics, given that the environment strongly endorses ethical adherence. In turn, amoral managers who ignore the ethical standards of the broader environment are likely to be perceived as being even less supportive of employees’ morally courageous efforts, which further increases unethical conduct.

Third, we contribute to the literature by providing a theoretical test of a moral conation capacity in the form of moral courage (Hannah et al., 2011a). Research on moral courage in organizations has been limited (Hannah et al., 2011a; Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007). To that end, our work reveals an antecedent, amoral management, and a consequent, unethical behavior, to an employee’s underdeveloped moral courage. Additionally, by studying the interactive effect of amoral management and ethical environment, our work helps to broaden the theoretical underpinnings of moral conation theory in terms of better understanding moderators (Hannah et al., 2011a). Although past research has demonstrated the importance of ethical messages, both from the environment (Treviño et al., 1999) and from individual leaders (i.e., ethical leadership) (Schaubroeck et al., 2012), our research explains how the interactive effect of these two contextual sources affects moral conation in the form of moral courage, which then influences morality-related behavior. Importantly, too, this work provides an example of when an ethical environment does not lead to positive ethics-related outcomes for employees, which is counterintuitive, given its typical influence on such behaviors (Treviño et al., 1998).

Practical implications

It is important for organizations to realize that ethical environments do not buffer against the negative influences of amoral management. In fact, our research reveals just the opposite across two different studies. Higher-level managers cannot assume that an ethical environment is enough to propel both lower-level managers and employees to “do the right thing.” Because lower-level managers are especially influential in dictating employees’ attitudes and behaviors (Treviño and Nelson, 2017), organizations need to pay attention to whether a manager’s ethics-related leadership style supports that of the broader organization. Employees need consistency from both managers and the broader environment to garner enough moral courage to resist unethical behaviors. Our findings demonstrate the importance of ethical alignment at all levels of the organization, from executives to front-line managers (e.g., Treviño and Nelson, 2017).

Related to this point, we suspect amoral management could have a long-term damaging effect on an otherwise ethical environment. Indeed, research has suggested that management styles that do not support the organizational environment could be particularly problematic over time (Treviño et al., 1999). The proper response for organizations, then, is to ensure management at all levels represents high ethical standards, regularly shows they care about ethics, and strictly enforces penalties for unethical behavior. We know employees look to their supervisors as a source of ethical role modeling (Treviño, 1986). Yet, managers oftentimes abstain from discussing issues in moral terms, even if they are aware a moral issue exists (Bird and Waters, 1989). Thus, it becomes paramount for organizations to train supervisors to consistently engage when situations have ethical implications, to behave ethically, and to speak about ethics confidently. Fortunately, the solution to amoral management may be a simple one. If supervisors simply lack knowledge of how to be an ethical leader, or the desire to do so, organizations can provide training on how to incorporate ethics into their management styles.

Limitations and future directions

This research should be considered in light of its limitations. The data collected for the tests of our theoretical model were all self-report data, which can present CMV concerns. Additionally, in Study 2a and Study 2b, we rely on cross-sectional data. Yet, in Study 3, we employ a time-lagged design, intentionally separating the predictor variables (Time 1) from the dependent variable (Time 2) across a three-week time span. This time separation serves as one way to alleviate concerns related to CMV (Podsakoff et al., 2012). We also tested and found a significant interactive effect of amoral management and ethical environment on employee moral courage in both studies. Scholars have previously shown that a significant interactive effect would be more difficult to detect if method bias were a concern in the data (Siemsen et al., 2010). Finally, we utilized a marker variable technique for assessing and treating CMV (cf., Butts et al., 2009), which revealed CMV was not impacting our data.

Although we used time-lagged data for Study 3, we were still unable to time separate amoral management and moral courage during the data collection. Thus, we cannot definitively rule out that the reverse direction of relationships might be driving their relationship. We did provide theoretical arguments that support the direction of our hypotheses and examined an alternative, reverse causal model, where moral courage influences unethical behavior via perceptions of amoral management. The AIC/BIC tests in Study 2b and Study 3 revealed that our proposed model is most likely to replicate. Yet, future research could benefit from an experimental or truly longitudinal study of the effects of amoral management.

Study 2b is also limited in that the alpha for unethical behavior was lower than desirable. We believe this was owing to the homogeneity of the sample (e.g., Callegari et al., 2016), as the reliability for this same measure was acceptable in Study 3. Irrespective of this low reliability, we were able to replicate our full theoretical model across two studies, which provides evidence of the robustness of our predictions.

Future research would benefit from additional examinations of the nomological network of amoral management. Conceptual arguments exist regarding the antecedents of amoral management (Greenbaum et al., 2015b). However, empirical work has yet to uncover why managers would choose to engage in this particular form of management. Thus, we believe the amoral management construct can be further tested in future research to demonstrate why this leadership style may be embraced (and viewed positively) by leaders themselves. As detailed by Greenbaum et al. (2015b), leaders who practice amoral management may believe that by avoiding ethics they are managing the organization more effectively and efficiently (e.g., by saving time) (Bird and Waters, 1989). They may also believe that they are less likely to be criticized in terms of hypocrisy judgments (Greenbaum et al., 2015a).

In terms of future research, we believe there is value to understanding why leaders choose certain leadership styles, and whether their chosen styles are effective for advancing their careers and the company. As an example, even though abusive supervision is usually viewed as highly dysfunctional from an employee’s point of view (Mackey et al., 2017), recent research suggests that abusive supervision is beneficial to the leader in terms of re-engaging the leader’s work efforts (Qin et al., 2018). Similarly, research on amoral management can be tested with the same rigor to discern whether this relatively common style of leadership (Carroll, 1987) is indeed effective or problematic and to whom. By introducing an amoral management measure to the literature, future research will be able to test the theoretical assumptions put forth by Greenbaum et al. (2015b) and help managers recognize why leaders may default to amoral management, and whether and when this leadership approach is effective or ineffective. For example, future research could examine whether amoral management results in more efficiency and thus higher profits when quick decision making is needed. Future research could also examine whether the personalities of employees influence the extent to which amoral management affects their behaviors. Amoral management may not affect the behaviors of those high in moral identity (see Aquino and Reed, 2002) because these employees follow their own moral compass when deciding how to behave within the organization.

With respect to the relationship between amoral management and moral courage, future research could investigate additional moderators that may influence the extent to which amoral management results in moral courage. For example, under the condition of an economic downturn (Sirola and Pitesa, 2017), employees may respond to amoral managers with even stronger reductions in moral courage because they are afraid of losing their jobs. Conversely, when ethical issues are high in moral intensity (i.e., potential harm) or social consensus (i.e., social agreement that an act is wrong) (Jones, 1991), employees may respond to their amoral managers by demonstrating higher moral courage than what is typical because the seriousness of the offense propels them to disregard their leader’s amoral stance. We hope that these ideas, and our development of an amoral management measure, propel researchers to further unveil the complexities, risks, and potential usefulness of managing amorally.

Conclusion

Scholars have argued that amoral management is a common type of ethics-based management style (Carroll, 1987; Greenbaum et al., 2015b; Treviño et al., 2003) and yet, empirically, research is limited in examining amoral management. Thus, by validating a measure of amoral management, we begin uncovering the implications of amoral management that will hopefully encourage future research. We present an initial nomological network of amoral management and in doing so demonstrate its unfavorable effects by decreasing employees’ moral courage, and subsequently, increasing employees’ unethical behavior. Importantly, we also show that when employees perceive a highly ethical environment in their organizations, the ill effects of amoral management are even worse. We hope scholars will continue to investigate amoral management and thus produce deeper insights that will advance theory and practice with respect to ethics.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the associate editor and the three anonymous reviewers for their time and effort during the revision process.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Matthew J Quade

Notes

Matthew J Quade is an Associate Professor of Management in the Hankamer School of Business at Baylor University. His research interests include behavioral ethics, ethics-based leadership styles, bottom-line mentality, and work–family integrations. His work has been published in various academic journals, including the Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Human Relations, Journal of Management, and Journal of Business Ethics. [ Email: matt_quade@baylor.edu]

Julena M Bonner is an Assistant Professor of Management in the Huntsman School of Business at Utah State University. Her research interests include behavioral ethics, moral emotions, ethical leadership, and workplace deviance. Her work has been published in academic journals, including the Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Journal of Organizational Behavior, and Human Relations. [ Email: julena.bonner@usu.edu]

Rebecca L Greenbaum is a Professor of Human Resources Management at Rutgers University’s School of Management and Labor Relations, USA. Her research interests include behavioral ethics, dysfunctional leadership, organizational justice, and workplace deviance. Her research appears in a variety of academic journals, including: Academy of Management Journal, Human Relations, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Management, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Personnel Psychology. [ Email: rebecca.greenbaum@rutgers.edu]

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