Abstract
Public procurement is one area needing governmental reforms. It is largely governed by dated rules that businesses feel are not able to encompass the complex needs of a modernising Indian economy. They also feel that there is a plethora of public contract rules often not in harmony with each other creating confusion and giving opportunity for corruption. However, the Modi regime’s anti-corruption mandate should not stifle business initiative that is the main critique against the Public Procurement Bill (2012). An amended public procurement law should inter alia be comprehensive in its coverage. It should incorporate new forms of tendering to cover complex procurement situations, maintain balance between the cost and the quality in tender awards, check abuse of monopoly in single-source procurement, prevent ‘digital divide’ in transparency provisions, maintain balance between external openness and promotion of domestic economy in market access provisions, encourage sustainable public procurement, incorporate effective mechanisms for redressing grievances of bidders and avoid penal provisions punishing offences covered by existing laws. Regulatory reform in public procurement will have substantial economic impact, as government contracts annually average approximately 30 per cent of India’s GDP and cover almost every sphere of government activity. Hence, such a reform will improve India’s anti-corruption/ease of doing business global rankings.
Keywords
Introduction
India’s maturity as a nation lies in the fact that despite increased external and internal challenges, it is steadily carrying on with its economic reforms agenda such as progress on the GST and the passage of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. One more step in reform constitutes reformulation of the rules governing public procurement for the first time after 2005, finding expression in Chapter 6 of the General Financial Rules (GFRs) published in March 2017, 1 dealing with procurement of goods and services.
This reform has been at the planning stage since 2010. Ever since 2010, when the Centre got mired in controversy over large-scale public procurement irregularities, the government of the day, to restore confidence in governance, established a group of ministers on corruption, which, in turn, set up a Committee on Public Procurement, under the chairmanship of Shri Vinod Dhall who had been the first Chairman of the Competition Commission of India. The committee submitted its report to the government in 2011, which highlighted abuse of public procurement regulations and recommended an overarching public procurement law containing necessary remedial measures. The Public Procurement Bill (2012), 2 brought into existence, inter alia, on the basis of the recommendations of the committee and introduced in Parliament in May 2012, failed, however, to gain traction and lapsed in 2014 with dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha.
The new government which came to power in 2014 evinced renewal of interest in the subject of public procurement and public consultations were held by the Department of Expenditure (DOE), Ministry of Finance, for an amended public procurement legislation. The consensus that emerged was against too many laws cluttering government procedures in India. Consequently, there was forward movement on amending flaws in the public procurement scenario through rules as expressed in Chapter 6 of GFRs (2017).
A new law would have been more appropriate, as one of the main problems of public procurement has been the plethora of rules brought in by different government departments which, at times, contradict each other, thus facilitating corrupt operators to follow their own agenda. Also, rules are binding only on government departments and not on bidders. A law could have brought clarity and legal consistency. Since rules are subordinate to law, any rules inconsistent with the law would not have survived.
However, even if a law has not been brought in, several features of GFRs (2017) Chapter 6 are worthy of appreciation. Several of the reforms sought to be introduced by businesses believing in ethical practices have found reflection in the new GFRs on public procurement.
Businesses, including major Central PSEs, private sector majors and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in a consultation on an appropriate public procurement regime for India held in New Delhi in June 2016 by the UN Global Compact Network India (UNGCNI),
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have expressed the need for a government contracting system that will be more angled than the GFRs (2005) or the draft Public Procurement Bill (2012) towards enhancing ease of doing business. These findings were communicated to several key government departments concerned with public procurement during June–August 2016, including the wing of the DOE, responsible for administering the subject of public procurement, that is, the Public Procurement Division of DOE. It is heartening to see that many recommendations of the business reflected in Chapter 6 of the GFRs (2017). The recommendations of business have been based on the following seven main elements:
Confirming who and what is to be covered by the regulations. Fostering competition through the rules. Promoting transparency through the rules. Appropriately regulating market access to foreign suppliers in the interest of the country’s economy. Establishing appropriate grievance redress modes for bidders. Promoting probity, given that public procurement is an area of governance very prone to corruption. Encouraging environmentally sustainable public procurement.
Coverage
The Public Procurement Bill (2012) prescribed a monetary threshold of ₹5 million for coverage under the law. Both private and public sector business felt that there should not be any monetary threshold limit for the public procurement law to apply, as otherwise there would be a possibility of above-threshold-level procurement being split into smaller contracts to escape the scrutiny of rules. It is heartening to see that GFRs (2017) have universal coverage for all types of procurement by ministries and departments of government, irrespective of monetary threshold.
Nurturing Competition
It is felt by business that the Chapter 6 of the GFRs (2017) is correct in enshrining open competitive bidding as the preferred mode of tendering.
Appropriate Bidding Mode for Complex Procurements
However, it was felt that a lacuna existed in the tendering modes prescribed in GFRs (2005)/Public Procurement Bill (2012), in that there was no appropriate bidding mode to meet a situation involving complex types of procurement, where the procurer cannot in advance specify the technical, financial or legal aspects of a project and therefore needs inputs from the private sector to conceive and formulate the project. In India, in such situations, the state governments have been resorting to the ‘Swiss challenge’ mode and it is understood that the Government of India is also using/going to use the Swiss challenge mode in some projects. Under the Swiss challenge method, ‘an unsolicited proposal for a government project is received and allows a third party to challenge the original proposal through open bidding and then lets the original proponent counter-match the most advantageous/most competitive offer’ (Vide Rule 79 A of the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Amendment Rules of August 2015). However, in utilising the Swiss challenge mode, it is observed that due to information asymmetry, the initial proponent is unduly favoured and therefore normally wins the contract. Business, therefore, believes that Swiss challenge is not the fairest mode of tendering.
It is gratifying to see that in such situations, where the subject matter of procurement is liable to rapid technological advances and market fluctuations (vide Rule 164 of GFRs [2017]) the new GFRs has through ‘two-stage bidding’, prescribed a ‘competitive dialogue’ mode, as was recommended by business, based on the example of Regulation 30 of the Public Contracts Regulations (2015), 4 of the UK. The procuring entity enters into a competitive dialogue with multiple bidders by inviting bids to formulate the technical specifications, ensuring equal opportunity in discussion for all bidders. Once the specifications are finalised through this dialogue, price bids are called for from those whose ideas were accepted and the award goes to the bid with the best quality–price ratio. This openness to draw on know-how from the open market is likely to enrich and/or modernise the government’s conceptualisation of projects.
Another significant effort in modernisation is with regard to assignment of greater weight to quality rather than costs. For example, in the procurement of consultancy services, where ‘quality of consultancy is of prime concern’, up to 80 per cent weight can be assigned to quality under ‘Quality and Costs-Based Selection’ (QCBS) tendering under Rule 192.
It is also good to note that the Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017, 5 brought out to supplement GFRs (2017) has in its Para 7.5.7 ruled that where a bid is abnormally low, its genuineness needs to be verified and if the bid is found to be too low to live up to the quality commitments, then it is liable to be rejected. This idea was also one of the recommendations of the business community.
Promotion of Transparency
Through Chapter 6 of GFRs (2017), transparency in the procedures of public procurement is promoted mainly digitally, as per global best practices. For example, regarding any tender, publication of all important procurement information, vide Rule 159, all bids must be received through e-procurement portals as per Rule 160; it is mandatory to record considerations on which procurement decisions have been taken as per Rule 144; Rule 149 establishes a government e-marketplace (GeM) 6 hosted by the GeM SPV online for common use goods and services; electronic reverse auction for goods is established through Rule 167 where the detailed specifications of the goods may be formulated and there is a competitive market of bidders anticipated to be qualified to participate in the electronic reverse auction and where the criteria to be used in determining the successful bid are quantifiable and can be expressed in monetary terms.
However, it is seen that a number of recommendations of the business sector were not accommodated in the new GFRs. For example, it had been recommended, following the UK Public Contracts Regulations (2015), that to obviate a digital divide between those knowledgeable about the digital technology and those less knowledgeable, the tools for e-communication should generally be ‘non-discriminatory, generally available, interoperable, using common technology products in general use’ (vide Reg. 22 of UK PCR). Also it had been recommended that there should be no obligation to require e-communication in submission where there is need for protection of sensitive information, this recommendation is based on Regulation 22 of Public Contracts Regulations (2015) of the UK.
Businesses from the SME sector had suggested that the Central Public Procurement Portal should also carry information as regards outstanding dues owed to suppliers by the procuring entities, beyond contracted time limits on undisputed bills. 7 The period and reason of delay should also be mentioned. A time limit for payment of bills should also be set in the public procurement Rules, especially as regards bills of the SMEs.
To overcome the problem of the ‘digital divide’ affecting the small-scale industry, which often cannot make use of bidding, there should be an e-registration system for bidders, through which an e-mail is issued automatically to all registered bidders/industry associations of the SMEs whenever an invitation for bids is invited by a public procurement entity.
Market Access
In GFRs’ (2017) Chapter 6, the market access remit (Rule 161-iv) has cleverly retained the wording of GFRs (2005). 8 It stipulates that non-domestic goods will be allowed into the Indian procurement market ‘if goods of the required quality, specifications, etc., may not be available in the country and it is necessary to also look for suitable competitive offers from abroad’. This wording provides policy coherence with India’s ‘make in India’ ethos by making preference for domestic goods the rule, rather than the exception. The exactly converse position prevailing in the Procurement Bill (2012) of the predecessor Manmohan Singh government drew much flak. Simultaneously, the conditions for import in exceptional circumstances are so liberal that government procurers have flexibility to import whenever the situation so demands.
Classicists argue that an open market which treats domestic and foreign players on a par is more efficient. The business community had also made recommendations on these lines. But in giving primacy to domestic goods, we are but following worldwide ‘buy national’ trends in public procurement.
It is also good to see that market access is qualified by a tilt towards make in India through Rule 153(ii), which recognises the policy notified by the Ministry for micro small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) under Section 11 of the MSME Development Act, 2006, 9 for preference policy which government may notify for procurement of MSME goods and services. Further, Rule 153(iii) upholds Central Government’s right to notify mandatory purchase and price preference for any type of goods from any category of bidders on grounds of promotion of local goods and services. This, for example, makes possible preferential market access to domestically manufactured electronic goods in government procurement, which is the current policy.
Grievance Redressal
In keeping with international norms, the Public Procurement Bill (2012) provides for an independent grievance redress mechanism (Clause 41), comprising a Redress Committee appointed by the government and headed by a retired High Court judge. This appeal mechanism is to be activated if review by the procuring entity does not yield satisfactory results for the aggrieved bidder.
Business stakeholders were of the opinion that it was important to maintain the independence of the redress mechanism and it was recommended that single independent ombudsman or independent external monitors (IEMs) be appointed by Government to look into the grievances of bidders of procuring entities if it was felt that a Redress Committee mechanism may be too cumbersome. For the ombudsman/IEM to be effective, it was recommended to alter the advisory role of the ombudsman, to make her/his advice legally binding on the procuring entity. The Redress Authority would, however, have to maintain a balance between ensuring fair competition and endangering public interest by unduly long suspension of contracts.
However, it is seen that the Manual of Procurement of Goods, which supplements Chapter 6 of GFRs (2017) has established grievance redress at the stage before signing of a contract only through the IEM, whose powers are only recommendatory and not legally binding. At the post-contract stage, dispute settlement has been provided for through arbitration under the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 in case of domestic disputes. In case of a dispute with a foreign bidder, the foreign bidder has a choice either to opt for the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act or United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules for settling disputes. In this regard, the expectations of business have not been fulfilled. The rules have also failed to fully satisfy the commitment taken under Article 9 para (d) of the UN Convention Against Corruption which India had ratified in 2011, due to our inability to set up an effective review mechanism.
Promotion of Probity
Rule 175(1) of GFRs (2017) creates a code of integrity binding on both the bidders and the procuring entity, which prohibits offer or acceptance of bribe, anti- competitive practices, false declaration, misrepresentation, coercion or threat to influence the procurement process, financial or business transaction between the bidder and an official of the procuring entity. But the mechanism to impose adherence to probity is only through debarment from the procurement process, vide Rule 151(iii) of the GFRs (2017). As per the Manual for Procurement of Goods 2017, the debarment is up to one year for less serious cases and up to two years in serious cases. In cases of very serious transgressions, there is debarment from country-wide procurement for up to three years.
In contrast, the Public Procurement Bill (2012) had provided not only for debarment but also for penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment if found committing corrupt or anti-competitive acts. Business had recommended that since certain acts under the 2012 Bill were already punishable under existing laws, the penal provisions of the Public Procurement Bill (2012) should be dropped in the revised rules. Therefore, the expectations of business in this regard have been met in the GFRs (2017). But it would perhaps be more appropriate if the debarment periods are increased to two years as minimum period of debarment and 10 years as maximum period of debarment if found in transgression of the rules.
Sustainable Public Procurement
Business stakeholders had recommended the retention of the Public Procurement Bill’s provision through Clause 21(1) that gave an option to use environmental characteristics in the evaluation criteria for award of tender. Therefore, the provisions of GFR 173(xi), which stated that the criteria for determining responsiveness to be taken into account for evaluating bids must include ‘environmental characteristics’ of the subject matter of procurement, are welcome as being aligned with the recommendations of business. The further proposal that the MSME sector would have to be aided by the government to adopt means to generate less pollution in their production processes, has, however, not found reflection in the rules.
The evaluation criteria could also include social responsibility clauses, such as the payment of living wages/extension of social security benefits to workers by suppliers. These could form part of selection criteria of any supplier for award of a public contract. These proposals were also worth considering in the formulation of Chapter 6 of GFRs (2017).
Conclusion
The Finance Minister in his Budget Speech of 2015 had posed the question as to whether a law should be introduced to check ‘malfeasance in public procurement’. If rules on the subject are considered a lighter version of the law, then the GFRs (2017) Chapter 6, with its many positive features that foster ease in doing business, can be considered a welcome first step in checking such malfeasance. The magnitude of the step may also be concluded from the fact that public government procurement, inclusive of Defence, by the Centre, States and local bodies is valued at 30 per cent of India’s GDP and covers almost every sphere of government activity. The reforms in the rules governing public procurement are likely to improve India’s anti-corruption/ease of doing business global rankings, but had the reform come in the shape of law, it could have perhaps improved India’s global image much more.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
