Nehru Report,Muslim Demands and the Hindu Mahasabha: Elusive Consensus on Future Constitution

Introduction

The Nehru Report was an exceptional document through its early envisioning of social and economic rights (Jayal, 2013, p. 139), a ‘close precursor’ of the Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitution (Austin, 1966, p. 55), ¹ envisaging a parliamentary system, recommending dominion status to secure a lowest common measure of agreement among groups (Nanda, 2010, p. 127) and standing out as the first major national initiative towards constitutionalising India (Chakrabarty, 2018, pp. 164–167). However, as Coupland points out, the ‘frankest attempt’ by Indians to wriggle out of the difficulties of communalism failed mainly due to the Hindu–Muslim split and the ‘painstaking efforts of the Nehru Committee to close the communal breach seemed to have widened it’ (Coupland, 1944). Though there were sufficient safeguards for protection of the rights of the minorities to prevent one community domineering over another, the report, positing the widest possible nationalist consensus, did not endorse either the idea of separate electorates or the set of communal demands of the Muslim leadership as an alternative to separate electorates. A close examination of the course of politics after October 1928 reveals Muslim leadership of significance falling for Jinnah’s sudden demand for expanding the scope of the report on communal representation, with equally intense opposition from the Hindu Mahasabha leadership. By mid-1929, all hopes of a consensus had almost disappeared, leaving the field wide open for the colonial government to mediate and decide.

Hindu Mahasabha’s Growing Intervention in Politics

Many leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha had graduated to constitutional politics through the Swarajist, and later, the Responsivist route. This witnessed, in the following years, the organisation’s increasing intervention in the debates on constitutional programme and progress. This became conspicuous during the period 1927–1929 when the leaders of the party grew extremely vigilant about these developments vis-à-vis the demands raised by the Muslim leadership, in general, and the Muslim League, in particular. The Nehru Report onwards, it was aptly clear that the organisation had adopted a largely uncompromising posture on issues involving constitutional progress and the more intricate issue of representation of various communities in the legislatures.

The schism within the Swaraj Party came out in the open during 1925–1926 led chiefly by Moonje, Jayakar, Kelkar and Aney from Maharashtra who styled themselves as Responsivists, advocating acceptance of office if they were offered one on honourable terms. From the North, these leaders received support from Malaviya and Lajpat Rai, both prominent leaders of the Congress as well as of the Hindu Mahasabha. These ruptures within the Swarajist rank had deeper roots, as the Responsivists, who had drifted more towards the Mahasabha, increasingly made their displeasure clear on any constitutional arrangement likely to give in to the communal demands of the Muslim leadership. The Punjab provincial Hindu Sabha, as compared to the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, had all along presented a more distinct anti-Congress approach. It strongly resented the Lucknow Pact describing its impact on the province as anti-Hindu and did not participate in the anti-Rowlatt Satyagraha and the Non-Cooperation Movement (Tuteja & Grewal, 1992). Bhai Parmanand decided to cooperate with the Simon Commission on behalf of the Punjab Hindu Sabha (Prakash, 1996, p. 36). However, leaders such as Moonje, Jayakar, Malaviya and Lajpat Rai prevailed upon the Mahasabha to fall in line with the boycott of the Simon Commission. A special meeting of the Mahasabha, held in the Congress pandal (pavilion) on 29 December 1927, and presided over by Malaviya, called for a boycott of the Commission ‘at every stage and in every manner’ (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 332–334).

Delhi Proposals of Muslim Leaders, March 1927

Thirty prominent Muslim leaders including Jinnah, Shafi Daudi, Mohammad Ali, Mohammad Shafi, Raja of Mahmudabad, Abdullah Suhrawardy and Ansari met in Delhi on 20 March 1927 and agreed in principle to give up separate electorates if four specific demands were accepted:

Representation of Bengali and Punjabi Muslims in the legislatures according to their population;

However, as Irwin noted, this manifesto in favour of joint electorate was given to the Associated Press by Jinnah without any vote, as he (Jinnah) possibly expected this to enable him to re-establish his old Independent Party. Also, the Punjab Muslims were greatly upset about the manifesto (Nehru Memorial Museum & Library [NMML], 1927). Speaking later, Jinnah called these proposals the ‘outcomes of many heads’ and ‘just and fair to both communities’ (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, p. 449). ² The very next day, the Congress Working Committee (CWC), while appreciating Muslim conference decision to accept joint electorates, hoped that a satisfactory settlement would be arrived at based on these proposals (All India Congress Committee [AICC], 1928 p.18; Mitra, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 4, 34).

This approval by the Congress upset some sections of the Mahasabha. On 23 March 1927, the Punjab Hindu Sabha resolved to deny the Congress any locus standi to represent the Hindu community in negotiations with Muslim organisations as the Mahasabha, it emphasised, was the only proper body to deal with such matters (Mitra, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 4, 35). On the same day, the Hindu members of the Central Assembly, meeting under Malaviya’s presidentship, outlined important principles to act as the basis of discussion between the two communities:

Joint electorate for all legislatures.

Moonje criticised Congressmen for encouraging Muslim communalism through their utterances and called the Hindu–Muslim relation of the day a ‘perpetual civil war’. If the Muslims were left ‘severely alone’, Moonje underlined, they would themselves realise the ‘folly of separation and communalism’ and merge into Indian nationalism (Mitra, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 417–419). ³ Inside Bengal, wrote Padmaraj Jain (secretary, Hindu Mahasabha), there was a strong feeling that Hindus should not yield (National Archives of India, 1927).

The Congress and the League Sessions, December 1927

The Congress at its Madras session on 26–28 December 1927 agreed on joint electorate with reservation of seats based on population in every province and the Central legislature (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 397–398). Responding to the appointment of Simon Commission, it called for the drafting of a Swaraj Constitution based on a ‘declaration of rights’ and to bring it for consideration and approval before a special convention consisting of AICC, leaders of other organisations, and elected members of the central and provincial legislatures (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 417–418). However, serious dissensions existed in the ranks of the Muslim League on both—the Delhi proposals and the boycott of the Simon Commission—prompting Irwin to happily note that the Muslim opinion was ‘tending to swing more and more our way’ (NMML, 1927). But to Birkenhead, the situation presented a ‘sufficiently complicated appearance’ (NMML, 1928a). Though a section of the League under Mohammad Shafi voted for cooperation with the Simon Commission (Moore, 1974, p. 34), the main faction of the League met in Calcutta to oppose the Commission. On the issue of the joint electorate, it adopted the Delhi proposals and the Congress settlement subject to separation of Sind and reforms in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and added that in Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP,

the Muslim majority shall make the same concessions concerning the proportion of seats reserved for the Hindu minority that the Hindu majority in other provinces would make to Muslim minorities over and above the proportion of the population of the provinces which shall be the minimum basis (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 443, 447–448).

Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha: Growing Distrust

As a follow-up to the decision taken at the Madras Congress, the All-Parties Conference, including leaders of the League, the Mahasabha and the Liberal Party, met in Delhi on 12–22 February 1928. Jairamdas Daulatram, Moonje and Lajpat Rai voiced their opposition to the Congress resolution on the separation of Sind. The Mahasabha delegates also opposed reservation of seats for Muslim majorities in Punjab and Bengal. This objection was also backed by Motilal, Jawaharlal, as well as by Sardar Mangal Singh, the Sikh delegate. Jinnah, Mohammad Ali and Hasrat Mohani protested (Hasan, 1980). While Jinnah agreed to the joint electorate only if it was based on the conditions laid down in the Delhi proposals, the Mahasabha underlined that it would rather stick to the communal electorate than agree to a redistribution of provinces (NMML, 1928b). The conference met again on 8–11 March 1928, but differences on the issue of separation of Sind and reservation of seats for majorities soared up once again (AICC, 1928, p. 22). The conference now stood adjourned.

Amid growing distrust, the Mahasabha held its annual session at Jabalpur on 8 April 1928, where Kelkar, in his presidential address, accused Jinnah of presenting the compromised formula in a ‘solid block’, to be accepted or rejected ‘as a whole’ which, he felt, had created an impasse. He underlined that seeking reservation of seats for a ‘majority’ population in any province was an absurd demand as it struck at the very root of the fusion of interests to be secured by the natural operation of joint electorates. Demand for separation of Sind was also opposed with Kelkar alleging that this demand had been raised to secure an additional hostage in Muslim hands as against the advantage which the Hindus had over the Muslim minorities in other provinces (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 424–425). This resolution against the separation of Sind overlooked Malaviya’s request to the party not to take the ‘odium’ upon itself of making a settlement impossible, but to wait for the outcome of the efforts initiated by the Madras Congress (Ketkar, 1941).

Formation of the Nehru Committee

The All Parties Conference met again on 19 May 1928 in Bombay and appointed a subcommittee under Motilal Nehru to draft a Constitution. However, a fortnight before this meeting, Jinnah had sailed for Europe. Motilal anxiously sent him a telegram with the request to nominate someone to act on his behalf in the subcommittee. He received no response (Nanda, 2010, p. 110). With organisations pulling in different directions, the task before the Nehru Committee was by no means easy. On the one hand, Motilal was disturbed by the Jabalpur resolution of the Mahasabha, and on the other hand, the League appeared to him ‘a very tangible body’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 308–309). ⁴ Jawaharlal argued that the real difficulty would arise on the issue of reservation of seats for a majority, especially in Punjab, as both the Sikhs and the Hindu Sabha were violently opposed to it and ‘all constitutional and democratic theory’ was with them in this regard (Gopal, 1972, pp. 50–51). ⁵ Motilal felt that for the committee to work properly, it had to be a small one, but an endeavour was made to have ‘spokesmen of some important viewpoints’ (AICC, 1928, p. 23). Ali Imam and Shuaib Qureshi were supposed to express the Muslim point of view; Aney and Jayakar, the Mahasabha’s attitude; G.R. Pradhan, the non-Brahmin view; Mangal Singh, the Sikh League; Tej Bahadur Sapru presented the liberal viewpoint; and N.M. Joshi presented the interest of the Labour (AICC, 1928, pp. 17, 23, 124). ⁶

Separation of Sind

The demand for separation of Sind from Bombay threatened to turn the Hindu population into a minority in the new province. Inclusion of this demand in the Delhi proposals and its acceptance by the Congress led to massive protests organised jointly by the Sind Provincial Hindu Sabha, the Sind Hindu Association and the Sind Zamindar Association (Hasan, 1979, p. 268). All-Sind Hindu Association stated that the move for separation was inspired by a ‘dangerous communal mentality’ (Indian Statutory Commission, 1930, pp. 228–247). These protests found support from the local Hindu Sabhas outside Sind and from the Mahasabha’s Jabalpur resolution in April 1928. The Nehru Report noted that by a strange succession of events, Sind had become a major problem. There had been a ‘sudden and inexplicable change of opinion’ as people in favour and opposition of separation of Sind, only a few years ago, had now swapped their positions which demonstrated how ‘communal considerations warp and twist our judgement’. The report suspected that the real opposition to separation was due to the fear of the Hindus that their economic position might suffer as Muslims could take charge of affairs in the new province (AICC, 1928, pp. 31–32). Therefore, it recommended the separation of Sind and its elevation as a full province, subject to ‘such enquiry about the financial position as may be considered necessary’ (AICC, 1928, p. 124). Aney and Mangal Singh, representing the Mahasabha and the Sikh League, respectively, were persuaded to agree to the separation of Sind and elevation of N.W.F. Province to the status of full province (Hasan, 1979, pp. 275–276).

Reservation of Seats

In the deliberations, the report questioned the very idea of reservation of seats for communities but recalled that ‘for various reasons of expediency’, such reservation was recommended for a time to serve as a ‘transitional stage’ between communal electorates and general mixed electorates. However, the expectation, that during this interval the distrust of one community of the other would be substantially reduced, had been belied (AICC, 1928, p. 38). ‘If communal protection was necessary for any group’, the report noted, ‘it was not for the two major communities—the Hindus and the Muslims’:

The only methods of giving a feeling of security are safeguards and guarantees and the grant, as far as possible, of cultural autonomy. The clumsy and objectionable methods of separate electorates and reservations of seats do not give this security. They only keep up an armed truce. (AICC, 1928, p. 28)

However, as a way forward, the committee while rejecting the principle of separate electorate allowed reservation of seats for a fixed period of ten years. A community could contest for more seats in addition to the ones reserved for it. Reservation for the House of Representatives would be for Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority and for non-Muslims in the Frontier Province, in strict proportion to their population in the province concerned (AICC, 1928, pp. 123–124). The demand for one-third reservation of seats in the central legislature was rejected on the logic that the Muslims formed less than one-fourth of the total population of British India. Inside the committee, only Sapru was ready to accept this demand (Hasan, 1979, p. 277). Inside the Punjab and Bengal legislatures, the committee rejected reservation for any community, while in other provincial legislatures, it accepted reservation for Muslim minorities on a population basis, and similar reservation for non-Muslims in the Frontier Province (AICC, 1928, pp. 123–124).

All-Parties Conference, Lucknow, August 1928

The crucial meeting of the All Parties Conference to consider the Nehru Report was held at Lucknow in August 1928. Jinnah’s arrival in India, however, had been delayed. Motilal lamented: ‘We have therefore to do without him. This means more trouble but I am afraid it cannot be helped’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 348–349). ⁷ Presiding over the conference, Ansari saw the report as the first and rare example of representatives of all schools of political thought coming together to draw up a definite scheme of the Constitution. It was the ‘last hope’ of 300 million human beings and, therefore, the representatives assembled, he underlined, held the key to India’s happiness (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 62–63).

The conference accepted Sind’s separation with provisos that after enquiry the new province was found to be financially viable and that the Hindu minority acquired the same weightage in the province as Muslims enjoyed in their minority provinces (Moore, 1974, p. 36). The Punjab delegates reached an agreement to accept the committee’s recommendation for the province, provided the franchise was based on adult suffrage. This agreement was signed, among others, by Lajpat Rai, Duni Chand, Satyapal, Kitchlew, Zafar Ali Khan and Abdur Rahman and was received with applause. Annie Besant enthusiastically declared that Indian unity and freedom had triumphed over communalism and sectarianism (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, p. 66). The clause of the report relating to Bengal was formally accepted by Akram Khan and J.M. Sen Gupta.

The conference, thus, closed on a positive note, approving major recommendations of the report related to communal questions. The amended report was signed by all the previous signatories (except Shuaib Qureshi and G.R. Pradhan) and by the new members—Malaviya, Besant, Ansari, Jayakar, Vijiaraghavachariar and Abdul Kadir Kasuri (Coupland, 1944, p. 95). Ansari happily concluded that his life’s work, that is, unifying people, had been achieved (Nanda, 2010, p. 115). M.C. Chagla, a prominent Muslim leader in this conference, told Hindustan Times that the decisions were more comprehensive than those of the Lucknow Pact of 1916 (where only the Congress and the League had been parties) since the conference had been of ‘an extraordinary and unusually representative character’ in which Congress, Mahasabha, Sikh League, Muslim League and Khilafat organisations—all had participated and ‘unanimously adopted and approved of various decisions reached’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1996, p. 232). However, many Muslim leaders, across provinces and beyond this conference, were not precisely on the same footing. And very soon, voices of dissent started pouring out.

Response of the Muslim Leadership

The immediate response of the Muslim leadership to the report was by no means uniform. Provincial circumstances also influenced it. While in Punjab and Bengal, it was welcomed for some time, the UP leaders rallied the Muslim opposition. Abdur Rahim maintained that after the introduction of adult suffrage, Muslim representation in the legislature would be either equal to, or above, their population. Barkat Ali, vice-president of Punjab Muslim League argued on similar lines. The report was also supported by the Raja of Mahmudabad, Ali Imam, Akram Khan, Suhrawardy, Mujibur Rahman, Abdul Karim, Ansari and Azad. Inside Bengal, the provincial Muslim League and the provincial Khilafat Committee stood in support (Hasan, 1979, pp. 283–284, 292). However, Shafi Daudi, Hasrat Mohani, Azad Sobhani, the Ali brothers, and inside Punjab, the Shafi group stood in stiff opposition. Shaukat Ali was even ‘obliged’ to make it clear that ‘he did not agree to the joint electorate unconditionally’ (NMML, 1928c). The Ali brothers accused the Hindu Congressmen of succumbing to the pressure of the Mahasabha, which, they alleged, had resulted in the reversal of their previous stand that had been in consonance with the Delhi proposals (Hasan, 1979, p. 292). Referring to opposition by Mohammad Ali, Jawaharlal characterised him as suffering from the ‘Mahasabha Complex’ for he saw ‘the evil hand of the Hindu Mahasabha everywhere and its tainted mark on every forehead’ (Gopal, 1973, pp. 98–99). ⁸

In the central legislature, most Muslim leaders were united to oppose any move to introduce the Nehru Report for adoption. Irwin reported that the leaders of the Mahasabha had fallen ‘significantly silent’ for the moment, and Motilal restrained some members of his party who were eager to move a resolution in the Assembly about the decisions of the All Parties Conference at Lucknow. The viceroy also apprehended that from then onwards, the ‘hostile criticisms’ of the conference proceedings would ‘become more and more frequent and important’ (NMML, 1928c). On his arrival in Simla on 5 September 1928, Motilal made it clear that he would not allow any resolution to be moved in the House from his side on the question of proceedings of the All Parties Conference. Irwin wrote that it had become quite obvious within just two to three days of the opening of the Assembly that practically all Muslims in the House, even those in the Congress, were going to oppose any resolution recommending the adoption of the Nehru–Sapru Constitution or the acceptance of the Lucknow resolution (NMML, 1928d). A fortnight later, Irwin noted the impermeability of this opposition, ‘I suspect that, like many we have seen in the hunting field, they (the All Parties Report people) will find that some of the worst falls come from trying to rush fences that are more solid than they look’ (NMML, 1928e). A month after this communication, the viceroy wrote that the reactions to the report were ‘exercising some discouragement on the minds of its authors’, especially the ‘Liberal friends’ who had joined hands with the Congressmen in the formulation of the Constitution (NMML, 1928f).

Mahasabha’s Response to the Nehru Report

All through the Mahasabha leaders were keeping a close watch on the Muslim quarters and also on developments within the Congress. Initially, there was support in favour of the report. Moonje tried to win support for the report to which his fellow Maharashtrian Aney was a signatory (Cleghorn, 1977). Narendra Nath and Gulshan Rai also endorsed the report. Jayakar’s support was based on the logic that its recommendations were ‘more beneficial to the Hindus than any scheme so far suggested on the Congress side’ (Hasan, 1979, pp. 278–279). Kelkar later referred to the report as the ‘greatest common agreement’ between the different progressive political parties in the country (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, p. 346). ⁹ But no sooner than the suspicion gained ground about the likelihood of it being modified to accommodate Muslim demands or the possibility of its rejection by the Muslim leaders, the Mahasabha coined its recommendations on communal issues as the maximum of what they could accept. Lajpat Rai commended the ‘memorable work’ of the committee (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 351–352). ¹⁰ Presiding at the Etawah Conference of the Agra Hindu Sabha in October 1928, he sought to mobilise opinion in favour of the report (Chand, 1978, p. 538) but rejected any move to change it:

In the matter of communal representation, the Hindus have accepted the recommendations of the Nehru Report as the maximum of what they can swallow. They shall not be a party to any tampering with the same. Retention of the separate electorate is altogether out of question. (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, p. 345) ¹¹

Pronounced Opposition of the Muslim Leadership

As the year 1928 drew to a close, the opposition to the report by the League and other such groups became pronounced. In the report, Motilal wrote to Gandhi on 2 October 1928, the seeds of Hindu–Muslim unity were so interdependent upon one another that the ‘least change’ endangered the ‘safety of the whole’. Then, he very rightly assessed his worries about Jinnah:

There is only one man about whom I am very anxious and that is Jinnah. He has not yet returned from England and has not expressed himself one way or the other. But for one weakness, he (Jinnah) is thoroughly sound. He is always afraid of losing his leadership and avoids taking any risks in the matter. This weakness often drives him to support the most reactionary proposals. (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 368–370)

Motilal understood the significance of Jinnah’s opinion and requested Purushottamdas to rope him in the moment he arrived in India. He suspected that Shafi Daudi, Shaukat Ali and other ‘reactionaries’ would attack Jinnah the moment he landed: ‘So much depends on Jinnah that I have a mind to go to Bombay to receive him’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 363). Jinnah returned on 26 October 1928 after a gap of nearly six months. Motilal wrote to him on 28 October, underlining that the report had not taken the view of any party in toto and it was ‘nothing more than the maximum agreement between the parties’ and invited him to a meeting of his (Motilal’s) committee, in which Jinnah had also been co-opted, scheduled for 5 November (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 385–386). Jinnah seemed to be least interested in Motilal’s overtures. On 25 November, Motilal informed Gandhi that the Muslim members of the Assembly belonging to Jinnah’s party (numbering just eight or nine) were bitterly opposed to the report and the Lucknow decision, and it was ‘in his anxiety to keep his hold on these people’ that Jinnah was ‘playing into their hands’: ‘The game is to put off the consideration of the Report by the Muslim League at its annual Session which means a protracted controversy during the whole year 1929’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 397–398).

The Bombay Presidency Muslim League in its meeting on 27 November 1928, in the presence of Jinnah and Shaukat Ali, rejected the report for ignoring Muslim interests. These ‘interests’, it was noted, were ‘essential at least as long as the present state of communalism that is being felt more and more keenly every day by the Muslim community is not rooted out’ (NMML, 1928g). This meeting, Irwin rightly remarked, was the most important pronouncement until then on the report by any political body, one which could influence the outcome of the forthcoming meetings of the League at Calcutta and the Muslims All Parties Conference at Delhi. Attacks on Shaukat Ali in the press also influenced the opinion of the Bombay Muslim League. At the time of the All Parties Conference, Shaukat Ali had objected to certain portions of the Nehru Report, but now his objections ‘got the added strength of personal annoyance and desire for revenge’. ¹² The League demanded substantial modification in certain particulars of the report or else threatened to abandon it virtually. Irwin expected some changes to be devised in the report to ‘satisfy some Muhammadans whilst not antagonising the Mahasabha’, but such attempts, he fancied, were ‘not likely to be successful’. ¹³

The Final Showdown, December 1928

Motilal suspected that efforts were on to close the ranks of Muslims against the report and the Lucknow decisions (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 393–395). ¹⁴ The crucial All Parties convention began in Calcutta on 22 December 1928. However, a day before, the Mahasabha’s working committee insisted that the agreements on communal issues in the report arrived at Lucknow ‘should not be reopened for revision’ (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 92–93). Therefore, no sooner had the convention begun than the Mahasabha delegates got busy distributing pamphlets against any revision of the settlement on the report. The League’s annual session which also began in Calcutta around this time appointed a delegation consisting of the Maharaja of Mahmudabad, Jinnah, Kitchlew, Chagla, Barkat Ali and others to represent its views before the convention (Mitra, 1928, Vol. II, p. 397). The convention also appointed a subcommittee consisting of Gandhi, Sapru, Malaviya, Ansari, Azad, Motilal, Moonje, Jayakar, Aney, Padmaraj Jain, Ali Imam, Besant and others to meet the delegates from the Khilafat Committee and the League (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, p. 121). The two groups met on the night of 27 December but failed to arrive at any consensus.

In his speech in the convention on 28 December, Jinnah insisted on one-third reservation in the central legislature, reservation in Punjab and Bengal based on the Muslim population in the absence of adult suffrage, residuary powers with the provinces, and separation of Sind not to be made contingent upon the establishment of the system of government as outlined in the Nehru Report (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 122–125). Sapru, associated closely with the report, clarified that the Nehru committee adopted adult franchise so that each community could stand on a perfect equality with the other. Therefore, it followed that the Muslim community should get representation in the central legislature in proportion to its numerical strength in the whole of India: ‘That was a logical position and we adopted logically’. However, for the sake of settlement, they could agree to Jinnah on this issue: ‘If he is a spoilt child, a naughty child I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be finished with it’. However, on the issue of reservation of seats in Punjab and Bengal, he hoped Jinnah would reconsider his position. He also warned against advocacy of residuary powers with the provinces as the Constitution devised by the report was neither federal nor unitary, it was both (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 125–127).

Jayakar, the signatory to the report, delineated ‘the four pillars’ of communal compromise on which the evidence of the report stood: (a) no other community except Mussulmans to have representation by reservation (b) representation based on adult suffrage (c) no majorities to have reservation and (d) minorities to be recognised only in the provinces of North-West Frontier (NWF) and Sind. Even if one brick out of these four pillars was taken away, he insisted, the whole structure would collapse. He had no objection if Muslims got a few more seats, but it was only with difficulty that he was keeping back the disturbers in his camp ‘who might break away if any violent departure from the pact was attempted’ (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 128–129). Jinnah replied that minorities would support a Constitution only when they feel secure in it— ‘The security of the minority was the test’ (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, p. 130). Amendments moved by him were put to vote and the three major ones were lost by a majority (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, p. 131). However, Jinnah’s demand seeking reservation of seats in Punjab and Bengal brought him the support of many Muslim leaders of these provinces who had earlier stood with the report. During the following weeks, many prominent Muslim leaders closed their ranks. December 1928, Jinnah is reported to have remarked later, marked the ‘turning of the ways’ with the Hindus (Moore, 1974, p. 38).

The Continuing Downslide

The failure of the convention at Calcutta was followed by a hitherto unseen display of unity among Muslim organisations. The Muslim All Parties Conference which was held in Delhi from 31 December 1928 to 1 January 1929 now demanded separate electorate. This meeting, presided over by Aga Khan, was a widely representative meeting of the Muslims. Mohammad Shafi (Punjab), Ibrahim Rahimtullah (Independent Party in the Assembly), A.H. Ghaznavi (Bengal) and Shafat Ahmad Khan (UP) were the prime movers. Mohammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani, Azad Sobhani, Shafi Daudi and Mohammad Yakub were also present (Mitra, 1928, Vol. II, p. 409). Mohammad Ali and Mohammad Shafi, always maintaining distance, now sat and deliberated together. Mohammad Ali strongly reprehended the Nehru Report which, though intending that ‘the universe may belong to God and the country to the British’ ensured, nonetheless, that ‘it was the Mahasabha who should rule’. He asked Muslims not to be afraid of the Hindu majority, and until they got freedom, the separate electorate was the only effective device to keep them alive (Mitra, 1928, Vol. II, p. 417). As Motilal and some other Congressmen made ‘desperate attempt’ to save the report from ‘total destruction’, Irwin noted that it was ‘no longer an agreed solution’ as practically the whole Muslim community was ‘raised solid against it’ (NMML, 1929a, 1929b). ¹⁵

In March 1929, Jinnah delivered his ‘fourteen points’, which packaged primarily the demands raised in the Delhi proposals. While the Jamiat-Ulema-i-Hind endorsed it, the Congress Muslims, the Shafi faction of the League and the Khilafatists were not forthcoming (Moore, 1974, pp. 38–39). However, in the Central Assembly, in a tactical move, Jinnah rallied his Muhammadan Independent followers behind the Opposition during the voting on the ‘National Demand’. This development, Irwin concluded, was because Motilal, Malaviya and Jayakar (the three important Opposition leaders in the Assembly) were ‘likely to get some accommodation with the Muhammadans’ (NMML, 1929c). ¹⁶ He, however, apprehended that the Mahasabha’s stiffening attitude towards the Muslim claims, and the somewhat intransigent attitude of the orthodox Muslims, could prove to be a major hurdle. ¹⁷

This tactical move in the Central Assembly notwithstanding, the Muslim League in its long-drawn meeting in Delhi at the end of March 1929, presided over by Jinnah, conveyed its unequivocal opposition to the Nehru Report. Jinnah recalled the attitude of the Mahasabha representatives at the All Parties Convention which, he claimed, was ‘nothing short of an ultimatum, that, if a single word in the Nehru Report in respect of the communal settlement was changed, they would immediately withdraw their support to it’. The proposals of the report, concluded Jinnah, could therefore be treated only as ‘counter Hindu proposals to Moslem proposals’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 363–365, 367). ¹⁸ Finally, after much discussion, the subjects committee of the League accepted the decisions of the All Parties Convention (by a majority of eighty-four to seven votes), but put such conditions which made this acceptance almost infructuous. These conditions were reserving one-third seats in both the Houses at the centre, the voting ratio of Muslims in Bengal and Punjab to be in accordance with their population, and to make the provinces as fully autonomous as possible (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, p. 369). Azad, who attended this session, explained to the Free Press that Jinnah and Mohammad Ali would not agree to any resolution which did not reject the Nehru Report. Therefore, the resolution passed by the subjects committee was carefully drafted to be acceptable to the largest majority (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 370–372).

In response to the developments at the All-Parties Moslem Conference and Jinnah’s subsequent demands, the Hindu Mahasabha in its Surat session from 30 March to 1 April 1929 rejected the Nehru Report altogether. The specific resolution moved by Moonje and seconded by Parmanand stated that the Mahasabha would have favourably considered the report as amended and adopted by the All Parties Convention, but in the face of its rejection by the All-Parties Moslem Conference, it was compelled not to do so. Therefore, it called upon all Hindus to support the principles propounded by the Jabalpur session of 1928 that was now ‘slightly amended to suit the present circumstances’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 359–360). Going back, it rejected reservation of seats on communal consideration in any elective bodies and educational institutions and reiterated its opposition to the separation of Sind (ibid.). ¹⁹ Moonje’s remark at this session, that if at any moment Jinnah consented to accept the Nehru Report then he would also be immediately prepared to do so, was an unmistaken admission of the fact that, by this time, the Mahasabha’s position vis-à-vis constitutional developments could ill-afford to ignore the stand taken by the Muslim leadership (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, p. 361). The Surat resolutions of the Mahasabha came under heavy criticism. Jayakar had wired a draft (the outcome of a joint conference with Motilal) to Moonje on the eve of the Surat session. He felt unhappy that this draft was ignored by Moonje. This ‘unfortunate error’ on Moonje’s part, he argued, had given a potent weapon in the hands of some Muslim leaders who were out to attack the Mahasabha. If the resolution on Nehru Report would have been passed in the form in which he had wished then, Jayakar argued, Motilal’s adherence to ‘our view’ could have been secured (NAI, 1929g). The ‘bulk of Moslem opinion’ was ‘pretty solid against’ the Congress Muslims supporting the Nehru Report, and with the Mahasabha, through ‘the mouthpiece’ of Moonje, with a ‘pretty uncompromising statement of their position on the other side’, the ‘communal feeling in the political field’, Irwin noted, showed ‘signs of becoming more acute’ (NMML, 1929d).

Resisting Moves at Modification of the Nehru Report

During July–August 1929, Moonje and some other leaders of the Mahasabha grew extremely anxious at the moves in certain quarters to bring around negotiations between Jinnah and leaders of the Congress and creating nationalist Muslim organisations, some functioning within the Congress. Moonje suspected Bombay Muslims, ‘under instruction behind the scene’ of Jinnah, of facilitating the formation of a Moslem Congress Party under the ‘apparent presidentship’ of Brelvi (editor of Bombay Chronicle) to get Motilal and the Congress to accept reservation of one-third seats at the centre and unconditional separation of Sind. The final objective of the whole endeavour, Moonje concluded, was to isolate the Mahasabha by getting the Congress and the Liberal Federation to agree to concede the Muslim demands (NAI, 1929a). The Mahasabha, should, therefore, re-state its position as early as possible, and let Gandhi also ‘know that the Hindus would not support him or rather would oppose him if he were to yield to the Musalman’ (NAI, 1929b). Moonje also wrote a long letter to Malaviya explaining how Motilal had fallen a victim to ‘the intrigues carried on by the Moslems under the able and skillful guidance, from behind the scene, of Mr. Jinnah to get the Nehru Report amended by accepting the Moslem demands’. He also informed Malaviya about Jayakar’s advice that he (Malaviya) should tell Gandhi: (a) not to open up negotiations with Jinnah for amendment of the Nehru Report, and (b) that if he (Gandhi) were to yield on these points then he (Malaviya) would be painfully obliged to lead the opposition on behalf of Hindus against him, Jinnah and Motilal combined (NAI, 1929c). Jayakar advised Moonje not to show ‘over anxiety’ at the likely meeting between Gandhi and Jinnah, since he felt that Gandhi would not ‘commit the mistake of capitulating to Jinnah without feeling sure that the Hindus will stand by him’ (NAI, 1929d). But the need of the hour, he stressed, was to tread cautiously. Therefore, referring to the likely meeting between Gandhi and Jinnah, he immediately advised Malaviya that if he (Malaviya) was against the Hindus ‘making any further concessions’ to the Muslims beyond the Nehru Report, then he should openly state so (NAI, 1929e). ²⁰

Amid reports that Sarojini Naidu was persuading Gandhi to act as an intermediary between Jinnah and Motilal, Moonje advised Gandhi to take a firm stand on the Nehru Report and shared that he was alarmed because his (Gandhi’s) remarks made to him (Moonje), at the night-meeting of the subcommittee of the All Parties convention held at Calcutta during the previous Congress week, kept ringing at the back of his mind. Gandhi had then, according to Moonje, remarked as follows: ‘Let us agree to give all that Musalmans demand and be satisfied with the crumbs that shall remain behind’ (NAI, 1929f). Kelkar reminded Motilal that the Mahasabha had agreed to the un-tampered Nehru Report as a matter of compromise. Therefore, any attempt to ‘unsettle’ the report would force the Mahasabha to reconsider its position. ²¹

A public meeting of the Bombay Muslims was held on 11 August 1929 with the Ali brothers in a leading role. Speaking on the occasion, Mohammad Ali came down heavily on the ‘Hindu’ and the ‘nationalist press’ for depicting Muslims as ‘shirkers’ of their duty and responsibility and emphasised that the Nehru Report was only meant to ‘perpetuate slavery and Hindu domination’: ‘We cannot accept the Nehru Report. Let them come forward and meet us in an honourable way, and they will find Muslims ready to work with them’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, pp. 351–353). In the midst of news about the proposed moves to modify the Nehru Report, Kelkar emphasised that he would ‘never agree to “the heads I win and tails you lose” policy that seems to be now pursued by the Mahomedan community’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, pp. 337–338). ²² Presiding at the Andhra Hindu Conference on 7 November 1929, Moonje made a point-to-point rebuttal of Jinnah’s ‘fourteen points’ and reiterated that the recommendations of the Nehru Report constituted the upper limit of giving in to the demands of the Muslim leaders: ‘Let the Hindus be firm and stern in their opposition to the introduction of communalism in the Constitution of the country beyond what has already been conceded in the Nehru Report’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, 340–342).

So, by the end of 1929, the line of division between the Mahasabha and the League, and other organisations including those led by the ‘nationalist Muslims’, on every major constitutional question involving communal issues, had become acute. Speaking in December 1929, N.C. Kelkar accused the Congress of being ‘overshadowed and overpowered by the Khilafat’ between 1921 and 1928 and said that though ‘its anti-communalism’ was ‘grand and glorious’ it was nonetheless ‘partial and one-sided’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, pp. 347–348). Given the Nehru Report being rejected by a large body of the Muslim leadership, Congress stepped up efforts to mobilise more and more Muslims in favour of its programme. However, beyond the ambit of the Congress party, most Muslim conferences continued their protest against the arrangement envisaged in the Nehru Report. The leaders of the Mahasabha were no less critical about these ‘nationalist’ Muslim leaders as they were of the orthodox and die-hard Muslim groups. Therefore, from 1929 onwards, we find increasing attacks on these ‘nationalist’ groups from the Mahasabha camp. Moonje claimed, in no uncertain terms, that these Muslim leaders, masquerading as nationalists, were attempting to infiltrate the Congress in large numbers to exercise pressure from within (Hasan, 1987).

Concluding Remarks

From the beginning of 1927 to the finalisation of the Nehru Report to the round table conferences in 1930–1932, the political climate of the country had metamorphosed critically. In this process, the Hindu Mahasabha made its presence felt in significant and critical ways. Entering the political domain in subtle ways through the Responsivist route, the party had now intensified the ambit of its intervention. Its entry into political negotiations seeking to protect the ‘Hindu interest’ also posed the vital question of defining its relationship with the Congress. The varying shades of opinion within the Mahasabha became more glaring on this issue. In this respect, Malaviya, on the one hand, and Moonje and Parmanand, on the other hand, represented two different positions within the organisation. Jinnah’s intransigent attitude, influenced primarily by his effort to regain a place of prominence within the Muslim leadership, played a crucial role in dampening the spirit of bonhomie generated around the report in initial months. His inflexible demand for one-third reservation for Muslims in the Central legislature, reservation for them in Punjab and Bengal, as well as seeking residuary powers for provinces—all these after the report had been accepted at the Lucknow meet of the All Parties Conference, made the meeting ground look remote, and possibly beyond reach. The leaders of the Mahasabha, more prominently Moonje, Jayakar, Kelkar and Parmanand, played an important role in thwarting attempts at expanding the scope of reservation for Muslims in legislatures beyond the Nehru Report, or beyond what had been accepted at the Lucknow meet in August 1928. By the end of 1929, the Mahasabha and the League had arrayed themselves in sharp opposition to each other. And with the Congress, increasingly losing ground in securing the dominant Muslim opinion in favour of its attitude on communal matters, the stage was set for a perennial logjam in Indian politics.