The Rise of the Panchayati Raj Institutions as the Third Tier in Indian Federalism: Where the Shoe Pinches

Introduction

The central focus in the history of the nationalist movement in India in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was on national unity, or on the promotion of conception of what is called a ‘composite federalist culture’. The idea of forming a federal form of government in India became an issue of debate and discussion during the freedom movement in the early years of the 20th century. The matter gathered considerable momentum when the Lucknow Pact was signed by the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League (ML) in 1916. Two contradictory pulls started becoming active since then. On the one hand, there was the INC fighting for high dose of centralisation and on the other hand, the ML working for best possible decentralisation (Datta, 1991). In this ‘unitary versus federal’ controversy, the issue of demarcation of powers figured prominently and the Congress and the League leaders differed sharply on the question of which tier of the government would be exercising the residual powers. All Parties Conference headed by Motilal Nehru, the Round Table Conferences and all the subsequent negotiations culminating in the British Cabinet Missions came to grips with the question of demarcation of powers between the Union and the states. The Constituent Assembly which was convened in 1946 debated the issue for quite some time out of which emerged the federal constitution. In Sabyasachi Bhattacharya’s words, it was definitely ‘a defining moment in the history of the new republic of India’ (Bhattacharya, 2018). It was included in the 1946 formula, which was a sort of a compromise between the INC and the ML, that the Centre should have powers only over foreign affairs, defence and communications (Kurien & Varughese, 1981).

The Congress Perception of Federalism

This formula was eventually rejected by the ML which opted for a sovereign state. It was expected that Muslim-majority provinces could achieve greater gains out of it. With the partition of the country in 1947, the prime motive of the Congress for the stress on provincial autonomy seemed to have lost its intensity. Immediately after partition, Nehru observed that the need of the hour was a strong Centre with a federal structure. According to Jain (1977),

It would be injurious to the interests of the country to provide for a weak central authority which would be incapable of ensuring peace, co-ordinating vital matters of common concern and speaking effectively for the whole country in the international sphere. At the same time we are quite clear in our minds that there are many matters in which sole authority must rest with unit, and that to frame our Constitution on the basis of a unitary state would be a retrograde step, both politically and administratively.

This unusual situation (where the ML did not find any reason to put pressure on the framers of the Constitution to opt for the structure already arrived at), provided necessary objective for the Congress to move away from its earlier position. As a result, ‘the superficial federal structure remained’, as Namboodiripad comments, but

[I]t was hedged in by innumerable provisions which it could make it possible for strong ruling party dominant at the Centre to make inroads into the powers of the federating units and transform the constitution into a unitary one, while it appeared to be federal. (Namboodiripad, 1981)

The Roots of Indian Federal System

The federal system of the post-colonial India is patterned broadly on the Government of India Act, 1935. India had to opt for a federal system with strong Centre, as it was argued, to avoid repetition of traumatic consequences of partition and in the interest of speedy socio-economic development. Subsequently the logic of the strong Centre concept shaped the Congress politics and the logic of the strong central planning had worked in such a way as to make the Union much stronger and correspondingly, the states much weaker than the constitution makers ever visualised.

The Impact of the Hegemonic Rule of the Congress

In a federal form of government, the Union and the constituent units are required to share the burden of governing the country with the latter acting as the vital link with people. In India, this role of the state got eroded following intensification of centralisation in subsequent years facilitated by the uninterrupted one-party rule of the Congress from 1950 to 1967. And whatever differences or conflicts arose between the Centre and states, they came to be resolved not as governments but between two wings of the same political party. This process was facilitated by the fact that the Prime Minister Nehru happened to wield personal authority that overshadowed the chief ministers of almost all states.

The Setback for the Congress in 1967, but Tradition Continued

The hegemonic rule of the INC suffered a serious setback in 1967, but it could not effectively arrest the processes of centralisation. It is, however, true that state autonomy movements gathered momentum in later years following the installation of non-Congress governments in many states but the comeback of the Congress to power could not produce desired results.

The Reorganisation of the Political Map of the Country

Incidentally, the need for effective decentralised polity in India became very strong after the reorganisation of the country in 1950s in accordance with recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC). Interestingly, the process of the formation of the linguistic states was accompanied by the drive towards centralisation. This led to contradiction.

The Demand for the Review of the Centre–State Relations

Resistance to this trend started building up and the regional political parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) in Tamil Nadu and the Akali Dal in Punjab joined the other opposition parties. The issue gathered public attention. The Rajamannar Committee constituted by the DMK Government inter alia demanded repeal of Articles 356 and 357. It had also recommended omission of Articles 256 and 257 relating to the issue of directions by the states and suggested that the issue of directions should be preceded by the consultation and approval of the Inter-State Council (Kurien & Verghese, 1981).

The Rise of the Third Layer: Looking Back

Against this backdrop, this article seeks to track the journey of the new tier of governance generally known as the Panchayati Raj system through the amendment of the Constitution in 1992. The second objective of the paper is to identify and analyse the hurdles faced by the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in their way to emerge as institutions of self-government as contemplated by the constitutional amendment. It is not perhaps true to say that the architects of the Constitution of India did not envisage a third tier of governance. But what it envisaged was neither in conformity with Gandhi’s vision of Gram Swaraj nor within the strictly federal theoretical framework. In the Constituent Assembly neither Nehru nor Ambedkar stood for the Gandhian model of village swaraj (AVARD, 1966; Mukherjee, 2007). In Gandhi’s scheme of things Panchayati Raj is not a gift of the all-powerful State to its citizens. In his conceptualisation of decentralised polity power does not flow to the people from the central authority but resides in the people (Datta, 2017). Gandhi formulated his idea of village swaraj as a ‘complete republic independent of its neighbours for its own vital needs and yet inter-dependent for many others in which dependency is a necessity’ (Gandhi, 1962). After a prolonged debate in the Constituent Assembly, Panchayati Raj was placed under the Directive Principles (Article 40) as a sort of a compromise formula (Datta, 1992).

The First-Generation Panchayati Raj

The first-generation PRIs in India began with recommendations of the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee Report. The Committee which recommended non-political three-tiered Panchayati Raj system, was guided by the basic consideration of ensuring people’s participation in the implementation of development programmes which was expected to unleash the process of change and growth. It seems that the constitutional perception of panchayats was not reflected in the design of the first generation Panchayati Raj and the Committee was largely guided by the administrative and developmental considerations (Datta, 1994).

The Second-Generation Panchayati Raj

The Asoka Mehta Committee’s dominant thinking, which was branded as a new approach, centred around the functional necessity for decentralisation of administration as it recommended two-tiered panchayats: one at the village and the other at the block level. It stood for participation of the political parties in panchayats. The committee had also realised the need for considering the question of Centre–state relations as a necessary pre-condition for strengthening the local government.

The Constitutionalisation of the Local Government

The 73rd Constitutional Amendment in 1992 marked a definite watershed in the history of rural local self-government in post-colonial India. The Act defines PRIs as institutions of self-government. In Article 243(G) and 243 (H), the term self-government has been used. The literal meaning of self-government is autonomy of the government without outside interference. It may be recalled that the village community in ancient India enjoyed autonomy in terms of organisation, functions, functionaries and finances. Every village community had the freedom to develop and set up its own institutions of governance.

Local Government as Institutions of Self-Government

Any institution of self-government must have, at the minimum, the following features: First, the functional areas have to be delimited. The listing of 29 subjects in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution may be said to have done it, although very feebly by giving the states liberty to take decisions. Second, mention has to be made about wherewithal to carry out its assigned tasks. This implies that PRIs should not be required to go with a begging bowl to the state or central government, and funds available to them should match their responsibilities. The Constitutional amendment has dealt with this issue by providing for the State Finance Commission. Third, PRIs should be able to decide the extent of bureaucracy required by them and should be able to recruit their own personnel. There is no constitutional mandate in this regard.

The constitutional amendments make it mandatory for every state to constitute three-tiered panchayats. It is also laid down in the Act that the state legislatures may, by law, vest rural local bodies with powers, functions and responsibilities listed under the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution.

Constitutional Position of the Eleventh Schedule

There is a view that the Eleventh Schedule does not list subjects or functions but only matters, as pointed out by T. N. Srivastava (2002). The legislature of a state is required to endow these bodies with such functions as may be necessary to enable them to act as institutions of self-government. Such law may contain provisions for devolution of powers and responsibilities subject to such conditions as may be specified therein for the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice and for the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those mentioned in the Eleventh Schedule. The state legislature is thus sole determinant of self-government.

The repeated usage of the word ‘may’ in the Article fails to make it mandatory on the part of the state government to implement these provisions, thus leaving power-sharing with the state government solely at the disposal of the political leadership at the state level. Presumably, the Parliament was compelled to use the word ‘may’ because some of the items come under the purview of the State List (Datta, 2011). One may argue that it is not possible to strengthen the process of decentralisation in India without overhauling the existing arrangements of Centre–state relationship.

Thus, panchayats cannot enjoy full autonomy as they are set within the states and form part of the State List. Nor can the states for that matter as they are placed within the Indian Union. The 73rd Amendment has constitutionalised three strata of government. Therefore, there will now be five-storied pyramid of governments rising from the village panchayats at the base to the Union at the apex (Mukherjee, 1994).

The Absence of a Local List

The Amendment Act provides for a schedule to indicate which functions have to be transferred to the PRIs. It is not in tune with general pattern of Indian federalism where the powers and functions of the central and state governments have been clearly spelt out in the three Lists (Datta, 2009). Presumably, the architects of the 73rd Amendment Act realised that providing a list would have required re-examination of the whole gamut of Centre–state relations.

Devolution in the Conformity Legislations

The 73rd Amendment of the Constitution of India stipulates the transfer of powers and functions to PRIs as a part of the decentralisation process. The state governments were supposed to transfer 29 subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj of Government of India has been conducting the annual study on the Panchayat Devolution Index (PDI) since 2006. The study is undertaken to assess where each State stands in the matter of devolution of powers to the PRIs or the rural local bodies.

The Indian Institute of Public Administration did a study in 2012 related to the implementation of the ‘Operative Core’—devolution of funds, functions and functionaries. According to this Devolution Index, certain States have done better than others. Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Gujarat, Odisha, Tripura, Uttarakhand and Sikkim are above average in the Devolution Index. Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Himachal Pradesh are at midpoint. States such as Goa, Punjab and Bihar show a very low level of devolution (Alok, 2013).

According to the latest study done by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj and Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) Kerala topped the overall Devolution in Policy rankings. Kerala was found as the front runner in all the parameters except funds. Karnataka was the best in transferring adequate funds to the PRIs. Karnataka came second and Maharashtra came third. While Sikkim was found doing well in transferring functions, it ranked low on other parameters (TISS Study, 2016). Clearly some states are still to initiate the process. There are again some states where they are not functional.

Transfer of Funds

The transfer of functions without corresponding transfer of funds does not make much sense. But this has happened. Mahi Pal rightly opines that before listing the functions to be performed by the panchayats, the states have introduced certain qualifying clauses (Pal, 2004). In Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Tamil Nadu, it is ‘within the limits of its funds’. In Punjab, ‘it is to the extent its funds allow to perform’. In Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, it is ‘as far as the gram panchayat funds at its disposal’. Thus, the states have transferred functions to the panchayats but have bound the panchayat bodies by providing that they have to look for the provision of funds as a pre-requisite for taking any action in this regard. In other words, they would not be able to perform the transferred functions if necessary financial allocation is not there.

The district tiers of panchayats do not have any powers to levy taxes, duties, tolls or fees on their own and are dependent on the state governments for meeting their running expenses. No advance indication about the size of funds that would flow to the districts, is given by the Central or state governments making decentralised planning a difficult exercise. Most funds flow to the districts as a part of the Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) or Central sector or state plan schemes, the size of which is also not known. In any case these are tied funds leaving little scope for planning.

Panchayats continue to be almost fully financially dependent on the Centre or the states for funds. The State Finance Commissions (SFCs) have been given the powers to make recommendations for assignment and sharing of taxes, duties, tolls and fees but little work has been done by any SFC. They have by and large concentrated on formalising the existing level of transfer without evolving a suitable formula for this purpose. All SFCs have put great emphasis on internal revenue mobilisation, but none has suggested any effective mechanism for PRIs to generate their revenue. The state governments have been slow and hesitant in accepting the recommendations where they are useful in terms of improving the revenue generation capacity of the local bodies. Rao (2015) observes, ‘Their record of appointing the State Finance Commissions and actions on their reports shows complete violations of Article 243 (I) and (Y). Only two states—Karnataka and Sikkim—have devolved funds to the panchayats for the 29 subjects’.

It may be mentioned that the Task Force constituted by the Government of India as a fall out of the Conference of the Panchayati Raj ministers in different states held in June 2001 made it very clear that there should be district-wise and panchayat-wise allocation of funds in the annual budgets of the state governments and that the state governments should provide certain percentage of their grants as untied grants. It was recommended that the gram panchayats should get 70 per cent of the untied grants while the district and intermediate panchayats should share the remaining 30 per cent (Planning Commission, 2001).

The Fourteenth Finance Commission (FFC) has tried to strengthen the financial base of the gram panchayats. On the recommendation of the FFC, funds earmarked are disbursed to village panchayats. Based on FFC’s recommendation, there is the target of granting more than rupees two lakh crore in 2015–2020 to develop panchayats.

The amount is three times more than the 13th Finance Commission’s recommendation. Now, at gram panchayat level, per capita availability of fund for five years is ₹2,440 and on an average, each panchayat will receive ₹17 lakh per year (₹85 lakh in five years). Each panchayat will spend this amount on sanitation, drinking water, maintenance of community assets, garbage management, drains, roads, footpaths, streetlights, burial and cremation grounds and other basic services (FFC; Centre for Policy Research, 2014).

One scholar has suggested that the 15th Finance Commission must incentivise the states to constitute their SFCs and empower their local bodies. Local bodies of states performing better will gain, which should induce the other state governments to be more conscious of their responsibilities and overcome the constraints mentioned above (Sen, 2018). This is important in view of the fact the SFCs are handicapped because resource base of the state is very weak.

Transfer of Functionaries

To function effectively as institutions of self-government, the PRIs need to have the power to recruit and control staff required for managing its functions. In most states the key functionaries, namely, the secretaries and executive officers at all the three levels of panchayats are state government employees who are appointed, transferred and controlled by the state government. Being under the direct control of the state administrative hierarchy, they are often reluctant to work under the administrative control of the elected panchayats.

Rural local bodies do not have any staff even for maintenance functions which is their basic domain. Even the maintenance and development functions are performed by the line departments. And there is a hidden battle between the line departments and elected panchayat bodies (Chakrabarti et al., 2011). These departments exercise control over the village level staff and the panchayats do not have anything worthwhile to do with them. In a study on the village-based planning in West Bengal, it was found that the line department was reluctant to co-operate with PRIs (Datta & Sen, 2011).

The MP Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme

Under the MPLAD scheme launched immediately after the amendment of the Constitution in 1993, each MP currently gets a sum of ₹5 crore per year. The amount has been increased over the years. It has serious implications for PRIs as the third tier of government in India because the constitutionally mandated local government institutions are being bypassed. The Ministry releases the funds directly to the Collectors who get the works done on the advice of the concerned MP. Interestingly some state governments have also started giving funds to their MLAs. This is a dangerous trend and has an adverse impact on the PRIs.

Sample audit reports by the Comptroller Auditor General in 1998 and 2000 indicate the kind of abuses which have taken place under the MPLAD scheme: ineligible schemes, public expenditure on private assets and so on. The so-called accountability regime within the MPLAD neither extends to the MPs nor does it limit their personal freedom to choose a location or scheme to be financed from public funds. The report showed that the scheme was plagued not only by the inadequacy of funds but also by the increasing underutilisation, misuse and diversion of money earmarked for the project (Tripathi, 2004). As Era Sezhiyan (2005) has pointed out in his exhaustive paper on MPLADS, ‘Instead of controlling the government and taking remedial measures to correct the irregularities of the administration, the MPs wrongly accepted a wrong scheme and become a part of the inept administration set up itself’.

What causes serious concern in the context of local self-government as the third layer in India’s governmental structures is that most of the schemes being funded and executed form part of the 11th and 12th Schedules to the Constitution which define the functional domain of the panchayats and municipalities. The guidelines authorising the MPs to exercise their personal choice and decision in funding and executing the scheme lead to usurpation of the power and responsibilities of the local bodies which have been created by them through an amendment of the Constitution.

Justice E. S. Venkataramiah, former Chief Justice of India, called the scheme an assault on the Constitution. In a scintillating analysis made in February 1997, he pointed out:

The scheme has the effect of interfering not merely with the federal scheme but also with the healthy constitutional principle of separation of powers; there is no provision in the Constitution, conferring power on individual MPs for spending public money or giving directions to any officer, particularly an officer belonging to a State public service, on any matter. (Sezhiyan 2007)

About the MPLAD Scheme, the report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, which was headed by former Chief Justice M. N. Venkatachaliah, recommended:

The MPLAD Scheme is inconsistent with the spirit of federalism and distribution of powers between the Union and States. It also treads into the areas of local government institutions. The Commission recommends immediate discontinuance of the MPLAD Scheme as being inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution in many ways. (Sezhiyan, 2007)

The National Advisory Council constituted by the United Progressive Alliance Government in 2004 recommended discontinuance of MPLADS. In its recommendation of April 2005, it said, ‘Ideally, local area development needs should be determined and interventions made by the elected local governments. Therefore, MPLADS should be dispensed with, and these funds should directly go to panchayats and municipalities for the same purposes’ (cited in Sezhiyan, 2007).

The Supreme Court has not accepted the argument that it has badly impaired the role of the PRIs as the third tier of governance. K. C. Sivaramakrisnan opines that accepting Court’s view that the panchayat and municipal bodies have not been denuded of their role is to accept passively a subordinate and subservient position for the local bodies (Sivaramakrishnan, 2010).

Having considered the problems, the Second Administrative Reforms Committee in its successive reports has recommended the abolition of the scheme (Government of India, 2007). The matter was hotly debated on the floor of the house. As most of the MPs openly expressed their unwillingness to give up the scheme, it was finally decided to continue the scheme but with new and stringent safeguards.

The Rise of Parallel Bodies

Another major cause of concern is the emergence and continuation of parallel bodies of different types with the Panchayati Raj for a long time. They use funds provided by the Central and the state governments or donor agencies and have a separate system of decision-making, resource allocation, execution of projects which is independent and removed from the domain of PRIs (Sarma & Chakravarty, 2018). These parallel bodies consist of different kinds of people like non-officials, elected representatives, technocrats, community leaders. Broadly speaking, the functions performed by the parallel bodies can be classified as ensuring user\beneficiary participation, convergence of programmes and promoting\ensuring efficiency. While these are the basic functions of the PRIs, the matters like irrigation, watershed management and development and minor forest produce come under the purview of the Eleventh Schedule which lays down the functions of the PRIs. The bodies like user groups weaken the panchayat system if they encroach upon the constitutionally defined jurisdiction of panchayats. As in the caste panchayats they keep on surviving at the behest of the local political leaders. They are important for them as they have political clout. The Gram Vikas Samiti in Haryana and the Vigilance Committee in Himachal Pradesh encroach upon the statutory functions of the panchayat bodies as spelt out in the Panchayat Acts of the respective states. It is high time to seriously consider banning those parallel bodies which impinge upon or interfere with the constitutionally mandated role of the panchayats or work against the declared key objectives of amending the Constitution such as strengthening decentralised governance, empowerment of women and the weaker sections of the people. There are programmes like Janmabhoomi in Andhra Pradesh and Gokulgram in Gujarat where the state governments deal directly with the village community without the involvement of panchayats.

There is another set of parallel bodies in some states where exist traditional panchayats with different legitimising sources. In Maharashtra, for example, there exist village ‘collectives’ called gavki. The gavki is constituted by the upper caste elites, the rich and undoubtedly, only the patriarchs of the village, women excluded. Before the amendment of the constitution these bodies functioned alongside the elected panchayats. Unfortunately, they continue even today. Lele narrates an interesting case of how a gavki defied the elected panchayat. The gavki decided to auction the sand from the riverbed and the money earned was to be a contribution to its own fund. The gram panchayat raised objection to it leading to a conflicting situation. The persons who raised objection to this issue, were the more informed active villagers, some dalits and women, associated with a local NGO who were in favour of the panchayats. However, they do not have strength to go against the gavki. The gavki has been found to be more effective in areas where women or dalits are in power. Thus, as Lele (2001) rightly observes, ‘reservations which intended to empower both these marginalised sections in rural governance are being made ineffective by the established powers in the rural areas’.

Caste panchayats in some states have outgrown their functions as local dispensers of justice. Recently a caste panchayat in Nauranjabad village in Uttar Pradesh’s Meerut district ruled that a young woman pregnant with the child of her second husband was forced to return to her first husband who had reappeared after five years. The argument was that the first husband, though assumed dead, had never divorced her. Married off at just 14 to a soldier, Mohammed Arif, Gudiya had barely spent a week with him when Arif was called to duty at Kargil War. After four years, ‘widowed’ Gudiya’s parents with the consent of the Community married her off to her cousin Toutiq. Gudiya became pregnant. Now the caste panchayat declared her second marriage illegal. The Constitutional panchayats failed to act against the order of the caste panchayats which do not have any legal sanction (Wadhwa, 2004).

User Groups as Parallel Bodies

The general reaction against the parallel bodies is that they represent processes external to the constitutionally mandated role of panchayats and enable bureaucracies to override democratic bodies. Thus, they pose serious threats to the effective functioning of local self-governing institutions.

Bureaucratic Domination

Bureaucrats in local governments, especially gram panchayat secretaries, continue to exercise considerable influence over elected representatives as they are the repository of information contained in the government orders that may not be readily accessible to the elected representatives who lack an understanding of the official procedures or basic literacy skills. In Assam, the co-ordination committee of the PRIs in Tinsukia district complained against the block development officers who were keeping the cheque books, ledgers and other important files with themselves (Institute of Social Science, 2003, Panchayati Raj Update). Instead of the panchayat leaders, the bureaucracy still holds the power balance in rural governance and the elected representatives have minimal influence over local development priorities and exercise limited supervision over line department officials. In the name of control and supervision the bureaucracy has been given overriding powers over the elected panchayats in every state legislation. Such laws permit the higher echelons of bureaucracy to suspend and supersede panchayats. In a couple of states like Haryana, the Act had given the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Parishad the authority to refuse to implement any of its resolutions if considered by him not to be in the public interest.

The District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs), which handle crores of rupees, should have disappeared from the scene following the 73rd amendment of the Constitution. But no such signs are visible. The battle is going on in some states. The DRDAs have been constituted as late as in 2002. Some state governments have refused to comply with the central government guidelines to ensure that the DRDAs get merged with the Zilla Parishads and the central government have failed to enforce it.

Centrally Sponsored Schemes

The creation of a large number of programmes called CSSs sponsored by the union ministries has posed a serious challenge to democratic decentralisation. Many of the subjects they deal with are either included in the State List or in the 11th and 12th schedules. The share of the CSSs in the plan budget of the federal government has shot up to 70 per cent against less than 30 per cent in the early 1980s which goes against the very spirit of decentralisation initiated through major constitutional amendments.

Besides the CSSs, there are also many sectoral programmers falling under the 29 subjects of the 11th Schedule which the central ministries handle. The schemes are drawn up at the Centre and implemented at the local level. The association of local bodies with the implementation processes does not really serve the purpose because the implementing bodies only implement according to the rules laid down elsewhere. The local government has to accept them because the Centre has financial clout.

Decentralised Planning: The District Planning Committees

Another important area where the state governments have not shown due regard to constitutional provision is the area of district planning. The Constitutional Amendment requires the state governments to constitute the District Planning Committees (DPCs) to facilitate decentralised planning. The states took more than a decade to constitute DPCs. Nine states have reported that DPC is not functional, including Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Goa, Jammu and Kashmir; 15 states reported that integrated district plans are not being prepared; and twelve states have maintained that integrated district plans are being prepared in all the districts (Ministry of Panchayati Raj & TISS, 2016).

Decentralised planning has received a new dimension as the concept mandates Gram panchayats to prepare plan for economic development and social justice utilising the resources available to them. It has to be understood that the FFC has significantly improved the financial base of the gram panchayats. The Gram Panchayat Development Plan (GPDP) planning process has to be comprehensive and based on participatory process which involves full convergence with schemes of all related central ministries and line departments related to 29 subjects enlisted in the 11th Schedule of the Constitution. The people’s plan campaign initiated by the Government of India under ‘Sabki Yojana Sabka Vikas’ will be intensive and structured exercise for planning at Gram Sabha through convergence between panchayats and concerned line departments of the state. Local governance institutions have a lot to deliver to the people provided the planning and policies are rightly placed (Sodhi, 2009).

But decentralised planning including GPDP is facing a lot of internal challenges due to ineffective function of the Gram Sabha. The meetings of the Gram Sabhas are not being held at regular intervals. Even when the meetings are held quorum is not given due importance. Proceedings are not properly recorded. Many a time the villagers are not duly informed about the venue and timings of the meetings. Attendance of women is far from satisfactory (Datta, 2019a). One study has indicated that most of the GPDPs focus on infrastructure like roads canals ignoring human development aspects like education and health. The participation of line departments in the Gram Sabha meetings has for long been a matter of concern (Kumar, 2019). He further observed,

There is a hierarchal understanding amongst the Panchayat officials about the GPDP plan. The common understanding is that funds can be sourced only from the central and state allocations as recommended by the respective FCs. Many Sarpanchs are not aware about the resource envelope available at the panchayat level. The GPDPs thus formed does not converge funds from different schemes and resources available at the Panchayat level. (ibid.)

The representatives of the villagers including panchayat officials like secretaries are overburdened as some of them have to take charge of more than one Gram Panchayat. Kumar (2012) has drawn our attention to the unholy alliances between the panchayat representatives and junior engineers leading to change of locations in the approved plan and corruption. He has correctly suggested to strengthen social accountability tools. It calls for disclosing of all plans through notices in public places, introduction of social audits as in the case of National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme.

Mention may be made of Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Odisha where the chairperson of the DPC is the Minister which goes against the very spirit of the Constitution of the DPC. There are also states where the DPCs are headed by the bureaucrats which also work against the basic philosophy of the DPC. The Centre has not intervened to compel the State governments to constitute the DPCs. This raises a question: Who will enforce the implementation of the amendment of the Constitution? The Centre has financial clout. It could have threatened the states of dire consequences even to the extent of non-release of central funds to ensure compliance of the Constitutional provisions. Thus, this silence or inaction on the of Indian state raises doubt about its genuine interest in decentralisation through Panchayati Raj

Concluding Observations

It is evident from the above discussion that PRIs are still to emerge as the third stratum, as claimed by Indira Rajaraman (2003), in India’s federal system. All over the world, decentralisation of planning is advocated in the interest of efficient utilisation of resources and for ensuring equitable sharing of benefits from development (Sharma & Sodhi, 2006). Incidentally Ninth Plan pleaded for greater decentralisation and referred to the concept of co-operative federalism whereby much greater freedom would be given to states to determine not only their own priorities but also the modalities of public intervention and provision of public goods and services. This concept also embodies a higher degree of dialogue and co-ordination between states. But the discussion above clearly shows that the scope of dialogue between the centre and the states, not to speak of the local and central government is getting reduced as result of the introduction of new set of schemes.

Given the weak financial base of the PRIs and the lack of effective political will on the part of the state governments to strengthen the base, it seems necessary to direct our attention to the Finance Commission. But The FFC says, ‘In our view neither the TOR nor the Constitution permits the Finance Commission to play any role in the devolution of powers to panchayats and municipalities or to promote a particular model of decentralisation’ (Finance Commission of India, 2015). This raises the basic question about who is responsible for making third tier work? Rao (2015) has raised three points which call for serious consideration:

First, it is important to have clarity in the assignment of functions and the local governments should have clear and independent sources of finance. Second, there should be clear mechanisms to ensure that States comply with the constitutional provisions, particularly in the appointment and implementation of the recommendations of the SFCs. Third, sustainable decentralisation comes from the demands of the people and advocacy should focus on a decentralisation agenda. Indeed, the framework needs to be evolved to accommodate the demand for decentralisation

It may be recalled that 90’s which saw the rise of the constitutionalised panchayats in India was not a product of pressures from below but a culmination of the compulsion which was created in the 1970s followed by the paradigmatic shift in our policy. The basic shift of policy calls for creating a new tier of governance in rural India to propagate and popularise the implications and the impact of this policy on them. It may be recalled that the British rulers became interested in creating a structure of governance at the village level after the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 for regular interaction with the people for the purpose of gathering information about them and for mobilisation of resources. Incidentally, the colonial rulers incurred huge debt to meet the expenditure towards fighting the Mutiny. Again, the first-generation Panchayati Raj was launched in 1950 to establish a link of the ruling party with the villagers who were not well aware of the glorious role played by the ruling party to win Independence. They might have possibly realised that the emotional support to the nationalist leaders might evaporate in course of time. Thus, the politico-administrative link through Panchayati Raj would help them in winning electoral support of the villagers for some time. But it did not work effectively because the higher-level leaders who were supposed to fuel the engine lost interest as they faced a threat from the new set of leaders born out of the Panchayati Raj system. Thus, the colonial rulers and post-colonial rulers in India had taken interest to develop a tier of governance in the countryside under unfavourable circumstances. This tradition seems to be continuing after the shift of policy in 1990’s.

One may, however, hope that the new social movements which are gathering momentum in different parts of the country may help generating pressures from below to strengthen the local government. There is some ray of hope following the rise and growth of the Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) in India working for democratisation and decentralisation of governance, although increasing competition among them for state funding weakens their solidarity and makes it difficult for them to raise voice against the failure or inaction of the state as and when required. Civil society interventions, as Monoj Rai (2017) suggests, may take place in four broad categories:

1. Promoting Public Ownership (Information Dissemination, Public Education, Linking Civil Society, and Accountability), 2. Building Capacity (Gram Sabha, Elected Representatives, New Leadership, Structural Functioning, Negotiating with Administration, and Networking), 3. Local Development (Micro-planning, Resource Use, Matching Funds, and Managing Services), and 4. Research and Advocacy (Monitoring Strategies, On-line Feedback, Policy Implementation, Policy Reform, Creating Enabling Environment and Knowledge Building.

He continues, ‘Information dissemination to the people and the process of bottom-up-planning or micro-planning are some of the most effective ways of strengthening participation by people in their own development’. The CSOs can sensitise the community at the collective and individual levels about their roles and responsibilities in Gram Sabha meetings in our traditional society. The CSOs can work with the villagers and if required, with their informal leaders as well for making them learn and understand their new roles and the expected benefits. They can also work with the panchayat bodies to make them aware of their responsibilities in this regard as well.

The 73rd Amendment of the Constitution has paved a new road for developing democratic consciousness among the villagers by mandating regular elections and creating new opportunities for participation of women and the weaker sections of the village society through the provision of quota. Although due to purely political reasons some of the state governments have been found to be reluctant to hold elections at regular intervals, people and CSOs have sought judicial interventions which have forced them to hold elections. Regular elections have started producing positive impact as it raises democratic consciousness and weakens the hold of the traditional caste leaders. It is definitely a great silver lining (Datta, 2013).

Reservation of seats for women and the weaker sections has been a right step in positive direction as indicated by some of the events and actions. For example, engendering governance through quota has increased the collective strength of women who have started raising their voices to bring about a change in development priorities. Some of them have started learning through experience and increasing knowledge that the amendment has created an opportunity for them which they must make use of despite resistance in some cases. It is true that the journey is not happy and they are facing lot of strong challenges rooted into patriarchy and its concomitant values but things seem to be changing in favour of women and the weaker sections, though at a snail’s space (Datta, 2010).

The increasing attempts on the part of the political parties to capture, control and influence the working of the civil societies raises questions. Right to Information has strengthened their hands. But one has reasons to be doubtful about the bright future of Panchayati Raj as a new unit of India’s federation because globalisation and liberalisation are throwing challenges to the liberal concept of local autonomy (Datta, 2019b).