European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Policy Implications For India

Abstract

With China penetrating markets across the world, its influence over the European economies has reached an unprecedented level. Though the European Union (EU) has significant economic presence in many parts of Asia, it has not yet figured prominently in emerging strategic calculations revolving around the Indo-Pacific region. However, the increasingly fraught relationship between the United States and China, coupled with the prospects of slowing global economy, offer the EU member-states with the opportunity to enhance its agency in shaping the geoeconomic and geopolitical future of the Indo-Pacific region. The article argues that the EU is currently undergoing a significant recalibration in its relationship with an authoritarian China even as it faces the challenge of having to balance security imperatives with economic interests and, not least, having to contend with a lack of unity among member-states. The article recommends that the emergence of the Indo-Pacific construct should prompt both the EU and India in enhancing their cooperation to realise the collective vision of a democratic, open and rules-based international order.

Keywords

Geoeconomic Trump China Germany France Quad supply chains

Introduction

While the US–China competition has multiple dimensions—political, military, diplomatic, and ideological—the heart of the competition is geoeconomic. Though the US is still the most powerful country because its technological superiority makes it the leading geoeconomic and military power, however China has emerged as the principal challenger to the US due to its rising ability to exercise its control over the geoeconomic instruments of power. In countries around the world, China has been creating new infrastructure projects and trade dependencies (Diesen, 2021, pp. 12–13).

Due to his ‘transactional’ and erratic approach to foreign policy, former US President, Donald Trump, had forced the European Union to reassess its relationship with the US. The Trump Administration hardly showed any interest in cultivating ties with Europe, perhaps motivating the EU’s drive for greater self-reliance in matter of security and economics, and a determined attempt to emerge as another key global player alongside the US and China. There was some relief in the EU after the election of Joe Biden as the US President because of his stated desire to revive the ties with the European allies (Alcaro & Tocci, 2021).

While some countries in Europe still resist taking sides in multidimensional competition between Washington and Beijing, China’s aggressive diplomacy and threatening military actions in its neighbourhood, its gross human rights violations in Xinjiang, arbitrary application of the national security law in Hong Kong, interference in Taiwan’s internal politics and the Covid-19 pandemic have created a negative perception about China in the EU member-states. This has allowed the EU to make a shift in its strategic orientation, taking a more sympathetic view of the US approach to safeguard existing international order premised on the rule of law. Consistent with this approach, the Council of the EU approved the ‘EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ in April 2021, and the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was finally released in September 2021.

Although the EU is not usually seen as a security actor in the Indo-Pacific, however the region is important for the EU due to strong trade linkages; the region’s sea lanes are crucial as the large volume of the EU’s international trade is carried through them. While the seeds of the Indo-Pacific strategy of many global actors might have developed out of fears of a rising China, but the EU has preferred a balancing act. This is because the costs of restructuring the economic links with China are enormous and many member-states seek to avoid bearing these burdens as far as possible.

The article has four sections. It begins with EU’s changing relations with China, which encompasses discussion on European concern over China’s penetration and Europe’s attempts at pushback. The second part analyses the EU’s Indo-Pacific shift which also contains discussion on Indo-Pacific strategies of France and Germany. The third part mentions the EU’s expanding security role; and the last part deals with the policy implications on these developments for India. The article employs a qualitative analysis of official documents, media reports and public statements with views of some renowned European and Indian scholars providing essential basis for understanding the issue. While remarkable research work has been produced regarding the India EU relations, and Indo-Pacific strategy of some European countries, but not much attention seems to have been paid to how the EU’s Indo-Pacific shift would impact India’s policies. This article seeks to fill this gap.

EU’s Relations with China

The EU remains in an ambivalent position toward China, which became the EU’s largest trading partner in 2020, replacing the United States. This very fact has been the primary justification for the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), signed between the two entities in December 2020. Started in 2013, and finalised after 35 rounds of negotiations, the CAI is seen as a very important agreement signed by the EU following the post-Brexit trade agreement with the United Kingdom. The CAI aims at strengthening the existing economic cooperation through reciprocity regime between the two economic partners (Gatti, 2021). Critics of the agreement, however, expressed dismay over the EU’s attempts to come closer to an increasingly authoritarian China (Mukherjee, 2021). In fact, the EU’s approach to China is primarily shaped by the way EU views world politics. ‘Liberal institutionalist’ perspective, which contends that growing economic interdependence brings political stability, remains deeply rooted in EU’s policy approach.

European Concern over China’s Penetration

China’s ambitious geopolitical project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is mostly connected with countries of Central and East Asia. Nevertheless, China in recent years has shown greater interest in expanding the BRI’s footprint in many parts of Europe. Some of the major BRI investment projects have taken place in Greece (Rapoza, 2020). Portugal is another EU member-state which has received large Chinese investments. Similarly, Hungary is part of the Budapest-Belgrade Railway, which is regarded among the BRI’s flagship projects in Europe. Since Beijing has been carrying out various projects to drastically reduce freight time to Europe, the restoration of the Budapes Belgradet link is seen as a critical step in terms of reducing shipping times. This project however has raised various concerns among the Hungarian public, the EU and the US, and is characteristic of apprehensions related to China’s growing influence in Eastern European member-states (Rencz, 2019).

The growing investments in European countries reflect Beijing’s approach to link itself to Europe through the expansion of railroads, airports and ports. Here, mention should also be made of the 17+1 Initiative, which is coordinated by China, to institutionalise cooperation between China and seventeen countries from the Central and East European (CEE) regions. Before Greece’s entry in 2019, the group was known as 16+1. Since Greece is neither a post-Communist state, nor a new member of the EU, but a Western capitalist democracy, its participation was seen as a big public relations victory for China (Ciurtin, 2019). As part of the BRI, Beijing has expanded its presence in the Western Balkans, and is seeking to revive trade routes on the Eurasian continent while increasing Chinese influence. The Bar-Boljare Highway is regarded as the biggest infrastructure project in Montenegro’s history. But the EU has expressed grave concerns over the lack of transparency of many Chinese projects and their economic feasibility in Montenegro (Sošić, 2021). So, when Montenegro approached the EU for help in paying off a nearly $1 billion loan to China’s Export Import Bank (EXIM), the European Commission rejected Montenegro’s repeated pleas for help (Ralev, 2021).

Europe’s Pushback

European countries are not oblivious to the impact of China’s rising influence on the balance of power on their continent. The spread of sophisticated propaganda and disinformation by China through European universities, civil society organisations, media groups, political circles and thinktanks is an issue which can no longer be ignored (Cook, 2021; Roberts, 2020). China’s notorious ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ against perceived adversaries has also played its part in turning the European opinion against China. In particular, this tool is part of Beijing’s public information campaign in which Chinese diplomats respond immediately to any perceived challenge against China’s interests, often using unconcealed fabrication of facts on social media networks (Cheng, 2020; Pei, 2020).

Germany has often believed in the conventional Western wisdom on China that pursuit of economic liberalisation would eventually lead to democratic openness. And the German government followed ‘a two-pronged strategy’ toward Beijing, gently criticising China for its human rights abuses while German companies were encouraged to make huge investments in the Chinese market (Karnitschnig, 2020). But a combination of factors, such as the brutal crackdown in Hong Kong, revelations about China’s gross abuse of Xinxiang’s Uighur minority, and apprehensions of surveillance application of the 5G technology have spawned the need to re-evaluate Germany’s ties with China.

In September 2020, the United Kingdom, France and Germany jointly submitted to the United Nations to challenge China’s claim on the South China Sea . The EU Ambassador to China, Nicolas Chapuis, during a speech in Beijing in December 2020, said that China should remain cautious about its worsening image in Europe and reverse the massive erosion of goodwill (Wang, 2020).

A Europe-wide shift in perceptions about China seems to be affecting national policymaking. After Mario Draghi became prime minister in February 2021, the Italian government set out its opposition to the authoritarian drift of China. In March, Draghi decided to block Huawei and ZTE—Chinese companies accused of spying for Beijing—from fulfilling a contract with an Italian telecommunications firm (Coratella & Varvelli, 2021).

In one of the most significant measures since an arms embargo after the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the EU imposed coordinated sanctions along with the UK, the US and Canada on Chinese officials in March 2021 for the human rights abuses of Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang (Rauhala, 2021). Lithuania has also pulled out of Beijing-backed 17+1 Forum in May 2021, a move that demonstrates its rising concerns with China. Before this significant diplomatic move, Lithuanian Parliament described China’s treatment of Uyghur community as ‘genocide’ (Sytas, 2021). Last year, Lithuania went a step ahead when it became the first European country to allow Taiwan to open its office in capital Vilnius in its own name (Nevett, 2022). This has only added to the diplomatic tensions between China and the EU.

EU’s Indo-Pacific Shift

Adopting the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ from former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and adjusting the Barack Obama Administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’, the Donald Trump Administration articulated a vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which is defined through the prism of the US’s great power competition with China (Calabrese, 2020). The overarching aim of the US strategy is to build connectivity infrastructure, to establish free trade agreements (FTA) and to develop strategic collaboration, specifically with India, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries. The growing importance of Indian and Pacific Oceans and Asia’s fast-evolving geopolitical landscape have brought the Indo-Pacific construct to the centre of global diplomatic discourse. The Biden Administration has sought to put down initial concerns over the US’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Europe seems to have realised that the Indo-Pacific space is a geographic, geopolitical and geoeconomic reality which it cannot avoid embracing.

France is the first European country to have expressed interest in the Indo-Pacific region. After China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, dismissed the ‘Indo-Pacific’ vision as an ‘attention-grabbing idea’ (Saran, 2018), French President Emmanuel Macron made the Indo-Pacific concept a part of French foreign policy for the first time in May 2018. Many prominent French scholars argue that the objective of their country’s Indo-Pacific strategy is neither to provoke nor contain China. While it may be true that there is no anti-China tone in France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, but its defence of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea may be indirectly viewed as such (Nicolas, 2019). Rightly noted by Frederic Grare,

France cannot act alone—it will need to gain the support of other European states, who may be reluctant partners unless France can both reassure them of its benign intentions and remind them of the need to protect their own interests in the [Indo-Pacific] region (Grare, 2020b).

France’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is to protect its international position, its interests in the overseas territories and promote a rules-based order. In the defence sphere, this strategy is premised on strategic partnerships and arms agreements with countries such as India, Australia, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore. During visit to Australia in May 2018, Macron had underlined the significance of building a strategic alliance between France, India and Australia (Reuters, 2018). Macron’s ‘Paris–Delhi–Canberra Axis’ was formally inaugurated in September 2020, and this trilateral initiative was elevated to the level of foreign ministers in May 2021 when foreign ministers of France, Australia and India met in London on the sidelines of the G-7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

However, when Australia cancelled a deal with France to build a fleet of conventional submarines and instead signed a trilateral security pact called AUKUS (it includes Australia, the UK and the US to help Australia build nuclear-powered submarines in order to counter Beijing’s influence in the South China Sea), it created animosities between France and Australia, and, in turn, the EU and Australia/the UK (Parker, 2021). The trade negotiations were also postponed by the EU after AUKUS fallout (Packham, 2021). In the aftermath of AUKUS, the EU is attempting to align with like-minded countries in the region especially ASEAN and other regional actors.

Germany became the second major EU country after France to adopt an Indo-Pacific policy. In September 2020, Germany issued a document entitled ‘Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region: Germany–Europe–Asia: shaping the 21st century together’. This meant that Germany officially endorsed the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, marking a decisive shift in the country’s foreign policy approach. In German document on Indo-Pacific, the China question deserves particular examination as the Indo-Pacific is primarily aimed at managing the rise of China. Germany has not indicated the willingness to contain China as they have substantial economic cooperation, yet it wants to protect itself against China’s hegemonic interference. This also reflected Europe’s apprehensions about China’s management of the Covid-19 pandemic, coupled with its growing dependency on Beijing for supplies of critical goods, and China’s systematic distortion of international law (Grare, 2020a). In November 2020, the Netherlands announced its own Indo-Pacific policy. The Dutch strategy sets out to include regional peace and security, climate change, and respect for human rights and the rule of law (Louis, 2020). Thus, the three European countries effectively laid the foundations for an EU approach toward the region.

Following France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the EU did not take much time in framing its own Indo-Pacific guidelines. The EU seems to have realised its lack of political weight as compared to its economic weight in a world characterised by increasing great power competition between the US and China. By exercising its autonomy in strategic domain, lawmakers in Europe are keen to display the EU’s capability in deciding its place in the world. As discussed earlier, the EU in April 2021 adopted policy guidelines to European institutions to elaborate a strategy on the Indo-Pacific by September 2021.

The EU has indicated its intent that it would adopt a tougher stance toward China’s authoritarian and non-democratic tactics. However, a major reason for EU’s decision to come up with a comprehensive strategy for the Indo-Pacific is economic. Europe’s economy is intensely entrenched in networks of trade and investment with the Indo-Pacific countries. Europe sends one-third of all its exports to the region, a majority of those transiting through the sea lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The centrality of the Indo-Pacific region is not just about geoeconomics, it is also geostrategic. As the EU countries appear to be worried about the geopolitical competition in the region which could directly threaten their interests, economics alone cannot spur the decision to create an Indo-Pacific strategy. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is also the consequence of the larger shift in perception of Beijing’s fast-changing role in the international system. This has been highlighted as much by China’s increased military assertiveness and political interference in European countries as much by their growing dependency on China for critical goods and materials. Moreover, the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—an FTA between the ten ASEAN member states and Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—in November 2020 (Petri & Plummer, 2020) may have further increased European worries around the emergence of an Asian economic bloc led by China.

The EU-member countries have already developed bilateral strategic partnerships in the region. And the EU has also built an institutionalised partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); it was agreed in December 2020 to elevate their ties to the level of ‘strategic partnership’ (Allison-Reumann & Murray, 2021). Despite these measures, the EU involvement in the Indo-Pacific remains ad hoc, limiting its overall effectiveness and influence. An observer of European scenario contends that ‘the European Union has elaborated time-specific strategies on issues such as connectivity and maritime security but has never fully managed to implement its policies in a comprehensive fashion’ (Morcos, 2021).

EU’s Expanding Security Role

The EU identifies itself as a normative power (Diez & Manners, 2007). It has often adopted ‘soft’ attitude toward ‘hard power’ issues. But it needs to be understood that structurally and conceptually, the EU is a different political entity than a classical Westphalian state. As underlined by a perceptive observer, ‘despite the increased scope of the EU’s opportunities and competencies, the Union remains an alliance of states’ (Savorskaya, 2015, p. 66). Thus, in terms of foreign or security policies, the EU is just a platform for institutionalised coordination of its members’ national interests and policies. Since each European country has a wide range of national security interests and threat perceptions, it would be unrealistic to expect the EU to take a combined strategic view towards security or foreign policy issues. However, the EU seems to have begun taking some concrete steps to realise its security role following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022).

Fourteen European Union countries—Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain—had proposed a rapid military response force to intervene early in international crises (Emmott, 2021). With its primary interest focused on economic issues, the EU has often boasted its ‘soft power’, traditionally relying on the NATO for any military action. However, Donald Trump had notoriously demanded that the EU contribute more for its own security (MacAskill & Crerar, 2018). This may have led to a shift in EU’s approach on security issues, driving it to become a stand-alone military power that is strong enough to fight on its own. Now, the EU is preparing ‘strategic compass’, a kind of military doctrine that would frame alliance objectives while accelerating efforts to deepen EU defence cooperation (EUISS, 2021). Britain’s departure from the EU could also be one of the reasons for the EU to give urgency to robust defence development.

The EU faces profound structural barriers when it comes to deploying military power internationally. France is the only member-state that has the capability to project hard power abroad. Therefore, while coordinating with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, the EU should ‘increase its visibility as a security actor’ and also ‘adopt a burden-sharing approach’ (Benaglia, 2021). France seems to lead the EU in this field. Underlining the growing strategic congruence, France joined all the Quad members in naval exercises—La Pérouse—in the Bay of Bengal in April 2021 (Pandit, 2021). Following the AUKUS announcement, Macron asked Europe to take care of its own protection. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework was created some time ago to promote cooperation in security and defense projects between its members and to increase their capacity to participate in multinational force groups (European Union External Action, 2022).

For the EU, true strategic autonomy remains more of a long-term ideal. The US’s exit from Afghanistan can also help the EU shape its strategic autonomy as it comes to terms with the fact that the US cannot reclaim its leading role on the global stage (Palacio, 2021). Achieving strategic autonomy would allow the EU to act independently in the Indo-Pacific.

Policy Implications for India

Indo-Pacific has been a part of India’s strategic discourse for the last few years, but its strategy got a coherent framework after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in 2018. This landmark speech gave a geographic definition of New Delhi’s strategically ambitious and comprehensive understanding of the Indo-Pacific as ‘from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018).

As China is aggressively augmenting its military power as well as focusing its attention on strengthening self-reliance, there seems to be a paradigm shift in EU’s strategy to think about expanding its economic partnerships beyond China. Consistent with this approach, the EU has come up with its own Indo-Pacific strategy that will intensify Europe’s cooperation with leading economies in the Indo-Pacific region, both bilaterally and multilaterally. India finds a place in this framework. The US’s deepening of military cooperation with India, Japan and Australia, oriented toward better targeting China’s expanding military presence in the Indo-Pacific, may have resulted in the EU willingness to deepen its ties with India.

The India EU ties have come a long way since they signed the strategic partnership in 2004. Through summits and high-level dialogues, they have been trying to deepen their cooperation in many areas. However, the partnership could not be sustained over the next decade. While New Delhi’s bilateral ties with France, UK and Germany have flourished substantially, similar progress has not been achieved due to their preoccupation with developments in their neighbourhood (Dutta, 2021). The mutual neglect led one insightful observer to term India’s strategic partnership with the EU as ‘paradoxical’ and ‘one that is neither very strategic nor really a partnership’ (Kavalski, 2015, p. 193). It was further argued that since both partners claim to share common values of democracy, pluralism and the rule of law, these birds of a democratic feather should have no problem flocking together around a common strategic vision. In practice, the EU and India remain rather aloof to one another while showering their affections on other international partners—China for the EU and the United States for India (Kavalski, 2015). Nevertheless, things are likely to change now.

In recognition of India’s economic potential and important geopolitical role, a 2018 policy document of the EU remarked that ‘it is vital that the EU and India implement effective multilateralism and global economic governance. The EU will seek to consolidate dialogue on multilateral issues, and to coordinate positions with India’ (European Commission, 2018). During the EU–India Summit, held virtually in July 2020, it was ‘decided to strengthen the EU–India Strategic Partnership, based on shared principles and values of democracy, freedom, rule of law, and respect for human rights, aiming at delivering concrete benefits for the people in the EU and India’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). A virtual India–EU summit was organised on 8 May 2021. As argued by an Indian scholar, the summit ‘was a special privilege accorded to the Indian PM to underline a new sense of urgency in the EU to get its India policy right’ (Pant, 2021). Over the past few years, the global acceptance of the Indo-Pacific construct has spurred extra-regional powers to stress cooperation with India. In order to dispel the apprehensions of a return of ‘Cold War mentality’, India and the EU decided to underpin their strategic cooperation with the connectivity initiatives.

In recent years, many initiatives have been launched to offer alternatives to China’s BRI. India has also introduced the Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) which focuses on securing regional supply chains, avoiding dependence on a single country and ensuring prosperity of all stakeholders. In 2018, India tried to align the objectives of the Quad with SAGAR. Similarly, the EU launched its Global Gateway Strategy to build resilient connections across the world in December 2021, setting an ambitious target to mobilise €300 billion in investments between 2021 and 2027 in hard and soft infrastructure (European Commission, 2021). The Global Gateway initiative plays an important role for the EU in its quest towards becoming a global power.

India and the EU held their second maritime security dialogue virtually on 1 February 2022, and the discussion included developments in the maritime security environment, policy developments covering the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the India–EU maritime cooperation (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022). As India’s major maritime security concerns include threats emanating from China and Pakistan and natural disasters, it is possible for India and the EU to institutionalise their partnership in this domain through a joint doctrine and standard operating procedures.

India has gradually removed some of its traditional hesitations by moving away from its non aligned position. India has adopted a multi-alignment strategy that is based on building strong partnerships with developed economies in order to boost its economic development and national security, as well as to strengthen its geopolitical presence by projecting influence in the region (Hall, 2016). There is a huge potential to be tapped as far as India’s economic ties with the EU are concerned. For instance, the EU accounted for just 11% of India’s total trade, while India stood at less than 2% of the EU’s trade in 2019–2020 (Dutta, 2021). Thus, there is ample scope for the EU and India to pool their economic strengths in a constructive manner as the EU has signed regional trade agreements with some Indo-Pacific countries such as South Korea (2011), Singapore (2019), Japan (2019) and Vietnam (2020). The EU will be a huge beneficiary of potential trade deals with ASEAN as well as India. With exports crossing $400 billion and the Ukraine war providing new opportunities, New Delhi is keen to conclude trade deals with many countries. India and the EU have recently appointed chief negotiators for a preliminary round of talks for FTA (Suryamurthy, 2022).

The Covid-19 pandemic has provided another opportunity for European countries to review and adjust their value chains for health security. This is a crucial Indo-Pacific dimension to step up the EU–India partnership, which can lead to greater convergence between Indian and European agendas on global health cooperation. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy has opened new avenues for India to play a greater role. For the post-Pandemic international order, there needs to be more knowledge-sharing between European countries and India about how to deal with public health issues.

The areas of collaboration between India and the EU include multilateralism, rare-earth minerals, green energy transition, maritime security, healthcare cooperation, critical infrastructure, and digital partnerships, improving trade relations and uniting in expanding their reach in Africa. However, challenges of disunity within the EU member-states, role of China, and EU’s undefined strategic autonomy could impede the common goals that India and EU share. What sort of role India wants the EU to play, and what Europe wants from India, and how best to try to create a balanced and sustainable system that can accommodate these different approaches—would be the key to success of realising the Indo-Pacific vision. As India has to deal with numerous pressing issues, it is worthwhile to be working with the EU in trying to resolve some of these issues.

Conclusion

The existing international system is in a state of enormous change. Much of the policy debate has been dedicated to power shifts away from the US and Europe and towards Asia. Therefore, EU’s adoption of Indo-Pacific is not a sudden development. It has been in the making, and China’s coercive diplomacy and growing assertiveness have played an important role in shaping European perception.

There is mounting evidence that European attitudes towards China have considerably deteriorated. China’s removal of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the mass detention of Uighur minorities in Xinjiang have further turned European attitudes against Beijing. However, it would be too early to assume that India and the EU are bound together by shared concerns about China’s unprecedented rise. Perceptions of China vary across Europe, and while security cooperation between India and some EU member-states remains strong, the complex relationship between China and the EU may act as a potential irritant. Being a major driver of EU policies, Germany’s relatively close ties with China could pose a barrier in the India–EU ties. On the other hand, China would also like to translate its greater political influence in some economically weak member-states to influence decision making on the EU’s security cooperation with India.

The Covid-19 has added another complexity. The deadly virus arrived in a world where protectionism, nationalism, and migration controls were on the rise. However, there is also a possibility that the global nature of the Coronavirus might promote international collaboration with an added awareness that the failure to mount an effective multilateral response would lead to the success of China’s model of authoritarianism. The India–EU relations need to be seen in such a context. It is reasonable to argue that the India–EU strategic partnership has begun to gain greater salience for the Indo-Pacific region.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

References

Alcaro

, & Tocci

(2021). Navigating a COVID World: The European Union’s internal rebirth and external quest. International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 56(2).

Allison-Reumann

, & Murray

(2021, January 30). What does the ASEAN–EU strategic partnership mean? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/what-does-the-asean-eu-strategic-partnership-mean/

Benaglia

(2021, January 28). How can the EU navigate the Indo-Pacific? Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/how-can-the-eu-navigate-the-indo-pacific/

Calabrese

(2020). Assuring a free and open Indo-Pacific: Rebalancing the US approach. Asian Affairs, 51(2), 2020.

Cheng

(2020, July 6). Challenging China’s ‘wolf warrior’ diplomats (Backgrounder No. 3504). Heritage Foundation.

Ciurtin

(2019, May 29). The ‘16+1’ becomes the ‘17+1’: Greece joins China’s dwindling cooperation framework in Central and Eastern Europe. China Brief, 19(10).

Cook

(2021, March 30). Beijing is getting better at disinformation on global social media. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/beijing-is-getting-better-at-disinformation-on-global-social-media/

Coratella

, & Varvelli

(2021, May 20). Rome’s moment: Draghi, multilateralism, and Italy’s new strategy (Policy Brief). European Council on Foreign Relations.

Diesen

(2021). Great power politics in the fourth industrial revolution: The geoeconomics of technological sovereignty. I.B. Tauris.

10.

Diez

, & Manners

(2007). Reflecting on normative power Europe. In Berenskoetter

& Williams

M. J.

(Eds.), Power in world politics (pp. 173–188). Routledge.

11.

Dutta

(2021, April 26). Unpacking the India–EU economic relationship. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/unpacking-india-eu-economic-relationship/

12.

Emmott

(2021, May 5). EU seeks rapid response military force, two decades after first try. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-seeks-rapid-response-military-force-two-decades-after-first-try-2021-05-05/

13.

EUISS. (2021, February 19). Finding direction with a strategic compass? Reflections on the future of EU security and defence. European Union Institute for Security Studies.

14.

European Commission. (2018, November 20). EU shapes its ambitious strategy on India. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6481

15.

European Commission. (2021, December 1). Global gateway: Up to €300 billion for the European Union’s strategy to boost sustainable links around the world. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433

16.

European Union External Action. (2022, March 25). Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO): Factsheet. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet-0_en

17.

Gatti

(2021, January 28). The EU–China comprehensive agreement on investment: Between realpolitik and fundamental values. The European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS).

18.

Grare

(2020a, October 16). Germany’s new approach to the Indo-Pacific. International Politik Quarterly. https://ip-quarterly.com/en/germanys-new-approach-indo-pacific

19.

Grare

(2020b, October 21). France, the other Indo-Pacific power. Carnegie endowment for international peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/21/france-other-indo-pacific-power-pub-83000

20.

Hall

(2016). Multialignment and Indian foreign policy under Narendra Modi. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 105(3).

21.

Karnitschnig

(2020, September 10). How Germany opened the door to China—and threw away the key. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-china-economy-business-technology-industry-trade-security/

22.

Kavalski

(2015). The EU–India strategic partnership: Neither very strategic, nor much of a partnership. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(1), 192–208.

23.

Louis

(2020, November 26). The outlines of a European policy on the Indo-Pacific. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/outlines-european-policy-indo-pacific

24.

MacAskill

, & Crerar

(2018, July 11). Donald Trump tells NATO allies to spend 4% of GDP on defence. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/11/donald-trump-tells-nato-allies-to-spend-4-of-gdp-on-defence

25.

Ministry of External Affairs. (2018, June 1). Prime Minister’s keynote address at Shangri La Dialogue. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018

26.

Ministry of External Affairs. (2020, July 15). Joint statement of the 15th India–EU summit. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32827/Joint_Statement_of_the_15th_IndiaEU_Summit_July_15_2020

27.

Ministry of External Affairs. (2022, February 1). Second India–EU maritime security dialogue. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/34781/Second_IndiaEU_Maritime_Security_Dialogue

28.

Morcos

(2021, April 19). The European Union is shaping its strategy for the Indo-Pacific. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-union-shaping-its-strategy-indo-pacific

29.

Mukherjee

(2021, March 26). Quad a forceful idea: EU must have a more strategic China policy. South Asia Monitor. https://www.southasiamonitor.org/spotlight/quad-forceful-idea-eu-must-have-more-strategic-china-policy

30.

Nevett

(2022, January 7). Lithuania: The European state that dared to defy China then wobbled. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59879762

31.

Nicolas

(2019, December 12). France’s Indo-Pacific strategy: Inclusive and principled. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/12/frances-indo-pacific-strategy-inclusive-and-principled/

32.

Packham

(2021, October 1). EU postpones trade talks with Australia amid sub deal anger. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-postpones-trade-talks-with-australia-amid-submarine-deal-fallout-2021-10-01/

33.

Palacio

(2021, September 21). If Europe wants strategic autonomy post-Afghanistan, it will have to adjust its budgetary priorities. Irish Examiner. https://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/commentanalysis/arid-40698626.html

34.

Pandit

(2021, April 5). Eye on China, Quad-plus-France exercise kicks off in Bay of Bengal. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/eye-on-china-quad-plus-france-exercise-kicks-off-in-bay-of-bengal/articleshow/81917310.cms

35.

Pant

H.V.

(2021, May 12). Can India and the EU operationalise their natural partnership? Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/can-india-and-the-eu-operationalise-their-natural-partnership-101620816581821.html

36.

Parker

(2021, September 2021). Aukus: Defence pact an awkward wake-up call for Europe. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58600454

37.

Pei

(2020, June 13). China’s ‘wolf warrior’ diplomats are being more reckless than Donald Trump. That’s a mistake. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3088462/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-are-being-more-reckless-trump-thats

38.

Petri

P.A.

, & Plummer

(2020, November 16). RCEP: A new trade agreement that will shape global economics and politics. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/

39.

Ralev

(2021, April 14). EU not to repay Montenegro’s loan from China’s Exim Bank—Spokesperson. SeeNews. https://seenews.com/news/eu-not-to-repay-montenegros-loan-from-chinas-exim-bank-spokesperson-737940

40.

Rapoza

(2020, April 18). Watch out for China buying spree, NATO warns. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/04/18/watch-out-for-china-buying-spree-nato-warns/?sh=3f1946d81758

41.

Rauhala

(2021, March 22). U.S., E.U., Canada and Britain announce sanctions on China over the abuse of Uyghurs. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/xinjiang-sanctions-european-union/2021/03/22/1b0d69aa-8b0a-11eb-a33e-da28941cb9ac_story.html

42.

Rencz

(2019, October). The BRI in Europe and the Budapest–Belgrade railway link (Briefing Paper). European Institute of Asian Studies.

43.

Reuters. (2018, May 3, 2018). Macron wants strategic Paris–Delhi–Canberra axis amid Pacific tension. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-france-idUSKBN1I330F

44.

Roberts

(2020). China’s disinformation strategy: Its dimensions and future. Atlantic Council.

45.

Saran

(2018, June 29). Quad can be the anchor for the Indo-Pacific region. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analsis/quad-can-be-the-anchor-for-the-indo-pacific-region/story-IC5jc7fxAUdI3BtD5ULwXN.html

46.

Savorskaya

(2015). The concept of the European Union’s normative power. Baltic Region, 4(26).

47.

Sošić

(2021, April 14). Montenegro’s road ahead: Infrastructure between EU and China. The Clingendael Spectator. https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/montenegros-road-ahead-infrastructure-between-eu-and-china

48.

Suryamurthy

(2022, March 22). India, EU plan talks on FTA. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/india-eu-plan-talks-on-fta/cid/1858068

49.

Sytas

(2021, May 20). Lithuanian parliament latest to call China’s treatment of Uyghurs ‘genocide’. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/lithuanian-parliament-latest-call-chinas-treatment-uyghurs-genocide-2021-05-20/

50.

Wang

(2020, December 10). EU ambassador to China hits out at ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’, urges Beijing to cherish ‘Deng Xiaoping legacy’. South China Morning Post.