Buying and Selling of Vote in Local Body Elections: A Case Study of Telangana

The Open Secret: Elections for Sale

Every political institution, administrative machineries and civil society knew that money or material reward were being given to the voters for the sake of getting their vote. But no one was ready to admit it on record. Similarly, while having discussions with the contesting candidates before the election, they firmly said that they did not bribe voters and they spent within the stipulated norms of the Election Commission. Their expenditure was only on the posters and flags which they carried for campaigns. Candidates also said that they didn’t even pay for their followers who accompany them during canvassing and rallies. Whereas the discussion with the enthusiastic supporters of the candidates revealed the fact that their leader spent money on these accounts. Especially the contestant for the post of President gives ₹500 per day for a group of 30–75 people who did door-to-door campaign. Apart from this, their food for three times in a day was taken care of. This campaign lasted at least for 7 days. Expenditure on liquor/toddy became an extra offering.

Observation on a day before election revealed the fact that money was given to each voter. In that particular Gram Panchayat, there was a tight competition for the President’s election. Candidate X gave ₹1,000 initially and then X came to know that candidate Y had already given ₹1,500 for each vote, X’s followers rushed back to give extra ₹1,000 for each vote. So, each voter received ₹3,500 in total. There were 3,500 voters in that Gram Panchayat, so grand total of nearly ₹1 crore was circulated in that Gram Panchayat in a single day. The expenditure incurred on campaigns, rallies, materials in the form of gifts given by other ward members were apart from this. Even though this money was not given to all the voters, exorbitant amount of cash was spent by the contesting candidates on a day before election.

A Case of Two Brothers

Elections to the Gram Panchayat in Telangana are not contested based on political parties. But, still, the contesting candidates identify themselves or associate themselves with a particular party. So, people term it as a contest between two parties or among different parties. But, in case of ABC Gram Panchayat, two brothers and their cousin along with two more candidates contested for the post of the President in the Gram Panchayat election. Two brothers and their cousin were from the same party whereas other candidates were Independents without any party affiliation. Two brothers, separately negotiated with others for money to withdraw from the election. From the discussion with the villagers, we came to know that these brothers paid ₹5 lakhs each to three other candidates to withdraw from the election. They tried to convince and negotiate among themselves to withdraw one of them from the election so that the other person could serve the party. But they could not arrive at any conclusion, so they decided to contest against each other. They ignored their cousin in the process of negotiation to withdraw since they knew that their cousin could not spend as much as they could during election if they decided to contest.

Two brothers became rivals during election and, while talking to them, we came to know that they were prepared to become the President much before the announcement of election dates and were now ready to face the election. A close relative of these two brothers said that they were united before because of the party affiliation. But, after the announcement of panchayat election, they became rivals and decided to contest against each other. Among the two brothers, the elder brother was in real estate business and the younger one is a retired government employee. Because of the real estate business, the elder brother had amazing amount of wealth and he recently sold a property worth ₹2 crore just to spend during the election. The younger brother had also to sell a land, but at lesser cost than his brother, and then also took money on credit to spend in the election, said the relative. Here, the party failed to unite the brothers and they were ready to spend money to get the position of power.

Banking on Self-Help Group

Self-help groups (SHGs) are the institutions of poor and offer as an organised group of people in the form of federations from neighbourhood level to state level. The strength of these federations is utilised for many other purposes, which includes vote-buying also. In the ZYX Gram Panchayat, SHGs were mobilised based on caste groups and the contesting candidates banked on these SHGs to cultivate their caste groups vote. These SHG members were paid ₹500–₹750 per day for 7 days, and they used to go along with the candidates for campaigns. They also entertained the voters by singing and dancing in a group at the midst of election rallies. The candidates also used them as their agents to distribute money to the voters, hence they were less suspicious in the eyes of the observers. Elderly ladies of the group mobilised the crowd for campaign, and the money was given to them for the distribution in the evening. The money was paid every alternative day. They also got an incentive if they mobilised a greater number of women for doing door-to-door campaign repeatedly. The entertainers got a special package depending upon the energy they exhausted. An interview with a lady revealed the fact that she had received ₹5,500 for 7 days of work. This was her highest earning in her life, she said.

Spending on Chicken and Toddy

Unlike pork-barrel spending in the USA, contesting candidates in GHJ Gram Panchayat spent more money on chicken and toddy. Ward members particularly spent more on chicken. Four days before the election, every household in their ward got 500 gm chicken (meat), and it got delivered in the early morning. So, when the front door of the house was opened in the morning, they could find a chicken meat packet lying on the ground. On the first day, people were shocked to see the chicken meat at their door, and they thought that somebody had done black magic! But, later, they came to know that candidate S has supplied the meat. On the second day, they were surprised to see two packets, making it obvious that the other contesting candidate had also dropped the meat. The chicken shopkeeper in that village and the nearby village were so happy that they got huge orders, and they delivered nearly 800 kg of chicken in 3 days. Local toddy was also in great demand and elderly people were happy when toddy was supplied to them free of cost.

Plan, Wait and Win

Patronage system also fared well in this election. Providing material support, at any time during the electoral cycle or even much before the announcement of election date, to individuals, families or communities within the context of enduring asymmetric, but reciprocal, relationships also yielded victory. The benefits derived from patronage, in contrast, tended to be less episodic and election-centred, since they were distributed within the context of enduring relationships between patrons and clients. In such cases, the spending could not be calculated. In KLM Gram Panchayat, a candidate who aspired to become the president planned strategically and started spending on the occasions of marriages, village festivals, providing material support for the past one year. The other candidates, to dismantle his plan, had paid ₹4,000 for a single vote. Altogether, a single voter received up to ₹30,000 in total from different candidates. Two of the contesting candidates spent nearly ₹5 crores only during the election time. It was a huge loss for the candidate who lost in the election. On the day of the declaration of the result after the election, everyone was waiting eagerly to know who won since it was a close contest and once the result was declared it was like a festive celebration for winners and their supporters.

Feast and Vote

In Gram Panchayat Z, there was a stiff competition between the two candidates for President’s election. All the people of that Gram Panchayat were allowed to eat in a hotel situated near the temple. While inquiring, the hotel owner said each meal cost ₹60 and there were about 450 people who came regularly for lunch for 5 days. The number varied from 50–300 for breakfast and dinner. Each contestant would take a turn and pay money for alternative days for the people who had food in his hotel. Since the hotel was located near the temple, no non-vegetarian food was allowed. But those who wanted to have non-vegetarian food, biryani packets cooked elsewhere was served @ ₹90. But he said that non-veg was served only for 2 days before the election and nearly 200 people took biryani packets on each day, and the payment was made by the candidates.

Flow of Liquor

Arrangements were made in a liquor shop located near the Q Gram Panchayat to supply liquor for the campaigners and the voters who would like to have liquor. Anybody from that Gram Panchayat could go to the shop, mention the name of the contesting candidate and could get one beer or 100 ml of brandy or whisky daily for 5 days. Later, the money was paid by the contesting candidates. But the shopkeeper was not ready to tell the turnover which had happened during the election time. The person who worked in the shop later said that there was 50% increase in sale of liquor on each day during the election time.

Targeting the Poor

The poor are more likely to have their votes bought than those who are wealthier. This pattern of distribution is troubling, for it means that vote buying is particularly harmful to the quality of representation enjoyed by those who are already the most powerless (Andeweg, 2003; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). Vote buying would be more where there was more unequal distribution of income. Everybody’s vote was still counted and weighted equally, but the votes bought from the poor were empty vessels. They were void of any information about their sellers’ policy preferences and demands for public goods. Vote buying thus violated the democratic principle of equal consideration of interests in policymaking. As a consequence, because of their material poverty, a subset of the citizenry was deprived of effective participation in collective decisions. They fell out of the circle of democratic accountability. Destitute old men and women were the targets of vote buyers. In R Gram Panchayat, old women who beg in the nearby temple were given ₹500 daily from the date of the announcement of election and were asked not to beg. Rather they were asked to spread good words about the candidate to other people and ask them to vote for them. When the researcher went to the temple after the election, he found the lady begging and now she said that elections are over, and she cannot expect any money from the candidate. Perhaps she pinned a hope that the winning candidate might arrange a monthly old-age pension for her and people like her in near future.

Commodification of Vote

Voting is commodified and some of the voters started demanding rewards for them, especially on the day of voting. Since the agents considered the winning margins were minimum, to lure the last few voters who were yet to cast their votes, they paid whatever the voter demanded. This trading was observed by the researcher on the day of election in front of the premise of the polling station. But there was no assurance for whom the vote was cast. Secret ballot system has given a lot of speculation, and the election has become a gamble. With respect to vote buying, as with respect to most other strategies of electoral manipulation, it is difficult to gauge its effect on final vote tallies. Yet, if the electoral losers had good reason to believe that they owed their defeat to vote buying, they might refuse to consider the victory of their opponents legitimate. If candidates got elected on the basis of money they spent for votes, they had little reason to care about the formulation of policies, the construction of programmatic decisions and practices of accountability. In the best cases, vote buying establishes a continuous obligation to provide services to constituencies (or only to those who have voted for them). In the worst cases, it cuts the nexus of representation between voters and candidates. Once voters are paid for, politicians may feel free of any debt to their voters.

Reward Not Only to Voters But Also to Ward Members

The peculiarity of this Gram Panchayat election was that the money was given during the election of vice-president also. Election to the vice-president is held indirectly, and one among the elected ward members becomes the vice-president. The elected ward members, start negotiating with other ward members to select them as the vice-president immediately after the publication of the results. The highest bidder will win. The money ranges from ₹2.5 lakhs to ₹10 lakhs, depending upon the competition. This is also dependent upon the reservation of the post of President. If the President’s post is reserved for women or SCs/STs, then the competition for the vice-president is more because of the deeply entrenched caste and gender hierarchy.

Class, Caste and Gender

Indian semi-feudal, hierarchy and patriarchy often get reflected in the grassroots governance. This is also evident from this study. Gram Panchayat A is reserved for SC (general) and Gram Panchayat B is reserved for SC (women). The researchers visited both the panchayats and made themselves available there on the day of election as micro-observers. In Gram Panchayat A, the vice-president’s post was auctioned for ₹2.5 lakhs and the candidate who won the post paid ₹2.5 lakhs each to 13 candidates. In Gram Panchayat B, it was auctioned for ₹10 lakhs, and it was paid to 12 candidates each. In Gram Panchayat B, the contest for President was not much of a fanfare and no money or reward was given to voters as contesting candidates are from poor background. Not even a single agent was found as a polling agent and counting agent on behalf of them during the election day. One of the ward members would become the vice-president and would abduct the position of the President because of the gender, caste and class of the President.

Yes, Defeated: Vote Cannot be Bought

Before election, the researcher interacted with the spouse of a contestant to discuss their election strategy and electoral mobilisation. Initially reluctant, but later it was admitted that they were planning to mortgage their land to spend for election campaign and to pay the voters. In the last tenure, the interviewee was the elected ward member and this time decided to field the spouse in the contest. They were planning to give ₹300 to each voter of their ward with the population of 350 voters like they had paid last time to win the election. After the election, the researcher went to meet the spouse of the ward member who had contested in the election to know the result. That candidate, who was defeated in the election with a margin of 55 votes, said that money could not buy voters. On the day before election, they paid more than what their opponent had paid but could not win. They were clueless on what went wrong and opined that voters might have been influenced by certain reasons better known to them.

Propositions

Ultimately, the victory of the candidate is dependent upon the swing voters. Candidates said that they were sure about who would vote for them and who would not vote for them. But they are only 50% of the population; the rest 50% decides who will win the election. The money or rewards are given to them as well, but their preferences usually swing based on the amount of money/reward paid to them and the credentials of the contesting candidates. Many candidates accepted the fact that their credentials were also very much important in spite of spending money. This was echoed during the focus group discussion held with the voters. This gives a hope that democratic process will survive (Kimberley, 2004). But the hard fact is the prevalence of feudal, hierarchical and patriarchal systems. Based on the field observation, the following propositions have been drawn:

An individual living in less competitive Panchayat is less likely to be a swing voter than the same individual located in a competitive Panchayat.

Of course, vote buying takes different forms in different places, and is more intense in some places than others (Finan & Schechter, 2012). The degree to which democracy is afflicted by these ills, and the particular kinds of damage is inflicted, thus vary. Vote buying, it should also be noted, has consequences that extend beyond the political realm. Certain kinds of vote buying affects the economy by driving up land prices and concentrating landownership: developments that, of course, may have long-term political implications as well (Hasen, 2000). In most of the cases, the incidence of money is found in the places where real estate business is booming. Also, all the Gram Panchayats visited have huge population. The competition is more in the panchayats where there is more income and grants from the government to the panchayats.

People involved in using money emerge as having divergent and often conflicting aspirations, motivations and agendas, within which money itself plays multiple roles simultaneously. First, to the extent that cash is put to work as a medium of purchase, the money does not buy votes, rather—somewhat conventionally—pays for a variety of campaign-related expenses, including hiring crowds to participate in campaign rallies. Second, money is shown to be productive and performative of sociopolitical networks infuse everyday life far beyond election day; gifts of money works much like any other gifted good in producing relations of debt and obligation. The cash-for-vote exchange simply describes already existing social ties; in election-season exchange is, instead, constitutive of enduring networks of trust, sociality and accountability (Gupta, 1995; Ruud, 2000). Third, this study attends to the significance of cash as the medium of the gift. Money simultaneously constitutes a scale of value enabling commensuration and exchange while also indexing particular histories (Gilbert, 2005) that signal access to powerful networks of knowledge, resources and authority. The ethnography demonstrates how highly visible spectacles of election-season cash expenditure generates intense speculation and political (re)alignments in the run-up to election day. Meanwhile, in its role as a ‘general purpose’ medium of convertibility and transaction, money’s ‘irreducible materiality’ lends itself to semiotic slippage between the two registers of value and power; (mis)interpretations of spectacular expenditure as marketised exchange fuel suspicions of vote buying in an already rumour-infused environment (Michelutti, 2007).