The role of Japan’s civil society organizations and the deteriorating relationship between Japan and South Korea

Despite the efforts of Japanese and South Korean governments to try to move bilateral relations forward within an overall framework of reconciliation, their relationship continues to be fraught and fractious. While the governments’ efforts are not comparable to the high-level reconciliation achieved between Germany and other European countries, the former Asian adversaries are cooperating through exchanges in the financial and business sectors, as well as the more sensitive political and military arenas. ¹ The chasm that has arisen recently suggests that reconciliation may be receding, however. While Japan and South Korea had ups and downs in the past, the current status of their relationship shows signs of a fundamental regression. ²

These signs are apparent at both governmental and societal levels. Regularized inter-governmentalism is a key component of bilateral relations, ³ and since 1967 Japan and South Korea have been increasing the number of official meetings. They have held annual ministerial-level conferences in Seoul and Tokyo to boost bilateral cooperation and discuss unresolved issues. Other processes, such as presidential and ministerial-level summits, have also been put in place to allow a smooth flow of communication. ⁴ However, the two countries’ current leaders have yet to meet. South Korean president Park Geun-hye has refused to meet Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo since taking office in February 2013. Even some gatherings between lower-level officials were called off after Park’s inauguration. ⁵ South Korea cancelled a series of proposed defence meetings and military exchange programs with Japan on 28 December 2013 in response to Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine just two days before. His visit to the controversial war shrine triggered strong criticism from Beijing and Seoul, as well as a statement of “disappointment” from Washington over Japan’s actions in exacerbating tensions in the region.

Recent studies—whether from a historical, realist, or domestic perspective—attribute the deterioration in relations at both government and societal levels solely to government-level actions. While the argument that the government’s role and changes in administration are the most important contributors is valid in explaining bilateral ties during a specific period or under a particular administration, it has its limits when describing ongoing conflicts between the two nations.

This study treats civil society as another agent and examines evolving South Korea–Japan relations through the prism of cooperation/conflict between civil society and government. Because this article focuses on Japan’s policies as they relate to South Korea, it analyzes the way Japanese civil society has influenced the government’s decisions on postwar issues. Experts have previously analyzed bilateral ties that revolved around the governments of the two countries and, when it came to cooperation between Japan’s civil society and the government, focused on domestic issues. In this study, the cases of forced sex slaves and history textbooks are used to examine how Japan’s civil societies affect policies on postwar issues or to find the reasons for their limited influence.

At the governmental level, Prime Minister Abe’s recent announcement of a shift in the country’s defence policy on 30 June that would make it easier for its troops to fight in overseas conflicts has strained the bilateral relationship. This change, the most dramatic policy shift since Japan set up its postwar armed forces 60 years ago, will widen Japan’s military options by ending the ban on exercising “collective self-defence,” that is, aiding a friendly country under attack. With clear signs that a revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution was likely, Seoul refused to accept any changes in Japanese policy affecting South Korea’s security unless it gave its agreement, and Abe’s advisers urged that Tokyo not take any action concerning a friendly country without that country’s consent. However, South Korea, still aggrieved at Japan’s colonization of the Korean peninsula in the twentieth century, continues to be agitated by Japan’s conservative moves.

At the societal level, deteriorating ties are evident in the changes in how South Korean and Japanese nationals feel about one another’s countries. A survey conducted by Kono and Hara for Japan’s Japan Broadcasting Cooperation (NHK) and South Korea’s Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) showed that more Japanese respondents “disliked” than “liked” South Korea in 1991. In 1999, there was a rise in the number of respondents who “disliked,” but in 2010, more Japanese said they “liked” than “disliked” their neighbour. ⁶ In South Korea, by contrast, 58 percent of survey participants said they “disliked” Japan in 1991, and this figure gradually increased in 1999 and 2010. ⁷ Another poll, conducted in May 2013 by Japan’s Genron Non-profit Organization (NPO) and South Korea’s East Asia Institute, asked respondents about “changes in the two countries’ relations over the past year.” Of the Japanese respondents, 66.3 percent believed that bilateral ties “had gotten worse” (this figure includes both “have gotten much worse” and “have gotten relatively worse”), while 53.9 percent of South Korean respondents ticked the same boxes. ⁸

From January to November 2013, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies surveyed South Koreans every two months. The results echoed previous surveys, with 82.1 percent saying relations between the two countries had deteriorated. ⁹ This belief is spreading among the country’s youth. Students from both countries responded that they felt bilateral relations will continue to be strained. Only 22 percent of South Korean students thought relations with Japan would improve in the future, ¹⁰ while 34.6 percent of Japanese and 59.5 percent of South Korean students believed that the future of bilateral relations “would not change.” ¹¹

Because Japanese civil society is still limited and ineffective in influencing foreign policies, postwar issues remain entirely in the government’s hands. The activities of most civil organizations are confined to local and regional issues. They have few opportunities to participate in policymaking at the national level. Furthermore, Japanese civil society is unable to overcome its limits because it is controlled by both market forces and the government. ¹² Thus, despite the efforts and goodwill of the two countries’ peoples, bilateral relations remain highly politicized and are swayed by short-term strategies each time a newly elected administration steps in. This has become a vicious cycle that has led to setbacks in the process of reconciliation in the past two years. The conclusion of this study will pose questions for self-evaluation, propose further research directions, and emphasize the need for a transnational civil society as an alternative.

Literature review

Historical approach

Most discussions of the relations between South Korea and Japan focus on their historical enmity. They explain the conflict by analyzing the two countries’ diplomatic histories, which are dominated by memories of colonial rule. ¹³ Expressions such as “politicizing the past” are commonly used in discussing conflicts over textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine, ¹⁴ the former being the most popular target of analysis. ¹⁵ Berger states that the memory of war hinders efforts to build peace between Korea and Japan. ¹⁶

While the “historical enmity” or “psycho-historical” approach is regarded as the most persuasive analytical framework to explain the unique features of Korean–Japanese relations, it has its limits in describing the broader picture. Seoul and Tokyo have not always been hostile to one another; they have cooperated at times in various fields. As Cha points out, historical variables are necessary but not sufficient in their explanatory power and cannot fully describe the positive changes in bilateral ties. ¹⁷

Realist approach

To overcome the limitations of the historical approach, the realist approach argues that the degree of cooperation between Korea and Japan correlates with the level of external threat. Victor Cha proposes the “quasi-alliance model,” which adopts the concepts “fear of entrapment” and “fear of abandonment” from alliance theory. ¹⁸ Cha’s model regards American engagement as a negative force that keeps Korea and Japan from working together. However, the quasi-alliance model fails to explain the boost in Korea–Japan cooperation while the United States’ presence remains strong.

Yoon and Woo propose a model that contradicts Cha’s framework. Yoon explains the fragile cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo using the “net threat” theory. ¹⁹ This theory explains their cooperation/frictions primarily as a function of a “net threat,” which is defined as “the balance between a common threat and the resources that are mustered against it.” ²⁰ In what he calls “the engagement-coalition politics” hypothesis, Woo suggests an alternative to Cha’s quasi-alliance model. ²¹ He offers two axes. He argues that the proactive engagement of the United States promotes cooperation between Korea and Japan and that the changes in coalition politics, especially in Japan, should be analyzed together with the policies of the United States. However, Korea’s political coalitions form differently from those of Japan, and the progressive forces of Korea, which have recently risen, do not see cooperation with the United States and Japan as an imperative. For this reason, the application of Woo’s hypothesis to the latest Korea–Japan relations requires further research.

Meanwhile, Samuels explains political and strategic changes occurring in Japan, South Korea, and China as Tokyo rapidly shifts gears. He focuses on the role played by Article 9 of Japan’s constitution—the so-called Peace Clause—in Japanese politics since the 1950s. He argues that multiple catalysts determine change in Japan’s security policy: international events, domestic political struggles, societal change, institutional change, and the transformation of the US defence establishment and policy. ²² Moreover, Japan may also regard South Korea as a threat, and this perception can affect the relationship between the two countries.

Pyle states that the conservative elite has been the source of Japan’s distinctive style and strategy in dealing with the external order. Each of the major changes in Japanese strategy has been an adaptation to the new configuration of power in the world. In sum, Japan is unlikely to make a sudden move hostile to the international system, since the stability of the international order protects Japanese interests. ²³ In this regard, Japan’s rise or its desire not to be part of the United States’ security policy can be perceived as a threat to South Korea.

Lind argues that Japan’s denial and unapologetic remembrance of its role in World War Two atrocities have been unsettling for its neighbours. However, she notes that contrition is only one of many factors that countries examine as they assess intentions. Moreover, contrition affects reconciliation by influencing domestic mobilization. By educating people about past misdeeds, official expressions of remorse may undermine nationalist mobilization. However, official contrition can also provoke a nationalist backlash, which fuels distrust among neighbouring states. This has happened repeatedly in South Korea–Japan relations. ²⁴ Lind’s theory can be said to be related to the “domestic approach.”

Domestic approach

This approach explains the atmosphere of cooperation and conflict between the two countries on the basis of domestic politics. The domestic approach branches into two parts: studies of leadership and studies of nationalism. Kim sees leadership as the most important factor in South Korea–Japan relations. Kim argues that leaders are not always rational and that, when it comes to issues of history and memory, Korean and Japanese politicians sometimes make decisions against their national interests. ²⁵ Thus, the mood of bilateral relations can shift from adversarial to collaborative, depending on changes in local administrations.

However, there were times when bilateral ties were not positive even when a relatively pro-Japanese president was in office and, conversely, Seoul and Tokyo were on good terms when South Korea’s incumbent president had hardline policies toward Japan. Hence, it is difficult to generalize that countries’ leaders determine the nature of the relations.

Both countries have sometimes mobilized nationalism in domestic politics. After Seoul and Tokyo normalized diplomatic relations, the South Korean government moved away from its anti-Japanese approach in foreign and economic policies. However, it continued to strengthen patriotic and nationalistic symbolism to boost national authority. ²⁶ In the process, anti-Japanese national heroes took centre stage, because those who saved the country by resisting Japan were directly involved in establishing South Korea as a nation. Hence, anti-Japanese nationalism was seen as equivalent to South Korea’s integrity as a nation. ²⁷ Likewise, in Japan, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), founded in 1955, governed for the next 60 years, with only one brief interruption in 1993–1994. The pacifist-opposition Social Democratic Party (SDPJ), forcefully opposed the LDP on postwar issues but never seriously sought, nor was it able, to challenge the LDP’S grip on power. ²⁸

While each of these approaches may be effective in explaining bilateral ties during a certain time or administration, each has its limits when describing a prolonged period of tensions like that seen today. The main reason is that these studies focus only on the two nations’ governments as primary agents. The argument that the governments’ roles and the changes in administration were important has been persuasive in light of South Korea and Japan’s “special” relations. The realist approach even includes changes in the United States’ president and policies as a key factor in Japan–Korea ties. However, as civil societies in the two countries have matured, they have started to influence decisions related to policies on Japan–South Korea ties. Previous studies overlook the role of civil societies or regard them only as a domestic factor. This study, in contrast, analyzes the characteristics of Japanese civil society and its influence over Japanese policies on South Korea, and conducts a structural analysis of its limited influence over the government.

Civil society’s restricted influence in Japan

A general definition of civil society is the “realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, autonomous of the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.” ²⁹ However, while that general definition suffices for many countries, such as the United States, it is inadequate for Japan. Pekkanen refers to “Japan’s dual civil society.” While there are many different civil society groups to which Japanese people belong, on the whole, the sector is under-professionalized, with the exception of the health and social welfare arena. ³⁰ Compared to other advanced industrialized nations, Japan has a huge number of small, local groups that cannot influence Japan’s international policies because they are neither independent nor large in term of numbers of full-time staff or budget. ³¹ Similarly, Pharr argues that most civil society organizations in Japan, with the exception of several large foundations, can be characterized by the “four smalls”: small membership, small number of professional staff, small budget, and small area of operation. ³²

Because these organizations operate within small geographical areas, Japanese civil society has limited influence over policies related to historical and postwar issues involving Korea. According to research by Yutaka Tsujinaka and Hiroki Mori, 46 percent of civil society organizations are active at city, town, and village levels, and 77 percent are active only within one prefecture. ³³ Kim claims that Japanese civil society is also limited by market forces and the government in its work “to improve the quality of private living.” ³⁴ Its area of activity is confined to small regional issues rather than major political issues.

The government is largely responsible for this situation: it has imposed restrictive regulations and provided comparatively limited financial flows. The regulatory framework has had two effects: independent civil society groups have found it difficult to become large, and large groups have found it difficult to remain independent. ³⁵ Hence, with the exception of some groups that work closely with the state, such as social welfare organizations, civil society organizations have few opportunities to participate in policymaking at the national level. ³⁶ According to Pharr, the state prefers to grant unilateral concessions to localized social groups, effectively isolating them from each other. As a result, a centralized authoritarian bureaucracy that caters to elites has been established to draw up policies. Upham argues that the government tends to channel disputes brought to courts by civil society organizations toward bureaucratic mediation, where it is better able to control the pace, process, and substance of policy change. ³⁷

According to Aldrich, even when strong opposition arises, state authorities rarely back away from their goals. ³⁸ Pharr argues that state authorities seek to contain protest by marginalizing protesters and keeping them outside the policymaking process while making pre-emptive concessions to prevent future protests. ³⁹ In Japanese society, bureaucrats remain relatively powerful in policymaking while professional civil society remains weak. But in spite of the fact that the Japanese government has neglected, discouraged, and even disapproved of the legitimacy of demands and policy proposals brought forward by the many civil society organizations, policy activism has by no means disappeared. ⁴⁰ Indeed, recognition of the role of civil society in Japan is growing. The difficulties of these organizations in gaining legal status and official recognition clearly indicate the government bureaucracy’s entrenched conviction that it is the sole and ultimate authority in all matters of public life. The government does not treat civil society organizations in a way that reflects their contribution to society. ⁴¹ Instead, it continues to emphasize the efficiency of the bureaucracy and its own authority.

Some researchers analyze the limited influence of Japanese civil society groups in terms of Japanese culture. Japan is commonly known as a society that values wa, or harmony, and in Western scholarship on Japan this is called the “harmony model.” These researchers conclude that it is fundamentally impossible for civil society organizations to prosper in Japan on the grounds that Japanese culture is collectivist while civil societies are founded on individual identity. Nakane describes Japanese society as vertical, so an individual’s loyalty to their group is more important than horizontal connections between individuals. What is more, groups ask for undivided loyalty from their members, so a pluralistic society like the United States, in which individuals can be associated with more than one society, cannot be established in Japan. ⁴²

Nevertheless, Japanese civil society organizations may be able to wield more influence now than they did decades ago. Because of an encouraging international environment, civil society groups have the potential to forge closer links with political parties and to exert more influence over public policy. Signs of a weakening state-centric tendency and a stronger pluralistic mood have started to emerge. However, this does not mean that these organizations are influential compared to civil society organizations in other states. In fact, Japanese civil society organizations themselves seem to agree that they wield little influence in comparative perspective. ⁴³ Although scholars differ slightly in their arguments, they agree that Japan is structured in a way that permits government to intervene relatively easily. The Japanese government does not suppress its people but rather manages them. The structural relationship between Japanese civil society organizations and the government—especially regarding foreign policy, including postwar issues—ensures that civil society will have limited influence despite its active movements. Based on this theoretical framework, the next section discusses the distance between civil society and government by using two case studies: former sex slaves and joint history textbooks.

The gap between Japanese civil society and government on postwar issues

Former sex slaves

The most sensitive issue between South Korea and Japan today is that of the former wartime sex slaves, also known as “comfort women.” Japanese civil society organizations have striven to compensate them, most notably through two non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Centre and Violence against Women in War–Network Japan (VAWW). The resource centre was established in 1995 as an extension of the Asian Women’s Association. It has tried to establish connections and exchange information with other NGOs and feminist activists. The centre focuses on six areas of concern: (1) women’s movements in Asia, (2) women’s human rights, (3) women in development, (4) women and the environment, (5) violence against women in war and armed conflict situations, and (6) women’s international cooperation. It has also been involved in the campaign on the issue of wartime comfort women. ⁴⁴ It supports the survivors of Japan’s military sexual slavery by demanding that the Japanese government take legal responsibility.

The VAWW was formed from the “International Conference on Violence against Women in War and Armed Conflict Situations” held in Tokyo in 1997. At this conference, more than 40 international participants gathered from 20 countries. The VAWW has launched campaigns, lobbying the Japanese government and international communities. In 2000, it held a tribunal, the “Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery,” to examine concrete cases of violence committed by Japan against women during the period of the Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945). ⁴⁵

Another notable project is the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM), in the heart of Tokyo. The WAM, which was opened in August 2005 by a civic activist, is Japan’s first peace museum with a collection on wartime sexual abuse. The collection includes reports on sex-slave victims around Asia, data on the Japanese emperor and military, and exhibits related to civil suits filed by former sex slaves of different nationalities. There is also a room where visitors can view the video testimonials of victims and listen to their voice recordings, including the voice of a Japanese solider who admits his own abusive acts, as well as a photograph of an actual comfort station. Recently, the WAM held a special exhibition for middle school students to help Japan’s younger generation develop a “correct” view of history.

Moreover, on 14 December 2011, which marked the 1,000th Wednesday Protest (some of the surviving comfort women in Korea protest in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul against the inadequacy of Japan’s response every Wednesday), a quilt made of 1,000 fabric patches sent from different parts of Japan—from Hokkaido to Okinawa—was delivered to the protest scene. The quilt captured the hopes of those Japanese who wanted the sex-slave issue resolved. More than 260 civic groups surrounded the embassy on that day to protest the Japanese government’s response.

The United Church of Christ’s (UCC) fundraising activities to help former sex slaves is another indication of the Japanese public’s willingness to acknowledge the violence and efforts at the societal level. This group had donated $230,000 over the course of 17 years, up to June 2013. When Japanese society shifted right, however, so did the Japanese church, and the UCC group faced difficulties in raising funds at the church level and had to switch to activities at the parish level. Nevertheless, persistent efforts by the church’s special committee and civic groups have made it possible to continue fundraising over the long term.

Despite such efforts, the sex slaves issue remains the most difficult and sensitive. The Japanese government tried to resolve the issue through the “Asia Women’s Fund” (AWF). However, the AWF provoked a backlash in both Japan and South Korea. In an essay published in Mainichi Shimbun on 1 February 1990, feminist historian Yuko Suzuki bluntly defined Japan’s comfort system as a “state crime.” Suzuki, who played a leading role in speaking out against the AWF for the lack of government involvement, argued that if Japan wanted to live as a “moral nation,” it would have to make a belated atonement for forcing women into sexual slavery, but that the AWF provided compensation using private rather than government funds. ⁴⁶ Japanese and South Korean civil societies called the AWF an act of arrogance because it meant that civilians had apologized on behalf of the state, thereby obscuring who should really be held responsible.

The fund also failed to seek the victims’ forgiveness. The surviving victims should have been both the agents and the subjects of compensation and they should have been the adjudicators of the fund’s success. Unfortunately, the former sex slaves were not given the chance to participate in devising the fund or taking part in its operations. Moreover, despite their ongoing efforts, the voices of Japanese civil society organizations are not reflected in the government’s decisions. Instead, the central body is trying to resolve the issue by formulating compensation policies most convenient for the government.

Not only did civil society fail to influence public policy but it also fell short of inducing politicians to change their perspectives. Their efforts have been overshadowed by right-wing political forces and occasional remarks made by conservative politicians. For example, Osaka mayor Toru Hashimoto described the system by which women were forced to become prostitutes for troops in the Second World War as “necessary.” He told reporters at a weekly press conference that “anyone would understand” the role of “sex slaves” when soldiers were risking their lives and you wanted to give them some “rest.” ⁴⁷ He claimed there was no proof that the women had been forcibly recruited by the Japanese military. When the South Korean media highlights comments made by right-leaning Japanese politicians, South Koreans regard these as voices that represent Japan’s majority. Moreover, on 4 November 2012, a number of Japanese public figures ran an advertisement in an American newspaper denying that the Japanese military had coerced the comfort women into sexual slavery, contrary to the official stance of Japan at the time. Among the politicians who backed this ad was Shinzo Abe, who was getting ready to make a comeback as premier. ⁴⁸

The collaboration between some politicians and conservative groups has become a major force behind the denial of Japan’s responsibility in the sex slaves issue. For example, Katsuto Momii, the chairman of NHK, defended the comfort women system in his first public news conference, and seemed to blame some of the victims. “The issue of comfort women is bad by today’s morals, but this was a fact of those times. Korea’s statements that Japan is the only nation that forced this are puzzling. Since all are resolved by the Japan-Korea treaty. It’s strange.” Shinzo Abe appointed Momii, a former businessman with no prior experience in broadcasting. Although Momii has denied that Abe directly influenced the appointment, there are reports that the prime minister favoured him for the role. ⁴⁹ Momii’s controversial political views angered neighbouring countries.

Another iconic example of cooperation between politicians and conservative groups is that between Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukurukai (Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, hereafter the Tsukurukai) and the Young Diet Members Group for Japan’s Future and Historical Education (HEG).

Many activists and scholars claim that politicians have created a Tsukurukai-friendly environment and carried out political actions that are likely to undermine confidence-building with neighbours. ⁵⁰ The Tsukurukai emerged in the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, Japan had experienced the shock of the Gulf War, which revealed the limits of the country’s capability to contribute internationally due to lack of manpower; a political upheaval, the so-called “collapse of the 1955 system” in 1993; and the Murayama Speech apologizing for Japan’s wartime deeds. But what sparked the Tsukurukai’s formation was the description of comfort women in a middle school history textbook approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education (MOE) in June 1996. ⁵¹ The Tsukurukai announced their organization in December 1996, and officially launched it in January 1997. They aimed to start a far-reaching nationalist movement to revise views of Japan’s history and ultimately to publish a history textbook. With the strong support of a newly emerged LDP-led coalition, the Tsukurukai engaged in public outreach programs, publishing many books and holding symposia/conferences in order to promote conservative perspectives that emphasized positive views of Japan’s history and national pride. ⁵²

The HEG, it has been claimed, is closely connected with the Tsukurukai and has empowered the movement by taking relevant actions and creating an atmosphere for the acceptance and adoption of Tsukurukai’s textbook across Japan. This is attested by Abe’s comment: “Through eight study meetings… debating pros and cons and assessing documents, evidence supporting the fact of [comfort women] coercively recruited by the government… was not found. I think that history education for elementary school students should help make them feel proud of their own culture, history, hometown, and country. Thus I have decided to do my best with the conviction that history education should not be something that teaches fabricated and skewed narratives to children to whom Japan’s future is entrusted.” ⁵³

Furthermore, there are signs that the official statements of previous Japanese prime ministers are under scrutiny for future revision. In 2007, a group of 120 LDP members sought to water down the Kono Statement, a 1993 statement acknowledging and apologizing for Japan’s “administrative/military personnel directly taking part in the recruitment of comfort women.” It is recognized as Japan’s first official acknowledgement of enforced sexual slavery during the war. ⁵⁴ Nariaki Nakayama, former education minister and leader of the LDP group, said, “Some say it is useful to compare the brothels to college cafeterias run by private companies who recruit their own staff, procure food stuffs, and set prices.” ⁵⁵ The same year, LDP minister Shinzo Abe denied that the Imperial Japanese military had recruited the comfort women. Abe backed down only after a stern warning from the US ambassador. Former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro also denied that such comfort women were forcibly recruited. Nakayama declared his pride that the LDP had succeeded in getting references to “wartime sex slaves” removed from most authorized history textbooks used in junior high schools, adding, “It might be said that the occupation was something they could take pride in, given that their existence soothed the distraught feelings of men in the battlefield and provided a certain respite and order.” ⁵⁶

Recently, Japan’s top government spokesperson, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, suggested that Japan’s apology for systematically exploiting former comfort women could be re-examined. His statement in parliament that “It is necessary to have additional academic investigations by historians and experts” on the validity of the 1993 Kono Statement has given a boost to Japan’s nationalists, who insist that the Imperial military never took part in forcing women into sexual slavery. ⁵⁷ And in July 2014, the Abe administration announced the results of its own review of the landmark statement, concluding that its contents were written upon consultation with the South Korean government and implying that the Kono Statement was a result of diplomatic negotiation. This review has set Korea–Japan relations back by 20 years and jeopardized the efforts of Japanese civil society organizations.

History textbooks

Whenever Japan has tried to revise its history textbooks, South Korea, China, and Southeast Asian countries have raised objections. To resolve such controversies, Japan and South Korea began holding “Dialogues on History” in the early 1980s. Historians sought to tackle the problem through cross-border exchanges and cooperation. In 1982 and 1984, the Society for Comparative Study on History and History Education conducted the first “East Asia History Education Symposium.” History researchers from Hitotsubashi University and Seoul National University began the Japanese–Korean History Joint Research Project in 1998, and in 2001, the Japanese–Korean Cultural Foundation held a conference called “Japanese–Korean Historians.” In October 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Kim Dae-jung agreed to establish the Japanese–Korean Joint History Research Committee, which commenced activities the following year, when tensions had been heightened over junior high school history textbooks developed under the initiative of the right-leaning Tsukurukai group.

At the same time, civil society exchanges between Japan and South Korea, outside of formal academic exchanges, have played an important but restricted role in preparing teaching materials used in both countries. What started as the Japanese–Korean Joint History Textbook Study Group in 1991 led to joint research projects between Japan’s Society for History Education Research and South Korea’s Society for History Textbook Research. This resulted in two joint collaborations: The History of Japanese–Korean Exchanges: From Prehistoric Times to the Modern Day (2007), produced by Japan’s Society for History Education Research and South Korea’s Society for History Textbook Research 2007, and History Opens the Future: The Modern and Contemporary History of Three East Asian Countries (2005), produced by Japan’s Society for History Education Research and South Korea’s Society for History Textbook Research.

Other organizations also published Korea–Japan teaching materials. In 2005, the Hiroshima Teachers’ Union in Japan and the Daegu Branch of the National Teachers’ Union in South Korea authored The Japanese–Korean Common History Teaching Materials: Korean Missions to Japan. In the same year, the Japanese–Korean Women Joint History Teaching Materials Compilation Committee published Japanese–Korean Modern and Contemporary History from the Viewpoint of Gender. In the following year, Japan’s History Educators’ Association and Korea’s National Association of History Teachers wrote The History of Japan and Korea Facing Each Other: Pre-Modern Times.

Further supplementary materials on Korean history are in the works, written for Japanese youth by noted historians in South Korea who have participated in bilateral dialogues on history. In addition, some South Korean and Japanese teachers in elementary through senior high schools have exchanged lesson plans. In projects established by the Japanese–Korean Society for Educational Practice and the Japanese–Korean Joint Research Society for Lesson Study, schoolteachers from both countries have introduced each other’s lesson plans, implemented them in their own schools, and developed further teaching methods. ⁵⁸

After the draft version of the new Tsukurukai history textbook became publicly available in 2000, widespread protests took place in Japan. Many Japanese historians and history teachers expressed their misgivings about the text’s chauvinism and fundamental inaccuracy. ⁵⁹ A Japanese civil society organization, the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, criticized the textbook as inappropriate for teaching material. In addition, the Historical Science Society of Japan (Rekishigaku Kenkyukai) released a booklet that highlighted distortions of historical fact and dozens of mistakes that had been overlooked in the MOE’s screening of the volume. ⁶⁰

The activists, including about 500 members from Japanese civil society organizations such as the Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, staged a symbolic event to create a “human chain” by surrounding the MOE building. At the protest, they accused the MOE of approving the new history textbook despite it being contrary to the Neighbouring Country Clause, the 1995 statement of Prime Minister Murayama, and the 1998 South Korea–Japan Joint Declaration. ⁶¹ In August 2001, the Asia-Pacific Higher Education Network (APHEN) held a fundraising campaign to purchase ads in Japanese newspapers to prevent the adoption of the new history textbook.

While materials are being published at the civil level, these activities do not have much influence or impact on either government or society in the two countries. In Japan, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is part of the government, with the power to approve or censor textbooks, a form of control widely regarded as “improper.” ⁶² Each public and private school selects one history textbook from a list of seven or eight authorized by the MEXT every four years. This screening process lasts one year. Japanese textbook companies submit manuscripts to the MEXT, whose committees examine them according to a prescribed set of criteria. The ministry offers the textbook companies opportunities to revise their drafts, and copies of the ministry-approved manuscripts are then available for consideration by the local districts. For a history textbook to be used in the Japanese national school curriculum, the textbook must either be approved by the MEXT or be published under its copyright. ⁶³

The use of approved textbooks is compulsory in elementary, middle, and high schools. Teachers may supplement these with materials that they prepare themselves or that are commercially available, but basically, they are expected to follow the order and content of the prescribed textbook in their teaching. Japan’s history textbooks have been appraised as being relatively restrained in their presentation of political and ideological propaganda in comparison with those of other East Asian countries. In this respect, the constraints imposed by the official Courses of Study curriculum guidelines are an important influence on the structure of the historical image portrayed in the texts. ⁶⁴

The History of Japanese–Korean Exchanges: From Prehistoric Times to the Modern Day was published on 1 March 2007, in both countries and in Korean and Japanese, but it is used only in schools or by teachers who have chosen the book voluntarily. It is not an official text provided by either government nor has it found much of an audience through bookstore sales. Furthermore, supplementary teaching materials are rarely used in classes under the present system in Japan. Thus, while there are many examples of exchanges between civil society organizations in South Korea and Japan, their efforts have not been reflected in government policies and systems. It is hard for them to reach a wider audience, and even if they are heard, they are unlikely to be regarded as important sources of information. This may also be related to ideology. Some argue that the MEXT is being influenced by nationalistic or right-wing organizations while the Japanese historians who have participated in civil society dialogues have inclined to lean left in their orientation. As a consequence, they have tended to be highly skeptical of government interventions in history education and have remained critical of government-backed actions.

Conclusion

It is crucial that civil groups gain a hearing, and in order to do so, they need to cooperate closely with each other and combine their voices. ⁶⁵

In a similar way, the countries of South Korea and Japan stand to benefit more from cooperation than discord. Economically, each is the other’s third-largest trading partner, and cooperation is of the utmost importance for national security because of a shared threat from an unstable and unpredictable North Korea. What is more, a close, binding relationship between Seoul and Tokyo will be important for their respective national interests in light of Sino-American relations. Thus, the deterioration in ties over the past few years is of concern for the stability of the region.

This article has identified Japanese civil society’s limited influence over Japan’s public policies as the reason for the deterioration in bilateral governmental and societal ties. Previous studies on South Korea and Japan’s relations concentrated on actions at the governmental level and saw the two governments as the primary agents. Changes in administration, especially transitions in leadership, were seen as the main determinant. Although this premise is applicable in interpreting bilateral relations under a specific president or during a certain period, it may not answer all the questions about the deteriorating relationship.

This study regards civil society as a key player and considers the impact of the structural relationship between Japan’s civil society and Japan’s government on the dynamics of Korea–Japan relations. The study is important in two respects: first, it steps away from a government-focused approach and conducts a structural analysis of the relationship between Japan’s civil society and government, and second, unlike other studies that focus on domestic policies, it evaluates the role of Japanese civil society organizations in foreign policies related to postwar issues.

Although Japanese society today is seen as right-leaning, it is necessary to remember that there are still various influential groups around. Domestically, there is an intense power struggle regarding how to move the country forward in the twenty-first century. A civic group called Kyokasho Net 21 (Textbook Network 21) ⁶⁶ carried out activities to prevent the Tsukurukai history textbooks from being used in schools, and this led to an extremely low adoption rate of the Tsukurukai edition. ⁶⁷ In addition, some civic groups have worked hard to resolve the issue regarding forced labour during the Second World War. The Truth Commission Network for Forced Labor was formed in 2005 to conduct fact-finding research on Korean victims who were coerced into labour. It consists of Japanese civic groups and researchers who are opposed to the conservative direction in which Japan is moving and who work toward achieving reconciliation with South Korea.

Even though such progressive voices exist in civil society, conservative groups have a stronger influence. There are several reasons for this. First, there is the difference in the groups’ sizes and methods of operation. While conservative groups operate in large, centralized groups, their progressive counterparts tend to work in the networks of independent organizations. Working in networks may bring greater autonomy but does not provide great efficiency or influence. A second difference concerns the range of issues covered by each group. While right-wing groups cover an extensive range of national issues, such as history textbooks, territorial disputes, and amendment of the constitution, left-wing groups focus on single issues. Third, conservatives manage relationships with politicians, businesses, academia, the media, and religious groups in order to widen their influence and position with each interest group. However, progressives spend most of their resources on like-minded intellectuals. Considering the lack of influence that the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party have in the Japanese political landscape, progressive groups’ solidarity with political circles does not provide much substantive help.

Unfortunately, structural factors, such as the Japanese government’s control over civil society and civil society’s restricted influence over government, cannot change in a short period. Friendly bilateral ties are desperately needed, and waiting idly by for changes in both governments is not an ideal option. A transnational civil society that involves solidarity between civil society organizations in both countries could be an alternative that would give meaning to Japanese civil society’s past efforts. In this context, a transnational civil society refers to self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest. ⁶⁸ This could affect Japan’s foreign policies on postwar issues in two ways. First, it could garner more support for Japanese civil society organizations from the international community. Japanese civil society organizations are not in a position to play a key advocacy role in Japanese foreign policies at this stage, but their voices could be heard if backed by support from the international community. Second, it could help publicize the issues internationally. Currently, the activities of Japanese civil society organizations are reported selectively by the Korean media, which does not deliver enough information about Japanese civil society’s efforts. Some of the information delivered is even biased. However, with a rise in international solidarity between civil societies, South Koreans will gain access to more information and come to appreciate the Japanese civil society’s previously less exposed endeavours. Today’s bilateral tensions are partly derived from selective reporting by the local media and misunderstanding caused by lack of information.

This study evaluates the structural limits of Japanese civil society and the reasons for its restricted influence over Japan’s foreign policies toward South Korea at a time of worsening tensions between the two neighbours. However, it still falls short of analysis beyond the structural setbacks of a single country’s policy decision-making process and its relations with its civil society. South Korea’s civil society clearly has a part to play in bilateral ties, but this study has concentrated on Japan. Future research highlighting the role of South Korea’s civil society and analyzing interactions between the civil societies of South Korea and Japan could help to deepen understanding of the complexity of Korea–Japan relations.