Dollars and sense? The Harper government,economic diplomacy,and Canadian foreign policy

Conservatives as sound economic managers

Whether via tax cuts, fiscal austerity, or the ubiquitous “Canada’s Economic Action Plan,” the Harper government sought to brand itself as a strong steward of Canada’s economy. The result was that global trade was a constant theme in the prime minister’s discussions of the economy. As he boasted to party faithful at the Calgary Stampede in July 2014, “under our Government, we have trade expanding, employment growing, our finances solid, Canada never stronger in the global economy.” Harper himself admitted to being surprised by the international dimension to Canada’s economic health. In an interview just after his majority win in 2011, he revealed that since becoming prime minister, “the thing that’s probably struck me the most in terms of my previous expectations—I don’t even know what my expectations were—is not just how important foreign affairs/foreign relations is, but in fact that it’s become almost everything.” In this regard, he noted that “we have a strong economy, but we really have a stronger Canadian economy within a world economy.” In May 2013, Harper confided to the Council on Foreign Relations that “what keeps me up at night” was the global economy, because for Canada, “the real significant risks are all external.” Canada, he underlined two months later, is “a land of hope in a sea of uncertainty.” ⁷ Portraying the prime minister as having a steady hand on the tiller in these rough waters became a central element in Conservative politicking.

In addition to both electoral considerations and concerns over global economic instability, a particular brand of neoliberalism drove the Conservative government’s international economic policies. ⁸ Speaking in Davos in January 2012, Harper scolded many of his counterparts in the West, lamenting, likely more to an audience back home than to the one before him, “As I look around the world, as I look particularly at developed countries, I ask whether the creation of economic growth, and therefore jobs, really is the number-one policy priority everywhere.” Rather than growth, he saw Western leaders focused on expanding entitlements and government services. The result was that

notwithstanding Canada’s many advantages, we remain very concerned about the continuing instability of the global economy, of which we are a part. The problems afflicting Europe, and for that matter the United States, are not only challenging today but, in my judgment, threaten to be even greater problems in the future.

Promoting austerity was one element of Conservative foreign economic policy. Another aspect was trade, which the Tories invested with considerable importance, touting trade and investment as a major element of Canada’s Economic Action Plan, the government’s economic blueprint. As Minister Fast explained in 2013, the Conservative government had rejected calls for a Keynesian boost to the economy; instead, it was pursuing “the oldest stimulus of them all: nations trading with nations.” ¹⁰ A mixture of domestic politics and austerity motivated the Conservatives’ trade-first agenda.

A fair trade? Global trade relations

Prime Minister Harper’s commitment to portraying himself as a sound fiscal manager via the rhetorical logic of austerity and other neoliberal impulses underlined his prioritization of trade liberalization and the overall emphasis on trade policy as foreign policy. Yet the focus of Harper’s trade policy evolved as a direct counterpoint to the previous Liberal government. The multilateralism and internationalism once associated with Canadian foreign policy were replaced by bilateral agreements ¹¹ that offered more fanfare than substance, even though multilateral trade initiatives are essential for that perennial Canadian interest of maintaining global order.

Prime Minister Harper and his team were “oriented towards bilateral deals with little commercial importance and no systemic significance,” ¹² signing more bilateral trade agreements than any previous Canadian government. After 2006, Canada concluded bilateral agreements with nine countries and entered into negotiations with six more, along with additional regional trade agreements. Much has been written about Prime Minister Harper’s deep distrust of multilateralism with explanations focused on a desire to distance the Conservative government from its Liberal predecessors, and the electoral gains that come from engaging diaspora communities. ¹³ This commitment to bilateralism, however, skewed Canada’s international priorities away from the political officers in Canada’s missions to the trade commissioners. The government consistently opened new trade offices, even as it closed and consolidated embassies and foreign service offices. In Africa, for instance, Canada shuttered five diplomatic missions since 2006 while it opened trade offices, including the first Export Development Canada (EDC) office on the continent. The EDC office opened in South Africa in 2015, following a USD$450 million EDC loan to South Africa’s rail operator to finance a massive Bombardier Transportation purchase.

Harper’s search for bilateral agreements began early on, with a focus on Latin America. Visiting Chile in 2007, he affirmed that his government “had made clear that re-engagement in its hemisphere is a critical international priority.” ¹⁴ Harper’s immediate predecessors had signed free trade agreements with Chile (1997) and Costa Rica (2002), as well as the NAFTA agreement with the US and Mexico. These previous agreements provided the building blocks for Harper’s successful trade negotiations with Peru (2009), Colombia (2011), Panama (2013), and Honduras (2014). Trade talks are also ongoing with El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, the Caribbean Community, and MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) as well as Turkey, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The trade agenda did not stop with Latin America: Harper updated Canada’s free trade agreement with Israel and concluded additional agreements with Jordan (2012), with Ukraine (2015), and with the European Free Trade Association (2009). In 2013, Ottawa concluded an agreement in principle with the European Union: the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Access to a market consisting of half a billion European customers is a definite prize and would go far toward meeting the aspirations of successive Canadian prime ministers who have seen Europe as the paramount economic counterweight. Harper was right to boast, then, that CETA “is a historic win for Canada.” While some sectors of the Canadian economy stand to lose—notably dairy farmers—CETA offers much promise. Detractors have pointed out, as has former prime minister Brian Mulroney, that “This one is significant, but it’s not in the same league” as NAFTA. Indeed, in 2013 trade among the three NAFTA partners reached CAN$1.1 trillion, compared with CAN$90 billion in trade between Canada and the EU. ¹⁵ Criticism on this score is misplaced, for the agreement is geared toward raising that CAN$90 billion level.

The conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) seems set to overshadow two more agreements, the 2014 agreement with South Korea and a nascent agreement with Japan. It is uncertain what Canada will be willing to give up as it moves toward ratifying the agreement under a new government. Abandoning agricultural subsidies—a sticking point in the trade negotiations—was a test of the Harper government’s commitment to its trade agenda. The prime minister voiced a commitment to protect supply management despite the demands of TPP brokers—a policy that appeals to rural Canadians, a Conservative voting bloc—but also underlined that participation in the TPP is “essential” for Canada. ¹⁶ Overall, support for the TPP deal is grounded in recognition of the long-term trend toward rising Asian economic power and the diminution of the place of the United States in the global economy. On the eve of a 2012 trip to Asia, then foreign minister John Baird gushed that “Strong trade winds are swirling across the Asia-Pacific region, and Canada, as a Pacific nation, will be a major player in these exciting times.” ¹⁷ Shifting Canada’s sails to benefit from these winds was a major focus for a Canadian government bent on expanding trade and investment.

Scratching the surface: The extractive resource sector

The Conservative government’s economic diplomacy—and the effect it had on other international portfolios—is exemplified by the prominence that extractive resources played in the government’s approach to international affairs. From official development assistance (ODA) to Canada’s relationship with China, Canada’s dominance in the extractive sector dramatically influenced the ways in which Ottawa projected itself internationally. This government trusted that the invisible hand of the market could and would ensure necessary outcomes. In an op-ed in the Huffington Post, then minister of international cooperation Julian Fantino wrote under the headline “Canada’s foreign aid is getting results” that his government engaged private mining companies “so that local populations can benefit from private sector-led economic growth in their countries.” ¹⁸ The extractive resource sector became firmly entrenched in Canada’s international agenda, and was a key facet of Conservative economic diplomacy.

Linking Canadian aid to a trade agenda was not a new proposition. What was new was the government’s unqualified trust in the private sector, and specifically the extractive resource sector, as a deliverer or purveyor of Canadian aid. As Brown outlines, beginning with the Chrétien government, the practice of tied aid declined; however, under Prime Minister Harper, ODA was recalibrated “towards the interests of private Canadian companies, particularly the extractive resource sector.” ¹⁹ The shift was framed as enlightened self-interest and as the rational application of market forces to aid.

In 2011, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) announced that it would partner with select mining companies in three specific projects. This integration continued, and in November 2012, the Conservative-dominated House Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development released a report, Driving Inclusive Growth: The Role of the Private Sector in International Development, which received the executive’s seal of approval, with the following praise: “the Government wholeheartedly agrees with the committee’s conclusion that ‘private companies can contribute to long-term poverty reduction’” and “the Government of Canada will examine ways to leverage private sector resources.” ²⁰ Subsequently, Fantino baldly equated development outlays with “investments,” noting, “This is Canadian money … And Canadians are entitled to derive a benefit. And at the very same time … we’re helping elevate these countries out of poverty.” ²¹

In Reviewing CIDA’s Bilateral Engagement, a policy document produced in March 2013, less than two weeks before it announced CIDA’s elimination as a stand-alone agency, the government emphasized that Canadian commercial interests would be a key consideration in determining how much aid a developing country would receive. While the government promised that Canada’s development work would retain CIDA’s poverty-alleviation mandate—a requirement under legislation passed in 2008—a majority of the three dozen countries included in the foreign aid report were promoted as destinations for Canadian aid in part because of the commercial benefits they offered to Canada. ²² For the Conservatives, the emphasis here reflected a limited conception of the benefits of ODA as well as profound faith in the power of the private sector. As Christian Paradis, Fantino’s successor as international development minister, put it: “By stimulating the economy in these countries and helping them create an environment conducive to investment, we are contributing to the well-being of people living in poverty.” ²³ Emphasis was placed on sending ODA to areas where Canadian mining companies are working. “We know,” Paradis told the 2014 World Economic Forum Conference on Extractives and Sustainable Development, “that a responsibly managed extractive sector has the potential to transform countries” and had “the potential to lift millions of people out of poverty.” ²⁴ Whether such funding will turn development recipients into trading partners while reducing poverty remains to be seen, but international development is hardly the raison d’être of Canadian resource extraction companies. ²⁵

These initiatives offer fairly obvious benefits to the mining companies involved, including the positive publicity of appearing to be good corporate citizens and engendering social licence in recipient countries; they may also serve to muzzle NGOs partnered with them or that may want to partner with them. ²⁶ Many of the government’s platitudes regarding the reliability of mining companies rang false, particularly as the United Nations chided Canada for failing to monitor the activities of mining companies working abroad. ²⁷ Indeed, recent years have seen a growing number of complaints levied against Canadian companies and their overseas subsidiaries, including a lawsuit initiated against HudBay Mineral Inc. in an Ontario court by a Guatemalan woman claiming that she and other women from her village were gang-raped and evicted from their properties by men working for the Canadian company. ²⁸ As for the aid and development partnership between the federal government and resource firms, in early 2015, 55 projects fell under the “extractives and sustainable development” portfolio, worth CAN$310 million. Paradis stated that he expected the government to expand the scope of these partnerships. ²⁹

The market also dictated Canada’s turn to China in 2009, as the Conservative government realized that China was hungry for extractive resources amid a mining “supercycle,” among other commercial opportunities. Just as Canada’s adherence to the TPP deal will necessitate the trade-off of abandoning strict adherence to supply management, in pursuing trade with China the Harper government had to abandon its vocal, though ineffectual, promotion of human rights. In effect, then, the Conservative government’s China policy was a bellwether of the trade-first agenda. Early in Harper’s tenure, with the Canadian economy humming happily along within the bounds of a North American setting, the Conservative government repeatedly snubbed Beijing, leading to a pronounced rift in the bilateral relationship.

Ottawa might have continued to neglect China had it not been for the 2008 global financial crisis. Underlining Canadian reliance on the US market, a major result of the huge recession was the Conservative government’s recognition that the rights-first China policy was damaging to Canadian interests. Moreover, the Harper government faced mounting domestic criticism over its approach, especially from Chinese-Canadian citizens. ³⁰ Thus, 2009 saw a change in the approach to Beijing: Harper finally visited China, with President Hu visiting Canada the following year. The rhetoric about China softened, too. Friendship was underscored that same year, when Chinese energy and resource companies invested CAN$14 billion in Canada, an unprecedented level to that point. In 2011, the massive sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation opened its first foreign office in Toronto, a move designed, in part, to facilitate extractive resource exports to China. ³¹ The positive trend continued in 2012, with Ottawa and Beijing agreeing to a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, the capstone to Harper’s four-day trade promotion tour to China that February. At the end of the year, one that saw an additional CAN$27 billion in Chinese direct investment in Canada, Ottawa gave the green light to a controversial CAN$15 billion takeover of Calgary-based Nexen by the China National Offshore Oil Company.

Although Harper once touted values, not the “almighty dollar,” as the central issue in Canada’s China policy, ultimately the Conservatives opted to expand economic ties with China, downgrading the emphasis on values as a result. Utter silence was more or less the Canadian government’s response to pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in 2014. Harper’s hopes rested on China as a market for natural resources and as a source of investment in the energy sector, particularly given the problems with the United States over oil pipelines.

But pipelines pose just as much of a problem for Canada–China relations as they do for Canada–US relations, with environmental concerns, provincial politics, and Indigenous lands presenting significant roadblocks for the development of infrastructure to allow oil and natural gas to flow to the Pacific. The Conservative government also expanded other, less controversial revenue streams, chasing after Chinese tourist dollars and enticing Chinese students to spend time and money studying in Canada. With so much at stake with China as a market and as a source of investment, the quieter tones that had characterized this bilateral relationship reflected a realistic assessment of Canadian economic interests. With Canadian policy toward China, the focus was on trade—and, somewhat, on human rights—with little emphasis given to strategic issues, such as the ramifications of the US “pivot” to the Pacific and the region’s changing military balance. ³²

Uncle Sam and Uncle Buck: Canada–US relations

To what extent these efforts at trade diversification and bilateral agreements will lead to economic benefits for Canadians remains to be seen. So far, the record has not been encouraging. In 2004, exports to the United States constituted 84 percent of total Canadian exports; in 2013 the figure was down to 76 percent. Whether these figures represent a slumping US economy, now on the rebound, indicate a shift in Canadian trade away from the United States, or are the result of shifting American demand for Canadian goods is unclear. Even so, trade with the United States remains important not only in its own right but because, since 2009, Canada has run a trade deficit with the rest of the world. ³³ Access to diverse markets, especially Europe and the Asia-Pacific, could arrest this deficit, but, at present, the trade agenda has led to little export growth. Given the pull of geography and the integration of the Canadian and US economies, the results of the trade-first agenda will be incremental. Harper was realistic about what could be achieved, admitting to the Wall Street Journal in 2011 that

we don’t want to see a diminishing of trade with the United States. It will always be—look, we’re under no illusion—even with our best-case scenario of diversification, Canada’s most important trading partner will always be the United States, by far. ³⁴

As it had been for their Liberal predecessors, keeping the Canada–US border open was a major policy goal for the Conservatives. Upon taking office in 2006, Harper inherited the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) process, which aimed to ensure that the North American Free Trade Agreement could continue to function in the post-9/11 world. The SPP fizzled, and in 2008 Harper warned of problems with the Americans along, first, the “environment–energy axis,” involving efforts to curb climate change, which were hampering Canadian exports of oil and gas, and, second, the “trade–security axis,” where there was “an increasing thickening of the border for security reasons or justified by security criteria, sometimes, not always, disguising protectionist sentiment that we think is very worrisome.” ³⁵ Harper’s response was a two-fold investment of time and effort in pursuing expanded trade with the United States (especially in energy)—or at least maintaining the status quo—and seeking out new markets and sources of investment in an effort to diversify trade. Unfortunately, the single-mindedness with which the Harper government approached its relationship with the US left Harper’s successor with a relationship that was far from warm.

In terms of access to the US market, issues along the “trade–security axis” have been one area of discontent. Canadian lobbying in Washington has proven ineffective at blunting “Buy America” provisions in congressional stimulus legislation and in a number of squabbles including the now aborted plan to reconstruct the ferry terminal in Prince Rupert, British Columbia. ³⁶ On a more positive note, Harper was able to secure White House agreement to a “Beyond the Border” initiative. Easing travel and trade, harmonizing entry regulations to the continent, and integrating cross-border law enforcement and joint border operations, the program offers the promise of easier travel and trade. Although elements of the initiative have been put into effect, Beyond the Border has stalled. Together with the disappointing results of lobbying against “Buy American” provisions, the sluggish progress on the Beyond the Border program showcases the difficulties that Canada has had in maintaining the all-important access to the US market. Yet, the Canadian government has been understandably and justifiably insistent on ensuring this access. Hence, Harper’s willingness to see Ottawa assume the full cost of building a new bridge and associated infrastructure at the Detroit–Windsor crossing. ³⁷

The Canada–US relationship toward the end of Harper’s premiership was described as being stuck in a “rotten period of stasis.” ³⁸ These frustrations came on the back of Canada’s unwavering push for the Keystone XL pipeline from Alberta to Texas, which President Barack Obama refused to approve. This issue, a reflection of problems that emerge along the “environment–energy axis,” led to cross-border sniping and introduced considerable chill into bilateral relations. As one analyst noted, that “Obama has occasionally let domestic considerations take precedence over diplomacy, even in the case of a friendly ally like Canada, is regrettable perhaps but also to be expected.” Government ministers pressed the issue in Washington, while Prime Minister Harper publicly called approval of the pipeline a “no brainer”—but to no avail. The Harper government indicated its displeasure in 2014 by largely ignoring the new US ambassador to Canada, a demonstration of how actions can speak louder than words. ³⁹ Ottawa also postponed the February 2015 Three Amigos summit until after that year’s federal election, apparently concerned that the frosty Canada–US relationship (along with cool Canada–Mexico relations) would not play well with voters.

Attempts at trade diversification are as old as the country itself; Canada’s reliance on the US market is unlikely to dramatically shift any time soon. Harper’s refusal to expand the relationship beyond the confines of economic diplomacy to develop meaningful ties in areas of climate change, the border, and other regional governance challenges damaged the relationship. The results of the 2015 general election in Canada and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s quick establishment of a good rapport with President Obama may have ameliorated the situation, though the president did kill Keystone, which—myopically—had come to be seen as the bellwether of the bilateral relationship during the Harper era.

The results of dollar diplomacy

The state of the Canada–US relationship reflects what was lost in dollar diplomacy. The scope of the relationship became limited to an economic calculus. While there are obvious political and electoral connotations, this calculus circumscribed broader objectives that demonstrate that meaningful international engagement requires an approach encompassing an array of policy areas. Dramatic changes to Canada’s public diplomacy, strategic and security agendas, and global cooperation initiatives reflected the primacy of both the message to the Canadian electorate and the Harper government’s very specific liberalization agenda. Beyond the Canada–US relationship, Canada’s engagement with its friends and adversaries was reduced to a very narrow calculation. In the final section of this paper, we review the fallout of 10 years of economic diplomacy beyond the North American continent.

We focus, first, on public diplomacy, and specifically cultural diplomacy, or the expression of Canadian arts and culture abroad. Arts and cultural programs, such as the Canada Council for the Arts, were among the first on the chopping block when the Conservatives tabled their 2006 budget. More pointedly, programs to promote Canadian art and artists internationally, including the PromArt and Trade Routes programs, were cancelled completely in 2009. Canadian cultural centres and libraries were shuttered and cultural personnel in missions were reduced or cut altogether, including at the high commission in London.

The Conservatives’ 2012 decision to eliminate the Understanding Canada program, which funded Canadian studies programs in 39 countries, underlined the government’s limited notion of Canada’s global presence. The cancellation of this initiative meant that dozens of Canadian studies programs outside Canada lost their funding. ⁴⁰ In addition, the Conservative government was accused of meddling in academic exchange programs such as the Foundation for Canadian Studies in the UK. ⁴¹ Although the connections and relationships made through public diplomacy initiatives such as arts, cultural, and academic programming enhance the quality and quantity of Canada’s international ties, ⁴² cultural diplomacy was out, sacrificed to commercial engagement.

When considering more conventional strategic issues, the trade-first agenda also precluded considerations about Canada’s non-economic presence in the world. Cuba, where Canadian firms maintain significant investments, especially in mining, provides a further example. When the Tories took power, there was a discernible hardening in Canada’s stance toward Havana. In 2008, Peter Kent, Canada’s secretary of state for Latin America and Africa, caused a stir with his denunciation of Cuba as “a dictatorship, any way you package it.” Yet soon after, Ottawa’s stance softened. In contrast to Kent’s comments, in January 2012 Diane Ablonczy, who took over his ministerial portfolio, promised not to “take a lecturing approach” with her Cuban counterparts on human rights. “There’s a lot of debate around these things,” she continued, “and there’s a lot of caution too. But Canada, as an investor in Cuba, with lots of people-to-people contact, wants to play as positive and constructive role as possible.” Travelling to the island in 2013, John Baird, too, adopted a quieter stance. ⁴³ Moreover, despite the rhetorical emphasis on values, the Harper government concluded a CAN$15 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia—a triumph for Canadian manufacturing, but a blow to rights promotion in the repressive kingdom. ⁴⁴ Contrast the treatment of Saudi Arabia, Cuba, and China with the Tories’ handling of Iran and Russia. The latter, targets of strident rhetoric and sanctions, lack much in the way of economic importance for Canada, except as rivals in the energy sector. Nonetheless, despite sanctions—and fiery rhetoric—Canada still maintains healthy trade levels with Russia, selling over CAN$1.2 billion in goods in 2014, with a positive trade balance of CAN$500 million; a smaller, but similarly favourable trade balance exists in Canadian–Iranian trade, despite the shuttering of embassies and loud harangues. ⁴⁵ As with China, with trade as Ottawa’s foremost concern, bombastic rhetoric became a whisper. Tough talk was not followed by action.

On security issues, under Harper Canada took part in Western operations in Libya, in Syria, and in Eastern Europe. This “six-pack strategy”—with the deployment, in each case, of six CF-18 fighter aircraft, plus supporting aircraft—served the important function of ensuring Canadian solidarity with our NATO partners. ⁴⁶ These commitments have hardly been major expenditures, but, instead, have reflected the limitations placed on the military’s budget. Indeed, while CF-18s were deployed in 2014 to deter Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank, the prime minister rejected an alliance request to boost overall defence spending. “The bottom line is this,” he explained.

As a Conservative government we have the same philosophy on defence budgeting that we do on any other budgeting, which is we do not go out and just specify a dollar figure and then figure out how to spend it … We go out and figure out what it is we need to do, and then we attempt to get a budget as frugally as possible to achieve those objectives. ⁴⁷

The same fiscal principles that drove this limitation of Canada’s ability to project military power also obstructed the prime minister’s efforts to control development in the Arctic. With construction beginning on the High Arctic Research Station at Cambridge Bay, and with the development of the all-season road to Tuktoyaktuk and of a functioning fishing harbour in Pangnirtung, Harper was no doubt correct in 2014 when noting that “no government has paid more attention and actually delivered more in the North than this government.” But, as he admitted, there had been delays, principally with shipbuilding. ⁵⁰ Along with the long-delayed construction of a deep-water port, the prime minister’s worthy effort to improve Canada’s limited capabilities in the region have been scaled back: from three ice-breakers to one along with six to eight offshore patrol ships; the construction of these vessels has been hampered by budget shortfalls and Canada’s disastrous military procurement process. Although Harper had emphasized protecting the north—“because Russia is also Canada’s Arctic neighbour, we must not be complacent here at home” he warned in 2014—spending to meet this aim has succumbed to the prioritization of the budget. ⁵¹ If Arctic policy, so personally important to the prime minister, has suffered, it is no wonder that environmental policy, an area traditionally scorned by the Conservatives, saw little action.

That the Conservative government placed economic interests at the forefront of its environmental policy in addition to its foreign policy is not that surprising given Conservative distaste for the UN and multilateral agreements as well as concern over the economic impact of arresting greenhouse gases—and perhaps disbelief that climate change exists. The annual awarding to Canada of “fossil” awards by climate activists is a testament to Canadian inaction on this file, just as the Tories neglect of the issue reflected their dislike of policies that could hamper economic growth. Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the tweaking of environmentalists’ noses—“some of those awards are worn with honour” boasted Environment Minister Peter Kent in 2013—sits well with the Conservative base, and is certainly popular with Canadian business. ⁵² More broadly, Environment Canada bore some of the deepest austerity cuts. Of course, in practice the Conservatives’ pursuit of a “made in Canada” climate policy prioritizing economic growth differed little from the policies pursued by their predecessors, who were equally inactive in tackling greenhouse gas emissions. ⁵³

Beyond the signature trade-first agenda, economic diplomacy also involved an effort to reduce and focus foreign aid, in addition to the linkages developed between the extractive resource sector and aid. Addressing the UN General Assembly in 2010, Harper stated that “Our preference is to take meaningful action. Action that produces real results.” Four years later, he informed the same body that, in his view,

freedom, prosperity and peace form a virtuous circle … the growth of trade between nations and the delivery of effective development assistance to ordinary people—simple, practical aid—these are the things that have become the signatures of our Government’s outreach in the world.

Across Africa, where Harper’s two Liberal predecessors specifically targeted Canadian aid dollars and political initiatives, five diplomatic missions have been closed, leaving only 15 Canadian diplomatic missions assigned to 54 African countries. Instead of political engagement, Ottawa prioritized trade and investment. In 2013, John Baird travelled to Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania, all countries where Canadian companies are eager to do business. In Kenya, while stating an admirable desire to help protect sexual minorities, he placed heavy emphasis on the economic benefits of his trip. “Our government is focused on creating jobs, growth and long-term prosperity,” and “increasing trade ties will benefit both countries.” Striking a similar chord in Ghana, Baird raised Ottawa’s intent to conclude a trade and investment pact that would “help bolster investment confidence to make the most of the abundant opportunities that exist here, contributing to job creation and economic growth in both countries.” ⁵⁶ Given the closing of diplomatic posts, it is evident that trade and investment were geared to be the extent of Canada’s presence in Africa. Prosperity, growth, and jobs certainly matter, but foreign policy is about more than a myopic focus on trade, just as Canada has interests in Africa that extend to security and development.

The focus on trade was limiting, and Canada already has limited means to effect change abroad. Perhaps the emphasis on economic diplomacy and the downgrading of political engagement reflected the prime minister’s own sense of what, realistically, could be achieved. Harper had mused about a post-American world and raised the necessity of Canadian action. As he noted,

the ability of our most important allies, and most importantly the United States, to single-handedly shape outcomes and protect our interests, has been diminishing, and so I’m saying we have to be prepared to contribute more, and that is what this government’s been doing.”

Conclusion

In his November 2013 speech announcing the move toward “economic diplomacy,” Ed Fast declared that “A robust trade environment is the legacy we leave our children. It is as much a part of the Canadian essence as our national game of hockey.” ⁵⁸ The Conservatives were not hesitant either in promoting trade or in surrounding themselves with patriotic symbols. Hockey and trade served as examples of the Harper government’s approach to policymaking, the former representative of the nationalism evident in efforts to rebrand Canada along Conservative lines, the latter reflecting the values that drove Canadian foreign policy from the Conservatives’ 2011 election win to their demise in 2015. Of these two prongs, economic considerations took precedence, trumping even military spending and control over the Canadian Arctic, both signal issues for the prime minister.

Under Harper, Canada’s engagement with the world came to prioritize economics. This focus had its roots in the prime minister’s efforts to establish the Tories as sound managers of the Canadian economy, especially in advance of the federal election campaign in autumn 2015. But Harper was not focused only on narrow political considerations. Rather, presciently, he recognized wide trends, especially the shift in economic power away from the West. His aim, then, a commendable one, was to position Canada in a “post-American world.” In light of the relative decline of the United States and the rise of other economic powers, Harper underscored the need to expand Canada’s trading horizons and establish a diverse trade portfolio. Even so, cognizant of the pull of geography, he also sought to strengthen economic ties with the United States by cutting at the thickening border and pushing the development of energy pipelines. This process was a frustrating one. Hence, his fervent pursuit of other markets, especially China, where a trade-first agenda trumped considerations of human rights, a trend apparent more widely with regard to Canada’s trade promotion efforts.

Certainly on trade issues, successive Canadian governments have had to weigh other concerns against economic growth—witness the current Liberal government’s twisting stance on the sale of CAN$15 billion worth of materiel to Saudi Arabia. Yet, while Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government has indicated that there will be continuity with the Conservatives on certain issues—the Saudi arms deal and the TPP most notably—the Liberals have also highlighted a range of foreign policy goals to belie their predecessors’ narrow focus on dollars and cents. While there is good reason to doubt a strategy of platitudes and star power, a foreign policy must be driven by more than domestic economic and electoral calculations.

Certainly, many of the criticisms presented here could be levelled against previous Liberal governments, such as Chrétien’s Team Canada brand and his finance minister Paul Martin’s dramatic campaign of debt reduction. Yet the Liberals also undertook a variety of diplomatic initiatives—admittedly derided by some as “pinchpenny diplomacy”—and thus for all of the Liberal rhetoric about “exporting Canada abroad,” a review of the Harper government’s years illuminates the juxtaposition between Liberal and Conservative approaches to foreign policy. To conclude, an emphasis on trade was but one element of the Tories’ prioritization of economic considerations, the effects of which were clear across a range of other policy areas, including defence policy, climate policy, and the disbursement of aid. Trade and sound budgets are important, but the costs of this approach were apparent in the diminution of Canada’s global role.