Abstract
Since 2001, Canada has participated in multilateral security operations in Afghanistan and Libya, and as part of the anti-ISIS coalition. Canada’s contributions have been the sum of eleven distinct time-delimited missions ranging from six months to four years. Until now, this variation in strategic duration has drawn little scholarly attention. This paper investigates the logic underpinning Canada’s variable mission commitments. We find that the actions of specific allies, as well as the NATO alliance as a whole, can account for the particular duration of Canadian military commitments. External pressure, combined with Canada’s internationalist orientation, reputational concerns, and the relative weakness of Canada’s Parliament, contributes to a cycle of engagement and re-engagement whereby extrication is perceived to come with high costs in reputation. This creates a dilemma for Canadian governments: participate in multilateral operations and be seen as a good ally, but cede control over strategic duration to forces beyond your control; or, don’t participate and risk that standing.
Since 2001 Canada has engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Libya and, as part of the anti-ISIS coalition, in Iraq and Syria. Although each conflict leaves the impression of a singular military effort, as is implied on the National War Memorial that reads “Afghanistan 2001–2014,” the reality is more complex. Each engagement has been stitched together by a series of time-delimited missions, extensions and renewals varying in length from three months to four years. This paper explains variation in “strategic duration”—the time horizons that Canadian governments set for military missions—and its implications for multilateral security operations. Fundamentally, strategic duration is a limitation placed on a state’s use of force not as a matter of what to contribute, but rather for how long. Here, we investigate the sources and implications of Canada’s strategic duration to illuminate a problem for Canadian policymakers: its foreign policy internationalism and need to be perceived as a good ally leaves Canada particularly vulnerable to external pressures when participating in coalition warfare. Canada is thus caught in a dilemma: participate and be seen as a good ally, but yield control over strategic duration to exogenous forces; or don’t participate and risk your good standing.
Canada’s military missions since 2001.
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force; PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team.
What explains variation? Sartre’s dictum that “hell is other people” is instructive, but with a twist. For Canada, hell is other people’s schedules: the strategic duration of most of Canada’s limited-term commitments was set to time frames determined outside Ottawa. We find that the most significant influences on Canada’s strategic duration are its international commitments to NATO and to key allies, whose influence Parliament is unable to offset. Throughout the Afghanistan and Libya wars, mission commitments were contingent on relationships with specific allies within a coalition. Over time, however, pegging strategic durations to external forces was replaced with a more endogenous pragmatism. As Canada joined the anti-ISIS coalition, the influence of other states in setting the strategic duration of Canada’s military commitment diminished, a point that will be discussed at length.
To account for variation in Canada’s strategic durations, we look for explanations in domestic and international sources. First, we address cooperative security operations at the international level to identify the influence of multinational security arrangements—such as NATO or coalitions of the willing—which give Canada an opportunity to secure its so-called “seat at the table.” Second, we look at bilateral relationships between Canada and its specific partners—not only the US but also other key partners, especially the British and Dutch. Third, at the domestic level of analysis, we look at factors that include electoral considerations and public opinion, and elite consensus. Fourth, we analyze the Canadian Forces (CAF) itself to assess whether operational cycles or logistical considerations influence the strategic duration of Canadian commitments.
Strategic duration and Canadian foreign policy
Analyzing strategic duration fills a gap in the existing scholarship on alliance politics and Canadian foreign policy. For the most part, specific time-delimited missions are mentioned in passing but not systematically addressed in the literature on Canada’s post-2001 military commitments. 1 In the much broader literature on alliance politics, time-delimited commitments of secondary states in multinational military operations have been almost completely overlooked. Instead, analysis of alliance politics has focused on themes of alliance creation, durability, reliability, and cohesion. 2 More recently, however, scholarship on intra-alliance and coalition behaviour has sought to explain the behaviour of secondary states in multinational military efforts, focusing on the variation in contribution levels among NATO allies in US-led wars since 2001. 3 Broadly speaking, scholars note important variation in levels of commitment to security operations (e.g. resource allocation and troop contributions), as well as the risks they are prepared to assume as part of a coalition (e.g. national caveats, burden-sharing). However, in spite of these important contributions, time-delimited contributions have been ignored in alliance literature and we think scholars in this field should take note.
We consider the strategic duration of military operations to be worthy of deeper operational and political analysis. Operationally, the initial decision on duration sets the time frame in which resources are committed and force is used. Military and policy planners set their objectives within a given period of time handed to them by civilian leaders. Nearly every member of US-led coalitions—including Canada—has grappled with the question of what military resources to commit and how long they can be committed. This kind of military commitment has significant operational and political implications for both the contributing state and the coalition as a whole. In operational terms, time limitations mean that military objectives must be met within an externally imposed set of conditions. This necessarily has an effect on the pace of resource consumption and personnel rotations. Furthermore, strategic duration sets the decision-making structure for a national contingent by establishing short- or long-term planning horizons. As Afghanistan demonstrated, misalignment in this regard has serious implications for alliance cohesion and mission coherence. 4 For Canada, limited military capabilities mean that the Canadian Forces can be deployed overseas only for limited periods of time, even when fighting alongside larger partners. Extended commitments push the CAF to its limits and require periods of inactivity for regeneration.
Politically, a government’s choice of strategic duration is a highly consequential decision and signals to its partners its degree of commitment to a multilateral mission. Alongside level of participation and level of risk, the strongest political endorsement of a mission would be one that has a high level of military participation, few caveats, and is long term. But even the most enthusiastic, risk-tolerant coalition partner cannot commit resources indefinitely and hard decisions about time must be made. For willing coalition members, particularly those with limited capabilities, strategic duration matters greatly as a dimension of military participation alongside national caveats and level of commitment. 5 Time limits may be even more consequential for less enthusiastic coalition partners. They can be used to manoeuvre within an alliance, as a show of solidarity, as insurance against deeper commitment, and, ultimately, as an exit strategy. The weakest political commitment would be a low level of participation with low risks, and would be short term. Of course, the duration selected by a single state is not as simple as this. Operational and political calculations will yield differing degrees of commitments along these three considerations.
How strategic duration is set is yet another political consideration. It may be the product of endogenous decision-making in a single state, reflecting domestic political negotiation, public sentiment, and military capability. But it is likely that this is not the whole story. In complex multinational security operations, strategic duration is also influenced by external pressures which, for Canada, emerge from key nodal points of its long-standing internationalism: the NATO alliance, specific allies, and other international obligations or linkages. Furthermore, strategic duration is a lens through which we can observe inter-alliance connections that bear upon domestic decision-making processes. It illuminates the interaction of domestic and international factors that influence a given state’s policy toward multinational warfare. As NATO’s conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan have demonstrated, this is hardly a trifling matter.
For Canada, analyzing strategic duration reveals a dilemma, one that emerges from its own internationalist foreign policy, shaped as it is by its commitments to the continental and transatlantic hubs of international society. 6 Canada’s close proximity to the US makes it sensitive to the dynamics of American security concerns. Similarly, Canada’s post-Second World War commitments to internationalism bind it tightly to European partners and international institutions. Thus, being an effective ally to the US and NATO partners has been a driver of its military commitments since at least the Second World War, as have concerns about reputation within the North Atlantic community, which often impel participation in multilateral operations. 7 In short, getting in and out of wars is a political move fraught with risk for any Canadian government. Once Canada is engaged in a multilateral operation, time horizons are often determined by external forces that undermine national autonomy. Withdrawing from an operation while allies soldier on runs contrary to Canada’s interest in maintaining good standing amongst its allies. Thus, in coalition warfare, Canada is constantly at risk of either yielding authority over strategic duration or compromising its reputation.
The role of Parliament and political parties
Strategic duration and Canada’s susceptibility to external pressures also illustrate the potential weaknesses of Parliament and of opposition parties in foreign policymaking. This weakness is attributable to both the formal institutional configuration of Parliament itself and the contingent preferences of opposition parties. These factors serve to constrain Parliament’s oversight capacities such that considerable authority accrues to the executive to set foreign policy, which, in turn, is highly susceptible to external influences.
Formally, Parliament is afforded comparatively few institutional and legal mechanisms that can mitigate the influence of external actors. For instance, it has relatively weak oversight capacity to hold the executive to account in decisions regarding the use of force, limited, for example, to questioning ministers and House of Commons debates. This does not preclude parliamentary consultation on matters of troop deployment, but the practice has been inconsistent. Historically, prime ministers have dealt with troop deployments by completely bypassing Parliament, holding limited debates or, more recently, full debates and votes in the House prior to establishing formal commitments. However, debates and votes are often held after the government has made its decision, or so close to the deadline that any parliamentary decision would have little influence on the decision. 8 There are additional limitations on the influence of members of Parliament in foreign policy decision-making. MPs have no greater access to information about missions, duration, and costs than the general public. MPs are not provided with top-secret security clearance. Standard practice has been for select parliamentary committees to disseminate declassified information to parliamentarians. 9
Decisions regarding the duration of the mission, the mission’s mandate, and operational issues are the purview of the executive, not of Parliament. 10 Ultimately, Parliament has no formal authorization role on matters of troop deployments, mandate, and mission duration. Of course, there is always the withdrawal of confidence in the government. Motions of no-confidence remain a parliamentary veto on the executive and can thus be considered a strong check on the executive; but the withdrawal of confidence is a measure of last resort for opposition parties because of the associated consequences—namely, the dissolution of Parliament and contesting a general election. The events that take a parliament to that point are highly contingent and can limit significantly the opposition’s willingness to go to those extreme ends.
Since 2006 a trend has developed toward securing Parliament’s approval for combat missions. This practice suggests a high degree of parliamentary influence, especially under minority governments. Indeed, during the Conservative minority years (2006–2011), opposition parties exerted considerable pressure on the government through parliamentary committees, and this was especially acute during the Afghan detainee scandal. 11 Parliament, therefore, can and does exert some degree of influence on certain characteristics of a mission during politically salient moments. However, this was not the case when it came to the strategic duration of renewed missions, which were decisively influenced by exogenous forces.
Between 2006 and 2015, Prime Minister Harper put seven combat missions to a vote in Parliament, and the House of Commons never rejected the government motion. During the Conservative minority years, Parliament’s decision to pass the motions was attributable to opposition parties that were neutralized either through their own weakness or through elite consensus on fundamental matters. This placed the government in an unusually strong political position. Indeed, the absence of strong opposition on the domestic front during the minority years is one factor contributing to Canada’s apparent vulnerability to external influences on its decisions on mission duration. This is particularly true of the Liberal Party, which served as the official opposition in 2006. Having been very badly affected by scandal, the Liberals suffered a major defeat in the 2006 election and were, for a time, effectively leaderless. The Liberal Party was in no position to challenge the government on a mission extension and, in any event, was not about to vote against the mission in Kandahar that it had authorized less than one year earlier. In 2008, the question of mission extensions had been depoliticized by the Manley Report and this resulted in a consensus among the governing Conservatives and opposition Liberals that effectively removed Afghanistan as an issue in any forthcoming election. During the Conservative majority years (2011–2015), the command enjoyed by the government coupled with strict party discipline enabled the government to put the issue of troop commitments to Parliament without fear of losing a vote. Weak opposition parties in the minority years and the Conservative majorities after 2011 strengthened the executive’s hand vis-à-vis Parliament.
This particular institutional configuration of Parliament, the contingent nature and strength of opposition parties, and Canada’s internationalist commitments, create a set of conditions whereby pressure from key allies and alliances can exert a powerful influence on the qualities of Canadian foreign policy. The combined force of internationalism and external pressure contributes to a cycle of engagement and then re-engagement, whereby extrication is perceived to come with high reputation costs; hence policymakers’ lingering concern with fulfilling Canada’s international responsibilities in order to continue being seen as a reliable ally. 12 Once the country is engaged in a multilateral security operation, Canada’s domestic institutional constraints are relatively powerless to act as a brake on this cycle. In terms of strategic duration, Parliament has little influence relative to external pressures emanating from Canada’s key allies. The post-2001 period offers a striking example of these influences on Canada’s foreign and defence policy.
Afghanistan
Canada’s war in Afghanistan was a complex episode and the story has yet to be fully revealed. The relatively short missions at the beginning—six- to 12-month commitments between 2001 and 2004—were superseded by much longer commitments measured in years. During the 13 years in Afghanistan, Canada made six major limited-term mission commitments the durations of which grew longer with each renewal. The earliest and shortest, a six-month commitment made in 2001, was bounded exclusively by logistical constraints. However, as Canada deepened its engagement, the strategic duration of deployments became increasingly determined at international and dyadic levels. Indeed, Canada’s “early in, early out” preference slowly became mired in NATO’s well-intentioned but indeterminate “in together, out together” mentality.
2001: The initial commitment—6 months
Thirteen years in Afghanistan began with a straightforward six-month commitment. On 6 November 2001, Minister of Defence Art Eggleton announced that Canadian ground troops would be sent to Afghanistan; six days later he specified that it would be for a maximum of six months. The exact nature of the initial mission was then to be determined, but there was a pressing security imperative to support the US, coupled with broad public and elite support for some form of action. 13 After an awkward rejection by the European-led International Security Assistance Force, Canada joined the United States on anti-Taliban and anti-al Qaeda missions in Kandahar in February 2002. 14
The six-month commitment was set by logistical constraints faced by the Canadian Forces. In 2001 the CAF and, in particular, the land forces, had been depleted in the decade since the end of the Cold War. They had been operating almost continuously in peacekeeping and stabilization missions, especially in the Balkans. 15 Moreover, budget cuts and attrition had diminished the operational capacity of the forces, such that by 2001 the CAF was underprepared for what was to come—Canadian soldiers were deployed to a desert theatre in woodland camouflage, to cite one colourful example. 16 In February 2002, when the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry was dispatched to Kandahar, the land forces were already stretched thin. Heavily committed to NATO’s stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they simply could not sustain much more than a six-month deployment in Kandahar. 17 When the government asked if the CAF could operate beyond its initial deadline, Chief of Defence Staff Ray Henault suggested it would only be possible with a six-month operational pause after May 2002. 18 His assessment may have disappointed politicians eager to demonstrate continuity in their show of support for US and European allies, but nonetheless the decision, was received positively in Ottawa. 19 There was a convenient political expediency to this: the Liberal government wanted to demonstrate Canada’s commitment to US security, but did not want to overcommit; hence the “early in, early out” sentiment—a sentiment held not just by the Canadians, because the Americans were also hoping for a quick exit. 20 When the mission was completed in May 2002, few could be faulted for hoping things would remain that way.
2003: The Kabul rotation—12 months
Between fall 2003 and fall 2004, Canadian troops were deployed to a stabilization mission in Kabul. A return of Canadian troops to Afghanistan was highly likely sometime in 2003 or 2004 after the operational pause. There was general consensus among elites about resuming the Afghanistan mission while public support among Canadians remained above 60 percent. 21 Logistical considerations, such as “when” and “where” were established in a crucial two-month period in January–February 2003. 22 On 5 February Defence Minister John McCallum announced that Canada would commit to a leadership role in the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF). Five days later, on 10 February, McCallum announced to the House of Commons that Canada would commit to a year in Kabul. Explanations of Canada’s return to Afghanistan in 2003 shed light on why Canada committed 1950 troops for a 12-month rotation.
The year-long mission can be explained by dynamics at the international level of analysis, beginning with the adoption of the ISAF mission by NATO in 2003. Because this was a NATO operation, the presumption was that the ample resources of the alliance would be drawn into the project. In theory, this provided a greater opportunity for burden sharing and delivered a built-in exit strategy for individual nations. 23 These new considerations enabled Canadian policymakers to think about strategic durations that were longer than the initial six-month contribution in 2002. In addition, the US promise to leave 10,000 troops and military equipment in place reassured Canada that material support was available if needed.
NATO–ISAF’s leadership rotation schedules also helped to fashion Canada’s 12-month commitment in 2003. When it was first deployed in 2001, ISAF operated under the lead of individual countries on a six-month rotating basis. This pattern continued under NATO command and probably helped Canada establish its 12-month commitment by pegging it to ISAF’s six-month leadership rotation schedule. This could only have been an assumption until 6 May when NATO secretary general George Robertson requested that Canada assume leadership of ISAF. 24 Germany took the first six-month NATO–ISAF leadership command, which was tacked on to the existing six months that began in February. This was followed by Canada, under the command of General Rick Hillier, in February 2004. A further consideration that confined the new deployment to 12 months was logistical restrictions. Simultaneous operations in Afghanistan beginning in August 2003 and its leadership of Multi-National Division South-West in Bosnia in October 2003 almost certainly stretched Canada’s capabilities. Committing beyond 12 months was probably unrealistic. Thus, the 12-month strategic duration for the 2003–2004 ISAF mission was pegged to logistical and alliance considerations.
2005: The return to Kandahar—9 to 12 months (combat) and 18 months (PRT)
The decision to deploy combat troops to Kandahar in 2006 is perhaps the most consequential decision of the entire Afghanistan campaign. Reduced to a minority government, the Liberals under Prime Minister Paul Martin conceived of the Kandahar mission as an undertaking of one year. The reasons why Canada redeployed to Kandahar remain contested. What is certain, however, is that the deployment to Kandahar in Regional Command–South (RC–S) was never intended to be a five-year endeavour. What, then, accounts for the initial year-long combat commitment to Kandahar? A presumption of continuity is probably the case.
The return to Kandahar was announced on 16 May 2005 by Minister of Defence Bill Graham with the plan to deploy an army task force of 700 CAF soldiers and a brigade headquarters of 300 personnel for a nine- to 12-month period. He also announced that Canada would deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Kandahar city for an 18-month period. 25 Pressed by opposition critics during the take note debate of 16 November, Graham was asked about the duration of Canada’s commitment and hinted strongly at the reason for this duration. His response reflected an assumption that another NATO partner would relieve Canada at the appropriate time. 26 This suggests that the governing Liberals presumed that NATO–ISAF would treat Kandahar as it had treated Kabul; countries would rotate through on a predictable schedule until the end of Hamid Karzai’s term, which would serve as a natural milestone for assessing progress.
2006: The first Kandahar extension—2 years
One month after Stephen Harper’s Conservatives were elected to form a minority government in January 2006, Canadian infantry began combat operations in Kandahar province. By May of that same year, the government made its first major foreign policy move, extending the mission to February 2009, two years beyond the original 2007 end date. The Conservative motion passed by 149 to 145 votes, splitting the opposition Liberals whose dissenting members objected on procedural grounds that the debate was insufficient. In reality, though, the Liberal opposition was not about to vote against a mission it authorized less than a year earlier.
As a form of assurance, Harper promised NATO allies that he would extend the mission for one year in the event that the motion was defeated. To this point, it was the longest sustained commitment of Canadian forces to Afghanistan and certainly raised the political and military stakes for Canada. Stephen Harper’s own justifications in the Commons debate for the 2009 horizon were based on three considerations: Canada’s NATO commitments; time horizons established by British and Dutch allies; and the end of Hamid Karzai’s presidential term. 27 Together, these three political currents explain the two-year mission extension, which could be reasonably pegged to the end of Hamid Karzai’s first term as president. Although there appears to be no direct military logic, it was generally presumed that any political transition would be aided by the presence of NATO troops. Thus 2009 served as a natural reference point for assessing development in Afghanistan more generally. However, multilateral and bilateral relationships offer a more compelling argument for why a good ally such as Canada was prepared to make a two-year commitment.
At the international level, Canada’s dedication to the alliance was once again brought into play. Twenty-four hours before the House of Commons debate, Canada had been asked to consider taking over ISAF command in 2008—a development that Harper announced to the Commons on the day of the vote. 28 Canada would eventually lead RC–S beginning in February 2008. With the twelve-month commitment ending in February 2007, Canada would have to extend its commitment for 24 additional months in order to meet the leadership pledge. Minister of Defence Gordon O’Connor also tied the two-year extension to the timelines set out in the Afghanistan Compact. 29 Signed at the London Conference in February 2006, the Afghan Compact was a multilateral framework for rebuilding the country and set 2010 as the benchmark date for achieving its comprehensive development goals. Although the 2006 extension did not synchronize exactly Canada’s commitment with the compact, it did signal a broader commitment than did the 2007 expiration date.
Around this time, similar time horizons were emerging out of London and The Hague. Diplomatic and political negotiations between the British, Dutch, and Canadians had been ongoing prior to the original commitment to Kandahar in 2005. Here again the fates of the three countries were intertwined. In the 17 May debate, Harper noted that “both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, our two primary partners in southern Afghanistan, have recently renewed their commitments, two-year and three-year commitments respectively.” 30 This point was reaffirmed by Bill Graham for whom recommitment was “inextricably linked up with our partners.” 31 Canada’s partners in the south, the Dutch and British, were committed until 2008 and 2009 respectively. British forces were deployed to Helmand province until June 2009 as part of ISAF’s expansion to the south, and Britain had committed to a Provincial Reconstruction Team for a period of three years. 32 The Dutch, Canada’s other key partner in the south, committed to Kandahar after Canada did, although for a longer period of time. On 2 February 2006 the Dutch Second Chamber ratified the decision to deploy soldiers to Uruzgan beginning in August of that year with an end date set for 2008. 33 Given that Canada was to assume a one-year overall leadership term for RC–S in February 2008, extending the commitment to 2009 was a logical decision.
The government’s decision to extend the Kandahar mission beyond 2007 was a major development shaped by international commitments, NATO obligations, and dyadic relationships with Britain and the Netherlands. This mission extension had consequences for Canada’s ability to extricate itself from what, in the near future, would become a violent counter-insurgency. While Canada was committed to performing as a strong ally, NATO’s prevailing “in together, out together” orientation would challenge the unity of the alliance and the patience of its highest contributors. It would also induce the Conservative government to extend the Canadian commitment in Kandahar one more time.
2008: The second Kandahar extension—3 years
Almost two years later, on 14 March 2008, Canada’s Kandahar mission was extended again for three years, set to end in July 2011. Victory in the south did not appear imminent and the 2009 end date that was originally proposed proved increasingly untenable. The Taliban insurgency was not slowing; Canadian casualties were increasing while public approval was dropping; and many European NATO partners were not especially forthcoming with support for their peers in the south. 34 A motion to extend Canada’s commitment was passed 197 to 77 after extensive debate. The reasons for the extension hinged on international unity in the face of impending failure in Afghanistan, the reputational costs of a unilateral exit, the negative effects on life in Afghanistan should the Taliban re-emerge, and the sacrifices already made. 35
The origins of the 2011 deadline are somewhat opaque. In the extension debate there is little to no discussion about the significance of 2011 as an operational deadline. It seems as if MPs presumed that NATO would rotate into Kandahar when the time came and that the deadline set for 2011 emerged by default. 36 Indeed, as early as November 2007, the US was talking about an extension to 2011. The influential Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Manley Commission) report released in early 2008 recommended extending the Kandahar mission beyond 2009 but was silent on any specific operational end-dates. 37
It is likely that the Afghanistan Compact played a role in conditioning the 2011 default thinking. The first extension took Canada to February 2009, almost two years shy of the Compact’s benchmark dates. An extension to July 2011 would cover the difference and synchronize Canada’s combat presence with development funding pledges made in 2006. Canada would not be alone in this regard. A November 2007 Dutch diplomatic cable suggested that the Netherlands were pegging their extension to the expiration of the Afghanistan Compact. 38 This timeline is consistent with the Dutch mission renewal made in 2007, which came with a clear deadline of 1 August 2010. No further extension would be forthcoming because the Dutch government collapsed over disagreements about the possibility of a second extension. 39 For the Canadian government in 2008, ongoing commitments by the Dutch and British probably made an extension to 2011 more feasible.
The March 2008 extension occurred under much more dire circumstances in Afghanistan than the one made two years prior. Similar to the first Kandahar extension, the mission’s renewal was motivated by powerful internationalist impulses. The commitment to three years was, as in 2006, probably pegged to international and dyadic commitments, which would take Canada into its tenth year of war in Afghanistan.
2010: Post-Kandahar training mission—4 years
After June 2011, Canadian Forces trainers were to leave Kandahar and return to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif for what would become a four-year commitment. With the combat mission nearing its end, the Conservative government recommitted the CAF to NATO’s training mission in an advisory and training role to the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. Although Stephen Harper wanted to bring the Afghan file to a close, there was sufficient pressure from the NATO alliance as a whole as well as from specific allies to draw the CAF back in. Canada’s training mission arose out of the alliance’s need to validate a decade’s worth of efforts and to complete the transition of security to Afghan security forces.
In January 2010, months before the NATO Lisbon Summit, Stephen Harper was pressured by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to consider a training role once the combat mission expired. 40 Similarly, key allies were exerting direct and indirect pressure. The US troop surge in 2009 had made it clear that there was a renewed American commitment to Afghanistan and the US continued to press Canada at the G20 meetings in South Korea. 41 In London, in September 2010, the British House of Commons voted to continue the deployment into 2015, its first vote on the Afghanistan issue. 42 The Dutch, Canada’s partners in RC–S, ended their engagement in Afghanistan after the coalition government collapsed in February 2010. 43
By November 2010, key national commitments had been made. At Lisbon, NATO reaffirmed that the ISAF mission in Afghanistan remained a key priority and that a multinational training force would carry out the final leg of the transition. 44 In this sense there were strong international and dyadic reasons for returning to Afghanistan after 2011. At home, elite opinion concurred with the virtues of recommitment, which overrode diffident public opinion. 45 For Stephen Harper, committing to a post-2011 mission meant reversing a pledge to end Canada’s involvement even in the face of a deeply ambivalent national public opinion. Nevertheless, the extension to 2014 had fairly strong elite support. The Liberal Party, after all, had long advocated a training mission for Canada after 2011. As the mission’s end-date approached, both Conservatives and Liberals, although not the New Democratic Party or Bloc Québécois, supported the idea of an extension as a matter of credibility and show of commitment to NATO. 46
The four-year commitment, which would extend the mission into 2014, was driven primarily by timelines set at the international level. Section 4 of the Lisbon Summit Declaration identified 2014 as the target for full transition of security responsibility to Afghan security forces. Although the declaration was explicit in stating that the withdrawal of ISAF troops would not be pegged to the transition date, Stephen Harper made it clear before the Lisbon Declaration that 2014 was the end of the line for the CAF in Afghanistan, a point that was reinforced unequivocally two years later at NATO’s Chicago Summit. 47 In March 2014 Canada’s experience in Afghanistan came to an end.
A six-month pledge in 2001 became a 13-year commitment to Afghanistan, a duration that was most certainly unexpected, was determined by the imperatives of being a good ally in an irresolute alliance. During the first few years, Canada’s strategic duration was limited by logistical and operational considerations, in addition to traditional interests in being a good ally. Over time, the good ally impulse had greater influence on strategic duration. The Afghan case reveals the perils of Canada’s interest in playing a strong supporting role alongside the US and NATO, especially after the fateful return to Kandahar in 2006. Canada’s own limited-term commitments over the next eight years were increasingly determined by international and dyadic forces. In effect, Canada committed troops to counter-insurgency on the basis of timelines determined outside Ottawa.
Libya
In the early debate on the Libyan intervention, NDP foreign affairs critic Paul Dewar captured the ambiguous nature of the coming conflict, suggesting that the “timeline of three months was simply because we needed to have some sort of timeline… We need boundaries on this. We need to have [an] understanding that this will not going to go on forever” [sic]. 48 Dewar’s statement could just as well apply to any of the post-2001 mission extensions. The irony is that Canada’s limited-term commitments in Libya were the most straightforward of the cases explored here. Stephen Harper committed Canadian Forces in three instalments of approximately three months each because it accorded with NATO’s own planning intervals.
Canada’s participation in the 2011 Libya intervention came about after a rapid unfolding of events during the Arab Spring. Canada’s participation in the Libyan campaign was relatively uncontroversial and motivated by internationalist precepts; “compelled,” as Minister of Defence Peter MacKay said, “to intervene, both [as] a moral duty and by duty [to] NATO and the United Nations.” 49 Humanitarian intervention was an easy case to make. Prime Minister Harper announced justified intervention on these grounds, insisting that CAF–18s would participate in Operation Odyssey Dawn in an effort to end the violence on the ground. Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird justified the intervention as a way to buttress Arab Spring movements and counter any al Qaeda influence in North Africa. 50 It was little surprise that the motion to enforce UNSC 1973 was adopted unanimously by the House of Commons on 21 March. The Libyan intervention seemed to be an ideal case for operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect doctrine within the context of the Arab Spring’s popular uprisings.
The mission was also consistent with the cooperative security plank of NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit five months earlier. 51 On 14 April NATO foreign ministers announced the Berlin goals, which set NATO’s objectives as bringing an end to the violence. Canada’s own position was closer to that of Britain, France, and the US, who had embraced regime change. 52 In a sense, dyadic relationships with core NATO states influenced Canada’s objectives in Libya. Canada’s strategic duration is another matter.
The origins of the initial three-month commitment made on 21 March 2011 are not easy to discern, but are probably to be found in the general planning assumptions set forth by NATO and the UN Security Council. UNSC Resolution 1973 adopted on 17 March established a panel of experts with a 90-day window to provide an interim report on the efficacy of sanctions, an arms embargo, and the no-fly zone. The 90-day/three-month time frame also seemed to inform NATO’s thinking. On 24 March NATO agreed to enforce the no-fly zone mandated by UNSC 1973. The next day, one NATO official suggested that “Much of the planning assumptions were based on a three-month planning window, but should the [NATO commander] feel it’s necessary to extend it, then he would simply have to say… I am anticipating it may be more or less.” 53 Although there is no clear origin moment for Canada’s initial three-month commitment, it is likely that this time frame was the common assumption circulating in defence ministries and at NATO at the time.
The House of Commons’ second mandate (the mission’s first extension) is much clearer. Like the initial commitment, this first renewal followed the NATO lead. On 1 June, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen announced that the alliance and its partners had extended the mission for 90 days. 54 One week later, NATO defence ministers met in Brussels and agreed to endorse a three-month extension of the operation beginning at the end of the month. 55 On 14 June 2011, with the three-month mandate expiring, the House of Commons voted again on a motion to extend the mission. In the debate, Peter MacKay made passing mention of the NATO agreement; no other explanation of the three-month time frame was forthcoming. Most of the government’s attention was spent justifying the ongoing mission, which hinged on the consequences for Libya of withdrawal, the mission’s importance to Canadian values, and the “credibility of the Alliance.” 56 It seems other Western allies followed suit. After NATO’s announcement, Spain’s Parliament agreed to an indefinite extension and Sweden extended the deployment of its aircraft for another three months. Canada’s second extension was also determined by the NATO alliance. On 22 September NATO announced that the alliance would extend its commitment for yet another 90 days. 57 The next day, a motion was introduced in the House of Commons to extend Canada’s commitment for another three months and passed 189 to 98, without NDP support.
Neither public opinion nor electoral implications seemed to drive the government’s three-month time frames on Libya. The initial commitment in March 2011 was met with broad public support; 70 percent of Canadians supported the no-fly zone. 58 This overwhelming support would suggest that a longer-term commitment would be possible. Three months later, the initial momentum gained by rebels had been blunted and initial public enthusiasm for the mission had dampened considerably by June. 59 Nevertheless, Harper, now armed with a majority government after the May 2011 election, was able to secure the June and subsequent September extensions.
The capture of Muammar Gaddafi by rebel forces on 20 October gave NATO licence to end the intervention, which it did ten days later. It was fortuitous for the Canadian Forces that it did not have to face another three-month renewal cycle. As David Perry states, by September 2011 it was becoming difficult to sustain Canada’s military presence, with most Halifax class ships in maintenance and relying on improvised mission staffing in both the navy and air force. It is also possible that the air force would not have been able to sustain another three-month commitment had operations not concluded in October 2011. 60 What effect this may have had on a hypothetical extension in December 2011 is a matter of speculation.
Canada’s renewal schedule was not linked to those of single allies either. The chief contributors to the Libya intervention—Britain, France, and the US—operated according to their own domestic laws. Ostensibly, the US is governed by the War Powers Resolution, which requires congressional authorization of troop deployment within 60–90 days. The British House of Commons voted to approve the Libya mission but did not specify its duration. France requires the National Assembly to vote on any troop deployment after four months. 61
Canada’s participation in the Libya intervention was inspired by internationalist principles of humanitarianism and multilateralism. Its strategic duration, unfolding in three instalments, was determined almost solely by decisions made within NATO deliberations. Other possible explanations at the domestic or dyadic level of analysis do not have any observable influence on Canada’s three-month extensions.
Anti-ISIS coalition
Beginning in early 2014, ISIS swept across western Iraq and eastern Syria with unexpected speed and brutality. By the late summer its well-publicized atrocities had stirred sufficient animus to prompt the US to seek the group’s degradation and destruction. Beginning in September 2014, a coalition of Western and Arab states coordinated military efforts to degrade and destroy ISIS, which had come to control large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. For its part, Canada deployed special operations forces for a period of thirty days beginning on 5 September. 62 On 7 October, the House of Commons passed a motion 157 to 134 committing bombing capabilities for a period of six months. On 30 March 2015 the mission was extended again for a 12-month period with 142 to 129 support in the House of Commons. It was widely acknowledged that neither commitment reflected time frames for degrading and destroying ISIS. 63 Once again the strategic duration was determined by non-operational factors. However, the Harper government’s time commitments to the anti-ISIS coalition do signal a break from patterns established in Afghanistan and Libya. The two major mission extensions since September 2014 appear to have eschewed pegging the mission’s strategic duration to international or dyadic ally considerations. Rather, the government showed an independent streak in setting time frames, thereby enabling Canada to reinforce its image as a reliable ally while minimizing the risks of mission creep.
The anti-ISIS coalition presents an analytical challenge in that it is a coalition of willing states, operating outside an established alliance framework, and therefore blurs distinctions between international and dyadic levels of analysis. As a multinational security endeavour, the internationalist character of the coalition presented an opportunity for Canada to maintain its good standing among key allies in a conflict that reflected the Conservative government’s Manichean world view. This helps explain why Canada joined but does not explain the initial six-month timeline. The 60-country anti-ISIS coalition itself does not provide any clues, nor does its most influential membership. As a group, it did not signal any preferred timelines in September–October 2014. In five meetings of coalition principals, prior to Canada’s second mission extension, there was no indication from coalition leadership that any operational time frame was forthcoming. Most of the focus was on fostering unity, setting common objectives, and pledging to meet at least every six months. 64 Essentially, the conflict remained open-ended and ambiguous.
Similarly, there are no obvious linkages with the timetables of other countries that joined the coalition. It is likely that Canada joined the coalition when it did after other key Western allies joined in short order. France committed on 18 September, the Dutch on 24 September, Britain and Denmark on 26 September, Australia on 3 October, and Canada on 6 October. The only countries applying clear timelines to their missions were the Netherlands for twelve months and Denmark for twelve months. 65 Canada’s six-month mission was staggered in relation to those countries that made time-delimited commitments. Logistically, it is plausible that Canada’s air capabilities could reliably have been deployed for six months only. However, if there were any technical limitations, they did not stop the government from extending the air mission for another year, or expanding the scope of CAF bombing runs into Syria, as it did in March 2015. It is possible to rule out international or dyadic considerations from Harper’s reasoning for six- and 12-month extensions.
There was, however, an electoral element to the extension made in March 2015. Extending the mission by twelve months leapfrogged the federal election scheduled for 19 October 2015. In effect, Harper depoliticized the ISIS mission, not by forging an elite consensus as the Manley Panel did regarding Afghanistan in 2008, but by eliminating the renewal of anti-ISIS commitment from immediate electoral contestation. A six-month commitment in March 2015 would come up for re-evaluation in the middle of the election campaign, which would be problematic for all parties involved. At the very least, the electoral dimension helps explain why in 2015 Harper did not renew the mission for a six-month period.
The explanation may lie in a newly discovered inward-looking pragmatism. In October 2014, Harper sought to show willing participation without ceding control over the mission’s strategic duration. Indeed, some form of commitment to the multilateral venture suited Canada’s traditional interests in being a good ally. As Thomas Juneau suggests, this is why Harper committed Canada for short periods of time. 66 But Harper can be forgiven for an abiding skepticism toward the premise that influence accrues to a coalition’s heavy burden bearers. The five-year Kandahar campaign demonstrated to Harper that Canada did not gain much influence with the US or NATO. 67 Moreover, the time frames that Canada set, especially after 2006, were linked to decisions made in international forums such as NATO or the London Conference. Harper’s prudence in retaining control over timelines reflects the hard-earned lessons of Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Libya. In 2014 and 2015, Harper did not want to commit the Canadian Forces in another open-ended cooperative security operation on a schedule pegged to decisions made outside Ottawa. Thus, the six- and 12-month commitments may well have been a strategic way of participating substantively while seeking to mitigate the influence of other people’s schedules. Like other multilateral security operations since 2001, Canada’s participation in the anti-ISIS coalition is motivated by security and internationalist interests. But unlike recent operations, Canada’s strategic duration is defined by a more inward orientation. Electoral considerations may have been influential in March 2015, but the proactive and staggered timelines signal Harper’s wariness about the perils of cooperative security.
Implications and conclusions
Piecemeal commitments to Afghanistan, Libya, and the anti-ISIS coalition align with Canada’s impulse to be a good ally to the United States, its core NATO partners, and—to a lesser degree—the NATO alliance itself. However, this logic is accompanied by the risk of mission creep and the possible repercussions of withdrawal. Canada’s impulse to be a good ally, to both the US and its European partners, is supposed to generate gains in influence over key partners, but this has not occurred in any readily apparent way. 68 This point was not lost on Stephen Harper, who grew wary of commitment to and extrication from cooperative security concerns during his term.
Canada’s strategic duration explained.
As important as it is to the national interest, Canada’s good ally status has not yielded the kind of flexibility one would desire from limited-term commitments. Each time a mission was initiated or renewed, governments appealed to Canada’s willingness to shoulder its share of the burden and not leave the heavy lifting to others. At no point did it seem as if Canada was able to redeem the credit it earned in its previous engagements and take a pass on the anti-ISIS coalition. Indeed, doing so would be inimical to Canada’s national interest in being seen as a reliable ally. Furthermore, as each mission continues, it becomes ever more difficult to withdraw from cooperative security endeavours as strategies and time frames become increasingly entangled in complex multilateral considerations.
Why does Canada peg its strategic duration to internationalist considerations? We have hinted at the role of international society, which binds Canada and its partners through common relations, interests, and institutions. More than just reputation, maintaining the integrity of Canada’s bonds with the North Atlantic order has been a constant since the Second World War. 69 The post-2001 period has tested the resiliency of that order mightily and it is in this multilateral context that Canada’s internationalist dilemma plays out. As we have seen here, Canada’s short-term commitments can quickly evolve into protracted commitments, extrication from which come with a high prestige cost that politicians are loathe to incur and that may be harmful to the international society Canada holds so dear. For Canada, a country of limited military means, this presents not only a problem for defence policy but also one that cuts to the core of the country’s national interests and identity. Indeed, hell is other people’s schedules.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We would like to extend special thanks to Stéfanie von Hlatky, Adam Chapnick, and the anonymous reviewers at International Journal for their insights at different stages of this paper’s development. A version of this paper was presented to the Conflict and Security Research Cluster at the Balsillie School of International Affairs and we thank the participants for their enthusiasm and comments.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
1
Justin Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan: A realist paradox?” International Journal 68, no. 2 (2013): 274–288; Kim Richard Nossal, “No exit: Canada and the ‘war without end’ in Afghanistan,” in Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Charles C. Pentland, eds., The Afghanistan Challenge: Hard Realities and Strategic Choices (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto: Penguin, 2007).
2
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1990); Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic states and commitment in international relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 109–139; Stephen M. Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997): 156–179; Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Why democracies may actually be less reliable allies,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (2004): 775–795; Evan N. Resnick, “Hang together or hang separately? Evaluating rival theories of wartime alliance cohesion,” Security Studies 22, no. 4 (2013): 672–706.
3
David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Stéfanie von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing caveats: Understanding the sources of national restrictions upon NATO’s mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012): 67–84.
4
David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, 217–236.
5
Jason Davidson, “Heading for the exits: Democratic allies and withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan,” Democracy and Security 10, no. 3 (2014): 251–286.
6
Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, “Defense against help: Explaining Canada–US security relations,” American Review of Canadian Studies 38, no. 1 (2008): 63–89; Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel, “Canada and the Kosovo War: The happy follower,” in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War: Allied Forces or Forced Allies? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001).
7
Justin Massie, “Making sense of Canada’s ‘irrational’ international security policy: A tale of three strategic cultures,” International Journal 64, no. 3 (2009): 625–645.
8
9
Philippe Lagassé, “Accountability for national defence: Ministerial responsibility, military command and parliamentary oversight,” Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) Study, No. 4, March 2010.
10
Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi, “The use of force under international auspices: Strengthening parliamentary accountability,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Policy Paper No. 7 (2005), 10.
11
The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
12
Jean-Christophe Boucher, “Selling Afghanistan: A discourse analysis of Canada’s military intervention, 2001–08,” International Journal 64, no. 3 (2009): 717–733; Nossal, “No exit.”
13
Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, 7.
14
Eric Lehre, At What Cost Sovereignty? Canada–US Military Interoperability in the War on Terror (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2013): 142–159.
15
Dan Fitzsimmons, “Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,” International Journal 68, no. 2 (2013): 305–313.
16
Anthony King, “The digital revolution: Camouflage in the twenty-first century,” Millennium 42, no. 2 (2014): 398.
17
Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan,” 279.
18
Matthew Willis, “An unexpected war, a not-unexpected mission: The origins of Kandahar 2005,” International Journal 67, no. 4 (2012): 979–1000.
19
Fitzsimmons, “Canada, NATO, and ISAF,” 306.
20
Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, 2.
21
Stephen M. Saideman, Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from the Experience (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation [CIGI], 2012) 14.
22
Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, 52–72.
23
Ibid., 96.
24
Ibid., 99.
25
Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, 16 May 2005.
26
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), 15 November 2005, 9706.
27
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), 17 May 2006, 1501–1504.
28
Ibid., 1503.
29
Ibid., 1527.
30
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), 17 May 2006, 1501.
31
Stein and Lang, The Unexpected War, 236.
32
UK, “UK Operations in Afghanistan: Thirteenth Report of Session 2006–07,” House of Commons Defence Committee, 2007.
33
George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, “The Dutch COIN approach: Three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 20, no. 3 (2010): 429.
34
Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan,” 285; Jean-Christophe Boucher, “Evaluating the ‘Trenton Effect’: Canadian public opinion and military casualties in Afghanistan (2006–2010),” American Review of Canadian Studies 40, no. 2 (2010): 237–258.
35
Nossal, “No exit,” 158.
36
Ibid., 160.
37
Canada, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 37.
38
39
George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, “Fighting the war at home: Strategic narratives, elite responsiveness, and the Dutch mission in Afghanistan, 2006–2010,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 1 (2016): 2–23.
40
41
Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan,” 286.
42
43
Dimitriu and de Graaf, “Fighting the war at home,” 2.
44
NATO, Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations Contributing to the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 2010.
45
Sarah Kreps, “Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 3 (2010): 191–215.
46
Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan,” 286.
47
Campbell Clark and Bill Curry, “Harper’s turnaround: PM says he felt he had to extend Afghan mission,” Globe and Mail, 11 November 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harpers-turnaround-pm-says-he-felt-he-had-to-extend-afghan-mission/article1259532/ (accessed 23 May 2016); Stephen Harper, “PM confirms firm end to Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan,” 21 May 2012, 
.
48
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), 21 March 2011, 9051.
49
50
David Perry, Leading from Behind Is still Leading: Canada and the International Intervention in Libya (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2011), 14.
51
Elinor Sloan, Canada and NATO: A Military Assessment (Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2012): 4.
52
Perry, Leading from Behind, 14.
53
55
56
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), 14 June 2011, 324.
57
58
59
Katie Domansky, Rebecca Jensen, and Rachael Bryson, “Canada and the Libya Coalition,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 14, nos. 3 & 4 (2012): 16.
60
Perry, Leading from Behind, 14.
61
The constitutionality of the US War Powers Resolution remains a point of contention between Congress and the presidency. Richard F. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance (Washington, DC: 25 September 2012); UK, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 21 March 2011, 700; Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 164.
62
63
64
65
Netherlands, Press Release, “Netherlands to make military contribution to fight against ISIS,” 24 September 2014, https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2014/09/25/netherlands-to-make-military-contribution-to-fight-against-isis (accessed 25 May 2016); Danica Kirka, “Britain joins fight against Islamic State group” Associated Press, 26 September 2014, (accessed 25 May 2016).
66
Thomas Juneau, “The civil war in Syria and Canada’s containment policy,” International Journal 70, no. 3 (2015): 471–488.
67
Massie, “Canada’s war for prestige in Afghanistan,” 285.
68
Justin Massie, “Public contestation and policy resistance: Canada’s oversized military commitment to Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 1 (2016): 47–65.
69
Tom Keating, “The transition in Canadian foreign policy through an English School lens,” International Journal 69, no. 2 (2014): 168–182.
Author Biographies
Aaron Ettinger is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo and a research fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. His research appears in Security Dialogue, Millennium, Politics, and International Journal.
Jeffrey Rice is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University, specializing in international relations and comparative politics. His current research focuses on the institutional and organizational dynamics of Western multilateral military interventions.