Regional turmoil,the rise of Islamic State,and Turkey's multiple Kurdish dilemmas

… and Turks

This article also seeks to locate the Kurdish role in the region's broader turmoil within the framework of Turkish policies, behaviour, and interests. As already noted, Turkey is the home of 50 percent of all Kurds, and its borders abut heavily Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Furthermore, fear of a loss of its territorial integrity, bitterness at the PKK's history of violence, and an elemental Turkish nationalism are all hard-wired into Turkish politics and society. Turkey is also one the region's most powerful states, economically, militarily, institutionally, and demographically. It is the de facto successor state to the Ottoman Empire that once ruled over the entire region. It is diplomatically well connected (not least as a consequence of its NATO membership), relatively democratic, and has not (yet) experienced anything like the degree of internal unrest that has afflicted much of its Arab neighbourhood. ⁷ For all these reasons, Turkey will be a key actor in the region's Kurdish affairs, and in the region as a whole.

A succession of electoral victories, the first of them in November 2002, combined with an impressive economic performance, gave the Islamist Adelet ve Kalkinma (AKP) government great self-confidence both in its capacities and in its worldview. Furthermore, the “Arab Spring” introduced onto Turkey's foreign policy agenda a number of issues that presented risks and opportunities to its decision makers. Perhaps most important, however, was the elevation of Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign minister in 2009, from his previous position as the prime minister's foreign policy adviser. In August 2014 he became prime minister. Davutoğlu's thinking about foreign policy is associated with catchy phrases such as “strategic depth,” “soft power,” and “zero problems with the neighbourhood.” ⁸ It has also been described as “neo-Ottoman,” ⁹ “Turkish Gaullism,” ¹⁰ as the foreign policy of a rising trading state, ¹¹ and as “pan-Islamist.” ¹² It is perhaps all of these things. However, two core ideas that lie at the heart of his thinking help explain Turkish foreign policy toward both the Kurds and the Arab Spring and its aftermath. The first is that Turkey is, or should be, a “central”' country able to exploit its history, geography, culture, religion, and economic prowess in order to put itself at the heart of a region that roughly corresponds to the former Ottoman empire. The “zero problems with the neighbours” approach and an activist regional foreign policy were expressions of this mindset. Davutoğlu's second idea, albeit one often honoured in its breach, is that Islam trumps ethnicity, and that the current, fragmented, state system in the region is fragile. The Arab Spring raised the hope that Davutoğlu's future prognosis might arrive sooner rather than later, and this encouraged Ankara's policy switch away from the existing regimes and toward the pro-Islamist and especially Muslim Brotherhood forces in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria. It also reinforced Ankara's antipathy toward those Kurds who value ethnic over religious identity.

In contrast to the generally distant approach toward the Middle East taken by Turkey's past Kemalist governments, but also as a consequence of the regional uproar, Turkey emerged as a determined actor in the region's developments. Thus, this article will focus on the region's Kurdish non-state actors, on the policies of the Turkish state, and on their interaction with each other and with the Arab actors they are obliged—through circumstances and geography—to engage with.

Syria, IS, Rojava, and Turkey

The complex civil war that emerged in Syria in 2011 increasingly dominated much of the analysis of what had once been termed the “Arab Spring.” Ankara was involved in the Syrian crisis from the outset. Having made its relationship with Damascus the centrepiece of its “zero problems in the neighbourhood” approach, Turkey reacted angrily to the failure of Bashar al-Assad's government to take its advice to adopt a more inclusive stance toward the opposition. Ankara began lobbying early and hard for Assad's overthrow, and sponsored the formation in August 2011 of the Syrian National Council (SNC). The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was headquartered in Turkey, where it received training and arms, until November 2012. Ankara became increasingly critical of the relative unwillingness of its Western allies, and most especially Washington, to follow suit. Turkey was especially frustrated that its calls to establish a no-fly zone and “humanitarian corridor”' in northern Syria, which could serve not only as a safe haven for refugees but also as a base for the FSA and to step up support for moderate opponents to the Assad regime, met with so little response. ¹³

Ankara's concerns were understandable. The May 2013 bombings in the Turkish town of Reyhanli on the Syrian border, which Ankara believed was the work of Syrian agents, offered ample demonstration of Turkey's vulnerability to Syria's turmoil. Following earlier incidents of cross-border fire from Syria in which two Turkish civilians were killed, and the shooting down of a Turkish fighter jet in June 2012, Turkey shelled Syrian military positions. In December 2012 NATO acceded to a Turkish request to deploy Patriot anti-air missile systems close to the Syrian border. This not only demonstrated NATO solidarity but also hinted simultaneously at the risk of over-reach in Turkey's stance. ¹⁴ Turkey had also received over two million Syrian refugees by mid-2015, of whom the overwhelming majority had distributed themselves throughout the country rather than remain in refugee camps, and who were increasingly seen as a threat to the country's social cohesion. Few had expected the Ba'athist regime to hold onto office for so long, and it became increasingly evident that Turkey now inhabited a deeply troubled neighbourhood. However, when looked at in the context of Turkish policies toward Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere in the region, Turkey's engagement in the Syrian crisis can also be seen as an element of its wider ambitions to emerge as a regional power.

The Kurdish dimension of the Syrian crisis further emphasized Turkey's vulnerability to the region's crisis. The establishment in early 2013 of three geographically discontiguous self-governing Kurdish cantons collectively known as Rojava in northern Syria by the PYD (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat, or Democratic Union Party) rattled Ankara. Turkey believed, with considerable justification, that the PYD and its armed wing, the YPG (Yekineyen Parastina Gel or People's Protection Units), were simply PKK offshoots. The PYD was formed by the PKK in 2003, both are affiliated to the KCK, and maybe one third of the PKK membership is of Syrian Kurdish origin. ¹⁵ The PYD's leader, Salih Muslim, spent time with PKK units in northern Iraq's Khandil Mountains until he returned to Syria in 2011 to help shape the Kurdish response to the uprising against the Assad regime. Syria's Kurds had long been notoriously fractured, but the PYD soon, and surprisingly, emerged as the most organized and militarily most effective of Syria's disparate Kurdish groups. ¹⁶ It undoubtedly prospered from its seamless military relationship with the PKK, which provided fighters and arms. To Ankara these developments implied the establishment of PKK-controlled havens on its southern border, and could herald similar initiatives in Turkey's southeast. ¹⁷ The Syrian regime's withdrawal from the Kurdish areas soon after the uprising began effectively handed Syria's largely Kurdish-populated areas over to PYD control. This gesture could yet prove to have consequences as far-reaching as Saddam Hussein's February 1991 withdrawal of the Iraqi state's presence in Kurdish Iraq. Ankara sought unsuccessfully to persuade the PYD to join the SNC, ¹⁸ despite the fact that most of its constituent elements were opposed to Kurdish self-rule. The PYD's position was that its struggle focused primarily on Kurdish self-determination, or “democratic autonomy.”

Ankara now worked toward both the overthrow of the Assad regime and the obstruction of Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. In pursuit of these objectives, Ankara was widely suspected of at least turning a blind eye to jihadist groups in their fight with Assad and their attacks on Syria's Kurdish enclaves. ¹⁹ Turkey kept aloof from an anti-IS coalition of Arab and Western countries assembled by Washington, and refused to permit access to the NATO air base at Incirlik to US bombers engaged in the campaign. Washington was obliged to air-drop military supplies to the PYD defenders of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane, which was besieged by IS forces, and to use more distant military bases from which to conduct air strikes against Kobane's IS attackers while the Turkish military looked on and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan loudly criticized Washington's action. ²⁰ IS was eventually expelled from Kobane in early 2015. When in June 2015 Syrian Kurdish forces captured—with US help—the border town of Tal Abyad, Erdoğan chose to express his concern about the possible “creation of a structure that threatens our borders,” ²¹ a concern he had not expressed during the previous two years during which the town had been under IS control. Tal Abyad was indeed incorporated into Rojava soon after. ²²

Erdoğan offered an insight into Ankara's thinking with his comment that “for us, the PKK is the same as ISIL. It is wrong to consider them as different from each other.” ²³ He also asserted that the PKK and the PYD are one and the same organization, and on that basis opposed Washington's air-drops to the PYD, fearing the arms might fall into the PKK's hands. It was evident that Ankara did not attach the same priority to the defeat of IS as did the US and its NATO and regional allies. Indeed, Turkey sought to prevent Turkish Kurds from crossing the border to join in the defence of Kobane, although it did eventually agree to allow, under US pressure, a small Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga force to transit Turkish territory and help lift the IS siege.

However, in the wake of the allegedly IS suicide bombing in the Turkish border town of Suruc on 20 July 2015 that killed 32 pro-Kurdish activists, Ankara finally seemed to commit itself to the US-led fight against IS in Syria. In particular, it agreed to allow US bombers and armed drones to attack IS targets from Turkey's Incirlik airbase. ²⁴ Within days of the Suruc attack, Turkish forces also retaliated against an IS base in Syria from where cross-border fire had killed a Turkish soldier. Furthermore, dozens of alleged IS activists were detained in police raids throughout Turkey, although most were subsequently released. Ankara's belated alignment with the anti-IS coalition was coupled with an agreement with Washington that they would cooperate to establish a safe zone along a section of the Turkey–Syria border.

However, Ankara's main objectives were to prevent the PYD from extending its control westward and to assist, along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, an alliance of jihadi groups known as Jaish al-Islam. ²⁵ Although such groups were increasingly ready to position themselves against IS, their memberships and ideologies overlapped with those of IS, and the relationships between them were fluid and frequently cooperative. From Ankara's perspective, the chief advantages of such a jihadi-controlled zone, particularly if it excluded any IS presence, were two-fold. It would serve to prevent PYD control of the entire border with Syria and contribute to the overthrow of the Damascus regime. Furthermore, Ankara had gradually come to appreciate the threat posed to it by IS, and hoped this would align its position more closely with Washington's. Ankara sought to strengthen this stance in the wake of the October 2015 suicide bombing of a pro-Kurdish gathering in Ankara, and embarked on another round of anti-IS raids and arrests. By now, however, few were entirely convinced of Ankara's sincerity. In any case, the US had tired of its failure to train and equip a viable, moderate Syrian force to fight IS, and elected instead to ramp up its support for a PYD-led force, called the Syrian Democratic Forces. ²⁶ With Russia's entry into the Syrian theatre in support of Assad, together with its expressions of solidarity with the PYD, it appeared both that the prospects of Turkey's Syrian allies had dimmed and that those of its Kurdish and regime foes had risen. Ankara even saw fit to warn both Moscow and Washington against support for the PYD. ²⁷ Ankara's game plan with respect to Syria's Kurds was clearly in trouble, as was its influence over events in Syria more generally. ²⁸

Ankara's “good Kurds”: KRG or KDP?

PYD leader Salih Muslim's condemnation of the Turkish reaction to the PYD's capture of Tal Abyad as “Kurdphobia” was understandable, ²⁹ but overlooked the close relationship Ankara had forged with the KRG, and especially the KDP and President Massoud Barzani. In Barzani, Turkey saw a socially conservative political leader, one who appreciated the necessity of Ankara's goodwill for the security of his quasi-state, and who shared its distaste for the secular and leftist PKK and PYD, partly because he also regarded them as rivals for the leadership of Kurdish nationalism. In November 2013, Barzani and Erdoğan even shared a platform in Turkey's overwhelmingly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, where Barzani expressed his support for Turkey's Kurdish peace process and acclaimed the brotherhood between Turks and Kurds. ³⁰

Ankara's relationship with the KRG was transformed in the wake of Ahmet Davutoğlu's appointment as foreign minister in 2009, notwithstanding the fact that it had emerged as a near or quasi Kurdish state in its own right, with its own government, laws, language, flag, security forces, border controls, and foreign and energy policies, and thus posed a threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. Davutoğlu's visit to Erbil in October of that year paved the way for the opening of a Turkish consulate there in 2010. Leading figures on both sides were soon using the term “strategic” to describe the Ankara-Erbil relationship. The expanding trade between the two provided a powerful driver to this rapprochement. The KRG was accounting for half or more of Turkey's trade with Iraq, while hundreds of Turkish companies and thousands of Turkish citizens were based there. ³¹ Energy considerations became increasingly central to this relationship. ³² The KRG's dynamic approach to the development of its energy resources synergized with Ankara's aspiration to develop as an energy “hub.” Encouraged by the arrival of major companies such as ExxonMobil in 2011, Turkey began accepting oil trucked directly from Iraqi Kurdistan in 2012. In early 2014 Kurdish oil began flowing through a new pipeline that connected the Kurdish oilfields with the existing Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline near the Turkish border, for export from the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Erbil negotiated a 50-year oil export agreement with Ankara. ³³ The oil was marketed independently of and against the wishes of both Baghdad and Washington. ³⁴ In the wake of the collapse of a deal between Baghdad and Erbil which would have reintegrated the KRG's oil exports with those of Iraq, and notwithstanding PKK sabotage of the pipeline during the summer of 2015, ³⁵ by June 2015 the KRG was again exporting most of its oil directly via Ceyhan. Indeed, by September of that year the KRG claimed to be exporting 700,000 barrels per day via the Turkish port. ³⁶ The destination of the KRG's oil is shrouded in mystery, as indeed is the whereabouts of the proceeds from its sale, but one report claimed that most of Israel's oil imports were from the KRG. In the longer term, the KRG's oil reserves should be enough to finance any eventual independence it might achieve, although the scale of misuse of its oil earnings is staggering.

Ankara had been hostile to the KRG following its establishment in 1992, largely because it feared the impact of Iraqi Kurdish self-rule on the aspirations of its own Kurds. ³⁷ However, a number of factors contributed to Ankara's shift in its approach to the KRG—or, more accurately, to the KDP. To trade and energy considerations can be added the marginalization of the Turkish General Staff in Turkish policymaking, the realization that the KRG had become a fixture in the region, Ankara's fracturing and increasingly sectarian relationship with Baghdad, Davutoğlu's “zero problems” approach to its neighbourhood, and the realization that Barzani especially was a “good Kurd” who shared Ankara's mistrust of the PKK and its affiliates and who might prove accommodating in Turkey's desire to marginalize them. Ankara even adopted a relatively passive posture toward Barzani's occasional pronouncements that Iraqi Kurdish independence was inevitable, and toward the KRG's extension of full control over the territories it disputes with Baghdad—including oil-rich Kirkuk—in the wake of Mosul's fall to IS in June 2014. ³⁸ It seemed possible that Turkey was positioning itself in the event of a total collapse of the Iraqi state. On the other hand, Ankara did little to help—in contrast to Tehran—when, a few months later, Erbil found itself under threat from an IS advance. Erbil's disappointment was palpable, and the “strategic” relationship shaken. ³⁹

Barzani was keen to preserve his advantageous relationship with Ankara, to maintain the KRG's economic progress, and to present himself as the true symbol of Kurdish nationalism. He was also irritated by the PKK's presence in northern Iraq. ⁴⁰ His unease about the influence of the PKK and its affiliates intensified in light of the widespread sympathy for the PYD's spirited defence of Kobane and against IS in Syria generally, and the role played by PKK and PYD fighters in Sinjar and Makhmur in Iraqi Kurdistan in the wake of their desertion by Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga in the face of an IS attack. ⁴¹ The PYD resisted Barzani's attempts to subordinate it to the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a coalition of Syrian Kurdish groups that was formed in 2011 under Barzani's sponsorship, ⁴² although in 2014 it did enter a power-sharing arrangement with Barzani-sponsored Kurdish groups. ⁴³ Erbil initially offered no assistance to the PYD forces, and even obstructed them from using KRG territory. Indeed, the KRG, like Turkey, closed the KRG–Syrian border even as the PYD was battling jihadi elements. ⁴⁴ However, under US pressure, ⁴⁵ Barzani and Erdoğan agreed to the deployment of Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga units to aid the PYD forces defending the town. Furthermore, they were allowed to transit Turkish territory in order to cross into Syria. Yet this rivalry persisted even as it coexisted with increasing cooperation against IS. ⁴⁶

Western countries, and the US in particular, became more and more reliant on Iraq's—as well as Syria's—Kurdish forces in the fight against IS, and embarked on programs to arm and equip them. ⁴⁷ This coincided with growing exasperation both at the inadequacies of federal Iraq's armed forces and at Baghdad's growing dependence on and cooperation with Iran and even Russia. Kurds have often been victims of the realpolitik of both neighbouring and external powers, and history could yet repeat itself. But the fragility of both Iraq and Syria, the West's growing reliance on Kurds in the fight against IS, the military successes both Iraqi and Syrian Kurds enjoyed in capturing and holding territory, and the arms and—for Iraq's Kurds—the oil wealth at their disposal, all held out a prospect of Kurdish autonomy and even independence. However, Turkey's stance toward any such outcome will surely be crucial.

Little peace at home …

Turkey's Kurds are more directly confronted with a determined and powerful Turkish state. Within a few years of the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, it became evident that the new republic was to be characterized by an intense Turkish nationalism, in which not only the Kurdish language but even Kurdish ethnic distinctiveness was denied. ⁴⁸ Unsurprisingly, the republic's history has been punctuated by Kurdish revolts, unrest, and alienation. For all Turkey's supposed democratization and westernization since the end of the Second World War, its political evolution is replete with the banning of Kurdish political parties and journals and the detention of Kurdish activists—typically for no more than declaring themselves to be Kurdish or referring to “Kurdistan.” In 1978 the PKK emerged under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK's ideology is both Kurdish and leftist, although over the years it has come to demand “democratic autonomy” rather than complete independence. The PKK embarked on its armed campaign in 1984, the Turkish state responded with its characteristic repressiveness, and a “dirty war” ensued. Turkey's southeast was in effect under military occupation, with at least one-third of Turkey's substantial army located there at any one time. The fighting was at its most intense during the 1990s, and martial law was not finally lifted across the whole of Turkey's southeast until 2002. ⁴⁹

The Turkish state's struggle with its own Kurdish problem has always been impacted by regional circumstances. With the establishment of the allied no-fly zone over northern Iraq in the wake of the 1991 war with Iraq, the PKK made increasing use of the Khandil Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan, basing up to half their fighters there. This prompted around 30 Turkish military incursions and air attacks against PKK bases in northern Iraq during the 1990s. Turkish forces were often aided by the KDP and the other leading Iraqi Kurdish political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Even so, PKK units remain in northern Iraq to this day, and even became involved in the defence of Iraqi Kurds against the IS threat. In particular, the PKK's role in defending northern Iraq's Yezidi minority from IS was seen by Iraqi Kurdish leaders as an encroachment into their domain and contributed to the current tension between the KRG authorities and the PKK and its affiliates.

However, the AKP government appeared to signal a new approach to Turkey's politically and economically costly Kurdish conflict. In a speech in Diyarbakir in August 2005, then prime minister Erdoğan conceded that Turkey had a “Kurdish issue” and that “mistakes” had been made in the handling of it. His motivations were several, but included a desire to draw Turkey's Kurdish voters away from pro-Kurdish parties and toward the AKP. The AKP having won a stunning election victory in 2007, the way was paved both for the marginalization of the political influence of Turkey's General Staff (TGS) over Turkey's Kurdish issue and for the so-called Oslo Process, a series of secret talks with Kurdish elements. ⁵⁰ This represented a sea-change from Ankara's hitherto heavily securitized approach to its Kurdish and PKK problem.

The government's approach took on a more substantive flavour with the 2009 launch of the so-called “Kurdish opening.” Welcome though the AKP government's 2009 “Kurdish opening” was, it ended in acrimony, and 2011 saw an intensification of the PKK's resort to violence. It was estimated that more than 700 people were killed in the 14 months up to August 2012—the highest level of PKK-related violence for 13 years. ⁵¹ All in all, there were reasons to doubt the good faith of both the government and the Kurdish movement, and there was little trust between them. However, when in November 2012 Ocalan successfully appealed to around 700 imprisoned Kurdish activists to end their two-month-old hunger strike, his undoubted influence but also his readiness to strike a deal was amply demonstrated. ⁵² Ocalan then delivered a message that was read out at the Kurdish new year, or Newroz, gathering on 21 March 2013 in Diyarbakir. ⁵³ It referred to the common past of Turks and Kurds, asserted that they live together under the “flag of Islam,” and that they needed to create a common future. On 8 May, PKK fighters began to withdraw into Iraq in order to implement a ceasefire, although they remained armed. One difference between this new “opening” and the previous attempt was that Ankara now recognized Ocalan's centrality to any process aimed at resolving Turkey's domestic Kurdish issue. This looked like progress.

However, with respect to the substance of any agreement, the two sides remained far apart. ⁵⁴ Although some reforms were introduced, ⁵⁵ the government appeared inactive and increasingly insincere. It was also evident that there were divisions on the Kurdish side. Many PKK fighters and activists were skeptical from the beginning. ⁵⁶ Kurdish demands were extensive, and included Ocalan's release or transfer to house arrest; the winding down of the so-called “village guard” system of government-sponsored and armed Kurdish citizens; the right to maintain a local self-defence force; an amnesty for Kurdish fighters and for imprisoned activists; a reform of Turkey's notorious and wide-ranging anti-terror laws; education in Kurdish; establishing Kurdish as co-equal with Turkish as an official language of the Republic; the replacement of the current ethnic definition of citizenship with a civic one; an end to the 10 percent electoral hurdle for parliamentary representation; and, above all, some kind of devolution, self-determination, or “democratic autonomy” that would, in effect, introduce something tantamount to a federal political system in Turkey. ⁵⁷ In fact there were few indications that Erdoğan, his party, or the opposition parties were at all ready to concede many, if any, of these demands. Indeed, a case can be made that neither side was in desperate need of a settlement. ⁵⁸ The PKK sensed that time was on its side in light of the wider development in the region, and also refused to meet the government's demand that it disarm before a peace deal could be agreed. ⁵⁹ Erdoğan appeared to think in terms of an Islamic “brotherhood” between Turkey's Turkish and Kurdish citizens, and did not appreciate the pressure to adopt a pluralistic approach that is inherent in Kurdish ethnic identity demands. ⁶⁰

Although the ceasefire partially held, sporadic violent incidents still occurred. Turkish security forces in the region were increased and their infrastructure improved. ⁶¹ Meanwhile, the HDP (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi) (Peoples' Democratic Party) and PKK strengthened their grip on the south-east's local government infrastructure. As the June 2015 elections approached, and the AKP needed both to reassure its nationalistic supporters and try to keep the HDP vote below the 10 percent threshold, the rift between the two sides became starker. AKP figures responded clumsily to a fatal bomb attack at an HDP rally in Diyarbakir a couple of days before the vote. Clashes in Turkey's southeast between the PKK and Kurdish Islamist groups immediately before and after the election were widely suspected of having been initiated by provocateurs. ⁶² Clearly, Turkey's Kurdish voters had become mistrustful and disillusioned. Developments in Syria and Ankara's reactions also angered Turkey's Kurds. In the national elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 7 June 2015, the HDP emerged as the biggest winners, receiving 13.1 percent of the national vote and more than doubling, to 80, the number of its parliamentary seats. Socially conservative Kurdish voters in Turkey's southeast had deserted the AKP in swings of over 30 percent from the AKP to the HDP, which in some Kurdish provinces won more than 80 percent of the vote. ⁶³ The consequence of the HDP vote was that the AKP lost its parliamentary majority and a “repeat election” had to be called for 1 November, in which the HDP vote dropped but nevertheless exceeded the 10 percent hurdle, and the AKP vote increased, enabling it to form once again a single-party government. In the run-up to the November election, and commencing with the July 2015 Suruc bombing, Turkey's security forces resumed the fight against the PKK—a fight far more intense than their more loudly proclaimed campaign against IS—which involved enforced curfews, bombing of PKK targets in both Turkey and KRG territory, attacks on soldiers, and the like. Turkey appeared just as unwilling and as unable as ever to arrive at an understanding with that strain of Kurdish nationalism represented by the PKK, HDP, PYD, and KCK.

Turks and Kurds: What future together, and what role in the region?

Taken together, the developments outlined above led to a rise in pan-Kurdish sentiment across Iraq, Turkey, Syria (and Iran), and of the prestige of the PKK and PYD. The KRG's reputation, or at least that of Barzani, had been punctured and its relationship with Ankara put under scrutiny, but as it won back territory from and remained a steadfast opponent of IS, Erbil gradually won back the respect of the US and its allies. Turkey's stance toward the Syrian Kurds, and its general approach to the Syrian crisis, led to a loss of trust with its Western allies, who became less inclined to follow Ankara's lead and respect its sensitivities regarding Kurdish issues. The US commitment to a unified Iraq, and therefore its opposition to Iraqi Kurdish independence, did not change but was increasingly questioned in Washington. Indeed, the readiness of the US and other Western states to train and arm the Kurdish peshmerga in their struggle against IS seemed to many to make more likely the eventual breakup of the Iraqi state. In light of increasing calls in the US and Europe that the proscription of the PKK as a terrorist organization be lifted, the HDP's performance among Kurdish voters in the June 2015 election, the continuing military successes against IS of the PYD on the Syrian side of Turkey's southern border, and the identification by the West of both the PYD's fighters and of the KRG's peshmerga as among the most effective opponents of IS, Ankara found itself confronting a set of interlocking Kurdish developments that were profoundly unsettling.

The KRG had already established a level of autonomy from Baghdad that would be difficult, even impossible, to reverse. In and of itself, this did not necessarily mean that full Iraqi Kurdish independence was only a matter of time. However, Baghdad's dysfunctionality and the weakness of its security forces in the face of the challenge posed by IS raised the question of whether Iraq could reasonably be expected to re-establish itself as a more or less functioning state in any foreseeable future. Greater de facto if not de jure Iraqi Kurdish independence could fall into Erbil's lap as a result of the collapse of Iraq itself. The prospects for a restoration of Syria's broken society and political system looked at least as dismal. The PYD had established itself as a formidable opponent to IS, and was valued as such by the US and its allies. The best possible outcome for Syria was the country's cantonisation—indeed, this, rather than full independence, was the PYD's objective. ⁶⁴ Syria's Kurds, too, had had a degree of autonomy thrust upon them partly by circumstances, and it would not be easy to reverse their gains. However, these landlocked “Kurdistans” to Turkey's south would ultimately have little option but to accept a high degree of dependence on Ankara. Turkey seemed to embrace that advantage with respect to the KRG, but remained unwilling to extend the same degree of accommodation to Rojava.

The apparent internationalization of the Kurdish issue that resulted from the region's chaos, and the welcome stance of the Kurds within it, made it ever more difficult for Turkey to persuade its allies to follow its lead with respect to the Kurds. Turkey's dubious regional policies and its sometimes aggressive denunciation of the West both in detail and in general had further undermined Ankara's influence. ⁶⁵ Given the West's past behaviour toward the Kurds, one cannot rule out the possibility that they could yet again be deserted by their new-found Western friends. What are presumed to be realpolitik considerations will always ensure that the views of Turks, Arabs, and Persians will influence Western thinking, and that the region's map will not be discarded lightly. Even so, the diplomatic and domestic political costs of doing so have been raised significantly, while faith in the value of Turkish friendship, and that of some Arabs, has fallen.

As a non-Arab state bordering and seeking to shape the region's evolution, Turkey's limitations were exposed. This was not exclusively the fault of Ankara's diplomacy, murky and inconsistent though it has been. Turkey has alienated more than it has won over the region's Arab governments, and differences with Iran over both Syria and Iraq have added to the sense of failure; but it would be rash to attempt a prediction based on the record thus far. Both Turkey and the region, including its Kurds, are in a state of profound flux. Nevertheless, two enduring observations hold. First, Turkey remains one of the region's major players; and, second, the Kurds will not submit easily to continuing attempts deny the consideration their distinct ethnicity warrants.