Testing middle power’s collective action in a world of diffuse power

Normative impulses

Moving beyond structural conditions and objective methods of analysis means a focus on two other factors in the evolution of middle power diplomatic practice: normative impulses and operational techniques. In the first category, a lens that gives significant insights into the meaning of middle powers showcases an image of international good citizenship. Great powers gain recognition—or as Martin Wright puts it, “Great Responsibilities”—at the apex of power on the grounds that they are indispensable to war and peace. ⁵ However, the legitimacy in applying this coercive capacity in order to carry out their duties was never complete because of both the lack of negotiations in institutionalizing these privileges and because at times these great responsibilities were carried out with at least a measure of irresponsibility, especially when unilateralism was substituted for multilateralism. Even US-based, realist scholars such as Robert Gilpin despaired about the tilt toward “irresponsibility” in US policy from the late 1960s onward. ⁶

Middle powers have not possessed the muscular capacity in the past to gain access to the high table of global power, although it must be said that the guidelines for middle power status identified by Wright are outdated, with their emphasis on “military strength, resources and strategic positions.” If geo-security factors eventually facilitated the access of the MIKTA countries to the G20, it was as a reward for being alliance partners not because the great powers (namely, the US) “bid for [their] support” or because middle powers had the ability “to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it.” ⁷

Nor could the middle powers gain recognition from the immediate post-1945 years onward because of a singular ability to shape the global system. Unlike the great powers, they had no veto power or special institutionalized privileges. The only route to influence was to demonstrate that they—even more than great powers—cared about the system. To the great powers, and especially the US, they had to signal their sense of responsibility for the management of the system. As Barbara Ward argued, while the first wave of middle power was ebbing in the late 1960s amid a greater appreciation of complex interdependence:

concrete compromises and working models of adaptation … are needed to get the world out of its maze of un-workable, overlapping, contradictory institutions and to offer it a number of concrete possibilities which look like beginning to work. Such experiments must be worked out, consciously, by governments.

But the number of governments which could, in an effective way, confront and redefine the crucial problem of state authority in the modern world are fairly limited. The superpowers are too vast, too unwieldy, too locked in their own responsibilities. The great mass of new states are too poor and too shaky. It is the middle powers … who occupy about the right position on the scale of influence … ⁸

The capacity of middle powers to take on this management role in support of global order should not be exaggerated. Throughout the different waves of middle power activism an aspirational streak is obvious. As with the good international citizenship theme, it is also in contradiction with a strain of opportunism and free ridership. What cannot be ignored, though, is the evident sense of duty of long-standing middle powers in taking on this role. Although this focus in terms of the society of states is on the balance between rights and duties of great powers, middle power can also be described as “accept[ing] the duty … in the light of managerial responsibilities.” ¹⁰

The level of emotions attached to the exhibition of management differed among the traditional middle powers. Both Canada and Australia took a leading position at the foundational San Francisco Conference, with an eye to keeping the great powers from grabbing too much institutional authority, but the styles they used differed. Australia under Labor and the leadership of H.V. Evatt robustly decried the entrenchment of “special privileges,” above all through the establishment of veto as a tool to secure great power authority, and the limitations on other institutional vehicles, such as the Economic and Social Council, amenable to extension of an “equitable” social and economic agenda. ¹¹

The dominant template, nonetheless, was the repertoire developed by Canada, a low-key, pragmatic style that highlighted with rare exceptions a pattern of quiet diplomacy. If the contrast in the immediate post-Second World War era was with Australia, later on it was with the “moral superpower” Sweden. Whereas Sweden and especially Prime Minister Olof Palme vehemently criticized US actions in Vietnam, Canada held back. Even when Prime Minister Lester Pearson made his well-publicized 1965 speech at Temple University, calling for a temporary suspension of bombing by the US on the premise that North Vietnam would make significant concessions while the US would regain reputational kudos, the intervention was made in temperate language that was consistent with the pursuit of order in the global system.

Emotional outrage as an expression of good international citizenship was downplayed in favour of the system supporter role. Also absent was a sense of frustration about the unfairness of the global system as exhibited by the BRICS. ¹² With an active presence—and voice capabilities—at the creation of the post-1945 institutions, the traditional middle powers had a vital stake in the institutional status quo.

Under pressures in the early years of the twenty-first century to “open up” the system at the apex, the middle powers appreciated that the rewards to be distributed by a reform process would go to the big rising powers, with a loss of status and benefits. To some extent, to be sure, this reinforced a pragmatic approach to defend entrenched interests, a stance witnessed most notably by Canada’s participation, along with several future MIKTA middle powers (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey), in the so-called Uniting for Consensus group designed to prevent the expansion of the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Such blocking activities were thus another variation of what Hurrell terms the dynamics around “membership through social construction” via a club of great powers. ¹³

As witnessed at the bureaucratic level, this defensive reaction also came into play in response to the proposal of Paul Martin to elevate the G20 finance ministers and central bankers to the leaders’ level in the form of an L20. At odds with the support received from think tanks inside and outside Canada, there was little enthusiasm for this initiative in other parts of Ottawa circles. ¹⁴ Rather than being an advance in global governance, it was perceived as a dilution of Canada’s special position in the G7/8.

To highlight the pragmatic instincts at the core of traditional middle power diplomacy is not to hide a state of frustration with the dominant approach. In the Canadian case, this tension was a long-standing condition, as manifested by the criticism of Lloyd Axworthy, in his younger days, of Pearson’s “worth[y]” but “grey and oh so solid” diplomacy. As neatly captured in a series of newspaper articles that Axworthy wrote for the Winnipeg Free Press in September 1965, this sense of impatience pointed toward diplomatic activity that was more noisy and public-oriented. ¹⁵

Indeed, to rehearse the issue-specific initiatives animated by Axworthy as foreign minister in the late 1990s through a normative lens reveals once again the continuous rethinking built into the middle power model. Reversing the image of a pragmatic, “quiet,” unemotional diplomacy from the earlier era, Canada took up issues such as land mines and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in a far more intense fashion. Instead of the reactive quality so firmly entrenched in traditional middle power diplomatic repertoire, the emergent coalitions of the willing of the 1990s were activist and mission-oriented.

Nor, at least at the ideational level, have these instincts faded. Some initiatives have continued to press on specific issues by an implicit embrace of the middle power model, a case in point being the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), an initiative intended to build momentum for nuclear disarmament. ¹⁶ Other initiatives privilege a normative dimension although downplaying the middle power component. An interesting illustration of this phenomenon is the Constructive Powers Initiative at the think tank level, showcasing the coalitional component as the core of an updated version of good international citizenship. ¹⁷

Yet to point to these initiatives reveals once again the continuous rethinking built into the middle power model. The MPI is increasingly a manifestation of a global non-governmental network. And while there is some overlap between the countries taking the lead on the normatively inspired niche diplomacy of the second wave of middle power activism and those taken to be representative of an incipient “constructive” component, it is the differences, not the similarities, that stand out. To a large extent the campaigns of the late 1990s and early 2000s represented the last gasp of countries that could be portrayed as good international citizens going back to the immediate post-1945 years. Australia, New Zealand, and the Nordic states were out in front with Canada on the ICC. On the land mines case, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland, along with Germany, became part of the “core group.”

By contrast, non-traditional middle powers deemed putative “constructive” powers, whether those associated with identities of an earlier era (Brazil) or as part of the new cluster in MIKTA (Korea, Turkey, Indonesia) were not firmly associated with the normatively inspired campaigns of the 1990s. The main sign of activity that encompassed a “mixed” coalition was the G-16 group (Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea, and Sweden) that pushed for other forms of United Nations (UN) reform beyond UNSC membership (especially on financial issues) from 1995–1997. ¹⁸

The shift in approach by South Africa epitomized the fading of the notion of “mixed” coalitions bringing together traditional and non-traditional middle powers in emotionally intense initiatives. After stepping into a leadership role on the ICC in the late 1990s, South Africa adjusted its position in conformity to the sovereignty and non-intervention position favoured by the African Union. In a similar vein, some of the most visible initiatives taken up by non-traditional middle powers were viewed by the old establishment as a fundamental challenge to the global order, a prime illustration being the failed attempt by Brazil and Turkey on the Iranian nuclear swap agreement. ¹⁹ Filling the gap of the late 1990s campaigns in the absence of a wider array of non-traditional middle powers was the emotional intensity of non-state actors. A number of NGOs, most notably Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, performed lead roles on the ICC. In terms of the land mines campaign, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was mobilized into action against the “scourge” of land mines by its field workers. Going beyond the organization’s traditional low-key, technical mode of operation, the Red Cross took the lead in gathering a broad-based NGO coalition calling for a total ban on the production, export, and use of anti-personnel mines. Eventually united under the auspices of the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, this NGO coalition included the Vietnam Veterans of America, the German group Medico International, and the French group Handicap International, together with Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights.

Operational techniques

Such developments lead into a discussion of the modalities of middle power diplomatic behaviour. At its most ambitious, the middle power role offered managerial system support to maintain order and stability. This approach had a crisis-oriented dimension, as when Canada was instrumental in the creation of a peacekeeping mission in the Suez crisis, or in a variety of other cases in the first wave of middle power activism when caution was directed at the US against unilateralism and excessive force as opposed to multilateral commitment. For if not depicted in the formal academic language used more recently by political scientists, there is no less an awareness that “Turning to multilateral organisations only under duress and when it appears convenient demonstrates a lack of commitment, even explicit rejection, of the principles of multilateralism. This in turn leads other states to expect the United States to renege on agreements or operate outside the constraints of multilateral organisations when it is convenient to do so.” ²⁰

But the middle power role also had a functional dimension in which middle powers took on a wide set of everyday responsibilities with respect to the global system. Followership did not mean just going along passively. A high premium was placed on skill in a wide variety of issue domains.

The pivotal techniques for operationalizing this set of responsibilities were of a technical and entrepreneurial mode. As on the normative component, nonetheless, the ability of middle powers to perform this managerial role has declined appreciably. On the one hand, structural constraints have come into play that downgrade the traditional middle powers’ capabilities. In the post-1945 era, middle powers possessed a privileged position, with little competition from the “Rest” in the global system. A world with BRICS demanding a great say in the running of the global system is very different. Not only has the G7 given way to the G20 as the hub of global economic governance, the role of India and Brazil has risen in the World Trade Organization (WTO) through vehicles such as the “Quint,” as Canada has lost influence from the time of the “Quad.”

On the other hand, the relationship between the US and middle powers has fundamentally altered. Critical commentators focused not on the issue-specific logic but on the emotional and volatile flavour of the relationship. It was difficult to maintain the position of being part of a “loyal opposition” when the US upped the ante to “for us or against us” in the context of the Iraq invasion. And the normative orientation of the Axworthy initiatives alienated some significant segments of American public opinion. From this contested standpoint, rather than providing a framework for structuring Canadian diplomacy on a rational basis, this approach imposed a sense of awkwardness and even ill discipline.

In institutional terms, the targeting of middle power activity also shifted. The pivotal sites for the first wave of middle power activity were the universal bodies, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and especially the UN. No longer, however, do these countries have a privileged position in these institutions, or if they do (as in the case of the IFIs) it is interpreted as being an (unfair) legacy of the past. In the IMF traditional European middle powers are facing pressure to recalibrate votes and shares as well as their leadership of established constituency groups. Nor can success for middle states in the competition for UNSC non-permanent seats be taken for granted, as illustrated not only by Canada’s 2010 loss to Portugal and Australia’s tough campaign against Luxembourg in 2012, but also Turkey’s 2014 loss.

The skill set so crucial to success as a middle power has either been used in a more restrictive manner or downgraded in terms of comparative advantage. While MIKTA embraced the elevation to the G20 at the leaders level in a positive way, Canada held back. There was an emphasis under Prime Minister Stephen Harper on technical coordination. But Canada also placed limits on the G20’s aspirations, as it has resisted many of the more ambitious proposals for bank regulations put on the table. The preference was for a pragmatic approach that underscored competitive advantage.

In entrepreneurial terms, the Harper government did promote some new forms of niche diplomacy, as showcased by the high-profile initiative on the Millennium Development Goals and maternal health via the G7/8. Still, in global terms, it is difficult to treat Canada in the twenty-first century as a standout in this sort of activity. Not only did Canada’s defensive stance differ considerably from the role taken by Korea and Mexico in the context of the G20, but the intensity was a far cry from the mobilization of the 3G campaign taken up by Singapore, Chile, and other small countries to defend their own interests and representation in the G20. ²¹

Through this set of lenses, the coalitional dimension of middle power diplomatic behaviour necessitates a closer look in terms of continuity and change. In Keohane’s words, a middle power is “a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution.” ²² Still, whatever value this definition possesses is deflated by its lack of attention to the question of how middle powers act together. What jumps out is the entrenched bias throughout the decades to ad hoc as opposed to collective behaviour. Whatever the sense of like-mindedness among the cast of countries in the middle power category, unlike both bigger countries (G7/8 and later BRICS) and the “Rest” (through the G77, Non-Aligned Movement) up to the creation of MIKTA, there was no distinct institutional home for middle powers, whether as a caucus embedded in a formal organizational or a stand alone informal summit.

To be sure, within the UN context there was the CANZ (Canada/Australia/New Zealand) caucus that met on a regular basis. Nonetheless this remained the partial exception that proved the rule. While other groups saw the need for an institutional entrenchment, often with a pattern of regularized meetings and executive leadership, middle powers kept to a loose format. Middle powers could take the lead in various coalitions. Some of these were of a relatively short duration, for example, the coalition of 44 like-minded countries in pushing for progress on a charter for a strong and permanent ICC in the run-up to and during the 1998 UN Rome conference on the issue. Dubbed by some “the Group of Lifeline Nations,” this coalition sought an independent court with an independent prosecutor, as opposed to a body under Security Council control. Although this coalition held together from 1995 to 1998, a period during which the emphasis was on the development of a detailed draft treaty, once the initiative ran its course, the group dissipated without an institutional imprint.

Other initiatives, most notably the MPI on nuclear disarmament, held together for a longer time period. But from its formation in 1998, the initiative has gone through numerous shifts in membership and names. Originally formed as part of the New Agenda Coalition with eight non-nuclear members (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and Slovenia), the initiative morphed into a forum of non-state actors including the Global Security Institute. No one distinct institutional apparatus was entrenched.

Moving from an ad hoc design

It is because of this tradition of ad hoc design that the creation of MIKTA marks such a significant transition. In specific terms, it marks a breakthrough in the creation of a designated forum. This new forum came into being on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 25 September 2013. This was the first gathering of foreign ministers of the MIKTA countries: Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia.

However, in constituting a break from the past, MIKTA remains very much a work in progress. Without a firm agreement about what normative component to emphasize, the rationale for the forum’s existence continues to be a diffuse blend of domestic attributes (most notably, a shared commitment to democracy even, in some cases, under stressful conditions) and collective global aspirations (wider global governance, especially in the context of the G20). If MIKTA represents an advance from the loose set of activities of earlier waves, a well-defined collective script (including building a shared sense of solidarity) is still lacking.

One means of thickening the association is for MIKTA to move to become a middle power caucus group embedded in the G20. Indeed, what should not be overlooked is the means by which the G7 and BRICS play this role. On various occasions, the G7 summit has been held before the G20, allowing its members to share ideas if not coordinate an approach. The BRICS, for their part, regularly meet either before or after the G20 summit, allowing a forum for targeting issues ahead of the hub summit and for commenting through concerted means of public diplomacy on both the successes and failures of the G20.

Up to now, it must be stressed, the middle powers have avoided taking the step toward a caucus formation. In part, this can be interpreted as a reflection of the heterogeneous character of the middle powers. If all of the MIKTA countries embraced their elevation to the “top table”—and aside from Indonesia embracing the opportunity to host the summit—they did so in diverse ways. South Korea was instrumental in shifting the focus from the global financial crisis alone to a wider agenda that includes international development, providing a differentiated agenda on development that focused on self-sustaining growth. Mexico also was ambitious in widening the ambit of attention on issues such as “green growth,” but also concentrated on the problem of youth employment. Although Australia wanted to keep to a “back to basics” agenda, the Brisbane Summit became embroiled in a much wider array of issues, including climate change and the status of Russia. The Turkish Summit points to a return to an ambitious agenda under the theme of “inclusiveness.” ²³

Nonetheless, these differences of style in the G20 cannot be said to serve in themselves as a serious impediment to caucus formation. After all, the BRICS gravitated together with much greater gaps in interests as witnessed by the sharp differences between China and Russia on the one side, and Brazil, India, and albeit explicitly South Africa on the other, on the issue of UNSC permanent status.

On top of the issues of style come substantial constraints on the thickening of the MIKTA identity. On the one hand, the MIKTA countries face a wide number of distractions and conflicting identities. Canada, Australia, and a wider if ever-changing group of countries in the earlier waves all had some element of a psychology or even ideology of being a middle power. The traditional middle powers also possessed active (even hyperactive) advocates of middle power activism, whether Lester Pearson and Lloyd Axworthy in Canada or H.V. Evatt, Gareth Evans, and Kevin Rudd in Australia.

The MIKTA countries lack this type of supportive environment. In part this is a function of partisan politics, but this is a barrier long evident in traditional middle powers as well. The difference is that the MIKTA members, outside of Australia, are either relatively new democracies (South Korea, Mexico, and Indonesia) or a country where democracy is under acute stress (Turkey, a situation exaggerated by the July 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath). And even in Australia there is a sharp contestation about the merits of a middle power identity and approach.

A case in point regarding the “thinness” of the middle power identity among the MIKTA countries is South Korea (see the article by Jongryn Mo in this issue for more detail). While the government of President Lee Myung-bak placed the language of middle powers at the heart of Korean diplomacy, the government of Park Geun-hye played down this image, preferring to emphasize the Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula, the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, and the government’s Eurasia Initiative. Having built up momentum through the work of a wide number of Korean think tanks and research centres, therefore, the middle power approach lost speed. ²⁴

Turkey is in a similar situation. Turkey has never openly declared itself a middle power and is unlikely to do so in the near future. Turkey appears to approach MIKTA as an instrumental means that could extend its global reach, rather than as a means of cementing a middle power identity (see the article by Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kurşun in this issue).

This segues into the key factor that prevents the MIKTA countries from more fully embracing a middle power psychology: the deeper set of competing interests and identities. All the MIKTA countries are pushed toward closer association by their global reach through the G20. The G20 offers the prospect of changing their image in terms of global projection. Not only does the G20 give the MIKTA countries entry to the premier forum dealing with global economic cooperation, but it also allows the MIKTA members to secure de facto delegative power over international financial institutions. The G20 also tasks the formal international organizations such as the IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the new Financial Stability Board, and reviews reports that they submit to the G20 ministers, working groups, and leaders for approval. G20 membership allows them also to have a privileged position on select security issues, for example, on Syria at the 2013 St. Petersburg G20.

But they are pulled back by other concerns. The alternative choice for the MIKTA countries of “going big” on their G20 membership is “going home”—that is, emphasizing their regional status. To be sure, this has been the separate track for all the MIKTA countries. Mexico pressed to build organizations beyond the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), notably the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Pacific Alliance (with Chile, Colombia, and Peru). The core institutional connections for Indonesia and Korea continue to be The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN plus 3, supplemented by other initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative in the case of Korea. Australia has demonstrated bursts of leadership in the regional context, although as illustrated by Kevin Rudd’s ambitious Asia Pacific Community initiative, this type of initiative possessed no guarantee of success. Turkey has extended its focus with the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

Of course it is possible that MIKTA member states could raise the stakes of a deeper association and move beyond a caucus to a summit process of its own. As argued elsewhere, this ambition has a logic to it ²⁵ in that the process replicates the trajectory of both the G7 and the BRICS as well as the G20 itself in moving from a ministerial meeting to an elevated leaders’ forum. But this move does not come without risks. For one thing, it necessitates the explicit application of a middle power identity. If not, why are Saudi Arabia and Argentina (also members of the G20 but outside the G7 and BRICS) not included? If this is because Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, or that Argentina has played a lead role in the G77, a signal to this effect should be made.

For another thing, it brings to the fore the issue of the distribution of diplomatic resources. Analogous to the ranking on nominal GDP, the MIKTA countries are placed in the upper ranks of global representation, yet in overall terms they stand behind the BRIC countries on this measure as well. Whereas China ranks 2nd in diplomatic representation (with 162 embassies and 87 consulates), Russia 4th (142/89), Brazil 7th (137/70), and India 12th (119/47), with South Africa trailing well behind (106/14), Turkey has moved well ahead among the MIKTA countries at 5th (132/80) with South Korea behind at 13th (116/47), Mexico at 14th (80/67), Indonesia at 20th (95/35), and Australia at 27th (78/30). ²⁶

Quite clearly MIKTA, by this profile, appears to have the credentials and ambition to be summit players on an autonomous basis. What stands in the way is the question of whether this degree of representation amounts to over-stretch. Turkey’s diplomatic profile is well out of proportion with its economic weight, with a heavy presence throughout its extended (and complicated) neighbourhood. ²⁷ And although Mexico’s representation is in proportion to its nominal GDP, the degree to which this diplomatic profile is tilted toward consulates in the US (focused on helping Mexican citizens living or travelling in the US who need assistance from their home government when dealing with US laws and legal system issues) is indicative of the tensions between a global reach and regional obligations.

Toward a hybrid model of middle power association?

Notwithstanding serious limitations, MIKTA has a salience that belies its initial modest design. However loose an association, MIKTA signals a willingness of a cluster of middle powers to hang together. Moving beyond the sounding out stage in September 2013, the first official meeting of MIKTA was held in Mexico City in April 2014, with a communiqué that signalled not the formation of a grouping but rather the initiation of a “dialogue” process that has continued up to the present.

Although refraining from following the path to a summit at the leaders’ level, in other ways MIKTA reproduces the mode of operation of the G7, G20, and BRICS as featured by such activities as the release of communiqués and joint declarations. Equally, however, there are signs of some network components being put into place, as illustrated by the move to consult academics on the role of MIKTA (although this process remains behind the concerted work by think tanks such as the Centre for International Governance Innovation [CIGI] and Brookings Institution on the L20/G20 in the early 2000s). ²⁸

Still, even a cautious approach does not avoid risks. As in the case of BRICS, gradualism takes the pressure off collective action and favours a process of trust building. In substance, some degree of a club culture can be built up with a minimization of difference and maximization of commonalities. Through a replica of this model, it is possible—and indeed likely—that MIKTA can maintain its incremental approach for a number of years. Adopting a low profile, and meeting largely on the edges of the annual UNGA opening or at the G20, MIKTA can “stay below the radar” of global debate.

Over time, though, this cautious approach will become more difficult. If it does very little because of the restrained style, MIKTA will become the target of criticism for being a talk shop. Moreover, if in declaratory statements MIKTA indicates that it is willing to subordinate global issues to specific regional issues of special interest to one member, then it will be evident that MIKTA serves only as a platform of convenience—leveraging attention on separate issues by individual members. Alternatively, if declarations on particular issues are not agreed on collectively—whether on IFI reform or on human rights—this non-action constitutes a signal that MIKTA is unable to forge a viable club culture with a common ideational or normative grounding.

Furthermore, operating for a protracted period of time exclusively as a dialogue process or consultative mechanism emphasizes the foreign ministry ownership of MIKTA. Notwithstanding the strengths of this approach, there is the risk that the relationship will still be defined in narrow, restrictive terms, not only about different national interests but also with respect to bureaucratic ownership.

An advance beyond this initial, cautious, trust-building stage is most likely to be taken on a niche or functional issue-specific basis. ²⁹ As telegraphed in a joint op-ed written by the MIKTA foreign ministers in November 2014, ³⁰ there are a number of scenarios in terms of policy targeting that are under consideration. One is the promotion of post-2015 development cooperation, with particular respect to infrastructure promotion. Another is a focus on health governance. The third is an emphasis on disaster risk management and humanitarian assistance.

Infrastructure promotion fits very well with the Korean initiative at the 2010 Seoul G20, a push that was not only substantively important but also contained huge symbolic importance. Whereas the first stage of the G20 dealt exclusively with crisis management of the global financial crisis, with the hosting functions performed by members of the traditional establishment, the Seoul Summit opened up the process both in terms of “actorness” and agenda. The health agenda gained some prominence at the third meeting of MIKTA foreign ministers on the sidelines of the UNGA in September 2014 with a joint statement expressing concern over the spread of the Ebola virus. ³¹ And significantly, MIKTA ministers and senior officials responsible for international development and humanitarian response met on the margins of the inaugural World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul on 23 May 2016. ³²

The problem with any of these choices, however, is one of comparative advantage. Both development and health governance are crowded areas with a large amount of overlap and competition. Whatever the ideational and material resources available to middle powers in the area of development, they remain in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the BRICS. Not only are the BRICS well positioned in terms of financial safety nets through the creation of the New Development Bank, ³³ but they have also demonstrated a capacity to take ambitious initiatives in the development/infrastructural domain. In the area of health governance, the MIKTA countries have to locate their initiatives next to the G7 (as in the case of the Muskoka initiative on maternal health). To carve out significant niches for MIKTA in these areas, therefore, is a formidable challenge.

Disaster risk management and humanitarian assistance appears to be more viable. All of the MIKTA countries have experience in this functional arena. Mexico assumed a high profile in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; Turkey and Korea mobilized impressive relief efforts in the Philippines after typhoon Haiyan, as did Australia in the context of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

The big question that remains is whether locating some significant niche will act as the defining mark for MIKTA. In terms of the distribution of global public goods, MIKTA’s embrace of this functional approach has some considerable attractiveness. Unlike either the G7 or the BRICS, there is no sensitivity about MIKTA projecting its collective effort to impose discipline or to challenge the status quo on a global basis.

Besides being done collectively, however, this functional approach by itself risks reducing, not enhancing, the middle power “brand” from previous eras. Unlike the first wave, there is no ambition to act as a manager of the system. Unlike the second wave, there is no emotional animation, with the occasional willingness to take on the great powers on an issue-specific basis.

Ultimately, the identity of the middle powers in MIKTA is not related to these countries being members of technically-oriented coalitions, as in the past; the identity is connected to their being pivotal members of the G20. It is this membership that has acted as the catalyst for collective thinking and potentially for operational activity.

The real test, and attendant risks, of MIKTA’s relevance is, therefore, likely still to be before us. With the confirmation through the G20 that the US can no longer dictate to the rest of the world, and especially China, and the BRICS as an entity, comes the recognition that the role of the G20 extends beyond acting in terms of economic governance. As the hub institution, the G20 will likely be the barometer of how effectively the global system can deal with the problems of both gridlock and crisis management into the geo-strategic sphere, whether on migration/refugee issues or the South China Seas, to name just two obvious candidates. ³⁴ With a massive stake in making the system—and the G20—work, it will be this role of entrepreneur and system stabilizers under increasingly uncertain and stressful conditions that determines the utility of the middle power model, whether activated in parallel or collective fashion. No less than in the past, the “rest” beyond the G20 has to be convinced that order allows universal benefits. No less than in the past, irresponsible actions of great power—both old and new—have to be restrained.