Positioning the third wave of middle power diplomacy: Institutional elevation,practice limitations

Profiling middle powers in the transforming conceptual framework: Rise of the functional understanding

By the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century, however, a fundamental if still incomplete transition took place. Although some legacy of attributing middle power status to large developing countries such as India and Brazil continues—with special regard to their role in World Trade Organization negotiations ⁶ —the interests and identity of these countries became more strongly associated with the BRICS. ⁷ In doing so these countries were more strongly associated with a fundamental challenge to the extant global order than issue-specific initiatives. ⁸

At the same time, the expansive repertoire of the second wave middle powers went through a turbulent period of growth and contraction. Using the space available in the post-Cold War period, a refined cluster of middle powers upgraded the intensity of their ideational and entrepreneurial roles. On the one hand, Canada, with Lloyd Axworthy as foreign minister, embraced an accentuated form of niche diplomacy. On the other hand, a number of non-traditional middle powers embraced this approach, with a resurgent Nelson Mandela-led South Africa the highest-profile illustration. ⁹ It is important to note that this second wave, rather than being antagonistic to the global order as it stood, wanted to stretch and refine that order. On questions of sovereignty, for instance, it is indicative of the ambition of this effort that the middle powers diverged not only from the US on issues such as land mines but the RIC (Russia, India, China) component of the BRICS.

The third wave defines middle powers more explicitly by their inclusion in the G20, the hub informal institution elevated to the leaders’ level amid the 2008 global financial crisis. In so doing, it privileges the core component of the “missing middle” within the G20 but outside the older G7 and the newer BRICS, namely Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia, or MIKTA. ¹⁰

The parsimony of this cluster is a major attraction in this reformulation. Instead of the diffuseness that complicated the first wave, with its long list of contentious accuracy, operating with small numbers allows a focused exploration of the nuances in terms of the nature of middle power status in comparative perspective.

Yet there are costs in sacrificing numbers for institutional coherence. Outside the MIKTA countries there stand countries whose own credentials as middle states remain strong despite some considerable contestation. The image of Canada as a “thick” middle power (both in terms of depth of self-perception as a middle power and ways of doing things in terms of diplomatic repertoire), notwithstanding its G7 role, remains embedded not only in declaratory but behavioural terms. ¹¹ Discarding Canada from the mix of middle powers is therefore a loss not only in terms of historical memory but substantive skill set. ¹²

The choice of the Jacob Zuma government in South Africa to embrace membership in the BRICS as opposed to a more diverse—and arguably more appropriate—role is, if anything, more detrimental. Despite official preference, the popularity of a middle power identity over BRICS status runs deep among South African academics and think tanks. While labelling Brazil—and certainly India—as middle powers is increasingly problematic in the twenty-first century, not least because of a lack of attraction of this model in the population at large, there is a robust comfort level with this self-identification across the societal divide in South Africa. As two South African academics conclude,

South Africans seem to implicitly support the idea that their country plays the role of being a middle power in world politics. This is one of the findings drawn from a public opinion survey [the first exclusively devoted to foreign policy since 1997] … on the views of ordinary South Africans. The survey, conducted for us by IPSOS/Markinor during October and November 2012, consisted of 3,500 face-to-face interviews—based on random sampling of South Africans aged 15 years and older—stratified for race, geography, age, religion and gender on a nationwide basis. ¹³

In search of the “missing middle”: Distinguishing the second and third waves of middle powers

Shifting from cast to context, the third wave defines the role of middle powers very differently in terms of relationship to great powers. The core attribute of the classic middle powers was to provide first followership to the hegemon of the global system, the US. This did not mean that these countries remained in lock step to the interests of the US. On a wide number of cases, the over-zealousness of the hegemon could be criticized with attempts to rectify it. Nor did it suggest that the repertoire of acting as “go-betweens” under conditions of East/West geopolitics were foregone. In overall terms, though, the generalized stance of traditional middle powers was to act as a reliable supporter for the US—and for that matter, the rest of the old establishment—on issues of global order. Through a wide spectrum of interpretation, middle powers were judged to be conscious and able agents of management of the global system, rescuing it from bouts of American isolationism or excessiveness in the advance of liberal internationalism.

The second wave stretched the contours of the relationship between the US and the middle powers. From a bottom-up perspective, traditional and non-traditional middle powers pushed the limits of what “loyal opposition” was in relation to the initiatives on land mines, the International Criminal Court, Responsibility to Protect, etc. If able to capitalize on the space available to them in the 1990s, greater discipline was exerted on them from a top-down perspective in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Akin to many smaller countries, they were pressed to be onside with the coalitions of the willing in the animation of the Iraq invasion. ¹⁴ Thus an important point of distinction between the first and the second wave middle powers appears to be their respective stance against the existing world order. The first wave middle powers tend to play a legitimizing role as the intermediary in the global political-economic structure, partly due to the benefits this can generate; while the second wave of “emerging”’ middle powers are more inclined to bargain and push for (although still with similar legitimizing characteristics) reform in the global architecture. ¹⁵ For instance, while BRICS, at the same time, have been trying to render the Western institutions into a more inclusive structure by actively participating and contributing to these bodies, they also try to stretch out the system by establishing new alternative institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB). ¹⁶

The great power context of the third wave prompted by the 2008 financial crisis was divergent on a number of counts. The MIKTA countries only gained inclusion to the G20 through the auspices of the US, with the status of strategic allies playing a key role. At the same time, though, this cluster of countries could no longer use their relationship with the US as their exclusive reference point. ¹⁷ Indeed, all MIKTA countries are pivotal states in the sense of their paramount geopolitical importance for the US. However, this is not a unidirectional relation since the US also needs them not only in terms of geopolitics but also in terms of the compromise they could foster. This reciprocal relation, in turn, feeds off the legitimate emergence of the third wave middle powers in the system. Although still viewing the US as the core locus of control, middle powers needed to be cognizant of the aspirations of the BRICS, especially in terms of the rise of China, on their interactions. ¹⁸

Although the global financial crisis brought with it renewed controversy about the extent of the US’s decline, ¹⁹ the implications of a waning hegemony for sources of leadership needed to be recognized and built into any operational response to the international system. In many ways this structural change opened up advantages for the middle powers. Rather than being able to “lay down the law” as it has done throughout the post-1945 era, the US had to negotiate and bargain. The system itself is not only more pluralistic but un-likeminded at the top tier of the hierarchy. The traditional “pyramid” model of decision making in international organizations and multilateral negotiations—where a small number of “club” insiders, for example, located in the IMF’s Executive Board and standing committees or the GATT’s “Quad” first make decisions among themselves and then impose them on the rest—has weakened or no longer applies. The change in the voting shares within financial institutions in favour of the rising powers—triggered by their solid pressure—is a good indicator of the transformation of this traditional “pyramid” model. In the same vein, the increasing number of executive staff from rising powers in these institutions also demonstrates a new era in which the US has to deal with new bargaining strategies. ²⁰ Emerging states—and to some extent transnational non-state groups—whose cooperation is essential to solving a growing number of global issues simply would not accept such a unilateral decision-making norm.

As showcased by the penetration of traditional non-great powers to the apex of power, the greater diffuseness of the system makes the context of relationships far more complicated. Faced with the challenge from a cluster of dynamic “rising” states and increasingly influential non-state actors, stark judgments had to be made about the challenges to the middle powers in terms of status and influence. Yet, rather than simply accepting a logic of decline, opportunities from this shifting environment must be acknowledged as well. If global affairs are moving toward an accentuated form of “multipolarity,” in which power coalesces around a small number of dominant poles, middle powers may well be relegated to a subordinate role. However, under the assumption of non-polarity, “a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power,” ²¹ the position could be enhanced. In this new context, since there is a clear diversification in the tools of middle powers, resulting in the exercise of different kinds of power in global governance, the reductionist explanations of structural/hierarchical positioning of them seem to be ill-suited to explain third wave middle powers such as MIKTA. As highlighted by the framework article by Andrew Cooper, close attention needs to be paid both to the diffuseness of power structure and the new forms of informalism available to middle powers. As the formation of MIKTA shows, there is greater space for some degree of institutionalization, although the degree in the shift from parallel to collective action remains open.

These opportunities are expanded by the differences between BRICS and middle powers in world order. While rising states have exhibited a willingness to work within established but reformed international institutions as a means of status enhancement, the extent to which they want to embrace this multilateral main game rather than national interest ²² and/or alternative global/regional institutional options where they have more autonomy continues to be ambiguous. Put another way, it is unclear whether rising states prefer to work through core, club-like mechanisms, or to use other parallel forms of international co-ordination. ²³ Working within the established institutions rather than seeking to create parallel bodies brings with it an increasing necessity for mutual responsibility. However, some argue that the attitude toward the established order on the part of rising powers could be a reflection of the degree to which they push democratic international political discourses. ²⁴

More than the first and second wave, it is the contradictions of the third wave with regard to middle powers that stand out. In terms of institutionalized agency, opportunities have become available as never before. Middle powers have long been placed in a subordinate position within the global order by informal concerts of power. At the origins of this system, a number of secondary European nations (including the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland) brought delegations to the 1814–15 Congress of Vienna, but they were not admitted to the core group. ²⁵ At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, participation by second-tier countries was opened to a widened geographic perspective (specifically Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), but this form of representation was designed for ratification only. ²⁶ The core decisions were made by the great powers—the Big Four of the US, the UK, France, and Italy. Although middle powers made their voices heard through the creation of the new universal organizations via the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, they were explicitly excluded from the key informal meetings at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. It was at these meetings that the leaders of the great powers hammered out the shape of the geopolitical architecture of the post-1945 world. ²⁷

What is different in the post global financial crisis era is that, for the first time in global governance, middle powers have been brought to the “high table” with an equivalency of bigger states. Certainly in terms of the “rise of the informals” ²⁸ the world looks more polycentric. After the first three G20 summits, middle powers have dominated the hosting function. South Korea hosted the G20 summit in November 2010, and served as co-host with Canada in June 2010. Mexico hosted the G20 in Los Cabos in 2012. Australia hosted the G20 in Brisbane in 2014. And Turkey hosted the G20 in Antalya in 2015. With this hosting function, these new middle powers have the chance to bring new issues about global governance to the table. South Korea emphasizes the diversification of development practices, Australia focuses on stronger economic growth, and Turkey stresses inclusivity.

As in the past, nonetheless, it is the weaknesses as much as the strengths of the smaller cluster of middle powers that require elaboration. In large part these are subjective limitations related to embedded perceptions concerning self-definition of identity and interests. The role of Canada as a “thick” middle power has been inculcated into the national DNA. A similar, if still younger, mentality evolved in South Africa. Still, even in these countries, there is a contestation. The embrace of middle power status has an ingrained partisan or ideological flavour, in that the model is associated with a particular party (Liberal) in Canada or presidency (Mandela/Mbeki) in South Africa. Moreover, the political backlash has been reinforced by a dichotomy between a positive traditional psychological representation of being in the middle and current, more embellished self-images. Abetted by membership in forums of a self-elective membership, the emphasis is on upward mobility through the ranks of the global hierarchy.

Making sense of institutionalization of the third wave middle powers: The case of MIKTA

This debate is no less problematic in the countries at the heart of the third wave middle power trajectory. Although each MIKTA country has some component of a middle power identity, it is a thin identity. How, when, and why this identity was shaped and plays out differs considerably. Even more than in the case of Canada and South Africa, furthermore, the relevance of this identity has been debated at great length. As the BRICS identity has formed around the notion of “rising powers,” the middle power identity of the third wave countries must debate rival definitions.

Mexico has never explicitly endorsed the middle power concept, ²⁹ although as Günther Maihold argues in his article, the narrative of Mexico acting as a bridge is attractive. As Maihold suggests, notwithstanding a number of constraints, MIKTA serves as a valuable vehicle for coming to terms with the dilemmas of marginalization in Latin America and bilateralization with the US. However, whether as a simple platform for dialogue or as a serious, multilateral cooperation mechanism, MIKTA involves specific challenges for countries with multiple affiliations like Mexico.

Awidya Santikajaya points to Indonesia’s intermediary status between a BRICS and a middle power, demanding some reordering of the established system of global governance while still supportive of the order. Akin to Mexico, a core Indonesian narrative is that of a bridge builder, acting as a middle-way player and mediator. Indonesia prefers to stay in the middle of an uncertain and unpredictable transformation of global governance. This wait-and-see attitude, on the one hand, has resulted in Indonesia’s flexible foreign policy and its ability to engage with different actors without being overly reliant on any of them. On the other hand, Indonesia’s middle-way approach restrained Indonesia from taking a consistently innovative initiative. Regarding MIKTA, for instance, Indonesia has decided to display a moderate ambition and has not yet shown a significantly great interest in it.

As Jongryn Mo highlights, the nature of Korea’s middle power orientation must be nuanced in relation to both the differences and the similarities among the Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye governments. ³⁰ Moreover, as Mo details, the association with this identity in Korea is restricted to specific state officials, not society more generally. Lacking strong grassroots support and strongly influenced by presidents’ personal agendas, South Korea’s middle power diplomacy has been uneven and inconsistent across different administrations. Regional challenges, most notably the North Korean nuclear program, have also acted as a significant distraction on middle power diplomacy by appropriating large foreign policy resources including time, human resources, and budget.

In their article, Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kurşun showcase Turkey’s civilizational attributes and imperial past. If Turkey is a middle power, it is from this perspective a geographic construct. Furthermore, being the only middle power that has a great power legacy inherited from its Ottoman past, the Turkish leaders have not identified or cast the country with a middle power role; rather they have emphasized Turkey’s “central country” function. ³¹ However, as outlines in the article, Turkey is disposed to use middle power tools when necessary. The authors use an embedded analytical framework to understand middle powers’ goals, means, and impact with regard to positional, behavioural and ideational factors in some key cases. Parlar Dal and Kurşun ask to what extent Turkey can play a middle power role under the umbrella of MIKTA, and they argue that although Turkey possesses the proper goals, means, and impact to act in harmony alongside this third wave of middle powers, it needs to channel its capabilities with a solid road map regarding its future trajectory within MIKTA.

Australia’s attachment to the model is the thickest among the third wave countries. Still, it must be noted that this identity has long been stronger when the Labor party, not the Liberal/National Coalition, is in office. ³² As Susan Harris Rimmer argues in her article, MIKTA has attracted positive attention with Australia’s current Coalition government, as part of a new emphasis on minilateral dialogues that extends also into important bilateral and plurilateral processes. Harris Rimmer discusses at some length how Australia’s skill could be embellished in these minilateral dialogues.

This unevenness of approach is complicated further by the hybridity of this third wave cluster as both middle power and strongly embedded in distinctive regions. ³³ Unlike the BRICS, these secondary powers do not dominate their regions economically or geopolitically. But more so than many other countries historically labelled middle powers. They remain rooted—arguably trapped—in those regions, even as they are under pressure to break free and take on a global reach. If Canada has moved to take on a global role, it was in the context of a lack of region (a regional power without a region), as underlined in later decades by how difficult it was for Canada to sustain a coherent diplomatic approach to the Asia-Pacific, the Americas, and Europe. With South Africa facing an even greater dilemma because of deep-seated suspicions in its “own” region, the third wave of middle powers was pushed into a global role notwithstanding the pull back, which made it difficult to escape their geographic location. Without G20 membership and the attributes associated with a middle power, by contrast, a wider cluster of regional powers (whether Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, or Pakistan) does not face the pressure to take on a higher-profile global role.

Nevertheless, these third wave middle powers, in contrast to the BRICS or the traditional middle powers, are nascent actors, most visibly in the cases of Turkey, Mexico, and Indonesia. In a sense, they can also be fairly portrayed as “emerging” middle powers. Although the literature leans toward distinguishing the regional actors from the middle actors, the “emerging” middle powers again appear as shuttling between the regional and global with a strong attachment to their respective regions.

Indeed, it is an acknowledged reality that “emerging” middle powers, for example, South Africa, have strong leverage in their regions in the sense that they are the reference points of “enmity or amity.” And since regional crises appear to be increasing in the 2010s, these “emerging” middle powers are no longer willing to confine their actions locally. They tend more to act globally in contrast to previous “emerging” middle powers. MIKTA’s position here becomes more interesting and needs further analysis.

The “emerging” middle powers in MIKTA, while trying to reduce their involvement with the regional crises, tend toward the global to maintain their functional position in the global order. Thus MIKTA countries have shown an increasing inclination toward the global but at the same time MIKTA seems to need additional “emerging” middle powers that are real and active regional powers in its organizational structure. Therefore, the discussions about enlarging MIKTA by including regional powers (such as Nigeria) make sense: although these countries have a broad geographical reach, their manoeuvring capacities in their respective regions appear somewhat limited.

This special issue offers an attractive—and timely—opportunity, then, to explore a combination of older and newer themes. A key dynamic that runs through the entire issue is the innovative, albeit nascent and awkward, advance of the third wave of middle powers toward some form of collective action via the MIKTA group. This shift in orientation, with serious implications of the thickening of middle power identity, necessitates an extended analysis of both the motivations of the individual countries involved and also the impact of joint action. In the most ambitious scenario, a consolidation of MIKTA could facilitate an extension of the older managerial role focused on global order, albeit using the informal forums in and around the G20, not the UN, as the prime vehicle.

This advance does not disguise the fact that the differences between the third wave cluster of middle powers outweigh their similarities. The move toward reproducing the type of informal institutional structure forged by the G7 and the BRICS remains wobbly and slow. Indeed, it must be recognized that a move toward elevation of this initiative to the leaders’ level may never occur. As a collective cluster, it is highly unlikely that the MIKTA countries will be able to engage in a materially driven initiative such as the BRICS New Development Bank, which leaves the possibility of MIKTA being a bank of ideational and entrepreneurial innovation instead, leaving space for functional delivery conducted initiatives to be done either in a loose parallel fashion or through ad hoc coalitions.

In either case, with the tradition of middle power identity behind it, and a common point of interaction through the G20 to encourage momentum, the third wave of middle powers merits examination. As Bruce Gilley concludes, the possession on the part of middle powers of not too much power but power enough gives them unique opportunities. Yet taking advantage of these opportunities requires a strategic sense that is not easy to develop and deploy. Whatever the tangible impact of MIKTA, however, the presence of a club of middle powers gives this cluster of countries a foundation long missing. The process of thickening of the middle power identity in such a diverse set of countries is not inevitable. But if status is an important driver of international politics—as the literature increasingly indicates—the attractions of this trajectory are clear. As the construct of the G20 signals, a middle power status is a move up from being a regional power. With this greater status come greater responsibilities, including the role of bridge building between the traditional establishment in the G7 and the assertive BRICS. The third wave of middle powers exist in complex regions—a structurally imposed given with no complete escape. At the same time, though, the lure of a self-created identity that encourages ambition through diplomacy has considerable attraction. It is the struggle between these two conditions that sets the scene for the individual contributions in this special issue.