Abstract
Reviewed by : J.L. Granatstein, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Toronto jgranatstein@rogers.com
That defence procurement in Canada has been and is a mess is beyond dispute. From the Ross Rifle at the turn of the century to the CF-105 Arrow, from the botched Sea King helicopter replacement to the Iltis jeep, the continuing F-35 fighter debacle, and a host of other delayed equipment purchases, Canadian governments and the Canadian defence establishment have wasted years and billions of dollars and left the nation’s defenders exposed to unnecessary risk. The title, Charlie Foxtrot, is military speak for Cluster F@#k, and that derogatory title lays out the scope of the mess. Kim Nossal’s clearly written and well-researched book offers good history and calm judgments that tell us how Ottawa might do better.
The blame for this situation rests on many. First in line is the Canadian people. With the sole exception of the early Cold War years when Louis St. Laurent’s Liberal government spent up to 8 percent of GDP on the armed forces, Canadians have never been willing to pay for defence at a level that would provide the military with the best weaponry. We have been easy riders, Nossal says rightly enough, willing to be marginal players militarily and happy to let the Americans defend us, moaning about protecting Canadian sovereignty notwithstanding. It’s always defence on the cheap. But it’s not only the people’s fault. The military for the last 65 years or so has always wanted to be capable of filling all combat roles, something that the easy riding voters will not pay for, but something that the generals and admirals call for without cessation lest their service be sharply cut. That Cabinet ministers have gone along with this while knowing that they would never provide the funds necessary for state-of-the-art equipment for all three services puts them to shame as well. The result, Nossal states bluntly, is that Canada is not “a serious country” (147).
This situation persists. Today there are three ministers responsible for defence procurement, a virtual guarantor of delays and turf wars. There is the high and increasing inflation of defence costs, not least in naval vessels and aircraft. The ever-increasing US dollar exchange rate runs up costs. There is the ongoing scarcity of experienced procurement specialists in the Department of National Defence, a legacy of the Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin budget cuts in the mid-1990s that laid off the experts. There is the insistence on domestic offsets for foreign purchases, something that makes every purchase cost more. (The Iltis jeeps cost $26,500 in Germany but $84,000 each when made in Canada!) There is a reluctance to purchase off-the-shelf equipment and an insistence on tailoring ships or trucks or aircraft to ultra-specific Canadian requirements. And there are the games the political parties play with defence, something they can get away with because they are certain that the voters don’t care. Every minister, every journalist, every informed voter knows that Canada will only fight a war with alliance partners; let someone else provide the muscle and machinery. Not a serious country.
So how can this be fixed? It’s no use trying for a silver bullet solution, Nossal argues correctly; there is none. Instead, governments should strive for a Liberal–Conservative bipartisan policy (he rightly and deliberately omits the New Democrats, Greens, and Bloc Québécois from serious consideration here, their perennial defence foolishness ruling them out) that gives the nation the defence forces and equipment that it will accept and be willing to pay for. We need aircraft to defend North America because of our alliance with the United States, and those aircraft must be able to operate seamlessly with the United States Air Force. We need ships that can patrol our waters and cooperate with the United States Navy. Everything else is, in effect, discretionary, and Canadian defence procurement should focus on what must be acquired for these roles. That doesn’t mean an end to the army, but it does mean prioritizing equipment purchases.
To achieve a bipartisan policy, Nossal calls for a continuous review of defence by a joint committee of members of parliament and senators, the object being to achieve buy-in on military roles and equipment. He wants White Papers produced on a regular basis and calls for ministers to support them because they understand and accept the fiscal implications, not simply to get defence off the Cabinet table for a few months. Such changes in the political process, Nossal argues, just might make Canadian defence procurement work better than it does. It could hardly work worse.
Nossal’s is a call for action that deserves serious consideration. Unfortunately, as he has noted, Canada is not a serious country, so we all know that nothing will be done, no matter which political party leads.