Abstract
Reviewed by: Laszlo Sarkany, King’s University College, University of Western Ontario, lsarkan@uwo.ca
Presidential elections such as the recent contest between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are not the only reason why US domestic politics matter. US domestic politics matter significantly for US foreign policymaking as well. In 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry noted that one of the reasons why the US has not intervened militarily in Syria is because the US Senate would not give its consent. 1
Elise Labott and Ryan Browne, “John Kerry in leaked audio: ‘I lost the argument’ with ... ” cnnPolitics, 4 October 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/01/politics/kerry-audio-recording-syria/ (accessed 24 October 2016).
Yet, of course, just as foreign policymaking in the US and elsewhere is not deemed very important for electoral politics, the key processes and actors are largely disregarded, or are only extended superficial importance. The outcome of US foreign policy seems to matter the most. Markedly more attention is paid, for example, to the fact that the US has not intervened militarily in Syria, or that it has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), than to what domestic political dynamics were at play in either case.
One key aspect of US foreign policymaking that puzzles scholars and observers alike is the American reluctance to join multilateral treaties. As of 2005, out of 550 treaties that were deemed relevant for the US, only 160 had been ratified (4). This 30 percent success rate is quite intriguing given the central role of the US in global affairs.
Johannes Thimm’s work is a valuable and timely addition to the discussions and debates over the following questions: “Why is the United States so reluctant to join global multilateral treaties? And, how does it determine which treaties to join?” (1) Given that the US joins so few international treaties, the key question Thimm explores is “not why the United States does not support more treaties, but rather how it manages to join any binding international treaties at all” (2). The author quite lucidly argues—while also testing power-based and cultural explanations—that the sources of US reluctance to join multilateral treaties are key domestic political actors and processes.
The work strikes a methodological balance between “single case studies and macro surveys” by developing the argument with the aid of four carefully chosen treaties (3). US foreign policymaking is tested in relation to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), and Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which the US has ratified, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Landmines Treaty) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which the US has not ratified (10). The discussion of the treaties is embedded in clear and concise discussions of the international and domestic dimensions of the involvement of the US in negotiating these treaties, and considering them for ratification. A further very valuable aspect of this work is that the author spends considerable “space and ink” explaining the US foreign policymaking processes in each of the cases, highlighting key and relevant institutions, and—given the main explanatory tools used in the work— “veto players” such as senators and presidents.
Overall, Thimm concludes that “it is much easier to block a treaty than to secure its ratification” (245). Joining multilateral treaties in the US seems to come down to veto players, which may include such domestic political actors as presidents, different departments within US government, civil society groups, and even “private interests.” Thimm notes, however, that “not all actors involved … have the same political weight,” and that coalition building among veto players is critical. Even “presidential leadership” may be trumped by a “determined opposition” (246).
It is difficult to find error in the work, save the use of double negatives in a sentence, or an error as a result of a missed key stroke on the key board—Trinidad recommended the establishment of an international criminal court in 1989 as opposed to in “1999,” as it appears in the text (57). What does leave the reader contemplating is whether an institutions-based argument may not also be appropriate. Given the complex nature of treaty ratification in the US, should the institutional complexities not also be factored into the explanatory calculus? Thimm notes that the US’s timid approach—if not often outright opposition—to multilateral treaties is “the result of America’s unique institutions. It is these institutions we should focus on” (249). The author observes that institutions do not change, and therefore, as is vogue with scientific inquiry, variables are more important than constants. However, ample evidence is put forth in this work to suggest that institutions do constrain, condition, enable, and empower social action. Therefore, more emphasis on the institutional environment—in addition to the actors-based explanation—should also be a part of the explanation. It would, for example, be quite interesting to discern the negotiating history of Article 2, section 2, clause 1 of the US Constitution, which sets the institutional parameters for treaty ratification.
In the final analysis, one is compelled to agree with Thimm. Familiarity with the US foreign policymaking process as well as the impact of domestic political actors in foreign policymaking is key to understanding why the US joins some treaties and why it does not join others. Awareness of the role that processes and actors play in US treaty acceptance most certainly aids US as well as foreign negotiators alike (248).