Abstract
Reviewed by: Joe Landry (joseph.landry@carleton.ca ), Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
The CBC Massey Lectures are considered to be a bit of a Canadian institution, with renowned authors and public intellectuals invited to weigh in on some of the most pressing issues of the day. Jennifer Welsh, with her impeccable record in academia and multilateral politics, was a fitting choice for this year’s iteration of the lectures. Welsh uses the seminal 1989 essay by Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” as a jumping-off point for her thesis. Fukuyama famously argued that Western liberal democracy had won out over communism and socialism as the “final form of human government.” 1 In contrast, Welsh’s thesis challenges Fukuyama’s proclamation of liberal victory.
She highlights four key areas where history as we know it is “returning.” The first is “barbarism,” and here Welsh focuses on the horrendous actions of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). She decries the group’s lack of respect for human dignity and its flagrant violations of international humanitarian law. She argues that the actions taken by ISIS over the past few years harken back to medieval times, and represent a major challenge to international law and security.
The second theme Welsh explores is the return of mass flight. The migration crisis emanating from the Syrian civil war has had a devastating toll on neighbouring Middle Eastern countries first and foremost, with the strain on European countries also reaching a breaking point. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, over 4.8 million people have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, with over one million having requested asylum in Europe. Welsh argues that this level of mass flight has not been seen since the Second World War, and notes that it represents an unprecedented challenge to Western liberal democracies. Indeed, Welsh advocates compassion and openness, pointing to Canada as an example—at the same time recognizing that we are fortunate to be able to screen and select those coming into our country, while the nations of Europe have no such luxury.
The third area of focus is the West’s relations with Russia. In the decade following the Cold War, Russia underwent significant democratic reforms, with many analysts assuming that the country would adopt a governmental structure akin to its European neighbours. However, the reign of Vladimir Putin has brought much of that into question. While Russia is a democracy in name, a closer look at the political reality uncovers astonishing levels of repression and intimidation. Numerous opposition leaders have been targeted with assassination, smearing, spying, and erroneous criminal charges. Couple this with a renewed aggression against Western allies—in particular in Ukraine—and retaliatory Western sanctions, and Welsh’s point becomes clear.
Finally, Welsh explores the theme of economic inequality, which she rightly points out is rising in the West. Both in North America and Western Europe, the share of the economic pie owned by the top 1% has increased exponentially. In the United States, “the top 20% of US households own more than 84% of the wealth, and the bottom 40% combine for a paltry 0.3%.” 2 This uncomfortable truth is something that Western governments are struggling to deal with, as the general population continues to feel that the economic system is rigged against them. Welsh notes that the rise of populism in the West is a direct result of this rising inequality, and that this situation risks pitting class against class.
Overall, Welsh paints a compelling picture of the return of history. Each of the themes she explores has had drastic effects on the political reality of Western countries. At the time of writing, Welsh did not have the analytical advantage of knowing of Donald Trump’s eventual ascent to the presidency, although she does touch on his resounding, unpredictable success in the Republican primaries. His victory vindicates many of her points, illustrating that the populist movement in the twenty-first century is stronger than ever before. On the other hand, Trump’s win may poke a hole in Welsh’s theory with regard to the return of the Cold War, as his ties with Russia seem to have resulted in a softening of the American posture toward that country. Nevertheless, Russia and Europe now seem to be at loggerheads more so than at any time since the Cold War ended, so perhaps Welsh is indeed on to something.
While the majority of the arguments presented by Welsh are persuasive, overall the book comes off as a bit alarmist. Welsh does note that every generation is fated to put more weight on the events of its own time as opposed to those that have occurred in the past, yet she may be making the same mistake herself. Yes, the migration crisis, ISIS, Russia, inequality, and the rise of populism all represent significant challenges to the Western liberal order, but at the same time, we have made massive strides in terms of global prosperity and peace. The poverty rate was halved between 1990 and 2010, five years ahead of the 2015 Millennium Development Goal schedule. The number of people killed in war is the lowest it has been since the end of World War II. Medical advances have drastically increased our lifespans, both in the developed and developing worlds, and the global economy is now irreversibly integrated to a level never before seen. These facts do not mean that we are living in a utopia, surely. However, they do point to a global order that is not on the precipice of disaster, but rather on a path of steady improvement. Massive shifts in power are bound to occur, but these will be driven more by population size and economic development (mainly in Asia) than by interstate warfare as we have seen in the past. To sum up, Welsh may indeed be right that we are seeing the return of history; however, it will only be nominally recognizable.
