Abstract
While Stephen Harper’s foreign policy sparked heated debates during his entire tenure as prime minister, these debates were mainly confined to Canadian foreign policy circles. Little attention was paid to allies’ perceptions of these developments and, more specifically, to the perception of the United States, Canada’s main economic and security partner. How did the Bush and Obama administrations perceive these changes? Were they seen as a break from Canada’s past? Did Harper’s handling of foreign policy alter White House calculations with respect to Canada? Based on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted in Washington DC with executive officials a few months prior to the end of the Harper era in 2015, this essay shows that despite a widespread perception in Washington that Canada’s foreign policy approach had changed under Harper, partisanship was the main dividing line in terms of how this approach was perceived and assessed.
Keywords
Over a period of almost ten years (2006–2015), the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper distanced itself somewhat from Canada’s internationalist past, which had been the dominant approach for over sixty years. Through a series of adjustments in tone and policy, Harper brought Canada’s foreign policy more in line with Conservative values. 1 His government was critical of liberal internationalism on the grounds that it compromised Canada’s core principles and values. 2 At the Conservative Party convention in 2011, the prime minister declared, “In the world, we must also have a purpose and that purpose is no longer just to go along and get along with everyone else’s agenda. It is no longer to please every dictator with a vote at the United Nations[.]… Moral ambiguity, moral equivalence are not options; they are dangerous illusions[.]… [W]e know where our interests lie and who our friends are.” 3 Moreover, contrary to his predecessors, Harper portrayed Canada as a valiant fighter defending its interests and values in places such as Afghanistan, Libya, and the Arctic. The intensity and consistency of his support for the state of Israel was a departure from previous governments. Harper’s unequivocal pro-Israel stance was part of a broader attempt by the Conservatives to transform Canada’s foreign policy identity. 4 Finally, Harper’s government did not hesitate to unilaterally withdraw from international agreements when the latter were deemed to be contrary to the Conservatives’ definition of Canada’s national interests. The unilateral withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 and the withdrawal attempt from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2012 were perfect illustrations of this.
These reorientations led observers to argue that the Conservative government had initiated a break with the past. 5 Although this view was contested by some analysts, 6 it nonetheless led Justin Trudeau, on the day following his 2015 victory, to proclaim in a message to Canada’s allies, “Many of you have worried that Canada has lost its compassionate and constructive voice in the world over the past 10 years. Well, I have a simple message for you: on behalf of 35 million Canadians, we’re back.” 7
While Harper’s foreign policy sparked heated debates during his entire tenure as prime minister, these debates were mainly confined to Canadian foreign policy circles. Little attention was paid to the allies’ perceptions of these developments and, more specifically, to those of the United States Canada’s main economic and security partner. Yet Harper’s foreign policy adjustments occurred while Canada and the United States were dealing with some challenging foreign policy issues, from the Israel–Palestine conflict to the Iran nuclear deal and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. How, then, did the Bush and Obama administrations perceive these changes? Were they seen as a break from Canada’s past? Did Harper’s handling of foreign policy alter White House calculations with respect to Canada? These questions are important on at least two accounts: first, they address the impact that significant foreign policy changes in Canada can have on Canada–US relations. Second, they are in line with past research on US attitude and perception toward Canadian foreign policy, and they offer a fresh look on this important issue. 8
First, this paper presents a theoretical argument linking partisan ideology to perceptions. Second, it assesses the validity of this argument using evidence from semi-structured interviews conducted in Washington DC in the spring of 2015, with officials who worked under the Bush and Obama administrations. The paper shows that top US executive officials from both of these administrations noted a clear departure from traditional internationalism under Harper. However, partisanship in Washington conditioned this perception, with executive officials tending to focus on different explanatory factors in accounting for these changes, and arriving at different assessments of Harper’s foreign policy. Overall, officials working for the Bush administration praised Harper’s foreign policy for its principles and clear moral values. Democratic officials were more cynical, and sometimes irritated, by the behaviour of the Canadian government. They emphasized that Harper’s rhetoric and positions often served domestic and, more specifically, ethnic interests, rather than real international objectives. 9
Perceptions and partisanship
Leaders can only make sense of their political environment by simplifying reality and making assumptions to compensate for unknowns. 10 Their political assessments are derived from a series of cognitive filters shaped by their belief systems and mental images of the world, rather than on the basis of objective reality. To understand foreign policy decisions, analysts must therefore reconstruct the world as it is perceived by decision-makers. 11 In the context of Canada–US relations, I argue that US executive officials’ perceptions of Canada’s foreign policy adjustments under Stephen Harper were primarily conditioned by the ideological beliefs and the values put forward by the administrations for which they worked.
In an essay exploring the sources of turmoil in Canada–US relations, Charles Doran points to ideological differences as a central factor in accounting for why this relationship periodically experiences communication and coordination failure. 12 Observers generally expect that mixed tandems, be they Republican/Liberal or Democratic/Conservative, will create discord, given the partners’ relative distance on the ideological spectrum. The differing responses of the Reagan/Trudeau tandem regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative, or of the Bush/Chrétien pair regarding the war in Iraq illustrate that leaders sometimes come from different planets in terms of values and ideologies. Trump’s “America First” and Trudeau’s “Canada is Back” orientations offer a timely illustration of such different ideologies and values living side by side. And as Doran argues, “[W]hen the natural cement of a common political party outlook and common ideological base … is not present to smooth and accommodate interstate relations, the bureaucracies on either side of the border also fail to interact effectively.” 13
Conversely, the argument maintains that “unified” tandems, be they Democratic/Liberal or Republican/Conservative, will work well or at least better and lead to more cooperative measures, given that the partners are relatively closer on the political spectrum—even though the right and left in the United States and Canada are context-specific and result from different political cultures. The Reagan/Mulroney duo led to the Free Trade Agreement, and the Obama/Trudeau “bromance” illustrated a strong community of views between the Democratic president and the Liberal prime minister, even if the tandem did not actually achieve much for Canada–US relations, partly because it lasted little more than a year. Based on this argument, I postulate that US partisanship regarding foreign policy impacted the executive elites’ perceptions of Harper’s foreign policy changes.
Douglas Nord contends that the analysis and discourse on US perceptions of Canada have been dominated by Canadian scholars and journalists. 14 I tend to agree with this observation. Thus, to evaluate the accuracy of the argument presented above, this paper gives the floor to top US executive officials by reporting their perceptions as accurately and systematically as possible. The research is based on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted in Washington DC a few months prior to the end of the Harper era in 2015. 15 It focuses on the assessment both of former and then-current senior US foreign policy executives from the State Department, National Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense (DoD), and US embassy in Ottawa. More specifically, interviews were conducted with then-current White House National Security Council Director for North American Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and Director of Canadian Affairs at the Department of State, and with the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Deputy Chief of Mission at the US embassy in Ottawa, and all US ambassadors to Canada during Stephen Harper’s tenure, with the exception of Bruce Heyman. These officials all dealt with the Canadian government on a regular basis on issues related to diplomacy, security, defence, and commerce.
Washington’s general perception of Harper’s shift
The common perception in Washington was that Canadian foreign policy had changed under Stephen Harper, and no one entertained the idea that Canada stood out as a liberal internationalist force. 16 Canada was seen as pursuing a more assertive foreign policy expressed in terms of conservative moral principles. In the words of one former official, “Canada has been clear in its moral stance, very supportive of Israel. Very clear to where it stands.” 17 Another emphasized the change with respect to Canada’s mobilized resources on the international stage: “Canada used to see itself as a catalyst for multilateral consensus building. Lloyd Axworthy was the proponent of soft power. Canada’s foreign policy today is not at all predicated on that kind of view. If anything, it has evolved more towards some expression of hard power and less focused on multilateral institutions and more focused on Canada’s view and ability to be a catalyst to drive outcomes.” 18 Even though Canada unilaterally defected from the Kyoto protocol in 2011 and criticized the United Nations (UN) for its inefficiency and moral relativism, most US officials did not perceive the Conservative government as withdrawing from world affairs. In fact, most officials stated that Canada was more engaged on security issues. With the positions that Harper had taken on Ukraine, Israel, and Iran, it was said that “Canada ha[d] stepped up on the world stage, more so than ten years [previously].” 19
Only one official suggested that Harper’s foreign policy was a mixture of both more and less engagement in the world. “In some areas, they’re further out than they ever have been, I think, and in some areas they have retreated under the Conservative government.” 20 Canada was more deeply engaged on issues such as Ukraine, ISIS, the Ebola crisis, and in contributing to the global climate fund, which was not expected by the Obama administration. At the same time, the Harper government considered the possibility of retreating from the OSCE in 2012, for instance, which was a significant concern for the Obama administration, given the importance of this organization for the United States. The Harper government’s idea was that Europe was peaceful and no longer required the OSCE. Moreover, Harper felt that, as the sixth-largest contributor to the OSCE but with few senior positions in the organization, Canada did not see much of a return on its OSCE investment, and could save resources by leaving the organization. 21 In Washington, the news that the Canadians were on the verge of leaving the OSCE was a serious concern, with the Obama administration fearing that, if Canada pulled out, other members might do likewise. The US administration ultimately helped convince the Canadians to stay in the organization.
Overall, the fact that the US officials noted the change in Canada’s foreign policy approach is not really surprising, considering that US officials do not work in isolation: they talk to their Canadian counterparts, read Canadian newspapers, watch Canadian news networks, and, in some cases, are in touch with Canadian journalists and foreign policy scholars. Nonetheless, these officials’ perceptions were consistent from the Bush to the Obama administrations. Their comments showed without a doubt that Stephen Harper’s foreign policy adjustments, in terms of both tone and substance, were well understood in Washington and signalled a departure from liberal internationalism.
Yet there was a discrepancy between Washington’s perception and that of many Canadian scholars and journalists regarding the scope of Harper’s foreign policy transformation. While some in Canada qualified these changes as a break from the past and criticized the Harper government for being divisive in tone and uncompromising in its demands, US officials somewhat downplayed their significance. The changes were viewed as fitting into the broader international context. Harper’s foreign policy was seen as part of a long-developing transition for Canada, rather than as a break from prior governments. Canada’s involvement in combat operations in Afghanistan, Canada–US norm security harmonization, and the steady reduction in Canada’s contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts were already in place when the Conservatives were elected. 22 While these changes did not play well into Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin’s internationalist agenda, they were fully assumed and valued under Harper. According to some US officials, those in Canada who overemphasized the magnitude of these changes were taking a very domestic, even egocentric, view, and disregarding the fact that the world and security issues had significantly changed around Canada and the United States since 9/11. This difference in perception between Washington’s political elites and many Canadian scholars is revealing. US officials appeared to be more detached from the subject; they focused on the big picture and assessed Canada’s external behaviour through a world politics angle. Canadian scholars, according to this reading, had a narrower view and were more engaged in partisan and identity politics.
From macro to micro-case analysis
Moving on to specific policy issues, this section seeks to deepen the investigation by exploring US perceptions of this change in foreign policy approach through five important and sometimes contentious international issues: the Israel–Palestine conflict, the Iran nuclear deal, the Keystone XL pipeline saga, burden-sharing in Afghanistan, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These cases were selected for two reasons: they highlight Harper’s foreign policy changes in tone and substance, and they account for variations in the Canada–US cooperation/tension axis. Indeed, the first three cases caused significant tension, while the remaining two were more harmonious. This section shows that although all US executive officials grasped the transformations taking place under Harper, partisanship had a direct impact on both their assessment of these changes and their causal explanations for them.
The Israel–Palestine conflict
During its ten years in power, Stephen Harper’s Conservative government unconditionally supported the state of Israel. Although Canada’s policy regarding the settlement of the Israel–Palestine conflict did not officially change under the Conservatives, the intensity and consistency of Harper’s support for Israel represented a significant diplomatic shift from previous governments. 23
This pro-Israeli stance was well known in Washington, and was seen as part of the new Canadian outlook on foreign policy. Canada’s stronger and more assertive support for Israel was welcomed by the Bush administration and viewed as a very positive shift, with Bush and Harper sharing a similar take on the issue. It was seen as a concrete example of Harper’s “principled diplomacy.” The Conservative position on Israel, however, had different implications for President Obama’s foreign policy. This became clear in 2011 when the Obama administration officially endorsed the position that the future Palestinian state should be based on the borders existing prior to the 1967 Six-Day War. This prerequisite was put forward as the foundation of a two-state solution. President Obama declared, “We believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states. The Palestinian people must have the right to govern themselves, and reach their full potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state.” 24
This policy was immediately rejected by Israel and criticized by Canada. At the G8 summit in Deauville, France, a few days later, Canada went so far as to block the final communiqué, against American wishes, because it referred to Israel’s 1967 borders. Prime Minister Harper indicated that he would have liked to see references in President Obama’s speech to “the fact that one of the states must be a Jewish state. The fact that the Palestinian state must be de-militarized.” 25 Haaretz, a leading Israeli newspaper, even reported that Prime Minister Netanyahu had asked Harper on the eve of the summit to make sure that the G8 would not back Obama’s policy. 26 The same newspaper reported that “[a]fter any reference to 1967 borders was dropped from the final communiqué Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman called his Canadian counterpart John Baird to thank him for his help.” 27
Harper’s position on Obama’s pre-1967 borders led to different reactions among US officials depending on whether they were active or out of office—thus, their party affiliation. For those working for the Obama administration, this position led to two main conclusions. First, it served as a good reminder that Canada should not be taken for granted, that the US administration could not simply assume that the Harper government would agree on every international issue. One US official pointed out that “talking more and consulting with each other more is absolutely a must.” 28 Second, Prime Minister Harper’s decision to block the G8 communiqué was perceived purely as a domestic political ploy, and not a very gracious one. As one US official stated, “I can’t remember what the other events were exactly at the same time but it’s always annoying to get slapped and have someone stick their hand out and ask you for something. I know there were a lot of things, particularly on the North American front, that people were asking for. That’s kind of irritating.” 29
Those who had worked for the previous Bush administration, however, were delighted with Harper’s position. In their view, Canada was holding the line and defending what had previously been traditional US policy, even if it meant publicly criticizing current US foreign policy. They held that Canada was being consistent and morally grounded, while the Obama administration’s position was controversial and took people by surprise. This contentious issue shows that US partisanship greatly influenced perceptions. Those inside the Obama administration were frustrated with Canada’s stance because it went against the president’s risky policy on the Middle East at a time when Obama needed support from core allies. Instead of tightening the ranks and supporting this new definition of America's “national interest” in the Middle East, those outside the White House, who had served in the Bush administration, were pleased that Canada was standing up to criticize current US policy and to defend the previous one.
The Iran nuclear talks
Stephen Harper was highly skeptical of the P5+1 talks on Iran’s nuclear military program that began in 2013 and culminated in the signing of the Vienna Agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - JCPOA) in the summer of 2015. While the states involved in the process, including three core Canadian allies (the US, the UK, and France), were working around the clock to strengthen mutual trust with Iran and find an agreement with Tehran, the Conservatives in Ottawa were arguing that Canada could not trust a regime that sponsors terrorism and threatens the state of Israel. 30 A few years earlier, the Harper government had in fact decided to close down its embassy in Tehran and expel Iranian diplomats, arguing that Iran was the most significant threat to global peace and security in the world. 31 The Conservative government’s stance on the Iran nuclear talks echoed concerns expressed by Republicans in Congress who strongly disapproved of the diplomatic strategy initiated by Obama. Former executive officials from the Bush administration once again welcomed Harper’s take on this issue. After all, the Bush administration had placed Iran on its list of rogue states.
Considering the Harper government’s stance on Israel, Canada’s skepticism regarding Iran did not come as a surprise in Washington, and its position did not have an impact on the talks conducted by the Obama administration. The Obama administration cared little whether the Harper Conservatives were behind the nuclear talks. However, the administration was paying careful attention to the Harper government’s reaction to and handling of Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s speech before a joint session of Congress in March 2015, just a few months prior to the conclusion of the JCPOA with Iran. At the invitation of House Republican majority leader John Boehner, Netanyahu delivered a passionate speech in Congress imploring the Obama administration not to sign a deal with Iran. The speech and the circumstances under which it was delivered were highly controversial and partisan. It was certainly a contentious issue in US domestic politics. Many saw Netanyahu’s congressional address as an affront to President Obama, and close to sixty Democratic legislators boycotted the speech, objecting to “a foreign leader using the Capitol as a re-election platform and pulpit to bully the American president.” 32
In this tense context, the State Department endeavoured to find out whether the Harper government had colluded with Netanyahu’s government, and whether Ottawa had helped Israel in its dealings with Congress. As one official who was closely following this issue pointed out, Canada weighs in our domestic politics like no other country does. … And whether and how Canada played into that is what we are watching for, because we know Prime Minister Harper and Ambassador Doer spend a lot of time on the Hill, in terms of making friends there when they don’t get the answers they want from the executive branch. … We were paying very close attention to how Canada would pipe in, you know, speak up or not regarding the Israeli angle to all of this. … What I learned was that Canada was watching us very closely as usual and decided to stay under the radar.
33
The positions taken by the Conservative government on the Israel–Palestine and Iran issues led the Obama White House to draw a conclusion: given that the Harper government was more assertive and categorical than previous governments, US officials might have to work harder in future to get Canada on board. The fact that the Conservatives had clear and strong views made it clear that Canada would no longer be a “tag along nation.”
The Keystone XL saga
Now that President Trump is in power, and the State Department has authorized the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, this issue is no longer a source of tension between Canada and the United States. However, Keystone was the most contentious issue for Prime Minister Harper and President Obama for nearly six years, and to some extent poisoned Canada–US relations.
President Obama’s refusal in January 2012 to authorize the construction of the pipeline by TransCanada Corporation marked the beginning of this saga. This refusal followed pressure from many environmentalists and citizens who had mobilized against the project. Greenhouse gases produced by oil sands refining, and the potential contamination of a major water table in Nebraska in the event of a pipeline leak, bolstered a national protest movement. In fear of losing the support of the movement’s most progressive militants during the 2012 election year, President Obama chose not actually to reject the project, but to put off the final decision until 2013. The State Department then required further studies by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the environmental impacts of the project. Given the extent of the capital involved, this decision alienated Alberta oil companies and displeased Prime Minister Harper.
This disagreement culminated in 2013 when Harper, addressing the Canadian American Business Council (CABC) in New York, declared that the “logic behind this project [was] simply overwhelming” and that he would therefore not take no for an answer on Keystone XL from President Obama. 34 Prime Minister Harper also indicated that if Canadian oil was not good enough for the Americans, other countries would most certainly be eager to acquire it. In China, the prime minister mentioned that Canada was now an energy power and suggested that Canada’s resources were available to the highest bidder. These statements aimed to put pressure on the Obama Administration to authorize Keystone. They came on the heels of off-the-record comments by high Canadian officials stating that Keystone was a test for Canada–US relations, and that if President Obama blocked the project, bilateral relations would enter a “deep freeze.” 35
Officials from the Democratic administration were all aware of the statement made by the prime minister at the CABC. Some strongly criticized the Canadian approach, believing the prime minister’s statement to be a veiled threat, one that “came across as a bit overreaching.” 36 It was seen as short-sighted because it boxed the Canadian government and US administration into a corner. Harper instantly eliminated all the options that the US could have used to arrive at a mutually agreed-upon solution. A State Department official pointed out that “[w]hen you politicize an issue, it limits your options.” 37 The general perception was that it was a mistake to turn this issue into a political test of strength. “When you hijack a normal business issue and make it political by the things you say in public, it ties your hand in the options. Regular people who normally go through the process are removed from it. It gets elevated and it slows down the process. Harper did himself a disservice.” 38 Another official, this time from the NSC, pointed out that “Harper helped make it a matter of domestic political debate in the United States and people clearly thought that would help the Canadian position. But the idea that a foreign prime minister would seek to make a matter of his domestic interests a partisan issue in the United States, well, it doesn’t seem to work for prime ministers in any time zones, wherever they are.” 39 This was a clear reference to Netanyahu’s 2015 speech in Congress.
Officials from the Obama administration gathered that Harper had made this statement for domestic political reasons, but considered it to be unhelpful and somewhat destructive. “These kinds of conversations should happen privately, not at a CABC event, where these statements are re-tweeted 50 million times.” 40 It was seen as an unwise political ploy and a classic example of people thinking they understand the American political system better than they actually do. One official even added that “Harper’s government has taken a ‘playbook’ from Israel in the sense that when Prime Minister Harper is frustrated with the executive branch of the US government, he’s been going to our Congress, and somehow for him it’s a winning strategy. We don’t see that. How going to Congress on Keystone is helping his cause when the decision is with the executive branch.” 41
Interestingly, former officials from the Bush administration empathized with the Canadian government. To them, Canada deserved an answer from the Obama administration; it deserved better treatment. In their view, the idea that the State Department had been studying this issue for more than six years was unacceptable. Regarding Prime Minister Harper’s statement that Canada’s oil was available to the highest bidder, they believed he was right. It made sense for Canada to target more than one market. At the same time, they acknowledged that Harper’s keystone strategy and the statement that Canada would not take no for an answer had certainly slowed down the assessment process in the White House. Once again, this case highlights the fact that US partisanship greatly mattered when it came to the perception and assessment of Harper’s assertive foreign policy.
Afghanistan and burden sharing
Moving on to less contentious issues, the American perception regarding Canada’s military contribution to foreign operations changed significantly after 9/11 and, more specifically, after Harper came to power. Officials’ comments from the Bush and Obama administrations were unanimous and dithyrambic in this regard. The level of Canada’s participation in Afghanistan, without reservations, was well noted in Washington, and the officials interviewed were well aware of the specifics of Canada’s contribution. As one official pointed out, “The service and the sacrifice, which was the highest on a per capita basis, were much appreciated in the United States.” 42 According to officials, Canada’s significant contribution in Afghanistan bought it more influence within NATO. As one pointed out, “Canada has more influence. Nations who fought and lost people like Canada did in the ISAF mission have a say.” 43 In their view, Canada became more of a participant than a spectator. One official even indicated that the US was looking at Canada the way it used to look at the UK: “Canada is increasingly viewed in those terms and decreasingly viewed as the junior partner, as the tag along guy.” 44
This is significant. Canada paid a high price in Afghanistan, but gained tremendous respect in return, from all sides in Washington. There is apparently no commitment that could have given Canada a better reputation in the United States. What this story does not tell, however, is whether this hard-earned reputation will last, or whether Afghanistan will set the bar higher in terms of US expectations of Canada’s military engagement in the future, which could hurt Canada’s reputation in the case where these expectations are not met.
Canada’s reputation as a tough and committed fighter was not altered by Prime Minister Harper’s decision to signal his withdrawal from Afghanistan at the time when the newly elected President Obama was preparing to send additional troops to fight what he called a “necessary war.” Prime Minister Harper told CNN in March 2009 that he believed Westerners would not defeat the Taliban by force in Afghanistan, and that it was essential to redefine the concept of victory. He told Wolf Blitzer that the idea of completely suppressing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan was unrealistic. A few days later, on the same channel, the prime minister told Fareed Zakaria, “We are not going to ever defeat the insurgency. Afghanistan has probably had—my reading of Afghanistan history—it’s probably had an insurgency forever, of some kind.” 45
The timing and manner in which Harper delivered his thoughts were not appreciated by the White House. One Democratic official from the NSC recalled being mildly irritated by Harper’s comments on CNN and thought that the prime minister was “playing to [his] home audience at our boss’s expense.” 46 However, again, the overriding sentiment was that Canada had pushed above its weight as far as burden sharing was concerned, and the Obama administration did not hold the announcement of Canada’s withdrawal against the Conservatives.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian politician, was ousted from power in February 2014 following weeks of popular protests in the streets of Kiev. This was seen in Russia as a Western-orchestrated coup against a democratically elected president. In the weeks following Yanukovych’s departure, Russia annexed Crimea and intervened militarily in Eastern Ukraine to support secessionists in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Russia’s behaviour was a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and contravened international law. Through these actions, Russian president Vladimir Putin revived the spectre of violence and insecurity in Europe, and accordingly Western leaders reacted to Russia’s moves. Canada, however, went substantially further than its allies in condemning President Putin’s adventurism in Ukraine. Stephen Harper called Putin an extreme nationalist and compared the Crimean annexation to the Nazis’ annexation of Austria in the late 1930s. At the G20 summit in Brisbane, Australia, Prime Minister Harper got the attention of the world media when he said to President Putin, “I guess I’ll shake your hand but I have only one thing to say to you, you need to get out of Ukraine.” 47
Canada’s response was well received by both former and then-current US officials. The Harper government was seen as assuming a leadership role, while some European leaders were being overly moderate in their responses. Canada’s rhetorical position was described as “terrific” because Harper “was calling out Putin for exactly what he is, a bully, while the rest of NATO and particularly the French, the Germans and to some extent the US have attempted to accommodate Putin, believing falsely that for some reason he was willing to change his course of action.” 48 At the same time, some officials from the Obama administration could not help but refer once again to domestic politics. As one official from the State Department mentioned, “As much as Prime Minister Harper loves democracy and human rights, he also has 1.2 million ethnic Ukrainians to account for in his country. We are very mindful of that.” 49
The Ukraine–Russia war allowed the Harper government to stand out on the international stage and illustrate its “principled diplomacy.” Harper did not position Canada as a “go between nation” or an honest broker, but he did somehow position the country as the conscience of the West. This was highly appreciated in Washington.
Conclusion
This paper has implications for Canada–US relations, and contributes to the literature on foreign policy and partisan ideology, 50 especially in the context of hyper-partisanship in Washington. 51 First, despite a widespread perception in Washington that Canada’s foreign policy approach had changed under Harper, partisanship was the main dividing line in terms of how this approach was perceived and assessed. This point reinforces the argument presented in the first part of the paper that Canada–US relations can experience downturns under mixed tandems reflecting ideological differences. Looking back at the five case studies, the Bush administration was quite pleased with Harper’s foreign policy stances, as Bush and Harper saw the world from a similar angle. Stephen Harper’s foreign policy meant less controversy with and less criticism of the Republican administration, and led to a more common-ground attitude after difficult years with Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. In the eyes of Bush’s officials, Harper’s moral clarity and values accounted for these changes in tone and policy. However, those who worked under Obama had a different take on Harper’s shift. They explained Canada’s behaviour by stressing that Harper was using foreign policy issues to score domestic politics points. This argument came up frequently during interviews, and the Conservatives were definitely seen as playing segments of the Canadian population for electoral gain, almost as if the word had been spread within the Obama White House that Harper’s real foreign policy motives were domestic. This tarnished the Obama–Harper relationship and made Canadian–American relations, at least from the White House point of view, relatively lousy. This also tends to validate a common claim in the literature in international relations that foreign policy is a venue for decision-makers to gain or lose domestic support. 52 What is surprising, however, is that none of the questions asked during the interviews implicitly or explicitly referred to the domestic dimension of Harper’s foreign policy; this issue was raised freely by the executive officials. This finding reinforces another argument developed by Charles Doran: that Canada–US relations experience a downturn when foreign policy is used to score domestic political points in Canada. As he argues, “when foreign policy is used in this way, it tends to worsen foreign policy relations with other governments because their interests and their concerns have been sacrificed to the furthering of one state’s domestic political objectives.” 53 This line of reasoning was shared by several Democratic officials with respect to Harper’s management of Israel, Iran, Keystone, and even Afghanistan. It was less problematic in the case of Ukraine because Ottawa and Washington held similar positions on the issue, although the Conservatives’ position was tougher than that of the Obama administration.
Despite some adjustments in Canada’s international behaviour under Harper, resulting in some points of contention with the Obama administration, at the end of the day, Ottawa and Washington remained core partners in world affairs. This point was repeatedly stressed by former US ambassadors to Canada. As one of them said, “[Y]ou can sit around and find specific instances where our policies do not coincide but they are clearly the exception. I will tell you that the most fundamental piece of this is that the United States perceives Canada as our partner in world affairs, and the reason is that we share core values.” 54 This suggests that while partisanship in Washington conditioned the executive officials’ perceptions of Harper’s shift, and although it created tensions and distrust with regard to certain specific issues, the fundamentals of Canada–US relations remained sound. This point is essential and echoes Charles Doran’s final take on the impact of party ideology on Canada–US relations: “Differences of party, ideology, and personality, though visible and strongly felt, are not necessarily sufficient to derail close policy coordination between democracies.” 55
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I thank Christopher Sands and Patrick James for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper as well as two anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions. This research was supported by the Fulbright Canada Visiting Scholar Program.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported in part by a fellowship from Fulbright Canada (The Foundation for Educational Exchange between Canada and the United States of America).
1
Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie, and Stéphane Roussel, “Le néoconservatisme en politique étrangère et de défense canadiennes,” in Julian Castro-Rea and Frédéric Boily, eds., Le fédéralisme selon Harper: la place du Québec dans le Canada conservateur (Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2014), 49–81.
2
Roland Paris, “Are Canadians still liberal internationalists? Foreign policy and public opinion in the Harper era,” International Journal 69, no. 3 (2014): 274–307; John Ibbitson, “The big break: The Conservative transformation of Canada’s foreign policy,” Centre for International Governance Innovation Papers, no. 9, 2014; Joe Clark, How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change, 3rd ed. (Random House Canada, Toronto 2013); Kim Richard Nossal, “The Liberal past in the Conservative present: Internationalism in the Harper era,” in Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, eds., Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2013) 21–35.
4
Adam Chapnick, “Stephen Harper’s Israel policy,” in Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, eds., The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016), 105–120.
5
6
See Ian Brodie, “Canada disengaging from NATO, the UN and multilateralism? Not a chance. Harper is an internationalist, albeit of a different kind,” Canadian International Council (CIC), 25 September 2014.
7
8
For past research on US attitude and perception, see Robert Bothwell and John Kirton’s trilogy: Bothwell and Kirton, “A sweet little country: American attitudes toward Canada, 1925–1963,” Queen’s Quarterly 90, no. 4 (1983): 1078–1102; Kirton and Bothwell, “A proud and powerful country: American attitudes toward Canada, 1963–1976,” Queen’s Quarterly 92, no. 1 (1985): 108–126; and Kirton and Bothwell, “A very necessary country: American attitudes towards Canada, 1976–1980,” Queen’s Quarterly 93, no. 2 (1986): 299–317. See also Jean-François Lisée, In the Eye of the Eagle (HarperCollins, Toronto 1990); Stephen Azzi and Norman Hillmer, “Intolerant allies: Canada and the George W. Bush administration, 2001–2005,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 27, no. 4 (2016): 726–745.
9
I should emphasize that some Obama officials were still in office when I interviewed them. These officials had to deal with the day-to-day implications of Harper’s foreign policy, while former Bush officials were all out of office and did not have to manage this complex relationship. This difference in status might have altered their perception, and could potentially explain part of the observed variation between the two administrations.
10
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). See also Todd Hall and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The personal touch: Leaders’ impressions, costly signaling, and assessments of sincerity in international affairs,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2012): 560–573.
11
This emphasis on perception is shared by cognitivists, constructivists, and neoclassical realists. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disaster of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Origins of National Interests (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, eds., Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
12
Charles Doran, “Canada-US relations: Personality, patterns, and domestic politics,” in Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O’Reilly, eds., Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 389.
13
Ibid., p. 394.
14
Douglas C. Nord, “Discourse and dialogue between Americans and Canadians—Who is talking to whom?,” American Review of Canadian Studies 41, no. 4 (2011): 391–401.
15
Ten semi-structured interviews lasting from thirty to ninety minutes each were conducted in Washington DC. Most of these interviews were with executive officials working for the Obama administration, but several were also conducted with officials from the Bush administration, bringing out interesting perceptual patterns. None of the questions asked referred directly or indirectly to partisanship in Washington. Interviews were structured in two parts: (1) questions on the transformation of Canada’s foreign policy approach to world affairs; (2) questions on specific and sometimes controversial issues. I relied on a snowball sampling strategy to identify US officials who dealt with Canada on a regular basis.
16
The first question asked was an open one: “How would you define Stephen Harper’s foreign policy?” The second question was structured and narrower: “According to you, which of the following propositions (ideal-type case) best describes Harper’s foreign policy approach? (a) Canada is retreating from world affairs and is increasingly seen as an isolationist country; (b) Canada’s foreign policy is defined by a liberal internationalist approach. Practices such as peacekeeping, conflict resolution, norm building, and multilateral diplomacy are central to its international behaviour; (c) Canada is pursuing a strong foreign policy rooted in moral principles. It emphasizes the struggle between democratic and non-democratic values, and it does not seek to “go along to get along” within international forums; (d) All of the above; (e) None of the above. The overwhelming majority of US officials indicated that proposition (c) resonated with them the most. Only one interviewee chose proposition (e) None of the above.
17
Interview with a former US official, Washington, DC, 26 March 2015.
18
Interview with a former US official, Washington, DC, 11 March 2015.
19
Interview with a former US official, Washington, DC, 26 March 2015.
20
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 3 April 2015.
21
22
Jonathan Paquin and Patrick James, eds., Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014).
23
Steven Seligman, “Canada and the United Nations General Assembly (1994–2015): Continuity and change under the Liberals and the Conservatives,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22, no. 3 (2016): 276–315. Frédéric Boily, “Les conservateurs canadiens, la question d’Israël et l’antisémitisme,” Études internationales 45, no. 4 (2014): 579–600.
24
25
Macleans, “G8 statement shouldn’t refer to Israel’s 1967 borders: Harper,” 27 May 2011.
26
27
Ibid.
28
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 30 March 2015.
29
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 12 March 2015.
30
L. Ian MacDonald, “Q&A: A conversation with John Baird: ‘We promote Canadian values,’” Policy: Canadian Politics and Public Policy 1, no. 2 (2014): 4–9.
31
32
33
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 30 March 2015.
34
35
36
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 30 March 2015.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 12 March 2015.
40
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 30 March 2015.
41
Ibid.
42
Interview with a former US official, Washington, DC, 16 March 2015.
43
Interview with a former US official, Washington, DC, 23 March 2015.
44
Phone interview with a former US official, 5 June 2015.
45
46
Interview with a former US official, Washington, DC, 12 March 2015.
47
48
Phone interview with a former US official, 5 June 2015.
49
Interview with a US official, Washington, DC, 30 March 2015.
50
The literature on party ideology and foreign policy is well established. It notably shows that left-wing and right-wing parties have different interpretations of the national interests and favour different policies. Right-wing governments are statistically more likely to get involved in arm conflicts while left-wing governments give more development aid than their right-wing counterparts. See Jean-Philippe Thérien and Alain Noël, “Political parties and foreign aid,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 1 (2000): 151–162. See also Stephanie C. Hofmann, European Security in NATO’s Shadow: Party Ideology and Institution Building (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
51
See Karl Kaltenthaler and William J. Miller, “The polarized American: Views on humanity and the sources of hyper-partisanship,” American Behavioral Scientist 56, no. 12 (2012): 1718–1734.
52
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic politics and international relations,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 1 (2002): 1–9.
53
Doran, “Canada-US relations,” 399.
54
Interview with a former US official, Washington, DC, 16 March 2015.
55
Doran, “Canada-US relations,” 394.
Author Biography
Jonathan Paquin is Professor of Political Science at Université Laval, and the editor of Études internationales. He is the coauthor of Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), the co-editor of Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security (UBC Press, 2014), and the author of A Stability-Seeking Power: US Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts (McGill-Queen’s, 2010). He has written numerous articles on foreign policy and international relations in Cooperation and Conflict, Foreign Policy Analysis, Mediterranean Politics, and The Canadian Journal of Political Science, among others. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from McGill University. He was a Fulbright visiting scholar and Resident Fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS, Johns Hopkins) in Washington DC in 2014–2015.