“Soldiers first”: Preparing the Canadian Army for twenty-first century peace operations

Introduction

When Canadians visualize peace operations or “peacekeeping,” as it is popularly known, they tend to see an iconic image of soldiers wearing blue berets interposing themselves between warring factions in order to bring a peaceful resolution to ongoing conflict. ¹ One can also argue that this idea is pervasive in Canada, perhaps even hagiographic, shaping not only public perception but also security policy. The election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his Liberals in 2015 resulted in a defence review, released in June 2017. The Governor General of Canada, His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, introduced this initiative on 4 December 2015 in his Speech from the Throne, which marked the opening of the forty-second Parliament of Canada. This address articulated federal government priorities for security and defence. It not only announced the need for a defence review, but also clearly laid out that this examination would be with the goal of ensuring defence resources were capable of reacting quickly and comprehensively to exigencies. One of those elements, which fell within the context of providing security to Canadians and assisting others in need, was to assist efforts to establish international peace through the United Nations (UN). ²

The main components of Johnston’s speech, pertaining to national defence, had been disclosed in the “Minister of national defence mandate letter” released a few weeks earlier in November 2015. These items included the requirements to “protect Canadian sovereignty, defend North America, provide disaster relief, conduct search and rescue, support United Nations (UN) peace operations [emphasis added], and contribute to the security of our allies and to allied and coalition operations abroad,” as well as to “ensure a close link between defence policy, foreign policy, and national security.” ³

However, with regard to these goals, Trudeau put it more succinctly with his catchphrase “We’re back!” In the immediate aftermath of his 2015 election, he observed that those who believed that Canada had given up its “compassionate and constructive” participation in global affairs would be heartened to see that the nation would take a rejuvenated role in the global community. ⁴ These statements all underpinned the Liberal government’s desire for renewed involvement by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in UN missions.

This possible increase of Canadian military involvement in contemporary peace operations necessitates scrutiny of the training and education conducted by the Canadian services, particularly the Canadian Army (CA), which has traditionally supplied the bulk of Canadian contributions to UN activities. After doing so, it is evident that the principle of training service personnel in general-purpose combat, or core elements of the profession of arms, remains foundational. In addition to that, professional knowledge—elements of specialized mission-specific training, combined with leader education and institutional training support—needs to be holistically applied to create a force that is able to deal with the ill-defined and complex problems posed by peace operations in current and future operating environments. The turbulent years since the end of the Cold War have highlighted the need for Canadian peacekeepers to be trained and educated in functions and processes applicable to a cross section of peace operations. This not only includes training for the conduct of peace operations, but also enhancing the education of all leadership, both non-commissioned members and officers, to provide them with the capacity to deal with these complex activities. ⁵

An evolution of peace operations

Peace operations of the Cold War were typically carried out under UN auspices. These missions were divided into categories corresponding to the relevant articles of the UN Charter, either Chapter VI “Pacific Settlement Of Disputes” or Chapter VII “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” The purpose of Chapter VI missions was the resolution of disputes endangering international peace and security. Generally, under this chapter, military contingents are deployed once negotiation, mediation, or arbitration have led to some form of agreement and the parties involved in the conflict agree to allow a UN force to monitor the agreement. Examples of Canadian Chapter VI operations include contributions to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964–present) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, 1974–present) located in the Golan Heights. Western perceptions of “traditional” peacekeeping were formed by the more stable missions in this period. Despite that, some of the missions during these early years, like Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC, 1960–1964) were fractious and violent. ⁶

However, during the 1990s and beyond, the security environment changed. Broadly speaking, the nature of the missions altered from monitoring ceasefires resulting from interstate conflict, to attempting to establish peace in regions suffering from intrastate violence. Military roles during peace operations expanded from simply providing for the monitoring of an established peace, to a wide range of roles like aiding the creation of sustainable institutions of governance, supporting and conducting human rights supervision, security sector reform, Disarm, Demobilize and Reintegrate (DDR) programs, and even assisting with development. ⁷ There was also a general shift in public perception. Partly as a by-product of globalization, there was a perceptible increase in Western public sensitivity to human suffering. This resulted in public calls for action and intervention. Through this effort, ideas concerning the “Responsibility to Protect,” or “R2P,” are still considered when debating intervention, despite the flawed use of R2P in Libya during 2011. ⁸

Consequently, during the 1990s, UN mandates were more often created using Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VII operations allow for actions pertaining to threats to stability, transgressions of an established peace, or in reaction to acts of aggression. This chapter allows the UN, or UN-mandated forces, responding to national, coalition, or alliance control, to impose or enforce peace. These peace enforcement missions can utilize military and non-military means for the restoration of peace and security. ⁹ Examples of Canadian participation in Chapter VII operations include the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia (1992–1993), the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR, 1995–1996), the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET, 1999–2000), the NATO-organized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (2003–2014), and Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti [UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti] (MINUSTAH, 2004–present). IFOR, INTERFET and ISAF are examples of UN-mandated missions that were not controlled by the UN. ¹⁰

Canada’s early history of peacekeeping

In order to understand the training and education implications in preparing members of the Canadian military for activities “in the service of peace” during the twenty-first century, it is necessary to start at the beginning. ¹¹ Canadian involvement in UN operations first commenced in 1949, and throughout the Cold War, Canada contributed to many peacekeeping missions. Initial Canadian military reception to the concept of peacekeeping can be best described as reserved. In the Cabinet meeting discussing possible Canadian contributions to the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan in December 1948, Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, convinced Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, of the necessity of being involved. Pearson “even offered to have External Affairs pay the costs for two of the four officers requested.” ¹²

Peacekeeping was soon embraced as a means of preserving Canada’s status as a middle power. ¹³ One can argue that participation in UN missions confirmed Canada’s position as a country maintaining saliency within the affiliated block of Western states, while furthering the bilateral interests of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). ¹⁴ They permitted Canada to be a committed member of the Western alliance and “an international arbiter with sufficient freedom to act decisively in the cause of peace.” ¹⁵ In a 1965 report on peacekeeping, then Lieutenant J. L. Granatstein, now one of Canada’s preeminent military historians, opined

Canadian isolationism is dead, and its resurrection seems most unlikely. The shrinking of the world has given new responsibilities to every nation, but very few are willing to pick up the burden. If peace is maintained and a nuclear holocaust averted, the credit may well go to those nations that took steps to prevent wars. Canadians can take justifiable pride in the role they have played. ¹⁶

Early Canadian peacekeeping training evolved naturally from the types of missions that were the norm of the Cold War, and usually matched the exigencies of a Chapter VI mandate. The first large-scale mission of this period was UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I, 1956–1967). In the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis, Lester B. Pearson, still Secretary of State for External Affairs, put together a Canadian proposal for an interim UN force to supervise the withdrawal of French, Israeli, and British militaries, as well as to monitor a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. He subsequently received the Nobel Peace Prize and has been lauded as the “architect” of modern peace operations. Following this, UNEF I set the stage for how the Canadian public was to visualize “peacekeeping.” ¹⁸

UNEF I also affirmed that at the core of peacekeeping training were the military skills needed for general-purpose combat. Due to rapid deployment, the Canadian contingent had no specialized training. While a number of challenges were cited with regards to this Middle East peacekeeping mission, training was not discerned as one of them. ¹⁹ Discussion of the requirements for peacekeeping in the early 1960s affirmed the principle that the core of successful peacekeeping training was based on normal professional military skills—the same required for general-purpose combat. At a Department of National Defence-sponsored conference in 1964, representatives from the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) observed that the involvement of their services in peacekeeping was little different from normal operations. The Canadian Army was in general agreement, but also noted a requirement to be prepared to aid the civil authorities in the maintenance of order, and to be able to control areas through cordon and search operations, plus the establishment and maintenance of checkpoints. There would also be a need to deal with the press, as well as UN authorities. At the same time, the focus would be on combat operations like patrolling, ambushes, and attacking armed insurgents. In general, it was suggested that the main requirements of the Canadian UN standby battalion were that it “be lightly equipped, fit and hard, and highly adaptable to adverse conditions.” ²⁰

A couple of years later, in 1966, a study of Canadian military operations supporting the UN reaffirmed that RCN and RCAF training for these types of military activities “is to some extent consistent with other operational commitments.” It noted that for the Canadian Army “the transition from other types of operations to UN operations is not great.” However, the study also observed that there was a premium on organic mobility, the ability to deploy on short notice, and the need to focus on the same types of military tasks noted in the earlier 1964 conference. The paper also suggested a need to be ready to act “from the police-type role in aid to the civil authorities to that of military operations to suppress armed insurgency.” These competencies were viewed as specific training necessary for peacekeeping and in line with that done for general military training. ²¹ The perception that the skills needed for peacekeeping were similar to those necessary to discharge normal military duties continued into the 1970s, with acknowledgement that awareness of language, culture, and other regional factors, plus a broader background in the social sciences—particularly international relations—would be useful for officers. ²² These ideas persisted into the 1980s. This conceptual approach of general-purpose combat training, of being “soldiers first,” was the underlying principle of preparing for peacekeeping. In 1989, the incumbent Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Paul Manson, wrote an article entitled “Peacekeeping in Canadian foreign and defence policy” for the professional journal Canadian Defence Quarterly. Within that piece, Manson highlighted that

Canadian soldiers are trained as ‘soldiers first;’ that means that Canadian contingents can be deployed in peacekeeping roles as integrated, self-sustaining units capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military contingencies. The determination to deploy only fully-trained military personnel in what can be, potentially, a very dangerous role, bears witness to Canada’s unwillingness to put the lives of those who serve in Canadian peacekeeping contingents at unnecessary risk.” ²³

Canadian peacekeeping after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War not only resulted in the dismembering of the Soviet Union, but also a change to the operational environment. The violence became more nuanced and the missions more complicated, as the roles demanded of peacekeepers expanded. Canadian deployments to Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda during 1993–1994, and disclosure of incidents at Bacovici in the former Yugoslavia in 1993–1994, created a great deal of public and private introspection in Canada regarding the nature of both the profession of arms and peacekeeping. In some cases, the focus on general-purpose combat skills in an environment where threats were difficult to discern, define, and neutralize resulted in frustration by those trained for combat, and manifested itself in untoward events, which in a rapid globalizing world, were quickly made public. In turn, this negatively affected the mission and Canadian public backing of it, as well as domestic support for the army. ²⁷

In a perverse way, these outcomes illustrated the concept advocated by psychologist Abraham Maslow, in which he proposed that reliance on a habitual tool created a situation in which that instrument was used for all purposes: “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.” ²⁸ Maslow’s idea accurately encapsulates the key dilemma of this period for the Canadian military. The tool was no longer appropriate for the situation, and there were highly visible negative incidents. The Canadian Forces’ (CF) ²⁹ reliance on preparation for general-purpose combat training for deployments, the discontinuity between mandate and evolving mission requirements, along with an apparent professional inability to deal with the resulting challenges, became public. The most well-known of these occurrences took place during the Canadian mission in Somalia.

In late 1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia. There were a number of negative incidents that far overshadowed the successes the Canadian Airborne Regiment had in fulfilling their mandate. The most infamous event occurred in 1993. At that time, the Regiment was based around the town of Belet Huen. The situation was desperate amongst the civilian population in that area. There had been attempted thefts from the Canadian camps, and orders were given to apprehend intruders. Subsequently, on 16 March, one such intruder was captured, tortured, and murdered by Canadian soldiers. The killing of Somali teenager Shidane Arone sent shockwaves throughout Canada, and resulted not only in the punishment of the perpetrators, but in the eventual disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. ³⁰

Training and educating Canada’s military for peace operations

The incidents in Somalia resulted in the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the CF to Somalia (1993–1997). In turn, the Commission, known colloquially as the “Somalia Inquiry,” prompted the minister of national defence to institute a monitoring committee that ensured all recommendations were put into effect. The inquiry also reaffirmed the principle that “general-purpose combat training remained the basis of effective peacekeeping contingents.” This statement was tempered with the recommendations that: (a) Canadian peacekeepers would need to be trained in a number of functions applicable to a cross section of peace operations, and; (b) Canada needed to assist with peace operations training in other countries as part of its contribution to peacekeeping. ³¹

This last requirement was addressed with the establishment of the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in 1996. The PSTC was mandated to not only deliver pre-deployment peace operations training, but also to provide peace operations training assistance to Canadian and other foreign organizations. Since then, the role of the PSTC has enlarged to give “specific, individual [peace operations] training to prepare selected members of the CF, other Government Departments and foreign military personnel.” In 2015, the annual number of students was approximately 1000. Furthermore, the PSTC is a centre of excellence for Canadian peace operations training. Consisting of a small unit of about sixty personnel, the PSTC provides enormous institutional capacity that far outweighs its size. ³²

Concurrent with the Somalia Inquiry, the Canadian military put into place systemic oversight of peacekeeping missions through a series of deputy chief of defence staff (DCDS) ³³ staff instructions and systemic evaluation of pre-deployment peacekeeping training at the individual and collective levels. ³⁴ During the same period, the UN General Assembly agreed that peacekeeping training needed to be made relevant by keeping up to date with the changing environment. ³⁵ Following on from that acknowledgement came projects such as the Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces (1997), A Strategy for 2020 (1999), and Officership 2020 (2001), which rejuvenated efforts to make education relevant to Canadian military professionals. ³⁶ Also, in order to provide institutional support to these recommendations, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was created in 2002, and in 2004 was given an official mandate “to act as the institutional champion of Canadian Forces professional development.” ³⁷

At the same time, the demise of the National Defence College in 1994 as a result of federal budget reductions created an impetus within the CF to address an unease regarding the lack of higher-level education for senior, general, and flag officers. This concern manifested itself in the recommendations of the 1995 Report on the Officer Development Board: Part I. The report’ssources indicated that a revision of senior professional military education was needed to provide educational experiences that focused on the higher-level aspects of fighting wars, and on national and international studies. ³⁸ The gap in professional military education caused by the closure of the National Defence College in Kingston, Ontario, led to the approval and establishment of the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) and the National Strategic Studies Course (NSSC) at the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in 1998. ³⁹ These two separate courses have since been combined into the senior leadership (captain[navy]/colonel) National Studies Program, a ten-month course of studies. At the same time, for mid-level leaders (commander/lieutenant-colonel and lieutenant-commander/major) the then Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course was revitalized, and later became the Joint Command and Staff Program. For the Army, with its Staff College in Kingston, Ontario, the former five-month Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff Course for more junior officers (captain) is today a shortened Army Operations Course. Furthermore, the Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development program located in St-Jean, Quebec, educates the non-Commissioned Officers of the CAF (master seaman/master corporal to chief petty officer 1/chief warrant officer). Despite the educational reforms started in the 1990s, peace operations researcher Walter Dorn has demonstrated that the quantity of peace operations material within professional military education has measurably diminished since the initial momentum provided by the Somalia Inquiry recommendations. ⁴⁰

Interestingly, Dorn also notes that the peace operations education provided by the undergraduate programs at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) has, for the most part, remained consistent. ⁴¹ In spite of that, there is little peace operations study at the graduate level in the same institution. One may be able to argue that it is sufficient to have exposed some developing officers to core peace operations concepts in their undergraduate years. However, without the push of graduate programs in the area, little serious research and study will be conducted in this subject. Graduate-level research, supervised by professors who teach the undergraduate courses, would also assist with informing and evolving the undergraduate curriculum to meet the needs of a changing international environment.

Arguably, professional military and academic education have not remained as robust as one would hope given the events of the 1990s, plus the current renewed interest in peace operations. However, the acknowledgement of specified training for peace operations has continued to evolve over the last two decades. Since the initial concerns expressed during the Somalia Inquiry and early DCDS training directives, peace operations’ training specialization has become very nuanced. It has changed from its early years with a sole emphasis on general-purpose combat and security operations to include these two, plus a broad range of focused topics. Peace operations training now considers, but is not limited to: cultural, religious, and historical awareness; use of force; rules of engagement; refugees and displaced persons; civil affairs and language; communications, command structure, and logistics; dealing with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and regional organizations; public affairs; environment-specific medical training; tactical training in operations; information gathering; mediation; negotiation; use of technology; gender integration; and dealing with child soldiers. ⁴² This list is not exhaustive and is constantly evolving. Additionally, one could also argue that these skills are demanded by most twenty-first-century military operations, not just peace operations, and are continually expanding. ⁴³ One must always pay attention to ensure that the institutional mechanisms like the PSTC, critical to maintaining and passing on these competencies, are appropriately staffed and resourced.

Added to this training perspective is that the CAF peace operations doctrine that has been created since the Somalia Inquiry—and all updated within the last decade or so—is still relevant. It provides, in its various manuals, a holistic and graduated view of peace operations in a multi-dimensional setting. Where gaps exist, like a lack of training and education on the protection of child soldiers, specific initiatives have commenced to address those deficiencies. ⁴⁴

Supporting all these initiatives is the legacy of recent operations in Afghanistan. As Canada became enmeshed in the evolving counterinsurgency from 2006 onwards, its military campaign became integrated to a large degree with civilian efforts, reinforcing a trend that had started with the changing nature of peace operations in the 1990s. This Canadian comprehensive approach became known as “whole-of-government” (WoG). Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, described its development and impact accordingly: “In late 2008/early 2009, just as the full weight of US leadership and ownership of the mission was beginning to emerge, Canadian WoG planning was beginning to coalesce and the Canadian civilian presence was increasing dramatically.” Along with this engagement, “an explicit government policy framework had been developed, with [a] clearly articulated set of objectives … which continue to guide Canada’s broader engagement[.]” ⁴⁵ This policy framework was articulated within the recommendations of the “Manley Report” ⁴⁶ that critically examined the Afghan mission. The report recommended a comprehensive focus on Afghan capacity building, and specifically stated: “We believe that Canada’s role in Afghanistan should give greater emphasis to diplomacy, reconstruction and governance and that the military mission should shift increasingly towards the training of the Afghan National Security Forces.” ⁴⁷ This methodology was something that had only existed in a nascent form during the peacekeeping and enforcement operations of the late twentieth century. In the crucible of the violence of Afghanistan, the Canadian’s WoG approach emerged as a distinctly different way of managing conflict, and had implications for the future of peace operations. These ideas were reinforced by Canadian Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, who noted in 2006 that “rebuilding failed states was not a security, governance or economic problem; it was all three, and had to be approached with that in mind.” ⁴⁸ These experiences have only highlighted the competencies, both intellectual and practical, necessary for peace operations.

Conclusion

During the November 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial conference, held in Vancouver, British Columbia, which consisted of over 500 delegates from 80 countries and five international organizations, Canada affirmed support to future peace operations. In tandem with other contributing nations, agreement was reached to provide: (a) “smart pledges,” moving away from traditional force contributions to providing high demand or niche capabilities; (b) contributing to international peacekeeping through training assistance, and other initiatives for capacity building; (c) protecting those at risk with comprehensive international strategies aimed at strengthening fragile societies; and (d) increasing effectiveness in generating and deploying peacekeeping resources. Additionally, the Vancouver conference was notable for one other, and possibly more important, evolution in peacekeeping: the creation of the Vancouver Principles respecting the protection of civilians, particularly children. Following from these discussions, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced

The nature of conflict has changed. So too have the demands of peace operations. Discrete offerings and one-off commitments have gotten us this far, but we won’t be able to deliver true, transformative change without a real institutional change. Canada is prepared to help lead that charge. To rethink how we engage, not just where we engage. To close the institutional gaps that prevent us from being even more effective agents of peace in a world that sorely needs it. That’s how we’ll protect the world’s children, empower women and girls, and build a more peaceful and a more prosperous world. ⁴⁹

The current Commandant of the PSTC, Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, eloquently summarized the complexity of the changes that have occurred since the 1990s, and their implications for peace operations, when he observed “The days of simply taking off your helmet and putting on your blue beret are gone.” ⁵⁰ In the security atmosphere of the twenty-first century, countries not only have the domestic, but also the international responsibility to anticipate, prepare for, and deal with a myriad of crises and conflicts. Canada’s military must have the ability to project sustainable and integrated peace operations forces that are imbued with all types of skills to deal with this threat environment. These forces are joint, capable of working within coalition or alliance operations, and encompass sea, land, air, and space. Many Canadian military contributions are based on land forces—the Canadian Army. These military contingents must also be integrated with partners, such as Global Affairs Canada. Such forces must exist, or be able to be created quickly, to deal with the demands of the twenty-first century. Our recent operations in Afghanistan have underlined the need for this military approach to the wide-ranging demands of comprehensive activities in conflict regions. The agreements articulated at the Vancouver conference reinforce these concepts. ⁵¹

The recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry, pertaining to the institutionalization of peace operations training in Canada and assisting with peace operations training capacity in other countries, were addressed by the detailing of training requirements for peace operations and with the establishment of the PSTC. At the same time, it can be argued that peace operations as a subject of study needs continued emphasis within these initiatives. Reinvigorating these educational reforms, in tandem with ensuring that existent training and institutional support initiatives keep pace with change, will better prepare the CAF for the changing peace operations of the twenty-first century. Professional education has equipped the officer corps, as well as senior non-commissioned sailors, soldiers, and aviators, with the cognitive competencies to understand and formulate appropriate military responses in a complex modern security environment. Education does not simply entail attaining an understanding of specific expertise; rather it includes developing the ability to think critically and creatively, as well as expanding the intellectual breadth required to design and conduct military activities in all types of situations. By making sure peace operations are included in the academic and professional military education provided to military personnel, the appropriate intellectual acumen will be instilled in those wielding the tools in peace operations. The Minister’s Monitoring Committees, which oversaw the reforms derived from the recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry, forced the idea of an educated professional leadership, at all levels, equipped to deal with the complex dilemmas of the current and future security environments. Otherwise, without appropriate leader education, the military will struggle to avoid the perils of seeing every problem in the same fashion: as a nail that needs to be hammered.