Trump’s National Security Strategy: “America First” meets the establishment

Does Trump’s National Security Strategy matter?

It was fashionable in the news cycle before and after the NSS’s release to declare its immediate irrelevance. Given the desultory nature of Trump’s policy positions, it is easy to dismiss the NSS as egregiously politicized and disposable on a whim. Even the speech announcing the new NSS contradicted much of its contents. Still, there are good reasons to take the 2017 NSS seriously. First, as a strategy document, it provides clarity to Trump’s worldview that had previously only existed in fragments. Importantly, the worldview often runs contrary to longstanding norms of US foreign policy. It is clear that the most prominent passages of the NSS signal a break from Trump’s predecessors and the broader patterns of post-Cold War US foreign policy. The 2017 NSS rejects Obama’s internationalism, Bush’s transformational agenda, and Clinton’s embrace of globalization. In its place is a full-throated commitment to maintaining primacy and unbinding the US from multilateral obligations. Thus, this new strategic direction, the reasoning behind it, and the potential consequences demand more than a summary dismissal.

Second, the NSS establishes a common framework for the vast US foreign policy bureaucracy. It establishes the prevailing assumptions and priorities of elected officials. It gives direction to policymakers on established files, and provides guidance in the event of unexpected crises. The NSS helps agencies prioritize limited resources and converge around a common overarching purpose. It is also a baseline for measuring foreign policy success. ² In this regard, the NSS is a common thread that runs through the conduct of US foreign policy. For example, the 2017 NSS is most strident in its hostility towards free trade, its intent to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, and its rejection of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iranian nuclear weapons. These areas have been central to Trump’s foreign policy over his first eighteen months. In other instances, the priorities and directions are more ambiguous. This new direction is a public signal of the new parameters of US foreign policy. To domestic audiences, particularly the Departments of Defense and State, it indicates that the prevailing assumptions of the post-Cold War period are no longer operable. Foreign audiences get the message that relations with the US are going to be less amicable than in the past. While the NSS cannot predict policy outcomes, it does set priorities—some more stridently than others—and guides their implementation.

Third, the NSS matters because it pits the Trumpian nationalists against the foreign policy establishment. The 2017 NSS contains deep tensions between the ideas that animate Trump’s nationalism, and the internationalism that has prevailed in US foreign policy since 1945. More specifically, this is a clash of personnel between the worldviews of those in Trump’s White House and the traditionalists that populate the foreign policy bureaucracy. To a considerable degree, the NSS illustrates the confrontation between Trumpism and traditionalism which divides foreign policymaking in Washington. Undoubtedly, unity of voice in the NSS is difficult to achieve. The document may be adorned with the president’s signature, but the NSS reflects much more than the president. It reflects the interests and influences of the vast US foreign policy establishment, which includes the White House, the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, Commerce, Health and Human Services, intelligence agencies, and congressional committees. Cabinet-level officials, their deputies, and senior bureaucrats arrive at agreed-upon language before the ideas arrive at the National Security Council for final deliberation, and then to the scribes tasked with putting words to paper. ³ Even in the best of circumstances, the interagency process is a terrain of competing institutional and personal interests.

In the past, NSSs have marshalled these competing influences in a single direction. But the intransigent nationalism of Trump and his closest allies is especially potent, enough to undercut the moderating influence of the establishment voices in his administration. It is no surprise, then, that the 2017 NSS has two personalities. There are moments where the Trumpian nativists prevail, and there are passages that affirm the status quo. There are even passages that are inimical to Trump’s own political survival: namely, references to Russia’s cyber- and misinformation campaigns. We see flashy and unmistakable rebukes of the foreign policies of Obama and Clinton. Yet much of the text reads as boilerplate that affirms the US's desire for primacy, access to international markets, and even the spread of its “values.”

Perhaps the surest sign of the influence of a status quo bloc is the NSS’s stance toward Russia. One of the most baffling aspects of Trump’s first eighteen months has been his approach to Russia. He has shied away from public criticism of Russia, has expressed his fondness for Vladimir Putin as a leader, and, most remarkably, has openly doubted the veracity of intelligence suggesting that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. If one thing is obvious, it is that Trump is most sensitive to any implication that his election is somehow illegitimate. In contrast to Trump’s silences, the 2017 NSS acknowledges patterns of Russian sabotage of democratic societies, including the use of information tools and cyber-capabilities to “undermine the legitimacy of democracies,” “target… political processes,” and interfere in “domestic political affairs of countries around the world.” ⁴ One can hardly imagine President Donald Trump and his partisans being content with this language. It is puzzling, then, to observe the presence of foreign policy ideas that are so contrary to the character and personal commitments of the President. Ideas and actors matter. The NSS reveals explicit contradictions and implicit clashes of personnel that cannot be ignored.

What is new?

The style and substance of 2017 NSS offers plenty of new material to consider. But a close read of the text reveals a planning document that directs action in opposing directions. Trump’s NSS is a hybrid of traditionalist internationalism and nativist disruption. It takes the existing framework of US foreign policy and grafts onto it the provocative language of Trumpian nationalism in a way that is both dissonant and unconvincing. What is new to the 2017 NSS is striking in the break it tries to make with the past. But reading past the attention-grabbing passages reveals that conventional internationalism is still part of the program. The first indication of dramatic change is the framing which proclaims a return to geopolitics. Trump’s introduction sets a scene of an “extraordinarily dangerous world” filled with transnational terrorists, and revisionist and rogue states. ⁵ This is a stark contrast to Obama’s portrayal of nearly the same challenges that can be overcome via the US's “unique capability to mobilize and lead the international community to meet them.” ⁶ Even George W. Bush’s aggressive war on terrorism was counterbalanced with the ideals of democracy promotion. Trump’s NSS takes a particularly aggressive posture towards China and Russia. Indeed, prior NSSs have hardly been blind to these two powers, but in contrast to Obama’s rejection of the “inevitability of confrontation,” Trump’s NSS declares that “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests.” ⁷

It makes sense, then, that a new era of geopolitics calls forth a new worldview, articulated in the NSS as “principled realism.” Since 1945, Republican and Democratic presidents have upheld a commitment to internationalism; the how has been a matter of presidential style. Soviet containment and liberal world order building was the Cold War imperative in US grand strategy, while the expansion of that order characterized the post-Cold War era. Trump’s NSS does away with any overt commitment to the internationalism of his predecessors. Instead, his NSS is premised on a theory of “principled realism.” According to the document, principled realism is a strategy “guided by outcomes, not ideology,” and based on a state-centric worldview that prioritizes “a world of strong, sovereign, and independent nations[.]” ⁸ It is realist because it recognizes the “central role of power in international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests.” It is principled insofar as it is “grounded in the knowledge that advancing American principles spreads peace and prosperity around the globe. We are guided by our values and disciplined by our interests.” ⁹ Throughout the NSS, the realist dimensions are much more prominent than the principled dimensions. The document’s realist bona fides are apparent in the way it frames the global security environment, affirms the virtues of deterrence, evokes a return to geopolitics, and appeals to the timeless nature of contests for influence. As for principles, the NSS articulates a muted commitment to championing US values and leading by example. Certainly, principled realism is not an innovation of the Trump administration. ¹⁰ Moreover, as a statement of principle, the NSS does not sound appreciably different from the broad tent occupied by liberal and conservative internationalists. Nor does it diverge greatly from other variations like neoconservatism. In this sense, the traditions of liberal internationalism are still present, but they are secondary to the flashier headlines.

If realism is the engine of Trump’s foreign policy with principle in tow, the NSS’s conclusion captures the underlying contradiction. It proclaims that “we are guided by our values and disciplined by our interests.” ¹¹ This formulation is unusual for such an aggressive document because it seems to get its concepts backward. One would think that a realist foreign policy should be guided by interests and disciplined by considerations like pragmatism and, yes, values. Indeed, a foreign policy guided by values seems out of step with the entire character of Trump’s document, and should be called by its true name, idealism. The mix-up may be a bit of rhetorical flourish whose logical inconsistency went unnoticed in the final draft. Or, it is symptomatic of something deeper: an inability to reconcile Trumpism with traditionalism in the administration’s foreign policy thinking.

Second, the NSS’s economic language is uniquely aggressive. This is probably the most novel development in NSS discourse since Bush’s articulation of the pre-emptive war doctrine. Supplanting free trade with reciprocity as a means of preserving national power is a sharp break from the post-World War II paradigm of open, rules-based international trade. Reciprocity is a return to some of the oldest strategies in the US foreign economic policy playbook. As far back as 1815, reciprocity was used to strengthen US positions vis-a-vis other economic powers, and to indicate that the US was prepared to retaliate against discriminatory trade barriers. Later, in the late nineteenth century, reciprocity was a useful way of asserting trade dominance over smaller economies in the western hemisphere while weakening European economic influence. ¹² Historically, the political purpose of trade through reciprocity has been to leverage the US's enormous size against smaller trading partners in one-on-one bargaining. In Trump’s NSS, the language of “fair and reciprocal trade” recalls a very old approach to economic relations. It reflects a program to supplant the post-World War II system of international trade rules with bilateral economic relations that in almost every case would be dominated by the US. It is no surprise, then, that “reciprocity” and “reciprocal trade” appear seventeen times in the text, while “free trade” appears twice, and only as a point of criticism.

Third, the absences are striking. Most noticeably, the old standbys of free trade, values promotion, and the newer consensus on climate change are muted or gone altogether. The biggest break with the past is the absence of any language about the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide. This was a standard feature of NSSs from Reagan to Obama. Democracy and human rights characterized much of the Clinton-era strategy of engagement and enlargement; they underpinned Bush’s program of transformation in the Middle East; and, according to Obama, were related to every enduring national interest. ¹³ Under Trump, however, there are non-committal overtures about continuing to champion US values and offering “encouragement to those struggling for human dignity.” ¹⁴ In this sense, Trump echoes not his immediate predecessors, but one from the distant past. In 1821, four years before he became president, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams cautioned his countrymen that the US “is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” Yet, buried in the NSS are standard commitments to humanitarian assistance, vocal opposition to human rights abusers, and other tools to isolate states whose actions run contrary to US values.

So, what is to be made of a security strategy that contradicts itself? At once, it signals an unambiguous break from generations-old conventions regarding diplomacy, trade, values promotion, and relationships with military allies. But the traditional ideas and, importantly, the bureaucratic architecture of foreign policy still exert influence over the crafting of this America First NSS. The strategic incoherence suggests an unworkable relationship in which the values and institutional legacies of major organs of US foreign policy are at odds. Already the fissures are evident in the exodus of career diplomats from the State Department and the number of vacancies in key positions requiring senate confirmation. ¹⁵

Sovereignty, national interests, and US grand strategy

Where the NSS is most puzzling is its basic assessment of the core problem in US grand strategy. The overriding strategic concern in the NSS is “sovereignty”: how the US can protect its rights and duties as a sovereign state. It is here that the Trump administration’s nationalist wing finds its fullest expression. The terms “sovereignty” or “sovereign” appear thirty times in the NSS, and the concept is treated as a normative ideal and a material object to be secured. But the most puzzling use of “sovereignty” in the NSS is its positioning as fundamental to the role of government in society. In a key passage, sovereignty is defined by the relationship between government and society: “strengthening our sovereignty—the first duty of a government is to serve the interests of its own people—is a necessary condition for protecting [national interests].” ¹⁶ Certainly, this is an awkward and politicized definition. Moreover, it runs contrary to conventional definitions of sovereignty as the state’s exclusive authority within a territorial jurisdiction, which has nothing to do with a government’s priorities. But, importantly, it reveals much about the America First worldview. In this formulation, sovereignty is redefined as a state’s primary duty to take care of its own, which to Trump means responding to Americans first. To put it differently, America First is sovereignty, and vice versa. The redefinition, in effect, dispenses with the objective meaning of the word so that it aligns with Trump’s preferred meaning. Thus, the nominal good of protecting “sovereignty” can be wielded as an all-purpose sentiment in support of a nationalist agenda. It is a rhetorical move similar to that of “alternative facts” and “fake news”—language that destabilizes the foundations of ordinary meaning and pre-empts reasonable argument. In a democracy, this is deeply disturbing.

For a foreign policy, the nationalist redefinition of sovereignty distorts the relationships between the core problem of US foreign policy and the country's national interests. That is to say, it confuses the means and ends of foreign policy. Like his predecessors, Trump articulates in his NSS national interests that are consistent with US foreign policy practice. They are: (a) protection of the homeland; (b) promotion of prosperity; (c) preservation of peace through strength; and (d) advancement of US influence. The first two carry over from previous administrations; the third echoes similar themes from Obama’s NSSs; the fourth is decidedly Trumpian. These four national interests are not inherently problematic, but they stand in an awkward relationship with sovereignty understood as Americans first. To understand this, we must return to the idea that strengthening US sovereignty is a necessary condition for protecting these four national interests. Here, sovereignty is situated as coming prior to, or as the means of, achieving national interests. Is it the objective of the United States to satisfy the four national interests, or to strengthen sovereignty? Presumably, the national interests are supposed to solve the core problem of US grand strategy: strengthening sovereignty. But when sovereignty is understood as a government duty-bound to its citizens, the relationship between overarching objectives and national interests becomes even less clear. One can easily imagine any of these national interests resulting in the strengthening of US sovereignty (conventionally understood), but not vice versa.

The conceptual confusion is not just a matter of bad writing or academic hairsplitting. It is another symptom of the dissonance between Trump’s foreign policy nationalism and the internationalist legacy in US foreign policy. For the most part, the national interests articulated in the 2017 NSS are well within the mainstream of US foreign policy practice. But the Trumpian nationalism welded to conventional national interests makes for a bizarre relationship that articulates strong sentiments but no discernable starting point, policy priorities, or connection between means and ends.

America First; America Alone

At the January 2018 World Economic Forum, Trump and his entourage of ten cabinet secretaries came armed with the slogan “America first does not mean America alone.” The phrase was intended to assuage fears that the US was closing its doors on the world, and it speaks to the difficulty of operationalizing a nationalist foreign policy in an interdependent world. For the rest of the world, responding to a national security framework that is a contradictory bundle of traditional internationalism and strident nationalism is a challenge. Mixed foreign policy signals can undermine the credibility of US commitments, and with uncertainty comes an increased chance of miscalculation.

The split-personality of the NSS and the deep bureaucratic divisions it implies suggests that any response depends on the policy issue at hand. Trade is certainly where Trump’s foreign policy is most disruptive. He has demonstrated a propensity towards dramatic rejection of free trade norms, and seems to take trade relations personally. He withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord entirely on the grounds of economic unfairness. He promised to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to renegotiate trade deals like the US–Korea Free Trade agreement and NAFTA. In his first year, Trump has made considerable changes to all three files. His move away from multilateral trade agreements reflects his desire for bilateral trade relations. Given Trump’s unambiguous commitment to reciprocity, it is wise for any US trading partner to expect US resistance to the multilateral trade paradigm. The trade field, however, is an open system affecting political interests in key electoral jurisdictions. It is possible to leverage interests in the fragmented US electoral system to maintain the integrity of a rules-based trading order. Canada has exemplified this approach in the NAFTA renegotiations by engaging in protracted hard-bargaining with the administration, but also by rallying support for open trade among officials from states with economies that are deeply dependent on the Canada–US trade relationship. The electoral stakes at the federal and state level are not lost on anyone. On security matters, Trump is much closer to the mainstream. His response to the Syrian gas attacks in 2017 and 2018 was consistent with a values-laden internationalism; his recommitment of troops to Afghanistan continues the seventeen-year-old nation-building project there; the war against ISIS is a continuation of a policy begun under Barack Obama. Even Trump’s grudging recommitment to NATO’s mutual defence clause suggests that establishment advisors can bring the President back to the conventional. But there are limits to this influence, and open questions of real consequence remain—not least of which is nuclear non-proliferation in Iran and North Korea.

As an insurgent candidate turned president, Trump took the helm of an enormous foreign policy apparatus deeply entrenched in internationalism. Perhaps, then, it should be no surprise that the NSS is a paradoxical Trumpian version of the status quo. It continues much of what the US has been doing since the 1990s, but reframes it anew and grafts hard-edged nationalism onto the existing architecture. The intellectual dissonance in the NSS may be the outcome of such a strange hybrid, but it may also be a symptom of something churning beneath. The NSS evinces a deep current of incoherence in US foreign policy under the Trump administration. It is this incoherence that bedevils US foreign policy under Trump, caught between his insurgent nationalism and deeply-held traditions of internationalism. Thus far, the sustainability of these contradictions has not been tested by a major crisis. But before long, something will have to give.