The Politics of War: Canada’s Afghanistan Mission,2001–14 by Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Nossal

Reviewed by: Eugene Lang (eugene.lang@queensu.ca), School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University; Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Canada

Henry Kissinger once wrote, “Foreign policy is in danger of turning into a subdivision of domestic politics[.]” ¹ It is a sentiment that reflects the chief argument in The Politics of War: Canada’s Afghanistan Mission, 2001–14, by Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Nossal.

A critical assessment of political leadership during Canada’s thirteen years in Afghanistan, the book’s thesis boils down to the notion that all of the political parties represented in the House of Commons used Canada’s various military missions in Afghanistan as a way of “scoring political points” against their opponents. None of the parties, according to Boucher and Nossal, had any genuine concern for the strategy of the international coalition fighting in Afghanistan—of which Canada was a key part—the morale of the Canadian Armed Forces, the battlefield situation, or the plight of the Afghan people. Boucher and Nossal acknowledge theirs is “a harsh indictment of Canada’s politicians, but … that the available evidence allows no other conclusion” (7).

The Politics of War is well written and accessible to a non-expert audience. The book is more about Canada—our institutions, our politicians, and political culture—than it is about international relations or national defence. The authors draw together an impressive array of media and other secondary sources, published government documents, parliamentary testimony, ministerial speeches, and public opinion surveys, which they link to various political science theories to help explain why decisions and events unfolded as they did.

Several major aspects of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan are covered. All of these dimensions—such as the framing of the various missions for public consumption; parliamentary votes on mission extensions; how the war was handled by the government and opposition parties in elections; and issues related to the treatment of Afghan detainees and Canadian casualties—are characterized as having been motivated chiefly by a quest for political advantage among the parties.

On some big themes, the book is persuasive. There is no doubt, for example, that Canadian Armed Forces missions in Afghanistan were frequently used by politicians, sometimes in unseemly ways, to advance their own interests. Real bipartisanship, as the authors assert, was a scarce commodity. It is also certainly true, as Boucher and Nossal document, that elected officials were less than clear, if not inconsistent, with Canadians as to why Canada was engaged militarily in Afghanistan. Canada’s political class also lacked basic knowledge of, and interest in, Afghanistan and the role that Canada and the international coalition were playing there.

However, Boucher’s and Nossal’s interpretations of events and motives is sometimes overdrawn. Take, for example, their claims for why the Chrétien government did not reveal to Canadians the deployment of Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), Canada’s special forces unit, to Kandahar in the fall of 2001. The authors argue that this strongly suggests that the government was trying to disguise the violent nature of Canada’s role in Operation Enduring Freedom. Yet there is a longstanding practice, both in Canada and among our allies, to conceal special forces deployments for reasons of operational security. These are highly classified missions, of which only a handful of people in government have any awareness, and for good reason. Operational security, not domestic political sensitivities, is the primary reason the government did not initially inform Canadians that JTF2 was in Afghanistan.

The authors’ interpretation of the motives of elected officials in voting on the mission extension to 2011 is also questionable. They write that “Canadian MPs knew full well that there was little prospect of imminent progress in Afghanistan that would allow the international community to declare success and go home by 2011” (94–95). This is based on their observation that various studies existed at that time concluding that the problems in Afghanistan were such that the goals of the 2006 Afghan Compact could not be achieved by 2011, and that Canadian MPs knew this and therefore should not have supported an arbitrary mission end date. The idea that a significant fraction of MPs had any knowledge of these studies, let alone the terms of the Afghan Compact, seems a little naïve. One big problem we have in Canadian foreign and defence policy is a congenital lack of interest or knowledge among the vast majority of MPs in all political parties—and that wilful ignorance extended in spades to Canada’s Afghanistan missions.

Boucher and Nossal’s account of discussions between Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae and Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff, which they claim led to some kind of tacit agreement between the Liberals and Conservatives for a Canadian training mission in Afghanistan post-2011, could also be on firmer ground. The authors’ account is based entirely on newspaper sources.

This relates to the main weakness of this book. The Politics of War is chiefly concerned with deciphering and criticizing the motives of politicians in their decisions and public statements in connection with Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan. Fair enough, there is good reason to do so—but in so doing, the authors would have been well advised to speak to the principals in the decision-making chain over the thirteen-year time frame under examination, and assess their sides of the stories. This amounts to a significant number of people: some three prime ministers; eight foreign ministers; seven ministers of national defence; four chiefs of defence staff; a couple dozen deputy ministers and senior privy council office and prime minister’s office staff; numerous opposition leaders and foreign affairs and national defence opposition critics—all of whom are alive and most of whom are retired, meaning they can now go on the record. Rounding out the research in this way is essential if the aim is to achieve a sophisticated understanding of government decisions and political motives on something as complex and politically charged as Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.

Despite this shortcoming, The Politics of War is an important contribution to the store of knowledge on a war Canadians should not forget and need to know more about.