Brazil’s entrepreneurial power in world politics: The role of great powers and regional politics for successful entrepreneurship

Introduction

Entrepreneurial powers are those states attempting to gain support of others to advance their interests in the international system. They are proactive states that “sell” their policies to others to gain support. Due to their constrained agency capacities, they rely on skilful and relatively large bureaucratic institutions capable of building coalitions abroad according to their aims. These bureaucracies can also rely on competent individuals and politicians that are able to convince others to follow the country’s positions and values. Hence, the central aspect of this definition is the capacity of cajoling and attracting followers with the focus on how such initiatives are developed and accomplished. ¹

In this paper, we examine Brazil’s entrepreneurship in two cases: the 1995 Cenepa War between Peru and Ecuador, and the 2010 Teheran agreement. In both scenarios, Brazil played the role of mediator trying to convince all sides to reach a feasible agreement in security-related crises. In the first case, Brazil managed to convince both sides to find a solution, whereas in the second, the agreement failed. The comparison is relevant to the discussion on entrepreneurship because, in both cases, all attributes of entrepreneurship were present, but in only one instance Brazil’s endeavour can be considered successful. In both cases, Brazil used its renowned foreign policy bureaucracy—Itamaraty—and the help of powerful and skilful politicians—presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva—but only in the regional crisis did it manage to strike a deal. Brazil has constantly sought to attract other countries closer to its preferences, and was always proactive in “selling” its position for both peace agreements, but in only one scenario did Brazil succeed.

This is an apparent puzzle to the entrepreneurship concept. That is, if all aspects of entrepreneurship were present in both crises, then why in only one did Brazil manage to gain full support from others? What factors led its handling of the Teheran case to fail and its handling of the Cenepa crisis to succeed?

Our argument is that, despite similar tools of entrepreneurship, two other contextual factors should be considered to gain a more encompassing view of the concept. First, the position of the great power involved in the crisis. The entrepreneurship equation is incomplete if one does not include great power preferences and behaviour, because the costs of opposing a dominant power can undermine the entrepreneurial power’s capacity to cajole new partners. Others might consider that following an entrepreneurial power that opposes a great power represents too much of a risk. So, success is never accomplished solely by shrewd agency. There are always environmental conditions, very often related to the dominant power’s behaviour, that constrain the entrepreneurial country despite its intentions and initiatives.

Focusing on issues of entrepreneurship may give us a different and more dynamic perspective on the challenges faced by intermediate countries aiming at playing an active role in the international arena. In addition, we can take advantage of some important findings conveyed by the studies of middle powers. The literature on middle powers shows that some middle powers have an ambiguous relation to great powers, while others tend to follow most of their initiatives. Whereas traditional middle powers—Canada or Australia—often support US visions and interests, emerging middle powers—such as Brazil or South Africa—are ambivalent toward dominant powers. ² Brazil tends to act independently from the United States—and sometimes contrary to US aims ³ —more often than other entrepreneurial or middle powers, and this autonomy should affect the way Brazil “sells” its policies, as well as how partners perceive them vis-a-vis the great power’s position.

Second, geography matters for the effectiveness of entrepreneurial powers. Regional politics entail permanent interaction with neighbours over time. Countries that intend to exert entrepreneurial behaviour often tend to avoid direct confrontation, especially if they aspire to be a regional power. The same goes for the countries that must deal with them. Regional politics entail iterative negotiations, not only at the moment of crisis, but also in the perceived future. Hence, the shadow of the future in regional interactions should benefit entrepreneurial powers in their efforts to convince others to follow them. ⁴

The literature is divided according to the importance of regional and global arenas to middle powers. While traditional middle powers are known for their preference for multilateralism and low regional influence, emerging middle powers are usually recognized as regional powers. ⁵ Since Brazil is known for enjoying regional supremacy in South America, except when competing with the United States, its behaviour within the region should be analyzed differently from situations where the country tries to expand its influence upon other regions where other regional powers are important actors and where the great powers have more important interests at stake. In this sense, Brazil’s entrepreneurial behaviour in South America should probably lead to different results from its efforts to influence outcomes in the Middle East.

To stress the explanatory value of the great power’s interest on the issue, as well as the regional insertion of the country deploying entrepreneurial powers, we have chosen cases that are as similar as possible in the three conditions for entrepreneurship. That is, (a) the intention to convince others according to its interests, (b) the use of skilful politicians and bureaucracies to persuade partners, and (c) a proactive foreign policy that “sells” its position on the crisis. Nevertheless, the cases differ on two other factors: (d) the dominant power’s pivotal position, and (e) the existence of regional politics commitments. Our argument is that differences in these two last conditions account for differences in the outcomes of entrepreneurial behaviour. ⁶

Although the Cardoso and Lula administrations, as well as the Middle East and South America, can be considered very different phenomena, the idea was to select cases within a most-similar design. According to Bennet and Elman, ⁷ in most-similar designs the key challenge for case comparison is to find cases that are as similar as possible in all but one or more independent variables, and that differ in their outcomes. The challenge is to demonstrate that the difference in the value of the independent variables of interest between the two or more cases accounts for the difference in outcomes. Thus, the two cases were selected by three independent variables: (a) skilful politicians/bureaucracy acting in the crisis, (b) Brazil trying to convince partners of its position, and (c) a proactive foreign policy that “sells” solutions to the crises. In other words, Brazil’s entrepreneurial performance was very similar in both crises, but rendered opposite results. The goal was to find omitted variables that could drive results to different directions.

Brazil as an entrepreneurial power

Brazil’s behaviour in world politics has been extensively studied in the last two decades, with the literature treating the country as either a middle or emerging power. For some, Brazil should be considered a typical middle power, ⁸ while for others Brazil does not fit properly in this concept, ⁹ and should be seen only as a regional power suffering from fierce contestation of its leadership. ¹⁰ Some see Brazil as a promising emerging power acting on issues where a great power used to dominate, ¹¹ while others see it as a country with global aspirations, trying to present itself as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and assuming the role of an international manager of crises. ¹²

More recently, scholars nicely captured the ambiguities and anxieties of a rising Brazil using the notion of “graduation dilemma.” This concept means that assessments couched in categories such as rising or middle powers make Brazilian foreign policy appear ambiguous because policymakers, facing multiple opportunities, choose between contradictory international strategies. In this sense, Brazil sometimes appears to be allied with the West in security issues, while at the same time appears to line up with the BRICS in similar discussions. ¹³

In our view, this ambiguity invites us to leave aside static conceptualizations and focus instead on the country’s performance. The novelty of our study is to analyze Brazil’s international performance, its successes or failures, and to go beyond the concepts of middle or emerging powers to assess the tools and mechanisms Brazil deploys in the process of achieving its international goals. The entrepreneurial power approach allows us to leave behind conceptions about fixed positions in the international system related to material capabilities, such as middle power, and move into something more fluid that is focused on agency, tools, and performances. On the other hand, we discuss two conditions that trace the limits to the efficacy of the entrepreneurial powers such as the regional context of the crisis and the pivotal position of the great powers, in particular of the hegemonic power, the United States. We developed a similar approach elsewhere. ¹⁴

The remainder of our article is divided into three sections. First, we analyze the 1995 Cenepa War with a focus on Brazil’s entrepreneurial actions, as well as the role of regional politics and its long-term commitments for all partners. Second, we analyze one of the most ambitious and costly episodes of entrepreneurial behaviour for Brazil: the 2010 Teheran agreements. Our goal here is to show Brazil’s entrepreneurial behaviours and their limitations. Finally, we draw some conclusions.

The 1995 Cenepa War: A case of successful entrepreneurship

The territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador is the only case in the Americas that has led to war several times since World War II. In 1942, Peru invaded Ecuador with 15,000 troops against 3000 poorly equipped Ecuadorian soldiers, and the result was a Peruvian military victory. Despite Peru’s achievement, the situation regarding the territory was a stalemate. It was only through the diplomatic efforts of four guarantor nations—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States—that a peace agreement was reached, which eventually established stable borders. These four friendly nations, together with Peru and Ecuador, signed in 1942 the treaty of “Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries,” known as the Rio Protocol. ¹⁵ However, in early 1995, the two countries fought a nineteen days’ war along their borders. Eventually a peace agreement was established in 1998. The 1998 agreement was the result of a long negotiation that started after the ceasefire, and the same four guarantors had a very important role in coordinating efforts towards peace. ¹⁶

From the beginning of the crisis, Brazil acted as mediator. The reasons for its assumption of this role are fourfold. First—and most importantly—Brazil sought to stabilize the region by reaching a peaceful agreement that would settle the issue for good. The Cenepa War introduced a type of instability that Brazil, having a tradition of perceiving itself as a peaceful country located in a relatively peaceful region, wished to eliminate. Second, President Cardoso’s administration aimed to open the Brazilian economy to globalization, based on the idea of a “new Brazil”—politically stable, responsible, and friendly to foreign investors and trade partners. Any political instability in the region could tarnish this image. Third, the conflict could be a sign of South America’s incapacity to integrate its economies and people. Peru and Ecuador’s rivalry was perceived as one of the last negative inheritances of the colonial past, in terms of unstable borders and painful state-building. Finally, endorsing and ensuring peace in Latin America has been one of Brazil’s lasting foreign policy goals, one that depicts the region as an important dimension of its own international identity as a peaceful nation. ¹⁷ So, it is fair to say that Brazil’s preference regarding the crisis was to bring stability and peace to the region. ¹⁸

A case of failure: The 2010 Teheran Declaration

On 17 May 2010, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, presented the Declaration of Teheran to the press. The document was the result of eighteen hours of negotiations between high representatives of Turkey, Brazil, and Iran, and offered a diplomatic solution for a long-lasting crisis initiated when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered a program to enrich uranium in secret Iranian nuclear facilities in 2002. The United Nations Security Council, under US leadership, had previously promoted three rounds of sanctions against Iran in 2006, 2007, and 2008. A tentative agreement proposed by Teheran, in 2009, under the auspices of the IAEA, France, and Russia, had failed due to Iran’s ambiguous commitment to bringing the secret program to a halt.

The agreement was joyously celebrated in Istanbul, Teheran, and Brasilia, and initially applauded by Russia and France as a triumph of diplomacy over force. However, this was not the United States’ perception. Despite the agreement, it decided to impose new sanctions, successfully garnering support from reluctant partners on the UN Security Council, such as Russia and China. Against this backdrop, on 9 June 2010, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1929 imposing additional sanctions against Iran, with the support of all members—permanent or not—except for Brazil and Turkey, which opposed the decision. ³⁴ For the first time in the history of the Brazilian participation at the Security Council, the country voted against a unanimous opinion of the permanent members.

The Obama administration considered Iran’s strategy towards Brazil and Turkey to be window dressing, as Iran continued to pursue its nuclear program while attempting to avoid new damaging sanctions. ³⁵ The Turkish–Brazilian initiative eventually came to be considered misplaced and naïve by many, a result of efforts from countries whose international experience and power resources did not allow them to play this kind of international game. According to Brazilian ambassador Marcos Azambuja, by deciding to participate in efforts to bring the Iranian crisis back to a diplomatic path, Brazil departed from a long tradition of prudent distance regarding conflicts in the Middle East. ³⁶

In Brazil, the government was severely criticized by domestic opposition forces for showing too much sympathy towards an authoritarian regime, and especially for overestimating its own power and going beyond its actual capabilities. Members of the Brazilian Senate’s Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee criticized Brazilian participation in the negotiation, expressing their regret for what they thought to be a waste of political capital, and their fear that it could contribute to the isolation of the country at the international level. ³⁷

However, this opinion was far from consensus. Former US under secretary of state Thomas Pickering and the former US chief arms inspector to the IAEA criticized the UNSC P5 for dismissing the Turkish–Brazilian initiative instead of building upon it to negotiate sensitive issues with Iran. In the same vein, in January 2011, Anne-Marie Slaughter, former state department director of policy planning, and professor at Princeton, argued that by rejecting the agreement reached by Turkey and Brazil, the great powers had lost the opportunity of having the Iranian uranium processed outside Iran, and of establishing a cooperative framework instead of a coercive one. ³⁸

Against such a controversial backdrop, why did Turkey and Brazil decide to embark on such a risky negotiation? Turkey’s motives were clearer and related to the country’s interests in the Middle East. ³⁹ Brazil’s motivations, on the other hand, were less obvious. Brazil’s decision was grounded on traditional ideas and motivations. First, the belief that Brazil had enough credentials to be a global actor and that the Iranian nuclear crisis was considered an important step towards strengthening such credentials. By going beyond its region and tackling an international security issue commonly thought to be chasse gardée of great powers, Brazil would show that it was qualified to be a member of a select club at the UN’s highest table. ⁴⁰

Second, the South-South orientation of Lula’s foreign policy helped to reinforce the centre-left government’s interest in Iran. Another member of the Global South was in peril, and Brazil should reach out to help. The long tradition of the Brazilian diplomatic bureaucracy in portraying Brazil as a leader of developing countries played an important role in its resolve to act as a broker for the Iranian nuclear issue. During a visit to Brazil in November 2009, President Ahmadinejad and President Lula enhanced Brazilian–Iranian relations as part of the South-South strategy, and defended the Iranian nuclear claims. ⁴¹

Third, Brazil had an interest, as signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in avoiding a precedent that could in the future have consequences for its own peaceful nuclear program. The Brazilian minister of foreign relations during Lula’s administration, Celso Amorim, later wrote about the Brazilian government’s motivations during the Iranian crisis. For him, Brazil and Turkey “succeed[ed] where the traditional powers had failed” because Brazil and Turkey—both developing countries—had “good relations with Iran,” and because Brazil and Turkey were “non-nuclear states, thus enjoying far greater legitimacy before the eyes of the Iranian authorities as far as efforts directed at non-proliferation [were] concerned.” In addition, in his view, Brazil and Turkey “did not assume upfront that the Iranian nuclear programme had necessarily non-peaceful uses. Both believed, much as the original proponents and the IAEA itself did, that the swap deal would help dispel at least some doubts.” Finally, he argued that “Brazil and Turkey have always recognized Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear programme, including the right to enrich uranium, so long as the IAEA could send its inspectors in and ensure the applicable regulations were being respected.” ⁴² So why did the agreement fail?

Conclusions

Our cases show that success or failure in international crises are not necessarily related to the position of a specific country within the distribution of world power. On the contrary, an entrepreneurial power seizes opportunities created by disruptive crises to successfully accomplish its goals through the mobilization of performative tools.

Brazil’s success in accomplishing its goals in the Cenepa crisis was related to three factors. First, since the negotiation was carried out under the principles of the 1942 Rio Protocol, all parties recognized Brazil as the only guarantor that had impartiality, as well as the only one capable of creating winning coalitions. Brazil managed to use a skilful political leader to “sell” its position on the crisis. Second, Brazil was willing to spend material resources on the MOMEP when necessary. Finally, US support for Brazil’s positions allowed Cardoso to push for its interests.

In contrast, the Iranian agreement seemed too difficult to sustain, especially after US opposition, and despite Brazil’s growing capacity in mediating conflicts. By acting outside its natural region, Brazil had limited resources to influence the decision-making process of all parties, especially the United States. This made Brazil’s preference on the crisis—that is, increasing its international prestige and credentials—impossible to accomplish, turning the Teheran agreement into a failure for the country’s entrepreneurial initiative. Although these efforts of confidence-building were efficient enough to gain the support of Iran and Turkey, they were not powerful enough to change the final US position. In the end, the challenge was not creating a coalition with Turkey or Iran, but developing a coalition wide enough to include members of the P5, especially the US.

By using a most-similar design, we showed that differences in entrepreneurial behaviour were related to distinct values in two factors—the position of the dominant power and the existence of regional commitments. All other factors that account for entrepreneurial powers were equally found in both cases. That is, the use of intense skilful politicians and competent bureaucratic institutions trying to convince all partners can be found both in the Teheran case, where President Lula and foreign minister Celso Amorim acted intensely throughout the negotiations, and in the Cenepa crisis, where President Cardoso and foreign minister Luis Felipe Lampreia represented key brokers to find a solution. In both scenarios, we also found that Brazil tried to “sell” its position to all partners, especially during the Iranian case when Lula and Amorim, alongside President Erdoğan, actively pushed for a political solution initially sanctioned by the Obama administration. Thus, the differences in entrepreneurial success derived from a favourable dominant power position in conjunction with regional politics commitments during the Cenepa crisis. These two key features could not be found in the Iranian negotiations.

In sum, these two cases show that performative tools are necessary, although not sufficient for success. The pivotal position of the dominant power plays an important role, as does the regional politics environment. The Cenepa case suggests that an unfavourable response of the dominant power can be changed or, at least, mitigated by agency and the smart use of performative tools. It also shows that regional politics matter since other parties preferred not to oppose the regional power. The Iranian case, in contrast, shows that a firm opposition by the dominant power dramatically decreases the chances for success, despite the shrewd use of performative tools by an entrepreneurial state. Acting in a region beyond Brazil’s traditional credentials also shows how important long-term regional commitments are to boosting performative skills.

Our entrepreneurial analysis brings evidence that for some middle powers regional politics is a key dimension for success, especially if the middle power is also a regional power. That is, while the literature on middle powers considers them to be successful in niche or issue-based politics regardless of their original regional position (e.g., Canada or Australia), our analysis shows that previous regional commitments can be an important factor for success regardless of the issue at stake. They create a path dependency of deep and multiple political connections among parties, which might prevent direct confrontations. However, we need more regional case analysis pointing in this direction to absolutely argue that entrepreneurship success is dependent on regional commitments. In addition, we still do not know whether regional commitments represent a sufficient factor for success per se, or whether there are specific combinations of regional factors that lead to entrepreneurial success more often.

On the other hand, our case analysis shows that there are always environmental conditions, very often related to the dominant power’s behaviour, that constrain entrepreneurial powers, especially when a middle power has an ambiguous relation to great powers. According to the middle powers literature we mentioned before, there are behavioural differences between traditional and emerging middle powers in relation to dominant powers. Whereas traditional middle powers—Canada or Australia—tend to support US visions and interests, emerging middle powers, such as Brazil or South Africa, are reformists and are ambivalent toward dominant powers. Whereas traditional middle powers seek to increase their influence within an international structure where the United States remains the dominant power through issue-based initiatives, emerging middle powers seek to create situations in which they can change their international status, both through niche politics and direct reformist confrontations. Thus, the pivotal position of the dominant power might have different effects depending on the entrepreneurial power under analysis. Opposition from a great power might represent different obstacles or opportunities to Brazil or Canada. However, only further evidence can give us a better picture of the true effects of pivotal dominant power positioning on entrepreneurial powers’ behaviour in general. The Brazilian cases show that for a reformist country the US position tends to be important.

Lastly, looking at performance rather than capacity represents an important research agenda that the entrepreneurial powers concept can fulfill. In the case of Brazil, there is a growing literature excessively focused on conceptualizations rather than behavioural effects. Focusing on how Brazil convinces others, as well as on the tools the country uses to that effect, can help to explain the factors leading to successful and unsuccessful foreign policy initiatives within a comparative research project.