Abstract
The fundamental problem in middle power scholarship lies in the research design that inadvertently permits bias, tautology, and circularity in the process of realizing the final outcome. Most researchers begin with a presumption that middle powers are countries in the middle range of the world order, capable and willing to play some constructive roles beyond their borders. Thus, they tend to select methods and data compatible with the given presumption, and reach predictable outcomes that determine middle power status by middle power behaviours, or middle power behaviours by middle power status. This is an epistemic fallacy where the ontic category of middle powers is defined by the epistemic knowledge of middle powers. Eventually, any countries with comparable characteristics/behaviours to the given presumption can be classified as “middle powers” conducting middle power behaviours. This article offers critical realism as a much-needed remedy to the stagnant middle power scholarship. It examines a group of countries already categorized as middle powers—Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA)—under a critical realist framework, and finds that those countries and their activities cannot be generalized by the conventional middle power conception. In fact, the middle power rhetoric itself holds both a positive and negative ideological implication that requires further scrutiny. Yet, what makes the critical realist research design and its findings invaluable is the commitment to ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental rationalism that addresses the recurring epistemic fallacy. Therefore, the research findings are not merely new insights about “middle power” countries; they are a valid clue that can help uncover the “real” world that causes the so-called “middle power” categorization.
The concept of “middle powers” is well established within the international community. Middle powers are generally known as countries neither “great” nor “small,” but capable and willing to play significant roles that influence and shape what goes on in the world. 1 These countries’ prominence is often identified by the roles they play as catalysts, facilitators, and managers in the international community. 2 Some of the well-known traditional middle powers include Australia, Canada, Norway, and Sweden, but there is now also some recognition of another group of “emerging” middle powers, such as Argentina, Malaysia, and South Africa. 3 In some cases, the middle power concept is utilized as an official foreign policy posture (e.g., in Australia and Canada) which has been internalized and is evocative of a particular group of countries with distinctive characteristics and behaviours.
However, underneath the seemingly straightforward categorization persists an unresolved question: what exactly makes countries “middle powers”? Numerous studies have sought to answer this question by providing a set of criteria associated with countries’ material capacity, behaviours, and/or ideological attributes claimed to cause distinct middle power roles. 4 Yet, there is still no precise definition or consensus on an explicit measurement, except for the general understanding of middle powers as middle-sized countries willing and able to play constructive roles in the world. The fundamental problem in the middle power scholarship actually lies in its connection of theory with research design. Although there are currently multiple approaches that can examine what makes countries middle powers, they often result in predictable outcomes that solidify the existing middle power conception. Thus, a country’s middle power status is determined by middle power behaviours, and middle power behaviours by middle power status. This creates a self-confirming loop that prevents middle power studies from progressing, since the dependent variables that determine the middle power status or middle power behaviours derive from the general conception that “middle powers” are indeed significant actors that play some constructive roles.
In the language of philosophy of science, this would be an epistemic fallacy 5 where an ontic category is defined by epistemic features. The ontological question of what is “middle power” is conflated with the epistemic knowledge of middle powers, and accepted as the general truth. Hence, those who study middle power countries begin from this epistemic knowledge and end in conclusions that reaffirm such knowledge as the truth. Then the bias, the tautology, and the circular reasoning used to determine middle power status by middle power behaviours, and middle power behaviours by middle power status, would not be considered fallacies. Instead, they are justified by the epistemic truth of “middle powers” as significant actors, capable and willing to play some constructive roles in the world. For that reason, the middle power scholarship remains weak and can never progress beyond such knowledge.
This article proposes an alternative theoretical approach that can help advance the middle power scholarship and shift our conventional conception of middle powers. A critical realist approach 6 allows researchers to question what else the middle power categorization may be outside the conventional conception. It is a meta-theory which asserts that there is a “real” world independent of our human awareness, which causes the middle power categorization. The critical realist approach to studying middle powers opens up the possibility for researchers to seek features yet unknown and not based on their own observations and experiences. At the same time, it considers the existing theories as possible truth claims about the nature of middle powers. What is unique about the critical realist framework is that it utilizes an abductive reasoning process that compares and contrasts new findings with the existing middle power theories. Therefore, it enables the researchers to choose between competing theories for the closest truth claim (the best theory).
The particular case study conducted here took a group of countries (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia: MIKTA) already categorized as middle powers and examined them under the critical realist research design. The case study uncovered that this group of so-called middle power countries cannot and should not be generalized as “middle powers” conducting “middle power behaviours,” and that there is both a positive and negative ideological implication attached to middle power rhetoric. However, the most important aspect of these findings is the critical realist research design that has allowed the researcher to delve beyond the empirical observations without hastily neglecting them. Its commitment to ontological realism (that there is a reality independent of human minds that we wish to come to know); epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced, knowledge emerges from pre-existing knowledge, and thus knowledge is fallible); and judgmental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible in principle to choose between competing theories) 7 addresses the common bias, tautology, and circularity rooted in the middle power studies. Moreover, this validates the research outcomes as indispensable clues to unravelling the “real” world that causes the middle power categorization. Otherwise, the MIKTA case study would have ended in another predictable outcome and again have committed an epistemic fallacy.
Weakness in the existing middle power scholarship
The common theoretical frameworks utilized to study middle powers have been materialist or behavioural theories, often related to ideational characteristics. Researchers have chosen countries’ physical, behavioural, and/or ideational variables (identity/norms) to determine who these so-called “middle powers” are, and/or what they do outside their borders. 8 If not, researchers choose to synthesize different characteristics and attempt to better explain the under-specified middle power categorization. Eduard Jordaan’s illustration of middle powers by two different worlds—the developed world and the developing world—is a good example of such synthesis. 9 He identifies the “traditional” middle powers as stable democracies that emerged during the Cold War, situated at the “core” of the world, living in the highest standards in the region, and relatively equal in distribution of power. Hence, these “traditional” middle power countries’ regional involvement and association are deemed less critical. The “emerging” middle powers, on the other hand, are identified as those that have recently democratized, are still unstable, and are on the “semi-periphery” of the world that emerged after the Cold War. Yet, as major players in their regions and surrounded by others in less favourable positions, these “emerging” middle powers are claimed to be eager to lead regional integration projects in the “periphery” of the world economy. 10
As with Jordaan’s illustration, most studies offer interesting insights about countries classified as “middle powers.” However, the fundamental problem is always in the way those insights (research outcomes) have been realized. Regardless of which theoretical framework has been adopted (i.e., materialist or behavioural theories), they end in predictable conclusions that solidify the conventional middle power conception. As researchers begin with the general presumption that “middle powers” are countries capable and willing to play some constructive roles beyond their borders, they naturally select variables, determinants, and/or case studies compatible with that presumption. In the end, a country’s middle power status or middle power behaviour is determined by the researchers’ own measuring/analytical criteria established through that precise presumption. Their epistemic belief about “middle powers” becomes the core basis for answering an ontological question about middle powers: that is, what makes countries “middle powers”? Ultimately, any country can be classified as a “middle power” conducting “middle power behaviours” as long as the researchers select variables/determinants/case studies attuned to the conventional middle power conception.
For example, it would seem most appropriate to classify a country like Japan a “great power.” Despite its restricted military strength, Japan is a prominent economic powerhouse in Asia. In addition, some Japanese leaders have described Japan as a great power. 11 Yet, Japan has also been identified as a middle power, particularly by its active engagement in human security (e.g., development assistance [ODA]). 12 There are also cases where major countries such as Germany and the UK have been categorized as middle powers in association with their potential roles against great power domination. 13 Even a small city-state like Singapore can be classified as a “middle power” based on its strong military capacity and diplomatic significance. 14 Therefore, the critical question becomes: how can one distinguish which countries belong in the middle power category from those that do not?
Laura Neack’s statistical cluster analysis demonstrates the feasibility of statistically measuring the middle power categorization, and attempts to reduce the ontological bias. She ranks middle powers by countries’ gross domestic product (GDP), population, and military expenditure per capita, along with the literacy rate and infant mortality per thousand live births. 15 At the same time, interestingly, Neack’s cluster analysis categorizes two prominent middle power countries, Australia and Canada, in the great power category during a period when they have been categorized as “middle power” in the literature. Neack explains the use of such categorization in the literature as “a desire to accommodate powerful, but less-than-superpower states in the post–World War II international system.” 16 Since these “middle states” are not like superpowers, yet are also not like many other states by their economic performance and significant international roles, the “solution” in the literature has been conceptualized as in-between or in-the-middle states. 17 In that case, then, the “middle state” can be interpreted as simply a convenient concept, socially constructed in order to better explain countries that are not superpowers but are also not poor and inactive in the international system. So, even if countries like Canada and Australia have been categorized as “middle states” in the literature, they do not have to be in Neack’s cluster analysis.
However, it should be noted that Neack’s final categorization of “middle states” still upholds the conventional middle power conception. Although her middle state countries are predominantly Third World countries different from the well-known middle powers like Canada and Australia, she justifies their middle state status under the common middle power criteria of achieving a significant degree of industrial development (economic capacity) and playing an important role in international politics (behaviours). The only distinctive conclusion from her analysis is that because these middle states are “in many ways new and significant actors in world politics,” they should not be automatically assumed to carry “considerable historical weight behind their international status,” as claimed in some literature. 18 Yet, such a conclusion cannot overcome the issue of bias, tautology, and circular reasoning in her analysis that is heavily dependent on the conventional middle power conception. Neack’s conclusion would become valid only if the conventional middle power conception is absolutely true.
Jonathan Ping’s mixed model is another good example of an attempt to reduce the ontological bias in middle power studies. He synthesizes the statistical measurement with hybridization theory. First, Ping takes nine statistics (e.g., population, geographic area, military expenditure, and GDP) and designates a middle power rank to a state that passes at least five of those nine categories in the ranking order of “the first four states being great powers, with the following fifteen being middle powers, and the remaining nineteen being classed as small powers.” 19 After that, he selects two middle power countries (Malaysia and Indonesia) from the fifteen, and further analyzes their statecraft (defined as acts conducted for creation and recreation of a state) and perceived power (or normative definition involving creating, implying, or prescribing norms or standards by which to classify) via the hybridization theory. Ping’s conclusion asserts that the two middle power countries “create and recreate themselves” in a constantly changing environment interrelated with domestic, regional, and international arenas. Therefore, they cannot be explained by the position of the traditional Western middle powers. 20
However, note here that Ping’s research outcome is also based on criteria contingent on the existing middle power conception. Even if his statistical measurement appears to help reduce the ontological bias and strengthen his qualitative analysis, his research design has been structured to uphold the existing middle power conception. That is, middle powers are particular countries that play some significant roles. Thus, although Ping provides an interesting portrayal of Indonesia and Malaysia as middle powers conducting middle power statecraft, this portrayal still carries some bias, tautology, and circular reasoning, from Ping’s selection of determinants to his selective qualitative analysis. Moreover, there is also the possibility that Indonesia and Malaysia have never classified themselves as “middle powers” or their policy conduct as middle power statecraft in the first place.
Likewise, the alternative theoretical frameworks claimed to address some of the neglected areas in the mainstream middle power frameworks do so using the conventional middle power conception. For instance, Cornelia Huelsz’s (2009) adoption of the New Political Economy approach places “structure and agency as mutually constitutive, and of the power to exist in both material and ideational form.” 21 Yet, Huelsz also evaluates and defines Brazil’s “emerging” middle power status through the common middle power premise of conducting particular behaviours. Again, we should ask: would Brazil identify itself as a “middle power” and the specified behaviours as middle power behaviours? Similarly, Sang Bae Kim’s (2014) adoption of the social network theory may offer an interesting explanation of South Korea’s middle power behaviours through a structural network. 22 However, Kim too explains South Korea’s unique middle power behaviours within the context of the conventional middle power conception. Therefore, although both Huelsz’s and Kim’s research outcomes provide some essential observations of the two so-called middle power countries, they commit a circular fallacy. Again, a middle power status is determined by middle power behaviours, and middle power behaviours by middle power status ruled under the conventional middle power conception.
More recently, Jeffrey Robertson (2017) has recognized the weakness in the middle power definition. He has called the current state of middle power studies “sclerotic.” 23 Robertson finds the “middle power” definition to be an evolvement through the agencies’ (i.e., the academic schools of thought, domestic leadership, and policymakers) own interests and pursuit of “persuasion, influence, and perhaps ultimately power.” 24 Therefore, Robertson discourages middle power studies aimed at answering “what really is a middle power?” Instead, he suggests asking “how we ought to use the term in the context of a specific field or subfield[.]” For instance, a middle power can be defined “in the context of global governance in the 2010s, a state with an interest in and capacity (material resources, diplomatic influence, creativity, etc.) to work proactively in concert with similar states to contribute to the development and strengthening of institutions for the governance of the global commons.” 25 With such pragmatic approach to contexts, Robertson claims, there will be considerable advancement in the study of middle powers.
However, the main concern is again in the way Robertson reaches his final conclusion. Even though his rationale relies heavily on the agencies’ roles in constructing the middle power definition, he does not provide any empirical justification or explanation on how those roles have influenced the middle power definition throughout time. Furthermore, Robertson does not address the complex relationship between agency and structure in the development of the middle power categorization. What are the agency’s roles in relation to the structure that allows this middle power categorization? Meanwhile, his approach of selecting contexts by specific fields or subfields of middle power roles still derives from and upholds the given presumption that middle powers are important actors. Consequently, his analysis functions in the same circularity that determines middle power status by middle power behaviours, and middle power behaviours by middle power status under the existing middle power conception.
In that case, the actual weakness in the middle power scholarship is beyond the simple lack of a concrete definition. It is the researchers’ continuous understanding of middle powers within the premise of countries’ economic capability and the significant roles they play. Hence, researchers naturally construct research designs compatible with such an understanding, and reach conclusions that further solidify it. As mentioned, in the language of philosophy of science, this is an ontic category of middle powers being determined by the epistemic features of middle powers. It is an epistemic fallacy where the ontological categorization of middle powers is conflated with the epistemological knowledge of middle powers. Yet, some research outcomes have established precise middle power characteristics—albeit with the bias, tautology, and circularity in the process of realizing those outcomes. 26 Moreover, they reinforce the current research frameworks as relatively reliable and the conventional middle power conception as the general truth. When new researchers adopt or refer to research outcomes/frameworks from previous middle power studies, they help sustain the customary explanation of middle powers by countries’ material capacity, constructive behaviours, or ideational characteristics that cause particular middle power roles.
For instance, John W. Holmes’s work, “Is there a future for middlepowermanship?” (1966) has been used as a reference for Robert Cox’s (1989) exploration of Japan’s “middlepowermanship.” 27 Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal’s (1993) middle power roles as catalysts, facilitators, and managers is a popular reference in other middle power analyses. 28 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant’s “niche diplomacy” as a specific middle power role has become almost a given fact. 29 It has been adopted to identify Turkey’s global roles 30 as well as South Africa’s proactive engagement in AIDS diplomacy as their middle power niche. 31 With such a trend, it is highly likely that the conventional middle power conception and frameworks will diffuse throughout time. The only way to break away from such a conventional approach would be if the researchers begin to question what else the middle power categorization may be outside the given conception.
For years, researchers have learned to accept the conventional middle power conception as the general truth. That is why their explanations of middle powers have been bound by the premise of a country’s material capacity, behaviours, or ideational characteristics (i.e., middle power identity/norm). However, it is time for researchers to perceive “middle power” in a completely different dimension. This means they should no longer focus on the habitual question of what constitutes middle powers. Rather, they should ask the most unconventional questions, such as what makes this ambiguous categorization, middle power, essential in the world order? Who is it useful for, and why so, when it lacks a concrete definition? At the same time, to ask such questions requires a major shift in the researchers’ mind. They must be opened to the possibility that “middle power” may be something beyond the epistemic knowledge they have acquired.
Critical realism as a remedy
Critical realism, as explained by Roy Bhaskar, is a variant of scientific realism that positions the world in a stratified form of three ontological domains: the “real” (the things that exist, and their structure and power, known as mechanisms); the “actual” (observable or unobservable events generated by those mechanisms when activated); and the “empirical” (events we experience/observe directly or indirectly). 32 The fundamental assumption is that there is a world independent of human thought, and to understand such a world requires two different dimensions of science: the “transitive” and “intransitive.” The intransitive dimension holds the relatively unchanging things of the world, “the object of science (or other kinds of propositional knowledge) in the sense of the things we study—physical processes or social phenomena[.]” 33 The transitive dimension is formed through theories and methods concerning the objects of study in the intransitive dimension. So, while different theories and methods seek to explain the objects in the intransitive dimension, those very objects of study remain the same. Theories and methods may change or be replaced over time, but that does not necessarily mean the objects also change, meaning “there is no reason to believe that the shift from a flat earth theory to a round earth theory was accompanied by a change in the shape of the earth itself.” 34
According to critical realism, there are mechanisms in the intransitive social world that generate middle power activities. The investigation of that intransitive social world can reveal not only the actual cause of the middle power categorization, but also features unobservable in the domain of the empirical. The conception of middle powers should not be limited by a reality conflated with our own observation and experiences, nor should it be generalized as a socially constructed by-product of human (agency) activities. Instead, it is best viewed in a stratified world committed to ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental rationalism. 35 In other words, as with the case of the flat earth theory that changed to a round earth theory without the actual change of the earth itself, the study of middle powers should begin with acceptance of the possibility that there is something more to the middle power categorization than what is currently known.
As human knowledge “emerges from a transformation of pre-existing knowledge, a set of antecedent materials; theories; paradigms; models; facts; speculations; linguistic convention; belief; hunches; hypotheses; guesses; symbolic gestures,” 36 the knowledge we hold of middle powers is also transient and fallible. “Some knowledge claims may be better than others,” and it is possible to choose between competing theories “without endorsing a debilitating epistemological nihilism.” 37 From this theoretical principle, the middle power scholarship is a continuous investigation toward the domain of the real, the “real” world that causes the middle power categorization. However, it does so without automatically disregarding the possible truth claims under the existing middle power theories.
A critical realist approach examines the middle power categorization outside the given presumption that middle powers are middle-sized countries playing some constructive roles in the world. Meanwhile, any new findings uncovered throughout the investigation are analyzed in relation to the existing middle power theories. Critical realist research operates in an abductive reasoning process to find the closest truth claim (best theory) among all possible truth claims. Like a detective who investigates all competing explanations before determining the best explanation of the crime, the researcher compares and contrasts his new findings with the existing middle power theories before choosing the closest truth claim (the best theory). Such a process addresses the common epistemic fallacy committed in the current middle power frameworks. The researcher is no longer bound by the given presumption or the premise of material capacity, behaviours, and ideological characteristics controlled via the conventional middle power conception. Furthermore, because the closest truth claim is chosen after a comparison with the existing middle power theories, it develops as a valid clue toward the “real” world that causes the middle power categorization.
A case study: MIKTA
Established in 2013, MIKTA is a group of five middle power countries—Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia—working together to build a constructive partnership and leadership for global governance. 38 It is a perfect example of a middle power mechanism under the standard of the mainstream middle power theories. As stated in their vision statement, MIKTA countries have “both the will and the capability to contribute to protecting public goods and strengthening global governance.” 39 All five countries are members of the G20. All have served as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. They have demonstrated global leadership by hosting important international meetings, such as Mexico’s G20 Summit in 2012 and South Korea’s Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. Some of their prominent roles can be observed in, for instance, Indonesia’s leadership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia’s proactive engagement in the development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and Turkey’s notable contribution to humanitarian aid. Therefore, it is easy to list attributes and behaviours that qualify these countries’ middle power status and meet the standard under the conventional middle power conception.
MIKTA countries’ physical comparison
Source: World Bank 40
In addition, some of their policy behaviours are inconsistent with what would seem to be expected middle power behaviours. For instance, global efforts to address climate change may be part of middle power countries’ agendas, 41 yet a prominent middle power country, Australia, has faced serious challenges in establishing a proper climate change policy. As one of the world’s largest exporters of coal, Australia’s attempt to implement a coherent scheme has affected its politics. It brought an end to several prime ministers’ careers, 42 including Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the originator of “creative middle power diplomacy.” 43 The recent UN report also highlights that Australia will not meet the Paris carbon emission reduction targets by 2030. 44 Despite its pledge to reduce emissions by 26–28 percent of 2005 levels, there has been an upward trend in Australia’s emissions since 2013. 45 Thus, Australia is still considered one of the worst climate offenders. The question is, how does this affect Australia’s middle power status? Should not a middle power fulfill its global responsibility? Or does it really matter, since the criteria that determine middle power status is based on a researcher’s own discretion? If the researcher chooses not to include the climate change policy as one of the criteria that determine Australia’s middle power status, there is no obligation for the researcher to highlight such policy and disqualify its middle power status.
At the same time, researchers’ choice of selecting and interpreting MIKTA’s collective cooperation, such as their joint fight against Ebola and their cultural and educational exchange, as middle power cooperation would be an unwarranted generalization. Those particular cases cannot address the bias, tautology, and circularity embedded in the research design built via the conventional conception. They are selective cases compatible with the given presumption that MIKTA countries are a group of middle powers, capable and willing to play some constructive roles. Therefore, even if researchers discover some unique characteristics and roles in the MIKTA grouping and report those findings as middle power attributes and behaviours, they are his or her own observation in the domain of the empirical controlled via the conventional middle power conception.
In that case, the critical realist question to ask is: is this “middle power” label really necessary in the MIKTA grouping, and if so, what kind of “real” world makes it necessary? While the MIKTA vision statement endorses the conventional middle power conception, there is no specific reference to the middle power rhetoric. In fact, it was rarely articulated throughout the fifth MIKTA foreign ministers’ meeting, in which MIKTA members adopted the vision statement. 46 The only two middle power references currently displayed on the official MIKTA website are from outside sources that portray MIKTA as a group of middle power countries, capable and willing to play constructive roles in the region and the world. 47 However, those sources cannot and do not explain the implication of the middle power rhetoric in relation to MIKTA countries’ regional/international positions. As a result, although the underuse of the middle power rhetoric does not deny or disqualify MIKTA from being a group of middle powers, it certainly does imply that the middle power label itself is not imperative in their collaboration.
Even the personal interviews with high officials of MIKTA countries have revealed a quiet discrepancy. Australia is actually moving away from the middle power categorization. The incumbent administration finds Australia to be more than a “middle power.” Thus, a more suitable classification for MIKTA would be a grouping of “like-minded” countries instead of the middle power categorization. 48 For Indonesia, there seems more caution among officials to use such a categorization: “Indonesia has no intention of differentiating countries by status.” 49 Implementation of “middle power” as Indonesia’s status would indirectly distance other countries or create a sense of neglect for those countries without the same status in the international community. Turkey also prefers not to promote itself as a middle power, although it does not mind a third source classifying it as such. As stated, the name “Turkey” already represents who Turkey is. It does not need a different identification. 50 It is only the officials from Mexico and South Korea who are quite keen on the middle power label. 51 Their interpretation of “middle power” readily aligns with the conventional conception that designates middle powers as significant actors in the world. Therefore, they have been eager to promote MIKTA as a middle power mechanism. In fact, South Korea has already implemented “middle power diplomacy” as its official foreign policy posture. The Mexican official also expressed the desire to further pursue middle power conduct in Mexico’s foreign policy.
From that standpoint, the use of the “middle power” categorization as MIKTA countries’ international representation is an independent choice made by each member country. Each member country differs in the way they perceive and understand the middle power categorization. While some member countries find the middle power status positive and useful, others do not. Therefore, researchers should not automatically interpret MIKTA countries’ cooperative engagements by the conventional middle power conception. Middle-power-like activities of middle-sized countries should not be automatically defined as middle power behaviours conducted by middle powers. Moreover, these examples indicate that there is both a positive and negative ideological implication attached to the middle power rhetoric itself. A deeper dissection is required as to why this is the case if the middle power categorization is nothing more than a representation of middle-sized countries, capable and willing to play constructive roles beyond their borders.
Benefits of critical realism in the study of middle powers
The case study above does not and cannot reveal the “real” world that causes the middle power rhetoric in these MIKTA countries’ foreign policy. That would entail further in-depth scrutiny of each MIKTA country’s use of the middle power rhetoric, not in one selective context of field or subfield as suggested by Robertson. Rather, it should be analyzed in multiple contexts over time, with the analysis open to the possibility of uncovering unconventional and unexpected functions and purposes of the middle power rhetoric. Not only do MIKTA countries differ in the way they perceive the middle power categorization, as shown by the in-depth interviews, but their usage of the middle power rhetoric has diverged throughout time. For instance, despite its recent reluctance, Australia articulated middle power (diplomacy) as its official foreign policy posture from early on during the inception of the United Nations. It was one of the main actors (with Canada) that sought UN recognition of the middle power categorization. South Korea, on the other hand, implemented middle power diplomacy as its official foreign policy only from the year 2013. This, then, should lead to another essential question: did South Korea use the middle power categorization before this implementation, and if so, in what ways?
The actual function and purpose of these MIKTA countries’ middle power rhetoric could have diverged all along. These countries vary by history and foreign policy priorities/interests. For example, South Korea’s middle power rhetoric may have a different function because of its unique geopolitical location, surrounded by four great powers (the US, Japan, China, Russia) and an unpredictable rogue state, North Korea. Meanwhile, it would be an unwarranted generalization to describe MIKTA countries’ middle power status as their individual quests for international prestige or some domestic support for their national agendas, as claimed in some constructivist case studies. 52 Such generalization automatically confines the middle power concept to a socially constructed identification that benefits MIKTA countries’ national interests. It commits an epistemic fallacy by assuming that the middle power categorization is positive and useful for MIKTA countries and the international community. Therefore, it is crucial that each member country’s middle power rhetoric be analyzed by contexts and time, unrestricted and uncontrolled by the conventional middle power conception. Only then can the investigation capture the genuine significance behind each member country’s middle power rhetoric, and uncover the “real” world that makes such rhetoric necessary.
Of course, it is this particular case study that demonstrates a hopeful advancement for the “sclerotic” middle power studies. Not only does it help guide researchers toward the “real” world that has caused the middle power categorization, it brings serious attention to the “middle power” rhetoric. There is now urgency in scrutinizing each MIKTA member country’s middle power rhetoric in their foreign policy discourse outside the conventional conception. The middle power scholarship, for decades, has been restricted by the conventional conception of middle powers. Researchers could not access knowledge beyond the given presumption that middle powers are some countries in the middle range of the world order capable and willing to play constructive roles. What is more alarming is that this conception has evolved into a general truth of middle powers. It operates as the main source that helps determine which countries and behaviours belong in the middle power categorization.
The critical realist approach to studying middle powers unlocks the researcher’s mind from a conception that has become a given norm, a general truth of middle powers. It activates an imperative question that asks, what else could this so-called “middle power” be outside the conventional conception? This then shifts the stagnant middle power study to another level where the researcher is no longer bound by the domain of the empirical. The researcher begins to seek something more to the middle power categorization than what is observable by his or her own observation or experience. Hence, the new insights discovered through the MIKTA case study do not reflect the domain of the “empirical.” Rather, they derive from the domain of the “actual,” where if the investigation had stopped at the domain of the empirical, they would have never been found. Who would question MIKTA’s middle power status under the conventional middle power criteria? Who would anticipate a negative ideological implication attached to a categorization often associated with constructive characteristics and roles? The research conclusion made in the domain of the empirical would have been another predictable outcome vindicating the conventional middle power conception. For example, the portrayal of MIKTA countries as a bridge between the developed and developing countries or MIKTA as a catalyst or facilitator in global governance is an ordinary conclusion. 53
Furthermore, the critical realist commitment to ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental rationalism is a component not found in the existing middle power studies. Such a commitment allows the researcher to speculate on MIKTA outside the conventional conception, without disregarding the existing middle power theories. The nature of the existing middle power studies does not include comparing and contrasting of the possible truth claims. Rather, it is aimed at finding a set of criteria (in the premise of capacity, behaviours, and ideological values) that constitute MIKTA’s middle power categorization. If not, it seeks to identify how these MIKTA middle power countries shape and influence the world order, without addressing the bias, tautology, and circularity rooted in the conventional middle power frameworks. Thus, the critical realist commitment to ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental rationalism is the key solution that uncovers and validates the new insights as the closest truth claim in relation to other possible middle power truth claims. And finally, that closest truth claim becomes another clue to finding more features yet unknown of middle powers or the “real” world that causes such categorization.
Conclusion
The ambiguity in the middle power definition has never hindered the use of the middle power categorization in academia or foreign policy practice. Scholars and students may have questioned the indefinite middle power definition, but they have never refuted the presence of middle-sized countries and their influential roles in the world. Practitioners have also freely adopted and applied the middle power rhetoric in their foreign policy discourse. As a result, the customary routine of finding explicit middle power criteria or better explaining middle power attributes has seemed optimal for the advancement of middle power scholarship.
However, such an approach has restricted knowledge of middle powers. As stated earlier, most middle power studies end in predictable outcomes that affirm certain physical, behavioural, and ideological characteristics as middle power characteristics, regardless of the theoretical/methodological framework. They operate with circular reasoning that determines middle power status or middle power behaviours in reflection of the given presumption. Ultimately, the present knowledge of middle powers is an end-product of repeated epistemic fallacies: that is, the ontic category of middle powers is constantly defined by the epistemic features of middle powers. The epistemic belief that middle powers are countries, capable and willing to play constructive roles in the world, naturally encourages researchers to select methods and data fitting to such a belief. And the only way to avoid such an epistemic fallacy is through a major shift in the human mind. The researcher must be opened to the possibility that there is something more to the middle power categorization than what is currently known.
The MIKTA case study demonstrates the effectiveness of critical realist research design for the stagnant middle power scholarship. It addresses the fundamental problem, the repeated epistemic fallacy, via the critical realist commitment to ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental rationalism. Ontological realism allows the researcher to locate “middle power” in the “real” world that causes it. The central research question becomes: what is the “real” world that makes this “middle power” possible or, better put, necessary? Hence, finally, the researcher is able to break away from the given presumption and question the conventional middle power conception in the domain of the empirical (our observation and experiences). Epistemological relativism allows the researcher to consider all possible middle power theories, since knowledge is relative to contexts, culture, and society. It is also transient and fallible. And, at last, based on judgmental rationalism, the researcher is able to analyze and choose between competing theories, and find the closest truth claim that best explains the middle power categorization.
The new insights (i.e., not generalizing MIKTA countries and their activities as middle powers conducting middle power behaviours, and that there is a positive and negative ideological implication attached to the middle power rhetoric) discovered through the critical realist framework are not merely interesting findings about MIKTA (middle power) countries. They are the closest truth claim that functions as a valid clue to the “real” world that causes the middle power rhetoric. And from there, another investigation can begin. But this time, the new research objective will be to find the actual function and purpose of the middle power rhetoric in each of the MIKTA countries’ foreign policy discourses throughout time. In other words, the critical realist investigation of middle powers is a continuous pursuit (abductive reasoning) toward the “real” world that causes the middle power rhetoric. And every step toward that “real” world is an opportunity to uncover features yet unknown of middle powers, and make a genuine advancement in the middle power studies—unfeasible through the existing research frameworks.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
1
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2
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers, 24–25.
3
Eduard Jordaan, “The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers,” Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 30, no. 1 (2003): 165–181.
4
Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics; Laura Neack, “Delineating state groups through cluster analysis,” The Social Science Journal 30, no. 3 (1993): 347–371; Bernard Wood, “Middle powers in the international system: A preliminary assessment of potential,” WIDER Working Paper (1987): 1–44. Jordaan, “The concept of a middle power in international relations”; Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 161–164; John Ravenhill, “Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint and choice in Australian and Canadian foreign policies,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 52, no. 3 (1998): 309–327; Andrew F. Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997); Andrew Hurrell, Andrew F. Cooper, Guadalupe González, Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes, Srini Sitaraman, Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States, Latin American Program Working Papers (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Researchers, 2000).
5
Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 5, 26–30.
6
Ibid.
7
Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight, “Scientific realism and international relations” in Joseph and Wight, eds., Scientific Realism and International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 10–13.
8
Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, 90, 221–223; Neack, “Delineating state groups through cluster analysis,” 347–371, 351; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers, 17; Ronald Martin Behringer, “Middle power leadership on the human security agenda,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 40, no. 3 (2003): 305–342; Jeffrey Robertson, “South Korea as a middle power: Capacity, behavior, and now opportunity,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 16, no. 1 (2008): 151–174; Cranford Pratt, Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990); Mark Neufeld, “Hegemony and foreign policy analysis: The case of Canada as a middle power,” Studies in Political Economy 48 (autumn 1995): 7–29; Hurrell et al., Paths to Power.
9
Jordaan, “The concept of a middle power in international relations.”
10
Ibid., 171–173.
11
Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Is Japan a great power or a middle power?” The Nations, 3 July 2017, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30319723 (accessed 10 December 2018); Jacob M. Schlesinger, “Identity confusion: Is Japan now a “great power?” The Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2014, 
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12
Yoshihide Soeya, “Japanese security policy in transition: The rise of international and human security,” Asia-Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (2005): 103–116.
13
Andris Banka, “Middle powers to the rescue?” The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 2 October 2018, www.saisreview.org/2018/10/02/middle-powers-to-the-rescue/ (accessed 10 December 2018); Zhang Yansheng, “Middle powers play big role in maintaining intl order,” Global Times, 12 July 2018, (accessed 10 December 2018).
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15
Neack, “Delineating state groups through cluster analysis,” 347–371, 351.
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Ibid., 368.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., 369.
19
Jonathan Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 69.
20
Ibid. See also Jonathan Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2017).
21
Cornelia Huelsz, “Middle power theories and emerging powers in international political economy: A case study of Brazil,” PhD thesis, University of Manchester, 2009, 9.
22
Sang Bae Kim, “Roles of middle power in East Asia: A Korean perspective,” EAI Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative Working Paper 02 (2014): 1–31.
23
Jeffrey Robertson, “Middle-power definitions: Confusion reigns supreme,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no 4 (2017): 13.
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Ibid., 12.
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Ibid.
26
Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Maryland, 2003), 163–180; David A. Cooper, “Somewhere between great and small: Disentangling conceptual jumble of middle, regional, and ‘niche’ powers,” The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 14, no. 2 (2013): 23–35.
27
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28
For example, Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, “The changing architecture of politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia’s middle power moment?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 2 (2014): 223; Sook-Jong Lee, “South Korea aiming to be an innovative middle power,” in Sook-Jong Lee, ed., Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US: Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 2.
29
Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 345.
30
Hasan Basri Yalcin, “The concept of ‘middle power’ and the recent Turkish foreign policy activism,” Afro Eurasian Studies 1, no. 1 (2012): 195–213.
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32
Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science; Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social Science (London: SAGE, 2000). See Joseph and Wight, Scientific Realism and International Relations; Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, “After postpositivism? The promise of critical realism,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 213–237.
33
Sayer, Realism and Social Science, 10.
34
Ibid., 10–11.
35
Joseph and Wight, “Scientific realism and international relations,” 10–13.
36
Ibid., 12.
37
Ibid., 13.
38
Jongryn Mo, ed., MIKTA, Middle Powers and New Dynamics of Global Governance: The G20’s Evolving Agenda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 1–101.
41
Sook-Jong Lee, Chaesung Chun, HyeeJung Suh, and Patrick Thomsen, “Middle power in action: The evolving nature of diplomacy in the age of multilateralism,” EAI Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative (2015): 1–28.
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46
The author was the rapporteur for the 5th MIKTA Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held on 22 May 2015, in Seoul, South Korea. Also see Byung-se Yun, “Opening Remarks, 5th MIKTA Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” 22 May 2015, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5689/view.do?seq=318587&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=7&titleNm= (accessed 19 May 2018).
47
Jorge A. Schiavon and Diego Dominguez, “Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA): Middle, regional, constructive powers providing global governance,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies 3, no. 3 (2016): 495–504; Sarah Kim, “Envoys from five middle-power nations tout MIKTA forum,” Korea JoongAng Daily, 19 May 2015, (accessed 19 May 2018).
48
49
Personal interview with high official of Indonesia, Seoul, South Korea, 8 January 2015.
50
Personal interview with high official of Turkey, Seoul, South Korea, 23 December 2014.
51
Personal interview with high official of Mexico, Seoul, South Korea, 1 December 2014; Email interview with high official of South Korea, Seoul, South Korea, 10 December 2014.
52
For example, Nikola Hynek, “Canada as a middle power: Conceptual limits and promises,” The Central European Journal of Canadian Studies 4, no. 1 (2004): 33–43.
53
Schiavon and Dominguez, “Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia”; Mo, MIKTA, Middle Powers and New Dynamics of Global Governance.
Author Biography
Monica S. Jeong is Assistant Professor at the Endicott College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Woosong University.