External forces and Russian foreign policy: Simulation of identity narratives inside Putin’s regime

Abstract

This article analyzes the impact of external factors on Russia’s foreign policy. Specifically, it identifies patterns in Russia’s foreign policy reactions to two kinds of developments: changes in US foreign policy, and fluctuating global oil prices affecting Russia’s economy. Our hypothesis is that US foreign policy, as it is perceived by Putin’s regime, is the key determinant of the Kremlin’s reactions, while the changes in economic trends, affected by oil price, influence the regime’s preference to choose more confrontational or more defensive ways of action. As the analysis shows, different versions of national identity narratives can be constructed within Putin’s regime: it acts as a closed political system that can produce different foreign policy reactions and even ideological narratives without major changes in the governing elite.

Keywords

Russia foreign policy identity oil prices US

Ever since Winston Churchill uttered his famous phrase, the commonly held perception in the Western world about Russia is that it is an unpredictable state, whose national interests lie in “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.”¹ However, it could be argued that there are clear and persistent patterns in Russian foreign policy.

Russia’s foreign policy relies on a complex system of factors. The Russian governing elite is neither separate nor autonomous from the international environment; on the contrary, for centuries it has been driven by insecurity and the pursuit of great-power status.² Hence Russia’s foreign policy is highly susceptible to outside influence, and its reactions might be predictable at least to some extent. In order to better understand Russian foreign policy, both the domestic context—especially material capabilities and self-perception—and the country’s interpretation of international realities must be taken into consideration.

The interaction of both external and domestic factors in shaping Russian foreign policy has already been scrutinized by many authors.³ According to Derek Averre, “[t]he link between domestic politics—in terms of both governance and ideas about the country’s development—and how foreign policy aims are prioritized and put into operation is crucial, but it is perhaps the most difficult factor in the equation to analyze.”⁴

Hence, the main question that this article seeks to answer is how specific external factors shape Russia’s foreign policy outcomes. Specifically, it identifies patterns in Russia’s foreign policy reactions to two factors: changes in US foreign policy, and fluctuating global oil prices affecting Russia’s economy.

The Kremlin constructs its dominant narrative vis-a-vis the US as the “other,” according to its own perception of US foreign policy, by employing different narratives of its own national identity. Jutta Weldes explains the constructivist concept of a formation of national interests and foreign policy in more detail. She argues that “before state officials can act for the state, they need to engage in a process of interpretation in order to understand both what situation the state faces and how they should respond to it.”⁵ According to Weldes, “[o]nce a situation has been described, that is, the national interest has already been determined—it emerges out of representations of identities and relationships constructed by state officials.”⁶

In this article, we rely on works of other authors that establish how external factors facilitate the promotion of a particular version of national identity (especially on the issue of Russia’s stance vis-a-vis the West), and subsequently create a more favourable ground for specific ideological groups within the political elite to acquire authority in the Kremlin.⁷ In competitive political systems, different ideological groups may promote strongly opposing versions of national identity. Consequently, the dominant version of the national identity narrative and foreign policy doctrine can change after a different group takes the lead.

However, Putin’s authoritarian rule during the last decade has eliminated genuine ideological competition among political groups in Russia. Nonetheless, since assuming power in 2000, Putin and his associates (including Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency in 2008–2012) have tried on various ideological patterns and different foreign policy strategies. The regime is still able to utilize other versions of national identity when needed, as an adaptive response to external changes.

Russia’s economy is sensitive to global economic fluctuations due to its high dependency on the revenue of exports of hydrocarbons. As it will be explained in this paper, the price of oil is the most significant variable that correlates with trends in Russia’s economy (GDP growth, federal budget, et cetera). Consequently, we use oil price as an indicator of external economic impact on Russia’s economic capacity which affects the material means and self-confidence of Russia’s regime to implement a specific reactive policy.

Our hypothesis is that US foreign policy, as it is perceived by Putin’s regime, is the key determinant of the Kremlin’s foreign policy priorities, while changes in economic trends, affected by oil price, influence the regime’s preference to choose more confrontational or more defensive ways of action. Hypothetically, the conjunction of assertive or unilateral US foreign policy and relatively high oil prices should provoke the most confrontational reaction from Moscow, while a more multilateral US foreign policy with relatively low oil prices should lead to a more cooperative approach vis-a-vis the US.

We assume that different versions of national identity narratives can be constructed within Putin’s regime: it acts as a closed political system that can produce different foreign policy reactions and even ideological narratives without major changes in the governing elite.

Russian worldview

The international environment is often cited as the main factor influencing Russian foreign policy. More specifically, it has often been seen as a reactive power, following from George F. Kennan’s characterization of the Soviet Union in his arguments for a Cold War “containment” strategy. Kennan emphasized Russia’s antagonistic nature, citing not only its ideologically based confrontation with the West (“the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility”),⁸ but also the amount of flexibility in the Kremlin’s actions, especially due to its sensitivity to the policies of its adversary.

Andrei Tsygankov also shares the view that Russia’s behaviour is particularly influenced by the behaviour of Western nations. According to him, Russia has continually responded to similar challenges to its security; hence, throughout the centuries, Russia’s engagement with the world has followed several persistent patterns of thinking and behaviour. The main feature of these patterns is the perception by Russian officials of their country’s role in the eyes of the Western world: specifically, whether or not Russia is regarded as an equal and legitimate member of the world.⁹

Moreover, as Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev noted, “[T]he central debate today and for at least 200 years revolves around the extent to which Western liberalism is an appropriate model for Russia, and subsequently how closely Moscow should ally with the West, or certain partners in it, to achieve its goals.”¹⁰

Magda Leichtova argues that Russian foreign policy is influenced by the development of the country’s understanding of the West, as it variously seeks either to resist Western imperialism or balance Western supremacy.¹¹ Bobo Lo, discussing the worldview of Russia’s elite, emphasizes the Kremlin’s sensitivity toward US international behaviour: “Seen from Moscow, American actions since the fall of the Soviet Union have demonstrated that old-fashioned power projection continues to matter very much, even if it is coated with a normative veneer.”¹²

The Putin regime’s reaction toward US foreign policy could be regarded as the result of a primary impulse to reformulate Russia’s status, mission, and place in the world. All these adjustments are reflected in the national identity narrative (“Who are we?” and “What should we do?”). The US posture in the international arena reflects the very essence of “Western powers” in the narrative of the Russian elite and society.

Reaction from inside: Identity narratives in the Russian regime

Among the domestic factors, competing narratives of national identity presented by various political groups (and eventually by the ruling elite) as well as the general economic situation in the country, have the biggest influence on foreign policy.¹³

In this paper, “identity” is defined as, following Tsygankov, a “product of discursive competition among different groups and coalitions, drawing on different actions of the other and interpreting contemporary international and local influences in a way that suits the groups’ interests.”¹⁴ Summarizing Tsygankov’s, Kuchins’, and Zevelev’s analysis, we distinguish three main ideological groups of Russian elites with distinct perspectives on Russia’s foreign policy.

The first group is made up of pro-Western liberals who advocate for cooperation with major European countries and the US as the best option for Russia to reduce the gap of technological and economic development. Pro-Western liberals also urge the adoption of domestic reforms and the transformation of an energy resource-based economy into a modern, diversified one. They also usually support free-market democracy as the best form of government. This labelling is simplified. In Russian political discourse, almost all opponents of Putin’s regime are called “liberals”—a similar tendency to that of the 1990s, when, according to Andrei Kolesnikov, supporters of a Westernized path of development were called “democrats.”¹⁵ However, even Putin’s opponents who argue for democratization should not be automatically labelled “pro-Westerners.” For instance, Aleksei Navalny has characterized himself variously as a nationalist democrat or democratic nationalist.¹⁶

The second group is known as the “great-power balancers,” “great-power realists,”¹⁷ or “statists.”¹⁸ They seek recognition of Russia as “a great power” and of its right to decide on international security issues as an equal partner with the US and other “great powers.” Balancers also aim for a “European concert,” similar to that which emerged at the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars. Such a system would enable Russia to play a prominent role. As Kuchins and Zevelev add, great-power balancers are “not so closely tied to Russia’s domestic economic and political development,”¹⁹ and more specifically do not argue for reforms to Russia’s political and economic systems.

The third group—Slavo-nationalists or Civilizationists (according to Tsygankov) claim Russia’s exceptional values and mission to lead the Slavic world, and to oppose Western traditions and even democratic values. Some authors say this group of nationalists tends to separate into sub-groups, including “neo-imperialists; proponents of a Russian sphere of influence; [and] ethnic nationalists.”²⁰

These main streams of national identity narratives vary in the extent of their preferences toward the West and/or neighbouring countries. Pro-Western liberals are mostly cooperative toward Western countries and Russia’s neighbours, while seeking economic development for Russia above all. On the other hand, Slavo-nationalists (or Civilizationists) would prefer to choose a more assertive or revisionist approach toward neighbouring countries (driven by the vision of unity of Slavic nations) and the West (as the main threat to Russian identity and sovereignty). However, there is also great diversity of opinion among so-called Civilizationists regarding the means of engagement with “others.” A more “isolationist” camp can be found preferring a “third way” for Russia; in other words, Russia should be separate from both the West and Asia. This notion has appeared in a recent article by Vladislav Surkov, who was the Kremlin’s first deputy chief of staff from 1999 to 2011, and the author of a concept of “sovereign democracy.” Surkov argues that Russia’s “epic journey toward the West” is over, and a new era in which Russia faces “100 years (200? 300?) of geopolitical solitude” begins.²¹ However, at the same time, Surkov does not exclude a possibility for Russia to act by military means or to become “an alpha nation that has surged into a big lead” over other countries.²²

Many authors agree that the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the initial dominance of a cooperative, pro-Western orientation in Russia. It was associated with Boris Yeltsin and Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian Federation’s first minister of foreign affairs.²³ However, the balancing of the increasing role of the US (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) became more visible during the latter stages of Yeltsin’s rule, when the number of critics of liberal reforms grew—while the voices calling for the “protect[ion of] Russia’s core interests” became louder. Yevgeny Primakov is usually associated with the rise of “pragmatism” or “a balancing approach” toward the US.²⁴

The balancing approach became much more influential when Putin came to power. Various shifts in identity narratives (i.e. Russia’s position vis-a-vis the West) during Putin’s regime have led to an interesting hypothesis. Even in the very closed system established by Putin, there is still some dynamism that affects its ideological positions and identity-shaping narratives. The ruling elite allow a limited competition among proponents of different notions of national identity, with the dominant group receiving promotion and support by the state. In other words, Putin’s ideological stance is not fixed, but is instead reactive and adjustable. The identity narrative promoted by the regime is a temporary reflection of Russia’s perception of US behaviour, while its specific foreign policies are shaped by available economic means.

An interesting interpretation of the relationship between oil and Russian national identity is provided by Peter Rutland. He argues that despite possessing all the characteristics of a “petrostate” (as established by Goldman, 2010²⁵), the Russian elite and society tend to “suppress the importance of energy to the Russian economy.”²⁶ According to Rutland, “oil and gas may be the cornerstone of Russian state capacity and economic well-being, but they are not central to Russian identity.”²⁷ Although the description of Russia as an “energy superpower” has been used by Putin and other Russian leaders, this idea has not been incorporated into the general national identity narrative, and is not directly related to the “great power” status of Russia. Based on Rutland’s findings, in this paper we accordingly do not incorporate the oil factor as an element of Russia’s identity narrative. Oil is instead considered as a principal source of economic capacity, which in turn expands or constrains the foreign policy means at the Kremlin’s disposal.

Russian economy and oil price

Russia’s economic growth is based on energy and raw material resources, rather than dynamic and innovative economic capacity.²⁸ Natural resource rents constituted 21.6% of the national GDP of Russia in 2000, and 18% in 2008; it has dropped significantly only in recent years.²⁹ Some 68% of Russia’s total export revenues in 2013 were accounted for by oil and gas, and 50% of federal budget revenue in 2013 came from mineral extraction taxes and export customs duties on oil and natural gas.³⁰ Due to the sharp fall in oil prices in recent years, the proportion of revenue obtained from oil and gas taxation has declined, and in 2016 it accounted for just 40% of federal budget revenue and 20% of consolidated budget revenue.³¹ However, in 2018, oil and gas export revenues are predicted to increase fivefold: according to a budget amendment by the finance ministry, the revenues are expected at US$44.4 billion (2.74 trillion Russian rubles) for 2018, up from US$8.5 billion (527.6 billion rubles).³²

Some authors argue that the change of hydrocarbon export revenues almost ideally correlates with budget revenues or GDP growth: “By 2008, 65 to 70% of the Russian budget effectively either directly or indirectly consisted of hydrocarbon export revenues. Changes in GDP, budget revenues, and state reserves have had a 90–95% correlation rate with oil prices.”³³

Relying on these arguments, we can simplify that the global market price of oil is the most crucial economic variable in the Russian economy:

The most significant external (or internal for that matter) factor with the potential to tip the Russian balance in one direction or the other is the world economy and how it affects oil prices. The lower-price environment favours liberals who call for deeper structural reforms of the Russian economic and political system to increase efficiency, while higher prices discourage reform and fuel greater assertiveness.³⁴

Official Russian economic predictions and budget planning are based on the oil price forecasts. According to Reuters, the break-even oil price, at which Russia’s budget balances, has increased from US$34 a barrel in 2007 to US$117 in 2012.³⁵ After oil prices collapsed at the end of 2014, the break-even price of oil for Russia’s federal budget tumbled along with the cost of a barrel to US$98 in 2014, then US$60 in 2017; it is expected to be US$53 in 2018, according to Renaissance Capital.³⁶ It is worth noting that the impact of oil prices for the Russian state budget is adjusted by the weakening ruble. “When the exchange rate weakens, the oil price in the seller’s currency falls less than in dollars. In such cases, the purchasing power of tax revenue received from oil in one’s own currency holds up better, because state expenditure is generally mainly in the domestic currency.”³⁷

The correlation between oil price changes and Russia’s GDP growth is impressive,³⁸ though in recent years the impact from oil prices to GDP changes is less significant (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Correlation of Russia’s GDP growth and changes in oil price.

Oil prices reached US$60 a barrel only by the middle of 2006. However, this peak lasted only a few months; a more sustainable growth of oil prices can be observed from the start of 2007 until August 2008. Oil prices collapsed again at the end of summer 2008 and recovered to above US$60 only in July 2009. Relatively high oil prices (over US$60) lasted until November 2014. From December of that year up until the end of 2016, oil prices were almost constantly below US$60. However, in 2016 oil prices had stabilized, and from the beginning of 2017 were showing a persistent trend of increase. The US Energy Information Administration in April 2018 forecasted Brent spot prices to average at about US$63 a barrel in both 2018 and 2019, up from an average of US$54 a barrel in 2017.³⁹ This prospect should give more optimism to the Russian government, and facilitate more self-confident foreign policy as well.

Oil price is a reflection of global economic fluctuations, and is just one of many factors affecting Russia’s economy. However, the change in oil price is a good indicator for predicting the impact of external economic forces on Russia’s economy and the country’s potential economic capabilities. In recent years, oil price fluctuations had a lesser impact on Russia’s federal budget and GDP; however, as the structure of Russia’s economy had not changed significantly,⁴⁰ Russian economic trends remained very sensitive to the oil price, both due to direct and, to a larger extent, indirect effects. Despite a more complex picture, oil prices can be a valuable indicator predicting the level of external economic pressure on Russian economic growth. Consequently, changes in oil price push the Kremlin to take either a more assertive or more cautious foreign policy stance.

It should be noted that rapid changes in oil prices have had a lagging effect on Russian economy and subsequently on budget planning and mid-term financing programs, especially when it comes to defence spending. For example, a drop in oil prices from 2014 did not change the defence spending trend immediately; only in 2017 was Russia forced to cut its military budget.

Analytical framework: Russia’s foreign policy as reaction to US policy and oil prices

In analyzing Putin’s foreign policy toward the West, many authors try to discover a coherent strategy that reflects a more-or-less stable ideological background for Putin’s regime. As Averre summarizes, there are two dominant tendencies in the Western literature to explain Putin’s foreign policy: to define Putin’s Russia as a “revisionist-status quo” power that seeks to challenge the US and to regain its lost influence; or to argue that Russia merely seeks to gain a stronger voice in a multipolar world and to create a framework of “a twenty-first century concert of powers.”⁴¹ However, neither of these approaches can explain the shifts in Moscow’s foreign policy—from cooperative efforts at the beginning of Putin’s presidency or during Medvedev’s term, to very aggressive moves in 2008 and 2014.

There is no persistent national identity narrative in Putin’s foreign policy. Putin’s narrative in relations with the US as the “other” may vary: although calls for a multipolar order dominated from 2000, the Kremlin’s narrative may become more “liberal” or more “revisionist” when it needs to, simply to provide ideological grounds to support a specific response to external challenges.

Some general assumptions about the external factors that have a major influence on Russia’s specific foreign policy options could be drawn up:

The Russian elite’s perception of US behaviour in the international sphere is the most influential force. The more threatening the regime views US policy to its survival and interests, the more arguments for a defensive foreign policy of Russia are advanced. However, opposition toward the West or a revisionist approach could evolve into a more defensive or more confrontational form, one that is related to the state’s economic performance.

External economic fluctuations (reflected by oil prices as the crucial indicator) affect Russia’s economic growth and ability to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. Periods of high oil prices lead to faster GDP growth, and favour bigger ambitions and revisionist goals in foreign policy.

We argue that Russia’s reaction toward external influences could be better evaluated by considering both of these external factors. Hence, we propose a slight change to Tsygankov’s causal process of foreign policy formation.⁴² Tsygankov explains that besides external influences, “[l]ocal conditions, such as the state of the economy, relations among different social groups, or the type of political regime, are just as important in shaping national perceptions.”⁴³ However, in Russia’s case, local political conditions over the period of 2000–2017 remained relatively stable.

Even if the economy is truly dynamic, it alone cannot influence the dominant view of national identity. Economic capabilities affect the choice of what type of reaction toward the “other” to employ—not the actual identity of the “self” or the attitude toward the “other.” Hence, economic capabilities should be regarded as means to an end, not as ideas about national identity.

Table 1 shows that international influences induce the formation of a dominant view of Russia’s national identity, which in turn shapes the regime’s vision and leads to specific foreign policy outcomes, subject to the impact of its economic capacities and condition. Putin’s regime is taken as consolidated and relatively fixed throughout the period of analysis. Therefore, domestic political opposition and other political “local conditions” leading to the consolidation of the regime are not analyzed in depth.

Table 1.

A causal process of Russia’s foreign policy formation (adapted from Tsygankov 2010).

It is interesting to test the hypothetical impact of the Kremlin’s perception of the US’s role in the world and Russia’s economic performance when those two factors push in opposite directions. What type of foreign policy strategy might be preferred by Russia’s elite when US policy is regarded as unilateral and assertive, but low oil prices impede economic growth and limit Russia’s capabilities to respond? On the other hand, what Russian reaction is likely in the case of a less assertive or more multilateral US policy combined with high oil prices?

Our hypotheses state that the assertiveness of US policy combined with low oil prices leads to a more defensive Russian approach, while US assertiveness and high oil prices form the basis for more active and revisionist reactions from Russia. If the US seeks a multilateral policy, low oil prices push Russia toward cooperation, while high oil prices could strengthen a confrontational approach due to a greater confidence in choices of available foreign policy actions.

Hypothetically, when the US is less assertive and does not threaten to expand its influence over Russia’s neighbourhood (or in spheres of perceived vital Russian interest) and the global economic conditions are unfavourable for Russia, the pro-Western (liberal) narrative should gain advantage. Hence, this should lead to a cooperative foreign policy with the West, with emphasis on Russia’s economic modernization.

US expansionism could lead to a growing discontent among the Russian elite, as it would be understood as a threat to Russia’s survival. If economic conditions are unfavourable, Russia’s regime should try to avoid direct confrontation with the US. This situation should favour great-power balancers, with their more defensive and cautious approach. However, when the oil price is on the rise, balancers should adopt a more offensive posture and seek to exploit existing advantages to increase Russia’s status and influence on the international level. It is true that this could bring to the forefront the ideas of “neo-imperialism” and the need to regain influence in the former Soviet space; however, it is likely they would be implemented with a “softer” approach rather than by using aggressive means.

With low assertiveness in US foreign policy and high oil prices, Russia’s regime may face two competing strategies: should a challenge from the US diminish, Russia might try to increase its status in a more cooperative way and promote a vision of multilateral world and international law; or, as an alternative, the Kremlin might treat the US as a weak opponent and use this opportunity by favouring expansion (or returning) to its zones of influence.

In the second case, the ruling elite could be inspired to pursue a narrative of exceptionalism, and pan-Slavic identity promotion, by presenting the country as the only one capable of challenging the US and increasing status and influence in the world. This might provoke the revisionist posture—including the use of military force. During a “window of opportunity,” the assumption of a more confrontational narrative is supported with nationalistic arguments; it comes from interpretations of various authors, who stress the revisionist side of Russia’s geopolitical interests.⁴⁴ As Marlene Laruelle summarizes, the nationalist view of Russia’s foreign policy objectives is mostly revisionist: “Disappointment is thus the main nationalist feeling regarding Russia’s official foreign policy. If the most vocal nationalists had been able to shape foreign policy, Russia would not have been the status quo power it has been for the past two decades. It would have acted more aggressively in the Near Abroad.”⁴⁵ The revisionist approach, supported by a nationalistic narrative, might become especially attractive in periods of economic growth and more cautious US behaviour. As Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul summarize, there is a group of authors who explain the current confrontational stance of Russia as a result of weakness of the West: “According to this line of analysis, the ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations that Obama initiated in 2009 was a mistake, signaled US weakness, and therefore invited Russian aggression. Putin knew he could invade Ukraine, so this argument goes, because Obama would not stop him.”⁴⁶

Analysis: Russia’s narrative in response to US foreign policy

For the Kremlin’s interpretation of the behaviour of the US in the international arena, the changes in the official narrative are analyzed mainly through the rhetoric of Russian presidents during their annual addresses to the Russian Federal Assembly and other important speeches. The periodization of analysis is based on the terms of Russian presidents.

2000–2004: Putin’s first term

Since his first election as president in 2000, Putin expressed willingness to cooperate with the US. In one of his first interviews with the US media, he said: “[I]n recent years, especially during the previous year, our relations had their ups and downs. But we have invariably achieved mutual understanding and cooperation …. Our relations have reached a very high benchmark.”⁴⁷ Similar rhetoric was used during the first Summit between US and Russian leaders in June. In the words of the Russian president: “I think we have found a good basis for promoting cooperation and establishing a pragmatic partnership between Russia and the US. And we reaffirmed our fundamental common position …. Russia and the US are not enemies; they do not threaten each other, they may well be allies.”⁴⁸ He even touched upon the possibility of Russia joining NATO.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Russia focused on ways to fight the “common enemy”—Islamic fundamentalism. For instance, during the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in 2002, Putin said: “Since September 11 last year, a lot of people in the world have realized that the ‘Cold war’ had ended. They realized that now there are other threats, another kind of war, the war against international terrorism.” Furthermore, he added that “the most important foreign policy goal is to ensure strategic stability in the world. For that, we work to create a new security system, to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the US and improve the quality of our relations with NATO.” ⁴⁹ In 2002, Bush and Putin signed a major arms control treaty, which was hailed by Bush as the end of “a long chapter of confrontation.”⁵⁰

Russia’s tone at that time was relatively moderate, even though the US was taking unilateral steps in Iraq and enlarging NATO. Putin maintained in 2003 that the countries remained “not only as strategic partners,” but “allies” in the fight against terrorism.⁵¹ He emphasized that NATO enlargement would not help in that cause, but expressed hope that it would lead to “the strengthening of trust in Europe and the entire world,” as “each country has the right to choose the form of security it considers most effective.”⁵² This period coincided with a significant growth in oil prices. The prices recovered from a dip during the crisis in 1998–2000 and rose relatively steadily throughout these years; Russia’s macroeconomic indicators in general also underwent a period of growth. However, the combination of the price—which was growing, but still below US$40 a barrel—and lasting effects of Russia’s economic difficulties in the previous decade, led to defensive Russian foreign policy priorities.

2004–2008: Putin’s second term

After the re-election of both Bush and Putin, the rather positive narrative had not changed, even though US foreign policy was still assertive and clashed with Russia’s interests in its neighbourhood. For instance, Bush’s neoconservative foreign policy doctrine was supportive of “colour revolutions” in the Post-Soviet space.

The sensitivity of the issue was noted by Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, who said that “spreading democracy … is impossible and dangerous on the account of the consequences[.] There cannot be any single model of democracy.”⁵³ However, Putin’s annual addresses in 2005 did not even touch upon the relationship with the US, while when Bush visited the Victory Day parade in Moscow that year, Putin reaffirmed that “we enjoy a very large volume of cooperation between our countries.”⁵⁴ In 2006, the Kremlin maintained a similar narrative: “Of great importance for us and for the entire international system are our relations with the US[.] … We are willing to take new steps to expand the areas and framework of our cooperation with these countries, increase cooperation in ensuring global and regional security, develop mutual trade and investment and expand cultural and educational ties.”⁵⁵ It was also reaffirmed that the countries “are reliable partners with common interests,” which enabled them to reach agreements on issues such as nuclear proliferation and the future of nuclear energy.⁵⁶

However, a significant shift took place in 2007. During a speech at the Munich Security Conference, Putin openly stated that “[u]nilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems,” and added that “[o]ne state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?”⁵⁷ While the criticism of US unilateralism was persistent throughout the years, the aggressiveness of the tone was rather unexpected. It could also be argued that it was not a reaction to the most recent US behaviour, as Putin’s criticism was based on events that had started some years earlier (Iraq, support for democratization, et cetera).

There was such a huge gap between Russian rhetoric prior to Munich and after it, that even Alexander Dugin, an ideologue of Russian nationalism, described it as a “turning point in contemporary Russian history.”⁵⁸ According to him, ever since the years of Mikhail Gorbachev, Russia regarded itself as a loser, while the West—especially the US—never stopped fighting the Cold War. The Munich speech thus marked a long-awaited shift in Russia’s self-understanding.⁵⁹ It also marked a formulation of Putin’s geopolitical views in a consistent and non-contradictory way for the first time since the start of his presidency.⁶⁰ A reaction to the speech in the West also emphasized the change in tone, with The New York Times stating that “the comments were the sternest yet from Mr. Putin, who has long bristled over criticism from the US and its European allies,”⁶¹ and also led to a renewed debate about “a new Cold war.”⁶²

The change in Putin’s rhetoric was linked to Russia’s economic recovery. As the oil price steadily climbed and went beyond the threshold of US$60 a barrel, the Kremlin acquired the necessary tools to readjust its narrative and actions by becoming much more assertive and critical of the West—the US in particular.

2008–2012: Medvedev’s election

The antagonistic narrative continued throughout 2008, even after Dmitry Medvedev assumed the presidency from Putin. Medvedev openly criticized NATO by saying that it had “failed so far to give new purpose to its existence,” and adding that in the case of “further NATO expansion to the east,” the relationship between Russia and NATO “would be completely undermined, ruined for a long time to come.”⁶³ He emphasized that Russia was being challenged—and was willing to respond, an aspect which was much less articulated before: “It is the construction of a global missile defense system, the installation of military bases around Russia, the unbridled expansion of NATO and other similar ‘presents’ for Russia—we therefore have every reason to believe that they are simply testing our strength.”⁶⁴

The new trend in Russia’s narrative showed increased self-confidence, which was boosted by economic growth. With the price of oil reaching the heights of US$140 a barrel and above, the Kremlin’s confidence was restored. The military aggression in Georgia in August 2008 became a peak of offensive balancing versus the US. Medvedev compared the importance of the war in Georgia to that of 9/11: “It occurred to me that for Russia, August 8, 2008 is almost like September 11, 2001, for the US. A lot of people are making this comparison now …. I think it is quite accurate.” He also emphasized that the US bears a burden of responsibility for what happened in the Caucasus region: “[I]t is … a mistake committed by the US and a mistake by Georgia, although Georgia holds criminal responsibility too.”

In general, Medvedev followed the tone of Putin’s Munich speech by denouncing unipolarity in US foreign policy: “A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the US. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.”⁶⁵

However, another shift took place in 2009, with the election of Barack Obama as US president. With the proposed “Reset” policy, the new administration removed some “irritants” of the bilateral relationship, such as the idea of missile defence systems in Eastern Europe. Although Medvedev initially followed Putin’s narrative vis-a-vis the US, he also represented the more liberal ideas of the Russian elite. Medvedev opened his address to the Federal Assembly in 2010 by reasserting that his goal was “to modernize our economy and give impetus to progress in all areas[;] … to confirm Russia’s status as a modern world power whose success is based on innovation.”⁶⁶ Instead of criticizing NATO or US foreign policy, Medvedev then focused on the need to create a renewed security architecture by signing a “European Security Treaty.”⁶⁷ Tsygankov describes Medvedev’s proposal as a way to enhance cooperation with the West by promoting an idea of a “Westernist-Statist Consensus.”⁶⁸

“Reset” culminated with a treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by Obama and Medvedev in 2010. For Medvedev, this was “the progress towards reaching a new quality level in our relations with the US, relations that take into account our mutual interests and that are based on predictability.” He also emphasized the importance of treating Russia rightly: “The main thing is that there are no winners and losers. Rather, this is what they call a win-win situation.”⁶⁹

It is hard to describe Medvedev as a genuine Westernizer, because he was never outside Putin’s regime. However, after initial criticism of the US, his articulation of liberal arguments was the closest one can find to a pro-Western identity narrative inside Putin’s regime.

However, it was soon concluded that the “Reset” policy had had a limited impact. Even though Medvedev, coming to the end of his presidency, concluded that it had led to a period which had “perhaps been the best three years in relations between our two countries over the last decade,”⁷⁰ the tone had shifted again. With domestic elections approaching, Putin strengthened the idea of a need to defend a besieged Russia—and the US was the main target. For instance, Putin said that Americans “are living like parasites off the global economy and their monopoly of the dollar,”⁷¹ and banned the adoption of Russian children by Americans. The portrayal of the US as an enemy was used at the same time the approval rating for Putin was only 63%—the lowest in a decade.⁷²

2012–2018: Putin returns

Even though the governing party United Russia and Putin—who replaced Medvedev—won the elections, multiple reports of electoral fraud caused massive protests in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square. This prompted Putin to respond by blaming the US, saying that the protesters “heard the signal and with the support of the US State Department began active work.”⁷³ Putin seemed to put an end to the reset by publishing an article in Moskovskie Novosti in February 2012, in which he specifically condemned the US promotion of human rights and humanitarian interventions.⁷⁴ Therefore, the US was the chosen “enemy” for Russia.

The apogee of such a shift was Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine. Putin described events in Ukraine as a “government coup and the forceful takeover of power in Kyiv.” Even though it was a proposed Association Agreement with the European Union that sparked the protests in Kiev, Putin again focused on blaming the US by saying that “American friends … are always influencing Russia’s relations with its neighbors, either openly or behind the scenes …. If for some European countries national pride is a long-forgotten concept and sovereignty is too much of a luxury, true sovereignty for Russia is absolutely necessary for survival.”⁷⁵

According to Tsygankov, the Kremlin began to strongly and assertively promote Russia’s values and interests, without hesitating to openly oppose Western policies. High oil prices were also an encouraging factor, as the economic prospects for Russia looked bright.⁷⁶ Oil prices during 2012–2014 were on the peak again, hovering around US$100 a barrel. This trend prompted more extensive state budget spending, especially in the defence sector. The state armament program for 2011–2020 was adopted in the wake of the high oil prices trend, and was the main factor behind the rise in the defence budget for 2012–2017. The program allocated approximately US$512 billion to the Russian Ministry of Defence over the entire period, an almost fourfold increase on the previous armament plan.⁷⁷ By 2014, the military output of the defence industry was growing at an annual rate of over 20%, compared with 6% three years earlier.⁷⁸

US foreign policy, in response to Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, regained some assertiveness, with Obama’s European Reassurance Initiative fund for Eastern members of NATO and increased military exercises in the Baltic States. Russia condemned these decisions: for instance, Putin’s spokesman said that Russia perceived these decisions as “threatening our interests, our security.” Particularly—again—the US was blamed: “[I]t concerns a third party building up its military presence near our borders. It’s [the US], not even a European state.”⁷⁹ Putin was still critical of US efforts for democratization. In a meeting with Valdai Club experts, Putin noted: “Another of our colleagues said that it is wrong to interpret things as suggesting that the US seeks to change the political system and government in Russia. It is hard for me to agree with that argument. The US has a law that concerns Ukraine, but it directly mentions Russia, and this law states that the goal is democratisation of the Russian Federation. Just imagine if we were to write into Russian law that our goal is to democratise the US[.]”

However, during 2015–2016, Putin’s general rhetoric on the US became a bit more cautious. In his yearly presidential address in 2015, the president avoided strong anti-Americanism and did not focus on Ukraine, talking more about economic and social issues. In 2016, Putin emphasized: “Cooperation between Russia and the US in addressing global and regional issues will benefit the whole world. We have a shared responsibility to ensure international security and stability, to strengthen non-proliferation regimes.” Again, terrorism was noted as a mutual threat, similarly to the period of 2000–2007: “I certainly count on joining efforts with the US in the fight against real rather than fictional threats, international terrorism being one of them.”⁸⁰ But he also reasserted unhappiness with the US decision to unilaterally withdraw from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty⁸¹—even though it had happened 14 years earlier.

The balancing approach became stronger after Donald Trump was elected as the new president of the US in 2016. A hope for cooperation, rather than conflict, was reflected in public perception in Russia: in November 2016, as many as 54% of Russians said they were expecting improved relations with the US. Furthermore, the number of Russians who regarded the relationship with the US as “bad” or “very bad” decreased to 56%—significantly less than when the war in Ukraine began.⁸² However, those hopes faded soon. At the end of 2017, the US was considered the biggest enemy by 68% of Russians (among those who said the country has enemies), far above Ukraine and the EU.⁸³

It is notable that US foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia at that period was ambivalent. While Trump promised a better relationship with Russia, it was followed by a continuation of the previous administration’s strategic policies. For example, the US, pushed by Congress, not only maintained, but also expanded sanctions on Russia, noting that they would remain in place until the Kremlin stopped its aggressive policies. Both sides agreed that the bilateral relationship was at a “low point.”⁸⁴ Trump’s own National Security Strategy, presented at the end of 2017, also clearly emphasized Russia’s threat. It stated that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity,” that “Russia interferes in the domestic political affairs of countries around the world,” and that “the combination of Russian ambition and growing military capabilities creates an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to Russian miscalculation is growing.”⁸⁵ In response, Putin called the document “offensive” and “aggressive”; furthermore, he noted that “NATO and the US [military] infrastructure is boosted by leaps and bounds” on Russia’s borders.⁸⁶

Russia’s response was also shaped by a fluctuating economy. A sharp decrease in oil prices and the impact of economic sanctions on some strategic sectors led to a fall in GDP of almost 4% in 2015, while the ruble lost half of its value.⁸⁷ Putin himself admitted the effect of sanctions: “Sanctions are hurting us. We hear that they are not a problem really, but they are, particularly with technology transfers in oil and gas.”⁸⁸ Russia’s economy showed only marginal signs of overcoming recession in 2017, with a projected growth of around 1.4–1.9%. These tendencies even led to cuts in defence spending of around 5%, with even these levels of funding being described as “unsustainable.”⁸⁹ However, at the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, the price of oil rose significantly.

A move from the most confrontational policy, based on the Slavic nationalist narrative, back to great-power balancing is not a surprise. Uncertainty about both the economy and US foreign policy shaped a mixed narrative. On the one hand, Putin praised Trump’s economic performance and maintained that there is a need for cooperation between countries:

[H]e said his intentions in foreign policy included improving relations with Russia. It is clear that he has been unable to do this because of the obvious constraints, even if he wanted to. … I hope that he does and that we will eventually normalize our relations to the benefit of the American and Russian people, and that we will continue to develop and will overcome the common and well-known threats, such as terrorism, environmental problems, weapons of mass destruction, crises around the world, including in the Middle East, the North Korean problem, etc. … Actually, we can do everything more effectively together.⁹⁰

On the other hand, Putin did not hesitate to show his willingness to use military power during his last annual address to the Federal Assembly before elections in 2018. During his speech, an unprecedented animated video of nuclear warheads apparently raining down on Florida were shown on screens. Putin emphasized that he “repeatedly told our American and European partners who are NATO members: we will make the necessary efforts to neutralize the threats posed by the deployment of the US global missile defense system.”⁹¹

Therefore, Russia’s narrative—as well as both the price of oil and US foreign policy—became mixed and ambivalent, with instances of both a cooperative approach and sudden shifts to open threats.

Conclusions

Russian foreign policy doctrine reflects the dominant national identity narrative whose main backbone is the role of Russia in world affairs and its general stance against the US. Putin’s regime eliminated natural political competition among ideological groups, promoting a flexible different narrative of Russia’s identity in relations with the West. However, the narratives formulated for both the international and domestic audiences have varied since 2000.

Evolving constructions of national identity provide ideological arguments for Putin’s regime not only to shift the mainstream of Russia’s foreign policy, but to attract (or reinforce) public support and legitimacy. By reinventing a new image of the threatening “other,” Putin can justify authoritarian restrictions on human rights, or even the worsening economic situation.

The perception of US behaviour forms the “basic instinct” of Russia’s foreign policy reaction: the more assertive US foreign policy becomes, the more one should expect a more confrontational attitude from Russia. However, in practice, the content of Russia’s reactive policy toward the US is closely related to oil prices: the higher the oil price, the less Russia feels the need to seek cooperation with the US—thus freeing it to adopt a more confrontational foreign policy in pursuit of its vision of the international order.

Under Putin’s rule, domestic influence on the regime is very restricted, almost frozen. In such an environment, an impact from outside becomes the main observable factor affecting the dynamics of contemporary Russian foreign policy. It does not mean that Putin’s regime is unaffected by other domestic or external factors; many of these can contribute to specific challenges or opportunities for Russian foreign policy. The political situation inside the EU, the behaviour of European countries, China, or a changing balance of power in the Middle East may have significant impacts on Russia’s foreign policy. However, the international behaviour of the US on the international level and the long-term trends in world oil prices are the most substantial forces that, like magnets, push Russia in specific directions.

The model presented here suggests that the most confrontational narrative and reaction of Russia can be expected in periods of assertive US foreign policy and high oil prices. These trends were observed quite clearly in 2007–2008, peaking with the Russian–Georgian war, and in 2012–2014, after Putin’s return to presidency and his persistent accusations of US interference in Russia’s and Ukraine’s domestic affairs.

The least confrontational narrative can be expected in periods of low US assertiveness (or propagation of multilateralism) and low oil prices negatively affecting Russia’s economy. This kind of cooperative approach and construction of Russia’s national identity as a “partner of the US” were observed during Medvedev’s term, in 2009–2011.

However, despite some variations of identity narrative and changing reactions toward external pressure, Putin’s regime tends to stick to a general line of balancing vis-a-vis the US. This approach may take more defensive or more offensive forms of action, and the Kremlin’s narrative is especially opportunistic in periods of divergent signals from the US and oil price trends. We can see this kind of mixed Russian approach since 2015, when attempts to propose a “deal” with the US (on Iran, Syria) were intermixed with a high level of confrontational behaviour (alleged interference in US political processes; increased support for the Syrian regime).

This article adds to a discussion of what are the nearest future perspectives of the Kremlin’s foreign policy, arguing that Russia’s behaviour is predictable to some extent, at least while it remains reactive to US behaviour and heavily dependent on the export of hydrocarbons.

Table 2.

Russia’s foreign policy reaction on US policy and oil prices: Hypothetical scenarios.

	Low oil prices	High oil prices
Assertive US policy	Defensive–balancing approach	Offensive–balancing approach
Multilateral US policy	Cooperative approach	Peaceful promotion of interests OR Confrontational revisionism

Table 3.

Summary of key aspects of Russian foreign policy in 2000-2018.

Russia’s foreign policy	Period	Oil prices	US foreign policy, as perceived by the Kremlin
Defensive balancing	2000–2007	Low (US$16-64)	Assertive, unilateral
Offensive balancing, with revisionist narrative	2007–2009	High (tripling from 2006 to 2008 to reach US$120)	Assertive
Defensive balancing, with cooperation narrative	2009–2012	Low (fall to under US$40, rising afterwards)	Non-assertive, multilateral
Offensive balancing, with revisionist narrative	2012–2015	High (US$80–100, till middle of 2014) Sharp decline in the second half of 2014	Non-assertive, multilateral Growing assertiveness since middle of 2014
Mixed—transitional— approach	2016–2018	Mixed (2015–2017: low, US$30–50; rising to US$80 in 2018)	Growing assertiveness unilateral approach (with mixed signals from President Trump)

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the Research Council of Lithuania under Grant REP-15113.

1

Alan Cowell, “Churchill’s definition of Russia still rings true,” The New York Times, 1 August 2008, (accessed 20 December 2016).

2

Matthew Sussex, “From retrenchment to revanchism… and back again? Russian grand strategy in the Eurasian ‘heartland’,” in Matthew Sussex and Roger E. Kanet, eds., Russia, Eurasia and the New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 33–34.

3

See Ariel Cohen, “Domestic factors driving Russia’s foreign policy,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 2084 on Russia, Russia and Eurasia, 2007, (accessed 18 November 2015); Derek Averre, “Russian foreign policy and the global political environment,” Problems of Post-Communism 55, no. 5 (2008): 28–39; Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev, “Russian foreign policy: Continuity in change,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2012): 147–161; Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Portsmouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012); Elena Kropatcheva, “Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 3, no. 1 (2012): 30–40; Marcin Kaczmarski, “Domestic power relations and Russia’s foreign policy,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 22, no. 3 (2014): 383–409.

4

Averre, “Russian foreign policy,” 33.

5

Jutta Weldes, “Constructing national interests,” European Journal of International Relations 2 (1996): 276–277.

6

Weldes, “Constructing national interests,” 282.

7

Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy. Change and Continuity in National Identity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 4–14; Kuchins and Zevelev, “Russian foreign policy,” 147–149.

8

George F. Kennan (as “X”), “The sources of Soviet conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947): 571.

9

Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 17–20.

10

Kuchins and Zevelev, “Russian foreign policy,” 147–148.

11

Magda Leichtova, Misunderstanding Russia: Russian Foreign Policy and the West (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2014).

12

Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 42.

13

See Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz and Catherine Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), (accessed 10 November 2015); Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 16; Cohen, “Domestic factors driving Russia’s foreign policy”; Kuchins and Zevelev, “Russian foreign policy,” 159–160.

14

Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 16.

15

Andrei Kolesnikov, Russian Ideology after Crimea, Carnegie Moscow Center, 22 September 2015, (accessed 12 April 2019).

16

Walter Laqueur, “After the fall: Russia in search of a new ideology,” World Affairs, March/April 2014, (accessed 13 April 2019).

17

Kuchins and Zevelev, “Russian foreign policy,” 148–150.

18

Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 5–7.

19

Kuchins and Zevelev, “Russian foreign policy,” 148.

20

Ibid., 149.

21

Vladislav Surkov, “Одиночество полукровки” (The solitude of a half-blood), Russia in Global Affairs, 9 April 2018, (accessed 12 April 2019).

22

Surkov, “Одиночество полукровки.”

23

Michael McFaul, “Russia's many foreign policies,” Demokratizatsiya 7 (1999): 398–399; Christian Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia’s Conduct towards the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 28–29; Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder, 42–48.

24

Allen C. Lynch, “The realism of Russia’s foreign policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001): 17–31; Richard Sakwa, “New cold war or twenty years’ crisis? Russia and international politics,” International Affairs 84, no. 2 (2008): 241–267.

25

Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).

26

Peter Rutland, “Petronation? Oil, gas, and national identity in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no 1 (2015): 67.

27

Ibid, 67.

28

Averre, “Russian foreign policy,” 35.

29

“Total natural resources rents,” World Bank, 2016, (accessed 6 January 2018).

30

“Oil and natural gas sales accounted for 68% of Russia’s total export revenues in 2013,” The US Energy Information Administration, 23 July 2014, (accessed 6 January 2018).

31

Heli Simola and Laura Solanko, “Overview of Russia’s oil and gas sector,” Bank of Finland, BOFIT Policy Brief 5/2017, (accessed 17 May 2018), 31.

32

Tsvetana Paraskova, “Russia to see oil revenues jump fivefold,” Oilprice.com, 11 May 2018, (accessed 17 May 2018).

33

Andrey Movchan, Decline, Not Collapse: The Bleak Prospects for Russia’s Economy, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2 February 2017, (accessed 17 May 2018).

34

Kuchins and Zevelev, “Russian foreign policy,” 198.

35

Jason Bush, “Analysis: Price of victory may be too high for Putin,” Reuters, 5 March 2012, (accessed 6 January 2018).

36

Andrei Rudakov, “Russia Inc goes into profit as the budget breakeven price for oil falls to $53,” The Moscow Times, 26 January 2018, (accessed 17 May 2018).

37

Simola and Solanko, “Overview of Russia’s oil and gas sector,” 32.

38

For explicit arguments, see Andrey Movchan, “Just an oil company? The true extent of Russia’s dependency on oil and gas,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 14 September 2015, (accessed 12 April 2019).

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“Short-term energy outlook, April 2018,” US Energy Information Administration, (accessed 6 May 2018).

40

George Friedman, “A top-to-bottom review of the Russian economy,” Geopolitical Futures, 30 November 2017, (accessed 12 April 2019).

41

Averre, “Russian foreign policy,” 30–31.

42

Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 17.

43

Ibid, 17.

44

Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder; Keith B. Payne, John S. Foster, “Russian strategy expansion, crisis and conflict,” Comparative Strategy 36, no. 1 (2017).

45

Marlene Laruelle, “Russia as a ‘divided nation,’ from compatriots to Crimea: A contribution to the discussion on nationalism and foreign policy,” Problems of Post-Communism 62, no. 2 (2015): 89.

46

Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, “Who lost Russia (this time)? Vladimir Putin,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2015): 167.

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“President Vladimir Putin held talks with US president George Bush,” Kremlin, 16 June 2001, (accessed 20 May 2018).

49

“Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации” (Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation), Kremlin, 18 April 2002, (accessed 20 December 2016).

50

“President Bush, Russian president Putin sign Nuclear Arms Treaty,” The White House Archive of President George W. Bush, May 2002, (accessed 20 May 2018).

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“Joint Press Conference with US President George W. Bush,” Kremlin, 27 September 2003, (accessed 20 May 2018).

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“Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации” (Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation), Kremlin, 10 May 2006, (accessed 20 December 2016).

53

“Интервью Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова газете ‘Известия’ 17 мая 2005 года” (Interview of the Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov to the newspaper Izvestia), Russian Ministry of Defense, 17 May 2005, (accessed 12 April 2019).

54

“Excerpts from a talk with US President George W. Bush,” Kremlin, 8 May 2005, (accessed 20 May 2018).

55

56

“The agreements reached during the meeting between Russian and American presidents will act as a good basis for a successful G8 summit,” Kremlin, 16 July 2006, (accessed 12 April 2019).

57

“Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Kremlin, 10 February 2007, (accessed 20 May 2018).

58

Alexander Dugin, Putin vs Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed from the Right (Arktos, 2014), 77.

59

Dugin, 78.

60

Alexander Dugin, Last War of the World-Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia (Arktos, 2015), 121.

61

Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, “Putin says US is undermining global stability,” The New York Times, 11 February 2007, (accessed 12 April 2019).

62

Rob Watson, “Putin’s speech: Back to Cold War?,” BBC, 10 February 2007, (accessed 12 April 2019).

63

“Speech at meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders,” Kremlin, 5 June 2008, (accessed 20 December 2016).

64

Ibid.

65

“Press conference following talks with U.S. president George W. Bush,” Kremlin, 15 July 2006, (accessed 20 May 2018).

66

“Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” Kremlin, 30 November 2010, (accessed 12 April 2019).

67

Ibid.

68

Andrei Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia: Development and Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 30.

69

“Joint press conference with President of the United States of America Barack Obama following Russian-American talks, Kremlin,” 6 July 2009, (accessed 20 May 2018).

70

Team of the Official Website of the President of Russia, “Meeting with President of the United States Barack Obama,” President of Russia, (accessed 21 May 2018).

71

Maria Tsvetkova, “Putin says U.S. is ‘parasite’ on global economy,” Reuters, 1 August 2011, (accessed 22 December 2016).

72

Approval of Putin, 1999–2016, Levada, 2 December 2016, (accessed 22 December 2016).

73

Ellen Barry, “Rally defying Putin’s party draws tens of thousands,” 10 December 2011, The New York Times, (accessed 22 December 2016).

74

Vladimir Putin, “Россия и меняющийся мир” (Russia and the changing world), 27 February 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, (accessed 15 December 2015).

75

“Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Kremlin, 4 December 2014, (accessed 20 December 2016).

76

Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia, 237–240.

77

Claire Mills, “Russia’s rearmament programme,” The House of Commons Library, briefing paper no. 7877, 24 January 2017, (accessed 20 June 2018).

78

Julian Cooper, Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011–2015, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, March 2016, –4239–SE (accessed 20 June 2018).

79

Ewen MacAskill, “Russia says US troops arriving in Poland pose threat to its security,” The Guardian, 12 January 2017, (accessed 20 January 2017).

80

“Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Kremlin, 1 December 2016, (accessed 23 December 2016).

81

“Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference,” Kremlin, 23 December 2016, (accessed 20 May 2018).

82

“Россияне стали меньше ждать от Трампа” (Russians have begun to expect less from Trump), Levada, 26 January 2017, (accessed 28 January 2017).

83

“Bраги Pоссии” (The enemies of Russia), Levada, 10 January 2018, (accessed 14 January 2018).

84

Andrew Rafferty and Abigail Williams, “Tillerson tells Putin that U.S.-Russia relations ‘at a low point’,” NBC News, 13 April 2017, (accessed June 10, 2017).

85

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the White House, December 2017, , (accessed 5 January 2018), 8, 14, 26.

86

“Putin stresses Russia has right to respond to US military buildup in Europe,” ITAR TASS, 22 December 2017, (accessed 5 January 2018).

87

Kira Zavyalova, “Russia GDP seen down 3.8 percent in 2015, minus 0.3 percent in 2016,” Reuters, 24 December 2015, (accessed 12 January 2016).

88

“Putin admits sanctions sapping Russia,” Forbes, 21 October 2016, (accessed 22 December 2016).

89

Mark Galeotti, “The truth about Russia’s defence budget,” ECFR, 24 March 2017, (accessed 10 June 2017).

90

“Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference,” Kremlin, 14 December 2017, (accessed 15 January 2018).

91

“Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Kremlin, 1 March 2018, (accessed 20 May 2018).

Author Biographies

Tomas Janeliūnas is a professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, and editor in chief of the academic journal Politologija.

Linas Kojala is a PhD candidate at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University.