Middle power South Korea’s disaster response contributions: A case of good international citizenship?

Understanding middle power

The concept of middle power is nebulous in that there are multiple approaches to its definition. Middle powers can be determined through their position, behaviour, or function. ⁵ The positional approach presupposes that in the global system of states, the placement of countries in a specific order is determined by their tangible attributes such as military and economic capabilities, literacy rate, size of population and strategic position—in that major powers seek their support and cooperation. ⁶ Carsten Holbraad defines a middle power as “a state occupying an intermediate position in a hierarchy based on power, a country much stronger than small nations though considerably weaker than the principal members of the state system.” ⁷ Countries that don't regard themselves as great powers but have displayed capabilities in exerting a certain degree of influence and strength not found in smaller and weaker states are classified as middle powers.

The behavioural approach to defining middle power supports the view that the attributes of a state are not reliable criteria to confer middle power status; rather, it is based on how a state behaves in the international system as a secondary power capable of assuming a leadership role in managing global affairs through multilateralism, institution-building and management, spearheading discussion and negotiations on key issues and providing global public goods. ⁸ Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal claimed that middle powers are defined primarily by their behaviour in “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of good international citizenship.” ⁹ Classifying states as middle powers based on their perceived capabilities and hierarchical position in the system poses a significant problem in terms of providing clear distinctions on which states qualify for the status. The size of a country’s GNP or military power are insufficient determinants for its classification as a middle power, because the selection criteria as to who qualifies is unclear and appears arbitrary. Also, a state may possess middle power attributes, but if it behaves otherwise, then such capabilities are irrelevant as capabilities alone do not confer middle power status. Middle power status is achieved through the possession of certain attributes and acting out those capabilities in the international arena.

The functional approach, according to Adam Chapnick, looks at how states gain recognition by assuming responsibilities in areas where they have the strongest capabilities. This approach identifies “states which are capable of exerting influence in international affairs in specific instances and differentiates them from all the rest.” ¹⁰ Andrew Carr has also classified the definition of middle power into three approaches: positional, behavioural, and identity. The identity approach adds a new analytical understanding to middle power by focusing on what image a would-be middle power is projecting in its relations with the other actors in the system. States endeavour to create a middle power identity which they act out in their foreign policy discourses on the world stage. ¹¹ States endowed with certain capabilities (military, diplomatic, and economic) cannot be considered middle powers if there is no effort on their parts to be associated with such recognition. Self-identification is an elemental component for the acquisition of prestige and a necessary precondition for a state to be considered a middle power. In addition, a “systemic impact approach” to middlepowership has also been put forward by Carr, which analyzes middle powers “through their ability to alter or affect specific elements of the international system in which they find themselves.” ¹² The systemic impact approach presents an alternative way of defining middle power, and is an outcome-based method of determining the results of a middle power’s actions and how these have changed or influenced the system. This approach focuses middle power analysis on the anticipated outcomes rather than on a middle power’s behaviour or its intentions. The extent of a middle power’s influence needs to be determined in order to understand its capacity to have an impact on the system, as opposed to just observing its measurable attributes or highly admired behaviour.

The emergence of a new set of middle powers, especially in the post–Cold War era, has prompted Eduard Jordaan to provide an alternative conceptual explanation by dividing middle powers into traditional middle powers, considered as stable democracies that were shaped by the Cold War, that are wealthy and that favour preserving the status quo; and emerging middle powers, which are regionally important states that emerged in the post-Cold War environment, are recently democratized, less economically wealthy, and seen to have reformist attitudes. ¹³ In another study, Andrew Cooper and Emel Parlar Dal identified three waves of emergence of middle powers in the international system. Accordingly, the first wave was connected with the post-1945 global order and characterized by multilateralism under the UN and other international organizations through mediation, peacekeeping operations, and other international roles. The second wave was composed of middle powers who engaged in high-profile initiatives in advocating and campaigning for certain global issues such as children’s rights, small arms, antipersonnel landmines, and human rights. The third wave—and currently the predominant condition of middle powers—is the so-called informal institutionalization where middle powers exert influence in various international fora and institutions. These new middle powers are no longer playing minor roles, but have assumed greater influence in global affairs. The composition of the G20 and the emergence of BRICS and MIKTA reflect the evolving nature of middle powers. ¹⁴

The concept of good international citizenship

Good international citizenship is strongly associated with middle powers and their propensity to address global problems in ways where they can display expertise and effective leadership. Gareth Evans views good international citizenship as not merely “Boy Scout deeds,” but the collective action to solve global problems, which is only possible if states are willing to engage in cooperative behaviour to advance global public goods. He further argues that the traditional focus of national interests on security and economy should be expanded to include the equally important goal of being seen as a good international citizen. ¹⁵ Good international citizenship occurs not in a static environment, but in a dynamic setting where states wanting to be recognized as such must actively promote certain activities and policies in which they have expertise and resources. States acting as good international citizens have to display these benevolent actions to remedy widespread problems affecting people outside of their territories. Good international citizenship is more than mere pronouncements: its fulfillment is concretely manifested through behaviour that displays “willingness to ‘pitch in’ to international tasks” and “leadership [in] improving or raising international standards.” ¹⁶

This paper argues that involvement in certain areas of international cooperation such as the creation of institutions, development assistance, and humanitarian aid requires material and financial capabilities which obviously smaller and poorer states do not possess. While all countries could claim to be good international citizens, it is understood that good international citizenship entails corresponding qualifications, and this includes the capacity and willingness to lead on, or make significant contributions to, a particular problem-area in global affairs. Take, for example, disaster response, whose requirements—such as sufficient financing, hugely complex logistics, and well-trained personnel—have restricted the participation of many countries in these kinds of operations. It is obvious that only economically wealthy nations have the capacity to actively engage in the financing and provision of human resources in such challenging global humanitarian assistance operations.

The objective of states that wish to be identified as good international citizens must include the balancing of national goals with the common good for all countries and the willingness to reign in their selfish interests for the benefit of humanity. ¹⁷ Middle powers practice good international citizenship by assuming leadership and coordinating roles in the often-neglected non-security fields of international cooperation, and their participative activism has established global norms and solidarity in finding solutions to these problems. Middle powers view good international citizenship as a concept created by “a merging of beliefs and norms in the international community” that led to the emergence of “universal morality or a global moral community” and to an understanding “that global problems required global solutions.” ¹⁸ However, the pursuit of national interests alongside altruistic behaviours is not contrary to good international citizenship. States, being rational actors, work for their self-preservation, and it is not a deviation of accepted norms if states conceal their selfish interests behind apparently altruistic deeds. Good international citizenship is the merging of national interests and international obligations to protect people across borders. ¹⁹ The pursuit of national interests within the context of humanitarian assistance is an acceptable state objective. Good international citizenship is not the abandonment of selfish national interests because in disaster response “the role of mitigating disaster and suffering on the one hand and furthering strategic interest on the other are essential elements of modern conceptions of foreign aid.” ²⁰

South Korea as a middle power

South Korea is the tenth largest economy in the world and has the sixth most powerful military. ²³ It is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G20, and is an active contributor to various international initiatives concerning issues such as trade, climate change, development assistance, humanitarian aid, and peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, as Jeffrey Robertson puts it, “[I]t’s hard to think of South Korea as anything but a middle power.” ²⁴ South Korea’s ascent to the club of middle-tier countries is a success story in foreign aid and development assistance. From being mired in poverty after the Korean War in 1953, South Korea has risen to become a highly developed country that in 1996 became a member of the OECD. By 2010, Korea had seen a reversal of its role as a recipient country of foreign aid, having joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, the body which oversees the organization’s global development assistance to poorer countries. The middle power identity of South Korea is built on its rapid development from a war-ravaged country into a modern and technologically advanced society. South Korea’s middle power status is mainly anchored by its economic power.

Korea as a middle power has to assume different roles for it to be a relevant actor in the world stage and within its immediate environment. The location of Korea in Northeast Asia—dominated by major powers, the United States, China, Japan, and to some extent Russia—has shaped its role as a mediator among competing interests, especially the US-Sino rivalry, and this mediating role is important in preserving the region’s status quo where a single power is prevented from dominating the economic and security spheres. One scholar has noted that “the primary function of South Korea’s middle power status has been to balance and neutralize the asymmetrical power relations in South Korea’s environment and to make it more conducive for South Korea’s own national interests.” ²⁵ Seoul’s mediating role in Northeast Asia is a “balancing act” which Korea must adroitly incorporate into its strategic foreign policy goals to maximize the country’s gains. The complex power contestation in Northeast Asia has made Korea incapable of asserting influence over its more powerful neighbours (China and Japan) and its principal security ally (the US). The geographical location of Korea constrains its ability to engage actively in security and political issues within the region; thus, in order to build its credentials as a middle power, Seoul has to engage in global issues on international development, trade, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance.

Korea is also seen as a “bridge” between developed and developing countries. ²⁶ The success story of Korea’s rapid economic development has made it a credible representative of developing economies in various international gatherings. Furthermore, Seoul has been an active facilitator in seeking acceptable solutions for both developed and developing countries in a host of global issues needing cooperative solutions. This image of Korea as a bridge is not only part of an activist foreign policy, but is also integrated into the national psyche. In a survey conducted by the East Asia Institute, Koreans were asked what role their country should take in resolving global problems, and 53 percent responded that Korea should play a bridging role in relations between advanced countries and developing states. ²⁷

Middle powers tend to invest their resources and expertise in areas where they can build a niche that would earn them the reputation of having an edge and distinct advantage. Terence Roehrig has emphasized that international development assistance and peacekeeping operations are the two areas where Korea has excelled as a middle power. ²⁸ Another area where Korea has shown its middlepowership is in “green growth,” which has given it opportunities to display its leadership in clean energy and sustainable growth. ²⁹ Korea has also burnished its middle power credentials by facilitating international dialogue and agenda-setting on major global issues. Victor Cha wrote that Korea as a middle power is interesting because of its ability to influence certain areas in international relations through coalition-building and connection-making as well as by positioning itself as the hub in important multilateral fora. ³⁰ Leif Eric Wesley and Kyuri Park claimed that Korea displayed its middle power identity by spearheading the leadership of the 2010 G20 Summit, the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, the 2013 Seoul Conference on Cyberspace, the 12th meeting of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2014, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Plenipotentiary Conference in 2014, the 2015 Seoul Digital Forum, the World Water Forum in 2015, and the Global Health Security Agenda conference in 2015—as well as by serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2012 to 2014. ³¹

Disaster relief operations

The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 was a watershed event for South Korea’s overseas disaster relief participation. The government responded with US$50 million in humanitarian aid, consisting of food, search and rescue teams, and medicine emergency relief supplies, with Indonesia receiving the bulk of the assistance at US$17 million. ³⁵ The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) provided various disaster recovery training, medical and social services, and provisions of reconstruction supplies and equipment during the recovery stage. In 2007, the government adopted the Overseas Emergency Relief Act to ensure efficient response to emergencies and to allocate resources for “overseas emergency relief in order to play a greater role in the concerted efforts of the global community towards disaster management.” ³⁶ South Korea provided humanitarian assistance for disasters to more than eighty countries between 2005 and 2020, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). ³⁷ On several occasions, South Korea participated in overseas disaster relief operations providing rescue and medical personnel, including supplies of medicine, food, and water, as well as emergency shelters for the affected communities (see Table 1). In 2010, the government established a specialized mission support system consisting of military transport aircraft for overseas emergency relief operations so that it can respond promptly and provide support within forty-eight hours after a disaster has occurred in a nearby Asian country. The guidelines for responding to large-scale disasters were also revised to reflect better the changing and complex natures of disasters by strengthening the assets and capabilities of the government to immediately address the need for relief operations.

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Table 1.

South Korea’s major overseas disaster relief operations, 2004–2018.

Date	Disaster	Country	Type of assistance
December 2004	Earthquake/Tsunami	Indonesia	1 transport aircraft;
			5 tonnes of relief supplies;
			2 vessels; 108 tonnes of supplies, including 16 excavators
March 2006	Landslide	Philippines	1 transport aircraft; 7.5 tonnes of supplies
May 2006	Earthquake	Indonesia	19 medical personnel
June 2006	Earthquake	Indonesia	1 transport aircraft; 7 tonnes of supplies
May 2008	Earthquake	China	3 transport aircraft; 26 tonnes of supplies; 41 rescue personnel
June 2008	Cyclone	Myanmar	30 medical and rescue personnel
October 2009	Earthquake	Indonesia	49 rescue personnel
November 2009	Typhoon	Cambodia	1 transport aircraft; 7 tonnes of supplies
January 2010	Earthquake	Haiti	86 medical and rescue personnel
March 2010	Earthquake	Chile	136 military tents; medical and food supplies
March 2011	Earthquake/Tsunami	Japan	10 transport aircraft; 60 tonnes of supplies; 102 rescue personnel
August 2011	Flood	Thailand	100 tonnes of water; 30 rescue boats; relief supplies
October 2011	Earthquake	Turkey	100 military tents
November 2013	Typhoon	Philippines	9 transport aircraft; 329 tonnes of supplies; emergency rescue team; 2,022 military personnel
April 2015	Earthquake	Nepal	40 medical and rescue personnel
July 2018	Flood	Laos	1 transport aircraft; 634 medical and rescue personnel; relief supplies

South Korea’s active engagement in overseas disaster relief operations reflects a strategic foreign policy that seeks to utilize soft power tools to enhance its image as a responsible country, by displaying the behaviour of a good international citizen through its willingness to respond to global emergencies. The government has claimed that in the case of the 2013 disaster relief operations in the Philippines, South Korea was viewed as a “country that helps with a sincere heart,” and that serving the disaster-stricken communities “immensely contributed to elevating the nation’s status.” ³⁸ South Korea’s disaster relief operations have provided the opportunity to show not only its military and economic capabilities, but also its active efforts to establish international goodwill. In fact, in the case of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, Korea is the only middle power to have mounted disaster relief operations within twenty hours from its deployment, and the first country to hit the ground ahead of the major powers. Furthermore, Korea sent a military contingent and civilian aid workers to help rebuild devastated communities, and they stayed for a year, far longer than any other country which provided aid. The Korean government reiterated that “Korea’s humanitarian assistance has aimed to save lives and protect the basic dignity and human rights for those affected by conflicts and natural disasters.” ³⁹ Participation in efforts to address global problems, such as disaster relief operations, provides Korea with a platform where it can display its middle power capabilities and good international citizenship. According to Korea’s foreign minister, Seoul has stepped up its “role and contribution on global issues,” and “such attempts have served to bolster the solid base of support for our foreign policy from the international community.” ⁴⁰

Search and rescue operations

South Korea has been involved in the global activities of the International Search and Rescue Group (INSARAG), the world’s leading network of urban search and rescue (USAR) teams from different countries whose main objective is to provide assistance during disasters and emergencies anywhere in the world. The organization has been recognized by the UN for its important contribution to reducing casualties during disasters, and has been tasked to work closely with the UN OCHA in improving the “efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of international urban search and rescue assistance, including the further development of common standards.” ⁴¹ One of its important contributions to global emergency response is the development of methods and systems for cooperation between international USAR teams working together in one disaster site at any given time. This is significant since in the aftermath of a natural disaster, searching for and rescuing survivors are time-critical tasks, and only a fast and efficient response can save lives. USAR groups are classified as heavy, medium, and light, reflecting their level of resources and expertise. Groups classified as “heavy,” the highest category, are capable of performing difficult and complex twenty-four-hour search and rescue operations in two sites simultaneously for up to ten days.

The Korean Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) was given a “heavy” classification by INSARAG in 2011, joining the only eight USAR groups in the Asia-Pacific region. Being classified in the top category, the KDRT enjoys the distinction of being on par with the best USAR groups in the world. In 2016, the KDRT was given the same categorization by the UN for “taking an active part in emergency rescue operations by the international community” and for being “expected to live up to the spirit of humanitarianism in disaster-affected areas across the world and contribute to the international community.” ⁴² The inclusion of the KDRT among the elite USAR teams reveals some important aspects of South Korea’s middle power status. Firstly, it shows the economic capability of the country to fund and equip the various costly requirements of such highly specialized teams to include the speedy deployment of rescuers to affected places, such as in the case of Typhoon Haiyan, where the KDRT commenced providing medical services to affected residents in the eastern Philippines within twenty-four hours of its deployment; ⁴³ secondly, it reaffirms the country’s willingness to assume a role in the global emergency response system; and, thirdly, it demonstrates the commitment to investing resources in cooperative efforts to address global humanitarian problems. One Korean government official pointed out that by being recognized among the top USAR groups, the KDRT has gained a more robust role in showing its techniques in disaster relief operations and its willingness to provide humanitarian assistance anywhere in the world. ⁴⁴ The KDRT has participated in several high-profile search and rescue missions, and its participation in disaster relief operations abroad has promoted South Korea as a country that pursues a humanitarian agenda through the utilization of soft power and public diplomacy. Middle powers broaden their strategic policy choices in order to build a niche in certain critical areas that would establish their expertise and leadership. The inclusion of KDRT in the top global search and rescue teams according to the Korean government is a recognition that the country is now an “emerging leader in international disaster response after previously being disregarded in the field.” ⁴⁵ This “niche diplomacy” benefits South Korea in two ways: firstly, by strengthening its participation in decision-making processes on several important humanitarian issues that help shape the global agenda on disaster relief operations and secondly, by enhancing the country’s international reputation by taking the lead and assuming leadership roles on issues in which it possesses the material, technological, scientific and military capabilities to do so.

Funding for global humanitarian emergencies

South Korea has been a consistent benefactor of global programs designed to respond quickly to disasters and emergencies. The country has been an active contributor to various initiatives addressing the needs of the international humanitarian community, and is the “only non-Western donor that has entered all the major multilateral humanitarian and norm-setting fora.” ⁴⁶ The UN has noted that many emergencies have stretched the capacities of poorer states, and international cooperation in the field of disaster response is badly needed to address the immediate needs of affected communities. Korea contributed US$680 million to the global fund of the UN OCHA from 2005 – 2020 as part of the global funding allocated for humanitarian emergencies. Moreover, within a fifteen-year period from 2000 – 2015, South Korea provided assistance in 224 emergencies caused by disasters in several countries. ⁴⁷ Korea has been hailed by one top UN official as a “significant contributor to the international humanitarian system.” ⁴⁸

In 2005, the UN launched the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which is funded by voluntary contributions from member states to ensure an adequate and immediate response to emergencies anywhere in the world. The emergency fund is a critical stopgap measure intended for quick disbursement of aid during humanitarian crises. The global response to disasters has been hampered by lack of resources, and the creation of the CERF proved to be crucial in the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities. South Korea has contributed US$56 million to the fund since its establishment, making it the fifteenth largest contributor. ⁴⁹ Bruce Gilley asserts that contributing to the CERF is connected to the level of development of the donor country, and middle powers, like South Korea, have made “humanitarian assistance a priority because it fits well with their active diplomatic agendas that seek to increase influence through such good citizenship.” These countries, Gilley says, “have both the capacity and the will to reshape the global humanitarian agenda.” ⁵⁰ South Korea’s consistent contributions to the global humanitarian funding of the UN OCHA and CERF is reflective of the behavioural tendency of middle powers to seek multilateral solutions on complex global problems through cooperation with like-minded countries. The recent appointment of a Korean diplomat to the advisory group of the CERF is seen as a boost to South Korea’s role in the global humanitarian system, with the Korean government expecting that this role “will be expanded in discussions on responding to humanitarian crises in the international community.” ⁵¹ Moreover, an official government report said that “with the increasing deadly impact of disasters, Korea is being recognized in the international community as an emerging donor in the humanitarian aid sector.” ⁵² Middle powers strive to build consensus through multilateralism, and this makes them relevant in the global arena by creating various opportunities for cooperation. They tend to turn their attention to global problems in need of solutions with insufficient programs to address them. By filling the void, middle powers can bring these neglected problem-areas to the world’s attention in order to find cooperative solutions for the continued stability of the international system.

Management and coordination of disaster relief

Close collaboration among various actors in the field is required for the management and coordination of disaster relief operations. In international disaster response, the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) is the lead agency tasked with coordinating disaster response activities. The organization is part of the UN OCHA and was created as a response to the UN’s call to strengthen international cooperation in the field of disaster preparedness and response. It is the “first response tool of the UN … that can be deployed in sudden-onset or escalating emergencies to establish or support a coordination mechanism for international response.” ⁵³ Data from the UN reveals that since 1993, UNDAC had carried out 285 missions in 100 affected countries and remains an important pillar in the international emergency response system. ⁵⁴ Disaster relief teams are deployed at no cost to the requesting country within twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the occurrence of disasters. These highly specialized teams are tasked with coordinating relief operations by providing local authorities with the needed manpower and expertise to create a system for coordination, emergency assessment, and disseminating crucial information. South Korea is among the only seven member-countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and its inclusion on the list is an acknowledgement of its capabilities and expertise in disaster management and operations. The overall composition of UNDAC, which includes both major powers and middle powers, shows the importance of international institutions as venues wherein states can project their soft power and enhance their respective images as global citizens. However, the greater burden of providing global public goods, especially on humanitarian assistance and development aid, has mostly been borne by the major and middle powers. South Korea’s participation in UNDAC afforded it the capacity to establish itself as a global humanitarian player. Responding to disasters enables it to cultivate an image of a reliable member of the international community that is ready to use its resources to assist in meeting the critical needs of countries affected by natural disasters and catastrophes. South Korea’s contributions to humanitarian activities “not only reflect an alternative strategic mission … but also spill over into the realm of global governance and good international citizenship.” ⁵⁵ Middle powers tend to utilize international institutions and organizations on issues needing multilateral cooperation because they cannot act independently, and through international institutions, their chances of success are magnified.