From physical to virtual to digital: The Synthetic Environment and its impact on Canadian defence policy

Concepts of operation

Concepts of operation (CONOPS) is a document, graphic, or description of characteristics by the end user of a proposed military system or strategy that may be implemented. The purpose is to communicate both the quantitative and qualitative characteristics that will encompass the system to all stakeholders. ³⁰ Military strategists typically envision a defence project with CONOPS, before transitioning to defining requirements. However, the impact of emerging (and potentially disruptive) technologies that are being developed at rapid speed—often by private sector entities—has upended the status quo. Increasingly, governments are partnering and co-developing with industry on loosely defined challenges. This newly found symbiosis differs considerably from the traditional paradigm, wherein industry was tasked with fixing problems, guided by comprehensive requirements, for national defence departments.

One consequence of this reversal is that SE technology enables more sophistication around digital and mission engineering, both of which are becoming more relevant in shaping the strategic investments, divestments, and procurement decisions of tomorrow. ³¹ For example, it is generally well accepted that Canada must contribute to interoperability and continental defence should it wish to remain a strong partner to the US within (and beyond) NORAD. SE can help inform which technologies and decisions to prioritize by simulating a given platform or capability and then wargaming it to determine its effectiveness and mission costs. ³² According to one participant, some industry stakeholders are submitting specifications to the DND to engage in this practice. This includes using low-fidelity models to narrow down proposals, high-fidelity models to develop countermeasures, and enemy weapon capability simulations to model adversarial positions. It also includes balancing the government’s current policy with a future-oriented view of what the world might eventually look like, and deciding on what should be prioritized and optimized as a result. What does this process look like in practice? Consider this particular example: after simulations supported the development of new maritime capabilities (during Operation Mobile, 2011), the CP-140 Aurora aircraft’s role was expanded to include an over-land mission set. ³³

The real challenge to CONOPS comes with joint modelling and operations. According to another expert, modelling at a high-level strategy is very different from modelling at an engineering level. The process remains distinct, and specialities are disparate across the greater enterprise. At DRDC in Toronto, for example, there is considerable focus on developing an integrated operational management system that can organize and amalgamize data coming from various sources. In the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), however, the progression towards developing a blended environment is moving far more slowly, with operators choosing to either focus exclusively on live or virtual training programs. In the effort to compete with its allies, Canada’s actions may result in developing SE that fails to integrate with other systems, thus jeopardizing its opportunity to form a connected battlespace.

Lastly, thanks to advances in modelling and simulation and augmented and virtual reality, SE will help develop future CONOPS by reducing the number of personnel required to master a specific task. As the DND/CAF further advances its SE program, simulation and training costs could be reduced significantly through an optimal match between user and capability. This would entail both low and high degrees of sophistication (depending on the required task), coupled with a more effective data-centric customized training module. This tailor-made approach would also drastically improve the feedback loop, which ultimately helps with training and wargaming. This has already been demonstrated with the CAF’s use of the Small Arms Trainer for the C7A2 automatic rifle; the feedback offered helped personnel learn from their mistakes and improve on future action.

Force development

In the era of digitization and rapid technological development, there is a growing need to modernize the CAF. In its current state, the procurement process has been a major hinderance because of its slow-moving pace. Canada’s history of procurement mishaps, which range from the Canadian Surface Combatant program to the Future Fighter Capability Project, has resulted in much higher costs and lengthier timelines than anticipated. Incidents like these pose a risk to the CAF because the systems and platforms needed to operate become obsolete before they are even deployed. Incorporating simulations and SE into the procurement process will enable rapid prototyping and testing feedback between industry partners and the DND/CAF. One successful example of this is the US Army Futures Command, which fosters a rapid-prototyping and collaborative culture alongside industry and academia to spur early-stage innovation and platform development. ³⁴ Former US secretary of state, Mark Esper, referred to the Army Futures Command as the Army’s version of Shark Tank, where cross-functional teams integrate the Army’s acquisition corps with program managers and industry experts to speed up the Army’s modernization efforts. ³⁵ Furthermore, simulations will help determine whether military off-the-shelf (MOTS) solutions or homegrown systems provide the best value and quickest path to deployment. This was demonstrated by the British Armed Forces’ decision to select an Israeli MOTS to fit its new Challenger 3 main battle tank with an active protection system.

The emergence and use of digital twins is also proving to be innovative. Digital twins consist of a physical entity, a virtual counterpart, and the data connections in-between. ³⁶ Designed to provide a live representation of a real-time digital counterpart, digital twins enable high-level command and control training that allow militaries to model the state of a physical entity or system through sensor-derived data collection. ³⁷ This technology lets decision-makers assess various outcomes by tweaking the environmental conditions of any given scenario. This ranges from substituting warfighting tactics; testing different types of technology, systems, or weapons; changing the weather conditions or time; and a myriad of other factors. The use of these predictive analytics has already proven helpful for training armoured fighting vehicle drivers, sailors, and air force pilots, drastically reducing the cost and risk associated with live operations. One notable example is the Griffon CH-146 Mission Rehearsal Tactics Trainer, which is a prototype cockpit of the Griffon CH-146 helicopter used by the CAF. Likewise, the use of digital twins can address emerging skill gaps amongst operators and maintenance personnel, allowing for remote operational and maintenance training. Other benefits include increasing retention rates, informing sustainment models, and providing innovative industrial approaches to technology and capability development, such as mission engineering.

While SE can reduce the training cycle for specific tasks, the shift from an SE prototype to a reality must be supported by government and industry programs and collaboration. The DND’s Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) program has already contributed to this process, but it is not as agile as the American Defense Innovation Unit, which has proven effective at attaining quick and time-sensitive solutions to procurement challenges. ³⁸ Moreover, IDEaS continues to fund many of these challenges at a micro-scale, rather than incentivizing major industry players or consortia to move in a significant fashion—that is, by tackling large projects with proportionally large budgets. These innovation and procurement challenges extend to the broader theme of military culture. Several experts informed us that a generation gap exists where some senior military officials are skeptical about, or do not fully comprehend, the implications of building SE. Similarly, different branches of the military, such as the Navy, are keener to fully exploit SE—technology that would keep sailors ashore for longer periods of time—than other branches of the military who are not regularly faced with similar constraints or obstacles. Although both sailors and aviators tend to prefer live training exercises, the latter appear to be more hesitant—both from the instructors’ and the pilots’ points of view—to make the transition towards virtual training. The Navy’s long history working with VR, along with the associated cost and time efficiencies that accompany this training method, have made it the leading unit in this space. Developing a holistic SE program that considers the specifications and fidelity needed by each military unit, along with the requirements imposed by Canada’s allied nations and partners, is a critical endeavour for defence purposes and for retaining sovereignty. Such a program would give Canada a voice at the table among its closest allies regarding technology specifications, best practices, and future requirements. This would simultaneously bolster domestic R&D while also ensuring cross-country standards and integration over time. The more Canada relies on others to supply these capabilities, the less autonomy it will have over specifications, development, price, and fit-for-purpose.

Training

A Synthetic Environment provides trainees with the necessary exposure and experience ahead of live-fire exercises, without the costs and dangers that are typically associated with this sort of activity. Currently, CAF members are providing instantaneous feedback in the Cave Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE), which is a virtual reality SE used to instruct future operators. Surrounded by large screens, the CAVE exposes students to systems and interactions that might be used in future operations. It also allows students to experiment with potential weapons, test evolving technologies, and alter prospective strategies to define the best course of action. ³⁹ Furthermore, technological breakthroughs, specifically in XR and the video gaming industry, provide users with near-limitless mission design and flexibility. This improves not only the skillsets of operators, but also the military’s efficiency in training more personnel, at a faster pace and in greater detail.

The operational function of each CAF branch can likewise be improved upon by relying on AI to speed up training programs by prioritizing certain aspects of the curriculum. For illustration, work is underway with the RCAF to establish a “simulation certification policy” to determine one-for-one equivalencies between simulated and live exercises and training. XR capabilities combined with modelling and simulation could result in a totally immersive and individualized training experience that would allow students to practice up to a certain level or proficiency. In a similar manner, one expert noted that because modern fighter jets are becoming so technologically advanced, it is becoming difficult for an individual pilot to master how to operate each system; SE can emphasize certain training tasks for certain pilots, thus dividing the expertise and competencies across the force. Another example comes from the US, where the Undergraduate Pilot Training Program 2.5, enabled by cloud simulations, helps identify and track the strengths and weaknesses of student profiles, thus improving the training curriculum overall. The program emphasizes the use of new technologies, such as virtual reality, artificial intelligence, and increased simulation time, to train future US Air Force pilots. ⁴⁰ This technology has single-handedly shifted the pilot training paradigm from a “teacher-centric model” to a “learner-centric model,” allowing instructors to focus their attention on helping students master specific skillsets where they might be experiencing challenges without requiring them to retake an entire course. ⁴¹

Finally, the use of AI within a military platform can help manage the information being presented to the operator, thus reducing the chances of information overload. Data collection and processing remains a major challenge of building a true SE ecosystem, and advances in AI and ML can help absorb, dissect, and relay critical data to end users in real time. These predictive analytics will help instructors and students focus on specific areas where refined skillsets or alterations may be needed, both in the short- and long-term.

Policy –˃ doctrine –˃ CONOPS –˃ requirements –˃ procurement –˃ fielding –˃ training –˃ sustainment

Thanks to the emerging centrality of data, it appears that all the above steps can be advanced in tandem and influence one another in no definite sequence—this is one of the revelations coming from the latest largescale tests, demonstrations, and experiments conducted under the umbrella of JADC2 in the US. Currently, an operator can train on a fielded platform in a SE where digital models of future autonomous assets can be injected into the scenario to define and refine CONOPS, evaluate platform architecture, and factor in human elements to training requisites. More of this will be needed if Canada wants to catch up with allies on both procurement speed and operational capability.

A fourth and final challenge also persists when thinking about the future of SE: how can we ensure it will succeed at its intended function? The Link Trainer discussed at the beginning of this article was indeed ground-breaking technology, but it was also a constant work in progress—a technology that never truly reached full levels of realism. The simulator replicated conditions in a cockpit, but it was unable to simulate the conditions of the air. ⁴⁷ Likewise, in an effort to simulate real-world landing on the moon in the 1960s, NASA created the Lunar Landing Training Vehicle and the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle—vehicles that almost killed the astronauts in the training process (Neil Armstrong was forced to eject from his seat at 200 feet). ⁴⁸ And both the Germans and the Americans had faulty torpedoes in the leadup to World War II, despite extensive wargaming and testing. These examples lend themselves well to the unknown about emerging SE technology. How can we be certain that SE will operate as designed? How much confidence should an F-35 pilot, for example, have in these systems and the data they are showing? And what safeguards can militaries and defence companies designing these technologies include to ensure that any damage—either human, physical, or digital—be minimized?

Despite these concerns, the experts consulted during our study, for the most part, felt that building a Canadian Synthetic Environment will allow the CAF to seamlessly integrate itself into the connected battlespace and to operate effectively alongside its core allies while also contributing to core defence policy items such as NORAD modernization. The experts also felt that conflicting messages from siloed leadership, resource constraints, and bureaucratic inertia risk stymying some policy outcomes. If Canada develops SE technologies and practices in a disjointed and delayed fashion, there may be serious consequences for force development and readiness, continental defence, and national security writ large. And yet, to a certain degree, SE is still very much an emerging concept that requires further in-depth research and discussion. Some speculation is needed to chart out its future use and utility—and for that, nothing surpasses a well-planned military simulation or exercise. By way of conclusion, then, what follows is an exploration of the near-term (i.e., 5 year) and far-term (i.e., 15+ year) opportunities and challenges SE may present to Canada, informed by a foresight exercise completed with participants during our stakeholder meeting.

Near- and far-term opportunities

As for opportunities, in the near and immediate term, a Canadian Synthetic Environment will provide some of the necessary ingredients needed for soldiers to train, rehearse, and alter scenarios in a safe, replicable, and user-friendly way. By implementing SE into the training curriculum, the CAF will be better suited to train in new and unfamiliar terrain, with both traditional and non-traditional allies and supporting actors. Modelling and simulation will also permit the CAF to practice skillsets before they are used on the field, reducing both training and live-fire costs and fatalities. ⁴⁹ Building a Canadian SE might also advance opportunities for developing the relationship between the government, academia, and industry. By sharing capability needs, industry and academia will have a better grasp—and potentially the flexibility and funds—to develop and exploit technology and skillsets that are not readily available to the DND or DRDC. For example, one research team at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, is developing a simulation program that can be used as a practice tool for soldiers who are engaging in overseas missions—specifically those being deployed for peacekeeping purposes. ⁵⁰ Programs like this not only enhance the performance of the trainees, but also improve and diversify the skillsets of the instructors.

Moving into the next decade and beyond, experts agree that SE expansion and pervasiveness will continue for the foreseeable future. While the core conceptual features of SE may still be relevant in the far future, the technology and capabilities certainly will not. Simulations will be larger, more complex, and with much higher fidelity than what is currently possible. This will help facilitate dream-like virtual scenarios. The real opportunities, however, come with Canada’s standing on the world stage. According to one expert, Canada has the ability to seize a market demand for high-end technological data, including in robotics, ML, XR, and simulations, all of which comprise and feed into SE. If Canada defines itself as a niche producer and exporter of some of these enabling technologies, policymakers could then expand their global influence and weight, force development and readiness would improve, and Canada would be far more self-sufficient, thus retaining a degree of autonomy and sovereignty. This newfound industrial ecosystem could make Canada a defence hub for research, innovation, and development. This would also create avenues for Canadian policymakers to push the use of Synthetic Environments for humanitarian purposes, as well as to lead the international community in drafting coherent SE doctrines and norms.

Near- and far-term challenges

Turning to near-term challenges, one of the greatest concerns is that the DND/CAF will be unable to harness enough highly skilled individuals to make tangible advancements on the digital front. It is essential for the DND to either employ the necessary personnel to tackle these problems, or to partner with businesses who can build models, run simulators, maintain IT, and provide data solutions, while also having enough time to experiment with, and develop, tomorrow’s capabilities. Likewise, it is also difficult to move forward with building a holistic SE without having answers (or readable solutions) to current roadblocks, like prolonged motion sickness caused by VR goggles. ⁵¹ Cognitive limitations, latency, cybersecurity, bandwidth, and fidelity—coupled with the everchanging speed of enabler technologies—are also persistent challenges currently facing the American STE program. ⁵² The US, however, appears to be acting with consensus in exploiting, investing, and developing SE. In Canada, one longstanding challenge remains simply convincing decision-makers, both at the civilian and military level, that there is a need for this type of ecosystem. It also requires improving the procurement system, making it easier to bring concepts to reality. ⁵³

As for the far-term stretching out 15 or more years into the future, SE must be continuously monitored and assessed to ensure that it is being optimally developed and leveraged for training and force development and aligns with programs that contribute to our shared goals with critical allies, specifically in making a data-centric connected battlespace that enables multi-domain and joint operations. In the long-term, this means making sure that there is sufficient transfer of training (mechanically and with personnel), appropriate levels of fidelity, ⁵⁴ and fit-for-purpose (i.e., it is capable of realistically reaching its objectives). The very nature of experimenting with and building SE may lead some militaries to either procure more technology than they can actually deploy, or to procure technology that may not be necessary for their particular forces. Neither is an option for Canada. According to one expert, maintaining a resource-conscious yet well-equipped SE will be a persistent, long-term challenge. Domestically, the DND must ensure that Canada’s SE can connect across the entire country, linking bases and operators from coast to coast to coast. Doing so will also entail procuring novel technologies that are able to integrate properly with legacy systems. Any future SE program must be fully interoperable with Canada’s FVEY, NORAD, and (eventually) NATO partners. In sum, building a true SE is a multifaceted, expensive, rapidly changing, complicated, and ambitious endeavour. Without explicit support from political leaders, the biggest long-term challenge will be sustained government funding and support.

Finally, in the coming decades, Canada must prepare for the eventuality that adversarial nations will also develop SE that will make it harder to defend against and deter potential threats. Adversarial SE would provide aggressors with the means to test and train against Canadian and allied interests, improve their performance and responsiveness, and potentially develop novel types of attacks—either digitally or physically—where a countermeasure is yet to exist. Developing an integrated and coordinated response and strategy for countering these emerging threats alongside allies will also be a challenge. How, for example, will these allied coalitions defend against cyber breaches targeting the vast amount of training data being uploaded into a shared cloud? What happens if an expansive virtual training exercise is targeted or hacked, putting the well-being of soldiers at risk? And how should Canada and its allies respond to adversarial nations building and using their own blended environments? Answers and solutions to these long-term challenges will be needed.

With an eye towards leveraging and meeting both near- and long-term opportunities and challenges, our research suggests several next steps for Canada’s continued foray into SE. First, committing to a long-term, adequately funded SE program built around key capability gaps and infrastructure investments will allow the CAF to be well prepared for defending against emerging and future threats. Canada’s SE program should rely on industry to test, demonstrate, and experiment with the technology, scaling it up as needed in an iterative fashion, and invite new government-industry partnerships that could expedite Canada’s legacy procurement process. Second, Canada needs to encourage and sustain top-down leadership from both civilians and military officials on the importance of exploring and adopting SE. The generational gap at the DND and CAF should be narrowed, and emphasis should be placed on promoting those who are committed to exploring the possibilities and utilities of a Canadian SE. Third, improving collaboration and knowledge-sharing on SE within the DND, CAF, and other major government departments and agencies is needed. Without better communication on SE across the government, siloed groups within the DND and CAF will continue to inefficiently work in parallel on similar issues. Fourth, Canada should explore partnering in joint development and research with allied nations, including, notably, Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group and the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. Finally, consolidating domestic skillsets, industry knowhow, and technical self-sufficiency in order to maintain Canadian sovereignty should remain a priority. Depending on allies for too much of Canada’s military modernization will ultimately cost more in the long run, as the CAF will be forced to make technical leaps to keep pace in the future rather than taking smaller, wiser steps today.