AUKUS and Southeast Asia's Ontological Security Dilemma

Introduction

This article aims to understand the responses of major Southeast Asian countries—particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines—to the AUKUS partnership. According to several scholars and analysts, there is no consensus on AUKUS in Southeast Asia. ¹ Indonesia and Malaysia, on the one hand, are concerned that AUKUS's proposed nuclear submarines will fuel an armed race and indirectly proliferate nuclear-related cooperation in the region. Three other major powers—Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines—are more neutral towards AUKUS, with several hoping that the agreement will balance security concerns in the region, particularly to reduce maritime territorial disputes and tensions in the South China Sea. In addition, while ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations—has opened discussions with AUKUS members, particularly Australia, it has not released a formal response to AUKUS and its nuclear-powered submarine programme. ²

This article discusses the divergent Southeast Asian responses to AUKUS. We argue that the absence of a coherent regional response to AUKUS reflects a new security dilemma. Southeast Asian countries face a conflict between preserving regional norms and identities—which would imply holding reservations towards AUKUS on the ground of non-intervention—or, on the other hand, increasing national security to contain potential extra-regional threats. Different from the old security dilemma that was centred on geopolitical uncertainty during the Cold War, this new dilemma is shaped by ontological security, in which Southeast Asian countries face a weakening collective identity. The new security dilemma is not only shaped by material and geopolitical factors, but also identities and norms states in a particular region uphold as a means of existence. Southeast Asian countries face this ontological security dilemma due to their different levels of engagement with extra-regional great powers (particularly China and the US), as well as ASEAN's relative lack of institutional capacity to manage great power relations.

We identify three factors affecting Southeast Asian responses to the new pact. First, several Southeast Asian countries—particularly Indonesia and Malaysia—must maintain regional norms and power balances while at the same time increasing their engagement with extra-regional actors. This dilemma led Indonesia and Malaysia to express reservations towards AUKUS. Second, other Southeast Asian countries—such as Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines—must increase their national security capacity against a rising extra-regional power, primarily China. Thus did these countries welcome AUKUS as a means of balancing China's influence in the region, even though it might not be consistent with regional norms and frameworks. Third, the divergent views among Southeast Asian countries inform ASEAN's organizational dilemma of how best to strategically utilize its regional frameworks in its AUKUS response.

This article proceeds in five sections. The first conceptualises Southeast Asian countries’ responses to AUKUS as a new regional security dilemma. The second section discusses Indonesia's and Malaysia's reservations about AUKUS, as both nations seek to enact the principles of ASEAN centrality and, moreover, are concerned about a potential arms race. The third section analyzes the warm welcome of AUKUS from Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines, which relates to these countries’ concerns over national security and, to some extent, antagonism towards China. The fourth section discusses ASEAN's non-response. The final section concludes with some policy reflections on ASEAN's potential role to mitigate this regional security dilemma.

Security dilemmas, old and new

John Herz coined the term “security dilemma” to understand the phenomenon of insecurity faced by states in danger of “being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals,” which leads to them to maximise security. ³ Providing a more rigorous conceptualisation, Robert Jervis defines a security dilemma as a situation in which “the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others.” ⁴ Shiping Tang in turn describes the security dilemma as follows: “anarchy generates uncertainty; uncertainty leads to fear; fear then leads to power competition; power competition activates a (dormant) security dilemma; and the activated security dilemma leads to war through a spiral.” ⁵ Taking a regional perspective, Alan Collins argues that Southeast Asian countries have experienced various security dilemmas after the Cold War, which centred on three aspects: 1) intra-state security dilemmas with regards to territorial integrity and inter-ethnic tensions; 2) inter-state security dilemmas within the region; and 3) the rise of China as hegemon. ⁶ Jason Blazevic, more specifically, focuses on the South China Sea disputes to elucidate the security dilemma faced by China and Vietnam in managing competing territorial claims in the twenty-first century. ⁷

These scholars have identified the key element of a security dilemma, namely, the uncertain global or regional security environment that affects the foreign policy and security choices states have available to address their major security issues. Nevertheless, constructivists challenge this interpretation by arguing that any security dilemma is also shaped by ontological security or, according to Jennifer Mitzen, “security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice.’ ⁸ States face dilemmas not only from uncertain security environments, but also issues of state attachment and recognition in international politics. From this perspective, according to Brent Steele, security dilemmas are closely related to identity issues, or how states perceive self and other to position themselves in anarchical and uncertain security environments. ⁹ An ontological security perspective, therefore, posits that security dilemmas are not simply constituted by material powers or the construction of “hegemony” by great powers, but also involve identities and emotional responses towards developments in international politics. ¹⁰ While uncertainty is obviously an important aspect of security dilemmas, how the state perceives its role and identities will determine the extent of the dilemma that a state will face and how states cope and mitigate dilemmas in international politics.

Building on this insight, we offer a reconceptualization of regional security dilemmas to understand contemporary Southeast Asia's responses to AUKUS. We define “regional security dilemma” as a situation in which an uncertain regional security environment, primarily caused by intense great power competition, affects regional cohesion in responding to global security challenges. Southeast Asian countries have faced such a security dilemma after the Cold War, which was characterized primarily by challenges to manage ethnic conflict, international security problems, and emerging disputes in South China Sea. ¹¹ However, Southeast Asian countries have been able to mute, though not fully resolve, this particular security dilemma through ASEAN-centred multilateral mechanisms that mediate between Southeast Asian countries and great powers. ¹²

Nevertheless, Southeast Asian countries face new regional and global uncertainties in the twenty-first century, such as intensified US-China geopolitical competition, the rise of China's Belt and Road Initiatives and their associated geopolitical implications, and the rise of “minilateral” cooperations such as the Quad and AUKUS, as well as the growing militarisation seen in the South China Sea disputes. ¹³ This changing regional security environment affects both the foreign policy choices of Southeast Asian countries and regional cohesion. Individually, Southeast Asian countries want to increase their national security through pragmatic approaches, some of which involve close cooperation in security and defence matters with extra-regional powers. Such actions, however, would contradict existing regional norms and frameworks embodied in “the ASEAN Way.” From an ontological security perspective, therefore, Southeast Asian countries face a major dilemma between preserving regional norms or prioritising national security.

To further understand the nature of Southeast Asia's contemporary security dilemma, we consider three key aspects. The first aspect of Southeast Asia's security dilemma relates to the conception of regional order, or the shared purposes and goals underpinning regional security in Southeast Asia. A regional security dilemma occurs when the political configuration that shapes international/regional order is affected by intense great power competition. ¹⁴ The second aspect concerns the perception of the “other,” or any rising extra-regional power that could pose an existential threat for countries in the region. In this context, a regional security dilemma occurs when a rising extra-regional power extends its influence on the region and becomes a perceived existential threat to certain countries in the region, which leads them to seek supports beyond the regional order. ¹⁵ The third aspect is related to collective institutional mechanisms through which Southeast Asia responds to major global security issues, which specifically relates to ASEAN, its biggest regional organisation. ¹⁶

By considering these aspects, this article identifies three forms of Southeast Asia's new security dilemma that leads to divergent responses to AUKUS. The first security dilemma—faced primarily by Indonesia and Malaysia—concerns the preservation of regional norms and values amid increasing engagement with extra-regional actors. Since the Cold War, regional order in Southeast Asia is preserved by a set of norms and values, such as non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, multilateralism, and consensus-based decision-making processes, which institutionalises inter-state relations in the region. ¹⁷ Several countries—particularly Malaysia and Indonesia—still aim for this conception of order in responding to AUKUS by emphasising ASEAN centrality, highlighting ASEAN's regional frameworks, and clearly stating concerns about AUKUS's nuclear-powered submarine projects. Nevertheless, these countries also understand the benefits of engaging with China, which has led them to craft better relations with China to fund their economic development projects. This tension leads to a challenge around maintaining regional norms amid increasing engagement with extra-regional actors, which informs their reservations towards AUKUS.

The second security dilemma—faced by Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines—concerns the rising regional hegemon: China. According to Evelyn Goh, ASEAN and its multilateral mechanisms address security issues and regional order in Southeast Asia, providing indirect balancing against potential threats, particularly China, through continued diplomatic engagement via “dialogue partners.” ¹⁸ With intensified competition between China and the US, and China's increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, ASEAN no longer has the credibility to protect the security of certain countries, who then react by prioritizing national security over regional collectivity. As we will show, countries with territorial claims in the South China Sea—such as Vietnam and the Philippines—have sought flexible forms of engagement with the US to further protect their national security from China's maritime expansion. Countries with strong national security agendas—like Singapore—have taken a pragmatic approach to China and the US, whilst at the same time engaging with China through diplomatic channels. This situation creates a dilemma in which Southeastern Asian countries are relying on great powers for their national security, which causes them to offer explicit or implicit support to AUKUS.

These new security dilemmas inevitably raise questions over ASEAN's role in managing and resolving the security dilemma at the regional level. ASEAN plays an important role in establishing the collective security identity of Southeast Asia, and in the past, Southeast Asian countries have used ASEAN as a mechanism to deal collectively with international security issues. ¹⁹ As we will show, ASEAN as a regional organization has yet to release a formal response to AUKUS. This absence reveals a third regional security dilemma: how ASEAN may utilize its regional frameworks to respond to AUKUS. While ASEAN already has normative commitments for non-interference, regional neutrality, and the rejection of nuclear proliferation and great power politics, it does not use its commitments strategically to respond to AUKUS. The absence of a response from ASEAN reinforces existing criticisms that ASEAN lacks the capacity to navigate increasing tensions between the US and China. ²⁰ Moreover, the non-use of ASEAN regional frameworks reflects the divergent views of ASEAN member states on AUKUS, given ASEAN's consensual decision-making process.

Preserving regional norms

We begin by analyzing Indonesia's and Malaysia's reservations towards AUKUS, which reflect the first aspect of the ontological security dilemma—preserving regional norms. Both countries stressed historical commitments towards regional neutrality, non-intervention, and nuclear non-proliferation in their responses to AUKUS. Indonesia and Malaysia are proponents of ASEAN's 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration, the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ Treaty). These frameworks reiterate key principles held by these countries in regional and global politics during the Cold War, including territorial integrity, non-intervention, neutrality, and nuclear non-proliferation. Both Indonesia and Malaysia were early proponents of ZOPFAN, which established regional neutrality during the Cold War. Later, they also pushed the SEANWFZ Treaty in the 1980s until its agreement in Bangkok in 1995. The two nations also supported the UNCLOS in 1982, in order to safeguard their maritime territorial integrity. ²¹

Shortly after AUKUS was launched, Indonesia's ministry of foreign affairs released an official five-point statement, in which Indonesia was “deeply concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region.” Based on this concern, Indonesia asked Australia to meet its nuclear non-proliferation obligation, as well as its commitment to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Indonesia also encouraged Australia and other AUKUS countries to respect international law to maintain peace and security, by referring specifically to UNCLOS 1982. ²² The five reservations referenced UNCLOS, as well as principles of non-intervention and non-nuclear proliferation, to reiterate Indonesia's commitment to regional norms and values.

Indonesia also submitted a working paper on nuclear naval propulsion to the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2022. Even though the working paper did not name any members of AUKUS, Indonesia hinted at concerns through criticisms of “nuclear naval propulsion”—a program to provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and ensure safe, reliable, and long-lived naval operations—and framed this as threatening regional and international peace and stability. Indonesia's working paper considered “any cooperation involving the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for military purposes from nuclear-weapon States to any non-nuclear-weapon States as increasing the associated risks and the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences.” Moreover, Indonesia also described nuclear naval propulsion activities as having implications for “navigation risks posed by potential proliferation and conversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons, particularly highly enriched uranium, in the operational status of nuclear naval propulsion.” Indonesia further wanted Australia's acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines to be monitored by the UN because it could threaten Indonesia's maritime territorial integrity. ²³

Malaysia also responded by confirming its normative commitment to neutrality and rejecting great power interference. In his early response to AUKUS, Malaysian foreign minister Saifuddin Abdullah reiterated Malaysia's position “on maintaining international peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, including issues related to nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.” Abdullah highlighted the fears of an arms race in light of AUKUS, as well as “tension among the world superpowers, and aggravate aggression between them in the region, particularly in the South China Sea.” Moreover, Abdullah called on members of AUKUS “to respect and comply with Malaysia's [existing] national regime under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ASEAN's Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Treaty (ZOPFAN).” ²⁴

Malaysia's position was also confirmed by Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob. In a formal press statement, Yaakob outlined Malaysia's reservations to AUKUS on the basis of strengthening “active cooperation in promoting and sustaining the region as a region of peace, stability, as well as of growth and prosperity as espoused in the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific.” Regarding this, Yaakob highlighted the importance of ZOPFAN—for which Malaysia was a proponent in 1971— to maintain regional peace and stability. ²⁵ As we see with Indonesia, Malaysia also referred to a set of normative frameworks in ASEAN and the UN to express their concerns and reservations regarding AUKUS.

However, another reason for these countries’ reservations involves their increasing engagement with Chinese economic and development initiatives. Indonesia and Malaysia are recipients of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—China's main platform for infrastructural and economic development cooperations since 2013. China currently funds several development projects, such as the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway in Indonesia and the MRL East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia. Indonesia is also cooperating with China on initiatives related to vaccines, post-pandemic recovery, and development of new capital. ²⁶ While Indonesia and Malaysia did not explictly reference these partnerships in responding to AUKUS, some analysts have voiced concerns over how their dependence on China's investment may affect Indonesia's and Malaysia's criticisms of AUKUS. ²⁷ Indonesia similarly considered Beijing's position and even sought Beijing's backing to support their reservations. For example, a spokesperson of Indonesia's foreign ministry acknowledged that Indonesia obtained Beijing's backing in the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which Indonesia expressed reservations towards the nuclear naval propulsion program. China's ambassador for disarmament, Li Song, acknowledged Indonesia's working paper (as well as Brazil's) and urged the UN to consider Indonesia's reservation towards nuclear powered submarines owned by a non-nuclear country. ²⁸

In responding to AUKUS, Malaysia also considered China's position. Malaysian defence minister Hishammuddin bin Hussein planned a working visit to China to discuss AUKUS and nuclear security cooperation, which Malaysia considered as having “the potential to disrupt security and stability in Southeast Asia.” China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, eventually visited Malaysia in July 2022, although AUKUS was not discussed explicitly at the bilateral meeting between Wang and Yaakob in Kuala Lumpur. ²⁹

In sum, Indonesia and Malaysia responded to AUKUS by reiterating historical commitments to regional neutrality, nuclear non-proliferation, and the rejection of great power politics. Both countries also sought consultation with China due to fears that AUKUS could spark an arms race and may escalate great power competition in the region. Additionally, both countries receive funds through China's BRI for their development projects. Our analysis thus points out a new security dilemma faced by Indonesia and Malaysia: to maintain their commitments to regional norms and values amid increasing extra-regional engagement in economic and development sectors, which informs their reservations towards AUKUS.

Increasing national security

The responses from Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines to AUKUS are characterized by a shared pragmatism, as they prioritise heightened national security over strictly upholding ASEAN norms and values. As an island country, Singapore has prioritised its national security by “realistically” welcoming AUKUS to protect its national security, given its close relations with both the US and UK. Vietnam and the Philippines, on the other hand, offer “silent support” to AUKUS to balance China's rising influence in the region. This situation reflects a dilemma for these countries around how to increase and leverage national security to respond to rising China—the “other” in Southeast Asian regional politics.

Singapore's response has been generally supportive of AUKUS. In his reply to a parliamentary question, foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan hoped that AUKUS would “contribute constructively to the peace and stability of the region, and complement the existing open and inclusive regional architecture.” ³⁰ Indeed, the Singaporean government also considered ASEAN centrality, which it has always regarded as a cornerstone for orienting its relations with Indo-Pacific countries. Nevertheless, from a Singaporean perspective, ASEAN centrality is not something that can always be achieved in responding to global security challenges, because, according to Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien-Loong, ASEAN has “ten disparate countries along a spectrum of geopolitical situations and with corresponding geopolitical strategic views.” ³¹ As a consequence, Singapore does not seem to be “unduly anxious” towards AUKUS's three-way technology-sharing agreement, and in fact treats AUKUS as a “plank” in maintaining the regional balance of power. ³²

Singapore's pragmatic approach to global security is articulated through an active and ongoing rebalancing approach towards China, which is indicative of Singapore's attempt to signal its like-mindedness with extra-regional parties who share their concerns over China's rapidly growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific arena. ³³ But Singapore also has close and mutual relations with the US and UK (two key members of AUKUS). Singapore is the US's first free-trade partner in Asia, which illustrates close economic relations between the two countries. ³⁴ The US views Singapore as the “champion of the rules-based international order” and a “major security partner” in the Indo-Pacific region. ³⁵ Moreover, Singapore not only maintains close relationships with the US but also cooperates with other trading partners such as Japan and South Korea, who are also US allies in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain a policy of rebalancing towards China. Singapore has also established a close relationship with the UK through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). UK foreign secretary James Cleverly, moreover, described the agreements as signalling a “tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific region. ³⁶ These close relations with the US and the UK explain Singapore's warm welcome of AUKUS.

Similar to Singapore, the Philippines also welcomed AUKUS. The Philippines was among the first countries in Southeast Asia to announce its support of AUKUS when the agreement was launched in September 2021. ³⁷ Regarding this, the Philippines’ foreign secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. stated that the country welcomes cooperation with AUKUS and that “ASEAN member states, singly and collectively, do not possess the military wherewithal to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia, discourage the sudden creation of crises therein, and avoid disproportionate and hasty responses by rival great powers.” ³⁸ Nevertheless, President Rodrigo Duterte was cautious of the nuclear-powered submarine cooperation in AUKUS and worried that the trilateral pact could trigger a “nuclear arms race.” ³⁹ President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who replaced Duterte in 2022, also welcomed AUKUS's establishment and the renewed engagement of the Quad “to prevent destabilising actions in the region that go against international law.” Similar to Duterte, Marcos Jr. considered that “these security arrangements should complement—not supplant—the ASEAN-centred regional security architecture [that] has been built over decades by the ASEAN and its member partners, as well as the existing network of bilateral security partnerships in the region.” ⁴⁰

The Philippines’ responses consider both its close relationship with the US and its antagonistic relationship with China in the South China Sea. The Philippines has a close relationship with the US through a series of agreements, such as the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) and Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which allows for the presence of US troops in the Philippines for a series of joint military activities. While President Duterte aimed to distance the country from the US by cancelling the VFA in February 2020 “as a bid to gain leverage,” the Philippines’ antagonistic relations with China in the South China Sea disputes led the Duterte administration to revive the agreement in February 2021. ⁴¹ In an election promise, Marcos Jr. sought to negotiate bilaterally with China on the disputed territories and to seek autonomy from the US in defence and security matters. Nevertheless, the Philippines is still concerned with China's maritime expansionism, which threatens its territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and maritime rights, and pursues a “free navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea.” ⁴² After a series of early bilateral negotiations soon after his election, Marcos Jr. still came up against difficulties in South China Sea negotiations, which led the Philippines to maintain close relations with the US and warmly welcome AUKUS. ⁴³ As with Singapore, close relations with the US explains the Philippines’ response to AUKUS.

Vietnam's position is similar to that of the Philippines. With disputed territories in the South China Sea, Vietnam has pursued stronger relations with the US, as well as other Quad countries. Analysts consider Vietnam as a member of the “Quad Plus” countries. ⁴⁴ In this context, Vietnam provided “silent support” for AUKUS by giving hints of approval, even though it did not release a formal statement. For example, responding to a question from a journalist regarding AUKUS, a spokesperson of the Vietnamese foreign ministry stated that “all countries strive for the same goal of peace, stability, cooperation, and development in the region and the world.” The spokesperson also mentioned that AUKUS's nuclear energy projects “must be developed and used for peaceful purposes and serve socioeconomic development, ensuring safety for humans and the environment.” ⁴⁵ According to an analyst, these statements show that Vietnam sees AUKUS both as an alliance and as Australia's vehicle to acquire nuclear-powered submarines using technology provided by the UK and US, and “does not have a problem with that.” ⁴⁶

This tacit approval also reflects Vietnam's concerns over its maritime territorial integrity amid the South China Sea disputes. The Vietnamese government has outlined the principle of “Four-Nos” in its 2019 defence white paper, which prohibits Vietnam from joining military alliances, siding with one country against another, giving any country permission to set up military bases or to use its territories to carry out military activities, and using force in international politics. ⁴⁷ Nevertheless, China is still Vietnam's largest trading partner, and Vietnam harbours fears of being seen as pro-West by China. Hence, although Vietnam may not have a problem with states strengthening their military posture, it will still be careful not to get caught in the middle of the great power competition, which would violate Vietnamese foreign policy principles. ⁴⁸ In this context, Vietnam is aware of its military and defence capabilities and its geopolitical position amid ongoing diplomatic disputes with China. This leads Vietnam to welcome AUKUS, in part as a response to China's aggressive military behaviour in the region.

To sum up, the cases of Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines show that certain Southeast Asian countries seek opportunities from extra-regional parties to strengthen “national security.” Consequently, they want their priorities to be higher in the agenda without necessarily considering ASEAN. Flexible modes of engagement with counterparts, as observed with Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam are an important means of leveraging national security. This reflects a need to increase security from extra-regional threats, primarily China, which leads the countries to welcome AUKUS in part to balance China's expansive maritime territorial claim. This security dilemma also leads Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines to recalibrate its individual foreign policies in responding to AUKUS rather than sticking to ASEAN regional frameworks and norms.

ASEAN's organizational dilemma

The divergent Southeast Asian responses to AUKUS raise the question of how ASEAN—the biggest regional organization in Southeast Asia—may respond to AUKUS. Even though ASEAN already has legal and normative frameworks that address nuclear proliferation and great power politics, ASEAN has not utilised these frameworks in its response to AUKUS. The absence of a solid ASEAN response to AUKUS shows that the organization has a dilemma around using its existing regional mechanisms and norms to deal with nuclear proliferation issues. ⁴⁹ ASEAN is illustrative of Southeast Asia's security dilemma because, as scholars have pointed out, ASEAN shapes the collective identity of Southeast Asian countries through “the ASEAN Way”—a set of norms and values that characterise interstate relations in Southeast Asia and determines how Southeast Asian countries engage with major external powers. ⁵⁰ Thus, from an ontological security perspective, ASEAN's failure to provide a coherent response sheds light on the collective dilemma of Southeast Asian countries in defining their selves and others through their responses to key security issues, thus illustrating an important aspect of Southeast Asia's security dilemma.

Since its establishment, ASEAN has created some regional arrangements to deal with nuclear proliferation and great power politics. In 1971, the five original member states (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) declared Southeast Asia as “a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality” (ZOPFAN). The Declaration proclaimed that Southeast Asia should be “free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers,” and aspired to establish Southeast Asian as a nuclear-free zone. ⁵¹ Nevertheless, it was not until the late 1980s that a treaty to establish Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapons-free zone entered negotiations. By the early 1980s, major conflicts in Southeast Asia had been resolved, and rivalries between the Western and Soviet blocs had cooled. This was also followed in the early 1990s by ASEAN's enlargement to include Indochinese countries. These regional and global political changes paved the way for negotiations to advance additional nuclear non-proliferation treaties. The decade-long negotiation eventually resulted in the enactment of the 1995 SEANWFZ Treaty. Signed by all ten ASEAN states, the treaty establishes commitments from the signatories to refrain from four key activities, including 1) developing, transporting, or testing nuclear weapons; 2) allowing other states to develop, transport, or test nuclear weapons; 3) dumping or disposing radioactive materials in its territories; and 4) receiving assistance to violate the three above-mentioned obligations. ⁵²

More recently, ASEAN also launched a regional framework to deal with increasing security tensions in the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) was adopted in 2019 after several months of intensive lobbying from Indonesia. The outlook envisions four key elements to establish regional peace and stability, including 1) a vision of the Indo-Pacific as an interconnected and integrated region, which acknowledges ASEAN's central and strategic role; 2) an Indo-Pacific region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry; 3) an Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all countries in the region; and 4) a vision that highlights the importance of the maritime domain in the evolving regional architecture. ⁵³

Despite these extensive regional frameworks, ASEAN has struggled to utilize these frameworks strategically in diplomatic meetings with AUKUS members. The first of ASEAN's responses to AUKUS was made at the 1st ASEAN-Australia Summit in October 2021. Chaired by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei Darussalam, ASEAN did not express any direct reservations towards AUKUS. Indeed, the chair's statement mentions that ASEAN member states discussed AUKUS-related issues with Australia at the forum and also expressed their views of AUKUS's implications for the region. However, ASEAN did not reference the ZOPFAN or SEANFWZ treaties. The chair's statement only highlighted Australia's commitment to ASEAN centrality and its “steadfast commitment to meet all its obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” ⁵⁴

This view was reiterated in the co-chairs’ summary of the 34^th ASEAN-Australia Forum on 28 April 2022. The summary, similar to the previous forum, welcomed Australia's continued support and reaffirmation for ASEAN centrality. In addition, it highlighted Australia's commitment to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as well as “its obligations as a non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” ⁵⁵ Both meetings only made a cursory reference to Australia's obligations towards the non-nuclear proliferation treaty and did not detail any actions that Australia should take to fulfill these commitments.

This organizational dilemma is also reflected on how ASEAN uses AOIP in diplomatic meetings with great powers. For example, at the 2022 East Asia Summit, ASEAN highlighted its commitment to resolve regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific. This important meeting, which was attended by US president Joe Biden and Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese, emphasised “the importance of the AOIP as a guide for ASEAN's engagement in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and encouraged the enhancement and promotion of practical cooperation in priority areas.” ⁵⁶ Nevertheless, there was no mention of AUKUS or other possible dangers concerning the nuclear-powered submarines agreement. As it did previously with SEANWFZ and ZOPFAN, ASEAN made a reference to AOIP to emphasise its importance in the Indo-Pacific region to dialogue partners, but did not utilize the framework to criticise AUKUS or raise other points of concern.

In this context, AOIP is only a reference point to justify ASEAN's statements rather than a tactical guide to inform ASEAN's security engagements. By “reference point,” we mean that ASEAN only refers to AOIP in diplomatic meetings and declarations without any guidance on how to implement it in engagement with extra-regional great powers. As a reference point, AOIP does not critically position ASEAN in the region, nor does it elevate ASEAN's relevance in any dialogue concerning security in the Indo Pacific arena. ASEAN's consensus-style decision-making process, which requires all members to agree on ASEAN's draft agreement or declaration, also contributes to AOIP's and other regional framework's lack of substantive development. ⁵⁷ Without proper operationalisation and further policy development, AOIP cannot protect the national security of ASEAN member states, nor can it improve ASEAN's position amid US-China competition. ⁵⁸

These facts point towards ASEAN's basic organizational dilemma between sticking to regional norms and frameworks and consequently, not releasing any response due to disagreement from ASEAN member states. ASEAN did not refer to existing regional frameworks in any dialogues and meetings with Australia or the US, and it did not release a direct statement on AUKUS. Rather, ASEAN referenced existing regional frameworks only by highlighting the importance of ASEAN centrality (with reference to AOIP) or its obligations to the nuclear non-proliferation regime (with reference to SEANWFZ), rather than providing an implementable framework to operationalise ASEAN centrality. ASEAN, therefore, failed to resolve the security dilemma of its member states, and was unable to mediate divergent positions from its member states regarding AUKUS.

Conclusion

This article has identified various factors that account for Southeast Asia's varied responses to AUKUS. We have argued that the divergent Southeast Asian responses to AUKUS are caused by a new ontological security dilemma around the preservation of regional norms amid increasing US-China great power competition. We have identified three expressions of Southeast Asia's ontological security dilemma. First, there is a dilemma, which Indonesia and Malaysia both face, to maintain regional norms to maintain a balance of power and regional stability amid increasing engagement with extra-regional actors. Second, Southeast Asian countries also face a dilemma around their need to increase security against extra-regional threats, primarily China. This dilemma has led certain Southeast Asian countries—such as Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines—to welcome AUKUS as a balancing force against China. Third, we have also identified ASEAN's organizational dilemma of how to strategically utilize its regional frameworks amid divergent responses from its member states.

A further question concerns whether Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN could mitigate this ontological security dilemma. To date, there is no sign of converging positions among Southeast Asian countries, and it is still highly unlikely that this security dilemma can be fully resolved. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian countries can mitigate its risks. While divergent responses to AUKUS are inevitable, there are still multilateralism mechanisms—embodied, primarily but not exclusively, in ASEAN—that Southeast Asian countries could pursue to mitigate any risks from the security dilemma over the stability of regional order.

ASEAN could consider two strategies to mitigate any possible risks from the new security dilemma. First, ASEAN needs bolder and clearer operationalization of its regional norms and frameworks that could be referred to in responding to major security issues. ASEAN already has some normative commitments to maintain neutrality and nuclear non-proliferation, and to reject great power politics to secure regional peace, security, and stability. These frameworks need strategic operationalization and utilisation in any diplomatic negotiations between ASEAN and great powers. A clearer breakdown of what the policy entails will be helpful for ASEAN to develop clearer frameworks and mechanisms to guide its member states in engaging with great powers and responding to major global and regional security issues. ASEAN could do that by providing a clearer roadmap for the implementation of ASEAN frameworks—particularly AOIP—through several initiatives, either through existing ASEAN-led multilateralism, such as the East Asia Forum, ASEAN Regional Forum, or ASEAN Plus-Three, or through ASEAN bodies, such as various ASEAN centres or working groups. ⁵⁹

Second, ASEAN could also consider the role of its chairman to engage with great powers constructively. The ASEAN chairman, which is rotated annually, often played a central but underappreciated roles in hosting and initiating meetings with ASEAN dialogue partners, which include China, the US, Canada, and other major powers who have been involved in close dialogues and relations with ASEAN. ASEAN should encourage the chairman to respond to recent developments within the framework of ASEAN's consensus mechanism, emphasizing ASEAN centrality, and at the same time to be responsive to the needs and positions of ASEAN member states. A greater role for ASEAN chairman to deal with crucial regional issues will bring the much-needed push to collate a strategic response to the region's security challenges.