Regimes and cultures of social security: Comparing institutional models through nonlinear PCA

Abstract

This article reassesses the link between the structural and cultural aspects of social security. Do Esping-Andersen’s ‘Three Worlds’ exist empirically if one considers a comprehensive set of formal institutions simultaneously? And if so, do such regimes coincide with coherent differences in people’s value orientations in this field, or informal cultures? In order to answer these questions, nonlinear principal components analysis was applied to a group of countries at the core of the original Esping-Andersen typology. Nonlinear PCA seems to be a promising tool for comparative research because the technique is able to handle discrete data and nonlinear relationships, and the number of variables can exceed the number of countries. The outcomes of the analyses suggest that the ‘Three Worlds’ of formal social security had a firm empirical basis in the 1990s, and that the typology remains largely valid today, albeit with some qualifications. Furthermore, three different informal ‘cultures of social security’ emerged, with country clusters quite similar to those of the structural regime typology.

Keywords

Comparative social policy nonlinear principal components analysis social security institutions welfare attitudes welfare regimes

Over the past two decades, Esping-Andersen’s distinction between liberal, social-democratic and corporatist welfare regimes has dominated much of the comparative study of social policy (Castles et al., 2010). While several new research avenues are currently opening up (see e.g. Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011), two classic issues are not yet fully settled. In spite of the abundance of empirical work – already designated as a ‘welfare modelling business’ by Abrahamson in 1999 – most tests of the typology covered its theoretical elements only partially. In addition, the relationship between the structural aspects of Esping-Andersen’s regime types and the ‘culture of welfare states’ remains puzzling, as previous research suggested a certain correspondence, but no straightforward connection (Svallfors, 2010). This article seeks to shed some light on these issues for a group of countries that are central to the original Esping-Andersen typology. Nonlinear principal components analysis is applied to a comprehensive set of formal social security and labour market traits, and to various indicators of informal social security cultures. The next two sections provide an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on regimes, and on their relationship with cultural distinctions at national level; based on this overview, two research questions are formulated. The third section outlines the methodology, measures and data used. The empirical outcomes on social security regimes and cultures are then presented; these are discussed in the concluding section.

Limited coverage of the ‘Three Worlds’

In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) identified a typology of divergent models of social security and the labour market that emerged in industrialized nations after the Second World War. He regards these three ‘regimes’ as structurally different ways of allocating welfare production between state, market and households (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 73). The liberal¹ regime features limited collective schemes but a well-developed private insurance system for the middle classes. De-commodification is low, and social stratification tends to take shape in three separate layers: welfare clients and the working poor; the middle classes; and the privileged. The social-democratic regime is theoretically far more extensive. Social benefits are available for all inhabitants, at a level appealing to the middle classes; private insurance is less important. The elaborate social security schemes require high taxation and near-full employment of both sexes, partly realized through a large services sector. De-commodification is high and the system aims to reduce social inequalities. The corporatist (or ‘conservative’) regime is theoretically well developed, but on a more selective basis than the social-democratic model. Rights are tied to paid contributions and past labour experience, thus favouring older ‘insiders’; occupational groups have separate benefit schemes which correspond to their social position (e.g. generous provisions for civil servants). Families with children are well protected through collective insurance, which results in low female labour market participation. De-commodification is moderate, and in terms of stratification the corporate regime seeks to reproduce the social inequality between status groups.

Although Esping-Andersen’s classification became highly influential over the years, various alternatives and extensions have been proposed (see Arts and Gelissen, 2010; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011).² The typology has also been criticized for its focus on the traditional economic perils faced by the male breadwinner employee (Stephens, 2010) and its neglect of new social risks (e.g. single parenthood, the reconciliation of work and family life; see Bonoli, 2006), gender issues, and welfare production within families (Orloff, 1996; Sainsbury, 1999; see however Esping-Andersen, 2009). The same applies to the position of employers operating under different production regimes, or ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Leibfried and Mau, 2008).

In order to substantiate his typology, Esping-Andersen (1990) presented various comparisons of different sets of OECD countries. His data mainly concerned income replacement schemes, labour market characteristics and employment incentives. These related not only to institutional traits (coverage, levels, durations and conditionality of benefits; tax rates; social expenditure; wage pressure), but also to several outcome indicators (unemployment and labour market participation rates; the structure of employment). Yet Esping-Andersen’s empirical work received a fair amount of methodological criticism. One objection concerned the limited validity, reliability and accessibility of his data (Bambra, 2006; Scruggs and Allan, 2006, 2008). Another objection related to his use of unnecessarily ‘soft’ or less adequate statistical techniques: tabular presentations, additive indices and regression analyses (Shalev, 2007). Later authors tested the typology more rigorously by generating new data and by applying more advanced methods (mostly cluster or factor analysis); see e.g. Kangas (1994), Ragin (1994), Obinger and Wagschal (1998), Gough (2001), Hicks and Kenworthy (2003), Saint-Arnaud and Bernard (2003), Powell and Barrientos (2004), Castles and Obinger (2008) and Schröder (2009). In their overview, Arts and Gelissen (2010: 577) conclude: ‘[Esping-Andersen’s] typology has at least some heuristic and descriptive value, but a case can be made for extending the number of welfare state regimes, perhaps to four or even five. […] Some cases are (much) more impure than others, and some are clearly hybrids’.

However, there are several reasons for doubting whether the foregoing empirical analyses provide an adequate test of the typology. First, the institutions included in these studies often did not cover the theoretical regime traits completely. For instance, Ragin (1994) analysed pension benefits, Gough (2001) looked at social assistance schemes, and Kangas (1994) focused on health insurance. Such partial analyses can neither corroborate nor rebut Esping-Andersen’s classification, which refers to the entire configuration of social security and labour market institutions. Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) argue that many deviations from the typology reported in the literature are simply the result of including traits from other policy fields (education, health care) that should be discarded on theoretical grounds.

A second problem concerns the limited number of indicators in most studies. Bonoli’s classification (1997) is an extreme example: he attempted to test the typology by plotting two variables, social expenditure and the share of contribution-funded social security (updated by Arcanjo, 2011). But in other cases too, often only between six and ten variables were analysed, mostly relating to expenditure data. This hardly does justice to the wealth of attributes that Esping-Andersen associated with his regime types.

A third objection is that most empirical assessments of the typology analyse continuous variables (e.g. expenditure and benefit levels), on the assumption of linear correlation. In reality, relevant regime traits can consist of discrete categories (e.g. various benefit conditions), or may be related in a nonlinear way.

These limitations imply that a new analysis, with a large set of traits covering the entire regime, and use of a technique more suited to the identification of different types, could have added value. Our first research question is therefore: Do Esping-Andersen’s ‘Three Worlds’ exist empirically if one considers a comprehensive set of formal institutions simultaneously?

The connection between regimes and culture

Esping-Andersen’s typology stems from ‘power resources theory’ (Korpi, 1983, 1989; Stephens, 1979). This approach posits that regimes are the outcome of the distribution of power across social classes, their interests and degree of organization, and the political struggles and coalitions which occur at historical turning-points.³ Following this line of reasoning, regimes are thought to be stable because they solve problems across class and interest cleavages. Thus the Swedish social-democratic regime is considered to be the result of high worker mobilization (strong trade unions), a broad alliance of social democrats and well-organized farmers (who traded an extension of benefit schemes in return for farm price subsidies), and successful incorporation of the new middle class into social security (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

In power resources theory the values, norms and beliefs of actors are generally regarded as a cultural spin-off of the structurally diverging regime features. Living under a specific regime may cause people ‘to adhere to a particular conception of a moral community’ (Arts and Gelissen, 2001), with different notions on equality, equity, solidarity, justice principles, etc. Van Oorschot et al. (2008: 1–25) situate this assumption in the more general materialist tradition in sociology (Marx, and to some extent Bourdieu), where culture is treated as a reflection of the social system. It contrasts with the idealist perspective (Sorokin, Lévi-Strauss), which posits that culture determines the social structure through the socialized convictions and symbolic acts of individuals. In the welfare state literature, the ‘national value hypothesis’ provides an example (see Coughlin, 1980; Lipset, 1963). Here, diverging value orientations rooted in national history are thought to bring about different types of welfare regimes. Accordingly, countries where egalitarian attitudes are comparatively strong tend to foster extensive welfare states, while individualistic nations – the USA being the prime example – only institute collective provisions if external circumstances (such as the Great Depression) force them to do so.

Both approaches imply a rather one-sided and over-deterministic perspective on the relationship between the structure and culture of modern welfare states. Power resources theory largely rejects the notion that ideas alone can shape welfare regimes. The national value hypothesis, on the other hand, postulates homogeneous and stable cultures, has difficulty in explaining policy changes, and disregards the role of interests, powers and political negotiation in welfare regime development (Brooks and Manza, 2007). Pfau-Effinger (2005), Larsen (2006) and Van Oorschot et al. (2008) therefore suggest that welfare regimes and cultures be regarded as dynamically interrelated and relatively autonomous. This is in line with Castles’s (1993) ideas on ‘families of nations’ and, more generally, with the ‘new institutionalism’ that emerged in recent decades. That approach combines the historical analysis of institutions with economic theory on property rights and transaction costs, and with sociological theory on the social construction of cognitions and morality (see Brinton and Nee, 1998; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Morgan et al., 2010; North, 1990). In new institutionalism structural regimes and cultural orientations tend to coincide for three reasons (Vrooman, 2009). First, modern social security rules on the one hand, and values, norms and conventions on the other, may both be thought of as ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990: 3). They are institutions that aim to regulate behaviour through a specific allocation of rights and duties and related conditions and sanctions. Although modern social security is largely formalized in national and international law, informal elements are still important because they fill in the gaps that legislation does not cover. Formal and informal rules thus tend to serve as functional extensions of one another; they are two sides of the same institutional model, and are therefore likely to correspond. Furthermore, coherent views on the way society should be typically played a role in the vesting of regimes. Those regimes do not merely reflect the power-weighted interests of their founders (see Coleman, 1990) and the idiosyncrasies of the bargaining process, but also the convictions of the parties involved. Such ideologies may persist to the present day in the form of a ‘collective memory’ among current policymakers and the general public. Finally, once regimes emerge, people’s attitudes towards welfare provision may block fundamental regime shifts. Path dependency is partly rooted in the cultural ‘rules of the game’, which make the existing regime seem a natural order, and may affect social policy through voting behaviour, opinion polls and media coverage (Brooks and Manza, 2007). However, as stressed in policy feedback theory (see Hacker, 2004; Pierson, 1993; Weaver, 2010), the opposite may also occur. The way in which social policies are designed (e.g. targeted at certain groups; phasing-in processes; visibility of contributions and benefits) and framed (e.g. by referring to ‘ticking demographic time bombs’ or to certain classes of ‘undeserving poor’) can also shape popular support for, or rejection of, reform measures.

From the new institutionalist perspective, the degree of correspondence between regimes and cultures is an empirical matter. It may be that under liberal regimes ideas of personal responsibility, individual freedom and aversion to state intervention are more widespread than elsewhere; that the population of corporatist welfare states is more inclined towards conservative attitudes (an organic view of society which preserves status group differences; traditional family values and gender roles); and that people in social-democratic countries more frequently favour social equality and state responsibility for every citizen’s welfare. But this is not necessarily so. The connection between welfare structure and culture may differ between countries, and it may change over time – though typically not always in a single direction, and not without a struggle.

Scrutinizing the empirical research on the relationship between regime types and welfare cultures actually reveals it to be rather ambiguous (see e.g. Andress and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Blomberg and Kroll, 1999; Bonoli, 2000; Jacobsen, 2011; Jæger, 2006, 2009; Kluegel and Miyano, 1995; Mehrtens, 2004; Papadakis and Bean, 1993; Svallfors, 2003; Walker, 2008). In his overview article, Svallfors (2010: 245) concludes that ‘support for equality, redistribution, and state intervention is strongest in the social-democratic regime, weaker in the conservative regime, and weakest in the liberal regime. However, we do not find any clear regime clustering of countries. Differences and similarities between countries show interpretable patterns, but they are too complex to be summarized as “worlds of welfare attitudes”…’ This rather confused picture may be due in part to the great diversity of nations, data sources and attitudes in the earlier work. In addition, countries were sometimes assigned to regime types to which they probably do not belong, or purer specimens of the various regimes were grouped together with more diluted examples.⁴ This may have distorted the correlation with the cultural domain. Finally, as in the regime analyses, welfare attitudes were often studied under the possibly erroneous assumption of linear relationships between continuous variables. Yet it seems unlikely that these differences and potential specification errors are so large and consistent that they can fully explain the lack of correspondence found earlier. The main reason may lie in a one-dimensional selection of value orientations. In most analyses these relate to the preferred level of public spending, degree of redistribution, solidarity and similar aspects. Indicators such as these chiefly capture the contrast between countries operating a small welfare state (the liberal type) and countries with more extensive systems (social-democratic and corporatist types). This implies that the cultural differences within the latter group were hardly ever included in the earlier empirical work, and therefore could not come to light. Theoretically these should imply a contrast between universalistic, redistributive orientations in social-democratic regimes, and particularistic, status-related attitudes in corporatist countries. Examples would be diverging ideas on income transfers, the prestige of civil servants, gender roles, etc. Re-analysing the relationship between formal regime types and informal cultures with a more balanced set of attitudes may therefore be worthwhile. Our second research question is therefore: To what extent do regimes coincide with coherent differences in people’s value orientations, or informal social security cultures?

Methodology, data and measures

Nonlinear principal components analysis

Shalev (2007: 289) states that a proper analysis of Esping-Andersen’s typology should indicate whether ‘welfare state regimes actually do “hang together”; and if they do, whether countries indeed cluster in three distinct subgroups on underlying policy dimensions’. In order to achieve this he suggests combining multidimensional scaling and factor analysis.⁵ Nonlinear principal components analysis fulfils these requirements. Like classic PCA, the technique reduces variables to a limited number of uncorrelated dimensions, but it also entails a process of optimal quantification. Categories are assigned numerical values in such a way as to maximize the accounted-for variance in the transformed variables (see Gifi, 1990; Linting et al., 2007; Michailidis and De Leeuw, 1998). Nonlinear PCA has several advantages over classic PCA. It can handle nominal, ordinal and numerical data; it does not assume a linear relationship between variables; and the technique is ‘eminently suited for analyses in which there are (many) more variables than objects’ (Meulman et al., 2004: 67). The latter implies that nonlinear PCA is not sensitive to the ‘small-N problem’ often encountered in comparative analysis (e.g. Goldthorpe, 2000): the items may outnumber the generally limited country sample.⁶ Nonlinear and classic PCA produce identical results if variables are treated as numerical in the quantification process and if there are no missing data (Gifi, 1990: 151–191; Linting et al., 2007). Examples of the application of nonlinear PCA include studies on personality disorders (Eurelings-Bontekoe et al., 1996), adolescents’ leisure activities (Zeijl et al., 2000), effects of obstetric complications (Arseneault et al., 2002) and organizational cooperation in crisis situations (Svedin, 2009). In spite of its potential, the technique has not often been applied in comparative research; but Jehoel-Gijsbers and Vrooman (2008) used it to assess social exclusion among older people in EU countries, and Soede and Vrooman (2008) to compare pension schemes. In the SPSS software package that was used the procedure is known as categorical principal components analysis (CatPCA).

Nonlinear PCA has attractive features for exploring Esping-Andersen’s typology and related cultural orientations, because here the number of countries and theoretical dimensions is small, while the set of indicators is large and consists partly of discrete variables (nominal or ordinal scale). When applying this technique, countries and institutional traits which share many features will obtain similar scores on the underlying principal components, whereas cases and categories with little in common will be positioned a long way apart. This makes it possible to ascertain the prevalence of distinct regimes and cultures of social security.

Data and measures on regimes

With regard to the regime types, eleven national systems of social security and labour market regulation were considered for the first half of the 1990s. This is probably the best period in which to test the validity of Esping-Andersen’s regime typology. In later years the picture may have become less clear, as many governments not only tried to contain the costs of social security according to a ‘logic of retrenchment’ (Pierson, 1996), but also attempted to strengthen work incentives and to recalibrate their systems to meet changing social circumstances (Castles, 2010; Kautto, 2010; Levy, 2010; Palier, 2010). The countries selected were at the core of the original ‘Three Worlds’ typology.⁷ Esping-Andersen (1990) places three of these countries in the corporatist group (Belgium, France and Germany), four in the liberal cluster (Australia, Canada, the USA and the United Kingdom), and three in the social-democratic group (Sweden, Norway and Denmark). The Netherlands was added as an example of a hybrid regime, which theoretically combines corporatist and social-democratic traits. An additional analysis was performed on a more limited set of variables, relating to 2008–2010 and including a larger set of countries. This enabled us to gain an insight into the stability of the Esping-Andersen typology over time, and to assess how sensitive the outcomes of the main analysis might be to case selection.

Nonlinear PCA was performed on 54 institutional characteristics. Data for the regime analysis were obtained from international sources, mostly the OECD, EC and ILO. The selection of variables was based on Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 26–29) theoretical demarcation of regime traits, and overlapped his measures of de-commodification, welfare conservatism, liberalism and socialism, tax burdens and social expenditure. There were however some differences:

– information was added on surviving dependants’ pensions, child benefits, social assistance, disability, retirement ages and fiscal labour incentives. These are part of Esping-Andersen’s theoretical framework, but were largely discarded from his tables and indices;⁸

– the ‘breadwinner bias’ and the scant attention for the position of employers in the original typology were addressed by including new data on leave arrangements, annual holidays, activating labour market policies, the statutory minimum wage, the coverage of collective labour market agreements, and employers’ contributions;

– tax rates, child benefits and unemployment replacement rates were differentiated by household type and income level, in order to achieve a more balanced picture;⁹

– Esping-Andersen’s indicators relating to outcomes (e.g. unemployment and participation rates) were discarded. In our view these are not part of the regimes as such, but are the combined result of the institutional configuration and various other country differences (demography, national resources, the economic cycle).

Nonlinear PCA makes it possible to analyse the entire dataset simultaneously. Appendix 1 provides a detailed overview of the regime indicators.

Data and measures on cultures of social security

In order to assess the correspondence of the regime typology and informal social security cultures, nonlinear PCA was also performed on data from the 1996–1999 waves¹⁰ of the International Social Survey Programme. The same countries were included as in the main regime analysis, with the exception of Belgium, which did not take part in ISSP at the time.¹¹ We selected 16 indicators of liberal, social-democratic or corporatist value orientations, presumed to be in line with the regime typology (see Appendix 2). Most items refer to the attribution of rights and duties in society and may therefore be regarded as representative of people’s commitment to informal institutions (Vrooman, 2009). A few variables were however simply preferences that would be in line with the structural differences between the regime types.

The contrast between liberal regimes on the one hand and corporatist and social-democratic regimes on the other is assumed to be captured in items relating to:

– governmental responsibility for the standard of living of older people and the unemployed;

– governmental responsibility for the provision of jobs;

– governmental responsibility for income redistribution;

– aversion to wide differentials at the top of the income distribution.

People living under liberal regimes may be expected to be less in favour of an interventionist government than those in countries with more extensive regimes. They are also less likely to oppose very high top incomes, as these reflect the individual’s market value and freedom to make the most of his or her bargaining position. Such orientations may theoretically be regarded as typifying a liberal social security culture.

Other variables might be indicative of social-democratic orientations. These include:

– aversion to income differentials between lower and higher occupations;

– a limited role for meritocratic performance in setting the wage level;

– postmaterialist work orientations;

– a preference among females for public sector employment.

As social-democratic regimes explicitly aim to reduce income inequality through vertical redistribution, inhabitants of countries operating such a system may be expected to favour small income differentials to a greater extent than elsewhere. In the same line of reasoning, it is likely that meritocratic principles will be deemed a less relevant wage criterion: a better job performance should not necessarily entitle someone to a (much) higher income.

The high degree of de-commodification pursued by the social-democratic regime could translate into comparatively strong support for postmaterialist work values: if every citizen is assured of a decent minimum income, people may more readily accept a job for motives other than financial gain. As noted earlier, the social-democratic regime requires high labour market participation by both sexes; for women this is mainly realized in the large public services sector. It may therefore be assumed that females have a comparatively strong preference for working in this sector.

Characteristic orientations theoretically belonging to the corporatist regime type could relate to:

– traditional gender roles;

– seniority as a wage criterion;

– the prestige of state officials;

– the acceptability of breaking the formal tax and benefit rules.

Given the prevalence of the breadwinner model in corporatist regimes, it is assumed that people are more likely than elsewhere to prefer women to stay at home, thus legitimizing the actual state of affairs. In similar vein, the strong emphasis on acquired rights and positions in these systems could imply that it is considered self-evident to reward people according to seniority. Furthermore, corporatist social insurance schemes were originally designed to reproduce status differences under the auspices of the emerging nation-states, personified by the civil authorities. A high prestige of state officials would be consistent with the extensive social security actually provided for this group. Finally, it may be presumed that bending the formal tax and benefit rules is more acceptable under corporatist systems. Due to the more generous benefits and higher tax rates, the potential gains of defection are greater than in liberal countries; and since corporatist regimes aim to serve particularistic interests, it may seem more natural for people to shun their duties than in social-democratic regimes (where benefit fraud and tax evasion are more likely to be considered an offence against the public interest).

In the empirical analysis some of these orientations had multiple indicators; and a few variables were derived from the original responses. Thus, the share of people expressing a preference to work for the government or civil service was split by gender. A high level of support among males is assumed to indicate a high status of civil servants (theoretically a corporatist feature); while a high ratio of female versus male support is presumed to imply a feminine bias towards working in the public sector (characteristic of social-democratic regimes).

The inequality aversion items were based on a set of questions where respondents had to rate the earnings they thought should apply for nine different occupations, ranging from an unskilled factory worker to a Supreme Court judge and the chairman of a large corporation. For each country, a distribution of preferred income differentials was constructed by concatenating the responses for the various occupations.¹² Two inequality measures were calculated for this variable. The Theil-coefficient was used to assess the preferred earning differentials between lower and higher occupations; and the Gini-coefficient – which is less susceptible to extreme values – was used as an indicator for the income inequality aversion regarding the six higher-level occupations. The same set of questions was also used to generate an indicator of the prestige of state officials: the ranking of the mean preferred income of a Cabinet minister among the nine occupations.

Empirical regimes

In the nonlinear PCA of regime traits, most variables were scaled at the ordinal level; however, four had low fit and were treated as nominal.¹³ Cut-off points for continuous variables were based on gaps and concentrations in their distribution; the impact of this is discussed in a sensitivity analysis below. The initial categorization and component loadings of the variables are listed in Appendix 1.

Interpretation of the dimensions

The first two components account for 62 percent of the total variance. Adding more dimensions leads to a limited increase in the proportion of explained variance and does not produce any new substantive insights.¹⁴ The component loadings suggest three major clusters of variables. The first group has high negative loadings on the first dimension, but fairly low ones on the second (numbers 1–26 in Appendix 1). Substantively, the horizontal axis is largely associated with variables measuring whether a system is residual or extensive. Lower scores indicate frugal benefits of limited duration combined with strict entry regulation through means-testing. As a consequence, expenditure and the funding required are low. In Esping-Andersen’s terms this is mainly a combination of de-commodification, welfare liberalism, the social wage and employment incentives through taxation. More specifically, a scaling on the negative side of the horizontal axis corresponds to low replacement rates in the first and fifth year of unemployment. Child benefits are meagre and earnings-related occupational pensions substitute only a small part of previous income. There is no link between the duration of the insurance period and the level of collective old age pensions. Earnings-related unemployment benefit is usually paid for a short period, with a maximum of one year. In disability schemes, the risque professionnel (medical impediments due to occupational activity, accidents or diseases) is only insured for employees, not for the self-employed, trainees, interns, etc. Coverage of the risque social is limited to people who are almost fully incapacitated (80–100%). With regard to leave arrangements, a low score on the first dimension points to a small proportion of working women with entitlement, a low level of maternity benefits, and the absence of earnings-related leave schemes. A large part of total social security spending concerns means-tested social assistance; child benefits and collective old age and surviving dependants’ pensions also are conditional on the absence of other sources of income or wealth. Taxes and social security contributions make up a relatively small part of GNP. Average tax rates for standard workers are low, as are the marginal rates for single people and double-earners and employers’ contributions. Tax breaks for work-related expenses are limited.

For two variables in this group (numbers 5 and 26 in Appendix 1) the component loadings – though rather low – are contrary to expectations. While a high statutory minimum wage and the existence of a specific orphan’s pension are theoretically traits of more extensive regimes, these in fact coincide with residualist system characteristics.

The second major group of variables show high negative component loadings on the vertical axis, and mostly positive values on the horizontal axis (numbers 27 to 39 in Appendix 1). It comprises features which Esping-Andersen theoretically linked to corporatist regimes: welfare conservatism; a close connection between employment or past labour experience and benefit entitlements; and work disincentives for females. Welfare conservatism is expressed in a high degree of occupationalism. There are separate schemes for different groups of employees, aimed at maintaining their standard of living; and expenditure on social security for civil servants tends to be higher than elsewhere. This corresponds with a considerable share of contribution-based funding, reflecting a strong emphasis on social insurance principles. On the labour market, employment contracts are largely covered by collective agreements.

The corporatist selectivity in protecting ‘insiders’ on the labour market is evident in disability schemes. Benefits are high for employees who become incapacitated due to their work; under some risque professionnel schemes, they may even continue to receive their full salary. On the other hand, the coverage of the risque social is limited. Typically, those with early onset disability, the self-employed, students, housewives and unemployed persons who become incapacitated are not entitled to any disability benefits. These traits coincide with fairly good (semi-)collective pensions for widows and orphans of employees, with no limits on duration. Surviving dependants of persons without an employment contract, however, have to rely on their own means or on social assistance. Child benefits are generally linked to family size, with no specific targeting of low-income groups. High child benefits are granted to large families which cannot be considered needy, while poor lone-parent families do not receive special protection. Facilities for mothers are comparatively limited. Maternity and paternal leave is fairly long, but is largely unpaid. It is combined with low coverage of formal childcare facilities and high tax allowances for couples with children. Nonetheless, the additional tax advantages single-earner families receive (over single persons) that are not related to children are limited. This suggests that labour disincentives are not linked to having a partner, but rather to the presence of children.

A third group of variables combines high positive component loadings on the second dimension with positive loadings on the first. These traits, numbered 40–49 in Appendix 1, are theoretically associated with social-democratic regimes: generous provisions with strict entry regulation, activation and elaborate leave arrangements. Universalism is most evident in pensions. All inhabitants are entitled to a collective old age benefit, at a comparatively generous minimum level; and in addition most employees are covered by a compulsory earnings-related pension scheme. These favourable provisions for older people are combined with a rather high statutory retirement age (65 years or more) and limited opportunities for full early retirement. Entry to disability schemes is also restricted: a minimum incapacity threshold is applied, even where disabilities and illnesses are work-related. The safety net is wide: after five consecutive years of unemployment, social assistance benefits for families with children are comparatively high. This is however accompanied by considerable efforts to get people back to work, as indicated by the substantial expenditure on activating labour market policy. Working people enjoy extensive leave arrangements; the statutory minimum annual leave is more than four weeks. As a corollary to the good level of provisions, tax and contribution rates tend to be high, especially for single earners with children.

One variable (number 50 in Appendix 1) does not belong to any of these groups. In most countries, entitlements to disability schemes covering the risque social are earnings-related; but the UK, Australia and Denmark operate flat-rate benefits, resulting in a component loading between the liberal and social-democratic groups of variables. The four remaining variables were scaled as multiple-nominal and do not have component loadings (see note 13).

All in all, the component loadings indicate a clear interpretation of the two dimensions, substantiating a hypothesis put forward by Shalev (2007: 291–292). On the horizontal axis, we find an underlying continuum stretching from residualist (negative loadings) to extensive (positive loadings) regime characteristics. This resembles what is sometimes referred to as the scope of social security, or the social security effort. Yet the first dimension reflects much more than relative expenditure, the commonly adopted effort indicator (e.g. Wilensky, 1975): it also indicates de-commodification, welfare liberalism and fiscal incentives to work. On the vertical axis we mainly see a contrast between ‘particularistic’ and ‘universalistic’ traits; hence, this can be regarded as a principal component indicating the degree of universalism.

Regime clusters

Figure 1 shows the object scores that were obtained on the two principal components. There are three distinct country clusters and one intermediate case. First, there is a liberal group, comprising the United States, Australia, Canada and the UK. These countries score low on scope, and are scaled about average on the vertical axis, mostly with a bias toward the universalistic side. Based on the characteristics studied here, the USA was the most ‘residual’ country during the first half of the 1990s, closely followed by Australia. Canada and the United Kingdom attained somewhat higher scores on the first dimension and may be regarded as less typical representatives of the liberal type. This was due to higher replacement rates in unemployment and social assistance schemes than in the USA and Australia, better income provisions covering the cost of children, and higher minimum collective old age pensions for persons who had never worked. Tax and contribution rates in Canada and the UK were correspondingly higher as well.

Figure 1.

Optimal scaling of 11 countries on formal regime traits (nonlinear PCA, object scores).

The second cluster consists of three countries which Esping-Andersen designated as corporatist. The Belgian, French and German systems are much wider in scope than the liberal regimes, and these countries achieve fairly extreme scores on the particularistic side of the second dimension. Although it is the most homogeneous cluster, there are a number of differences within it: France had the most residual system in the early 1990s, and Germany was somewhat less corporatist than the other two countries. Each case also diverges in some respects from the theoretical expectations. In Belgium, unemployment insurance benefits were lower than is customary in corporatist countries, while France had fairly substantial social assistance regulations, typical of liberal regimes. German disability benefit schemes were comparable in many respects to what one would expect in a social-democratic regime.

The Nordic countries of Europe form a third group. These countries score higher than the corporatist countries on the first dimension, while on the second they surpass the liberal cluster. This means that countries operating a social-democratic regime have the most extensive and universalistic schemes. In the first half of the 1990s, Sweden and Denmark were the purest representatives of this type, although both had a specific bias: the Swedish system was more extensive, while the Danish regime was more universalistic. Norway comes out lower than Sweden on the first dimension and lags behind Denmark on the second, suggesting that it was a less typical example of the social-democratic regime type at the time. The smaller scope of the Norwegian system is mainly due to slightly lower replacement rates and more modest contribution rates. The lower universalism score chiefly results from Norway’s voluntary earnings-related occupational pensions (generating lower coverage) and the smaller amount spent on activating labour market policy.

The Dutch system emerges as a hybrid. In the early 1990s, the Netherlands was rather similar to the Nordic countries on the ‘scope’ dimension: slightly less extensive than the regimes of Denmark and Sweden but comparable to Norway and outranking the corporatist countries. This stems mainly from the generous benefits and correspondingly high costs and tax rates. The Netherlands achieves an average score on the second axis, about halfway between the social-democratic and corporatist groups. While two decades ago the scores on the social assistance and old age pension variables were quite ‘Scandinavian’, in a number of other respects the Dutch system resembled a corporatist regime: the privileged position of the breadwinner; the large share of social insurance contributions; the generous schemes for civil servants; and the disincentives to the female and older labour supply. Dutch social security also showed a number of unique features, such as the absence of a distinction between social and occupational disability benefits. The scaling confirms Esping-Andersen’s (1999: 88) characterization of the Netherlands as ‘a Janus-headed welfare regime, combining both social-democratic and conservative attributes’.

Cluster analyses of country scores

The foregoing analysis raises a number of methodological issues. The first concerns the classification of countries into the various regime types. The ellipses in Figure 1 are based on the sign of the scores on the two underlying dimensions and their distances from the origin. To obtain a more substantiated classification, hierarchical cluster analyses of the country scores were performed. A two-cluster solution results in a contrast between the liberal nations (Australia, Canada, UK, USA) and the rest. With three clusters specified, the non-liberal group is split into corporatist (Belgium, France, Germany) and social-democratic (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) ones. The Netherlands is included in the latter, but emerges as a distinct case in a four-cluster solution. The classification was corroborated in a more formal way as well, by applying latent class cluster analysis. This technique allows a test of the differences in the goodness of fit of various cluster solutions (see Vermunt and Magidson, 2002). A two-cluster model once again shows a distinction between liberal and non-liberal regimes. The fit, however, is not significantly different from the baseline model, which contains a single cluster (Δ log-likelihood_2-1= 4.5/3 d.f., p = .21). A three-cluster model distinguishes the liberal, social-democratic (plus the Netherlands) and corporatist countries. Its fit is significantly better than both the baseline and the two-cluster model (Δ log-likelihood_3-1= 12.8/6 d.f., p = .04; Δ log-likelihood_3-2= 8.3/3 d.f., p = .04). Due to the small number of cases, LCA models with four or more clusters are not identified and could not be tested.

Sensitivity analysis: Nonlinear and classic PCA

A second issue relates to the merits of nonlinear PCA compared to the classical method. In order to assess this, a sensitivity analysis¹⁵ was carried out on a subset of ten items, covering various regime aspects; clearly, classic PCA cannot be performed on the entire dataset because the number of observations is too small. A nonlinear PCA of these 10 variables results in component loadings very similar to those of the original solution. However, due to the smaller number of variables it is easier to fit: the explained variance (75%) is higher than before (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Sensitivity analysis – (N)PCA component loadings and explained variances (10 formal regime traits, 1990s)

		Nonlinear PCA (categorized)		PCA (categorized)		PCA (raw scores)
#	Variable	Dim 1	Dim 2	Dim 1	Dim 2	Dim 1	Dim 2
	High negative loading on dimension 1
1	Level of maternity benefit* [% earnings]	−0.96	0.23	−0.81	0.23	−0.80	0.27
6	Direct/indirect taxes + contributions* [% GNP]	−0.89	−0.33	−0.92	−0.11	−0.93	−0.03
11	Duration of earnings-related unemployment benefit (not means-tested)	−0.96	0.24	−0.93	0.02	−0.92	0.03
14	Unemployment benefit 1st month, couple + children (2/3 APW)* [%]	−0.83	−0.01	−0.77	0.26	−0.74	0.19
25	Means testing widows’ pensions	−0.59	−0.12	−0.63	−0.42	−0.60	−0.45
	High negative loading on dimension 2
29	Coverage of collective labour market agreements* [% employees]	0.34	−0.90	0.51	−0.74	0.67	−0.57
38	Contribution-funded social security* [% of total funding]	0.19	−0.84	0.12	−0.85	−0.01	−0.75
	High positive loading on dimension 2
42	(Semi-) collective schemes for full early retirement	0.18	0.71	0.30	0.66	0.27	0.72
45	Social assistance couple + 2 children, 5 yrs unemployed (NRR)* [%]	0.53	0.76	0.59	0.54	0.78	0.35
49	Disability threshold (risque professionnel)	0.62	0.42	0.31	0.46	0.36	0.42
	% explained variance	75.1		66.8		65.3

Raw scores used in the second PCA. # Variable numbers correspond to Appendix 1. Italics: decrease of component loading on characteristic dimension ≥.05.

Sources: see Appendix 4.

If we apply classic PCA to these 10 items (with the same categorizations), the explained variance drops to 67 percent and the component loadings decrease; but their structure – and therefore the interpretation of the dimensions – remains the same. In a third analysis, the six variables that may be regarded as continuous were entered as raw scores in a classic PCA. Three of the items then have considerably lower component loadings on the second dimension, and the explained variance is 10 percentage points below that obtained in the nonlinear solution (65%). The country clusters remain visible in both classic PCAs, but the dispersion within the liberal and corporatist groups increases; and the Netherlands now inclines towards the corporatist side. Thus, the merits of nonlinear PCA for comparative research seem to go beyond its ability to analyze a set of variables that outnumbers the country sample. The outcomes of the sensitivity analysis suggest that it may result in a considerable fit improvement compared with classic PCA, and in a clearer identification of country clusters.

Stability over time and case selection

The outcomes depicted in Figure 1 are a snapshot of the institutional configuration as it prevailed in the 1990s. This of course raises the question of whether the regime classification would be appropriate today. For various reasons some convergence is likely to have occurred, as countries faced similar challenges (the need for retrenchment; globalization and international competition) and may have learned from each other through policy exchange and international coordination. As a result the distinction between the three types may be less clear-cut in later years. However, from a theoretical standpoint it is equally possible that the structural differences were preserved in a process of path-dependent change. The previous analyses were moreover limited to countries that were considered rather ‘pure’ examples in the original Esping-Andersen typology (with the exception of the Netherlands). It may of course be that the inclusion of other, possibly more mixed countries would blur the picture. The results of an additional nonlinear PCA (Appendix 3) provide some information on the potential vulnerability of the typology to the chosen time frame and to case selection. The 10 variables used in the sensitivity analysis were updated¹⁶ to 2008–2010 for the same countries as before, plus six new ones: New Zealand and Ireland (possibly liberal), Iceland and Finland (possibly social-democratic), and Austria and Switzerland (possibly corporatist). Thus, all the countries in Esping-Andersen’s original de-commodification and stratification indices are included, except Japan and Italy.¹⁷ The 17 recent observations were added as supplementary objects to the nonlinear PCA of the reduced 1990s dataset. This implies that these cases do not influence the component loadings, but are fitted into the solution afterwards (Meulman et al., 2004: 50); both periods are therefore measured against the same criteria. In 2008–2010, most countries turn out to be scaled in the quadrant to which they belong theoretically. This indicates consistency and persistence of regime differences, rather than overall convergence: the typology does not collapse. But this conclusion requires some qualification. If we look at the 11 ‘old’ countries, the contrasts over time remain fairly stable on the first dimension (liberal versus non-liberal),¹⁸ but diminish on the second dimension. France, Belgium and Germany turn out to be less selective, while Sweden and Denmark emerge as less universalistic than before.¹⁹ Although structural differences remain, this suggests some convergence between the corporatist and social-democratic systems of Western and Northern Europe. Secondly, while Ireland and New Zealand certainly belong to the liberal group in 2008–2010, and Iceland is placed squarely in the social-democratic cluster, as expected, three other ‘new’ countries emerge less clearly from the analysis. The Finnish system seems a rather hybrid form of the social-democratic and corporatist types, while Austria and Switzerland are placed at some distance of the corporatist countries.²⁰ However, this is not a new result. Finland and Switzerland are also listed as less pure cases in Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser’s (2011) meta-analysis of empirical regime typologies. Esping-Andersen (1990) classified Austria as social-democratic in terms of de-commodification (see also Bambra, 2006), but as conservative with regard to stratification. Esping-Andersen’s typology therefore seems to be still relevant today, albeit with some reservations; and it probably stretches beyond the cases selected in Figure 1. Even so, it is not engraved in stone; and a similar analysis based on more items, time points and countries could shed more light on the actual evolution of regimes. This, however, is not the aim here.

Cultures of social security

In the nonlinear PCA of 16 value orientations, we used the categorized mean country scores on each variable as input. These were scaled at ordinal level.²¹ Appendix 2 lists the categorizations and the component loadings that were obtained.

Interpretation of the dimensions

The first two principal components account for 72 percent of the total variance.²² Three distinct groups of variables emerge from the component loadings. The first dimension shows a cluster of five variables with negative loadings (items 1–5 in Appendix 2). Theoretically, these are in line with a liberal welfare regime. A low score on the x-axis indicates that comparatively few people think the government should be responsible for providing a decent standard of living for the elderly and the unemployed, for providing jobs and for reducing income differentials. This corresponds with a limited aversion to inequality at the top of the income distribution, as indicated by the substantial value of the Gini-coefficient calculated over the preferred earnings for six higher-level occupations.

The second cluster of variables has high positive loadings on both dimensions (items 6–10). In principle, these value orientations fit in well with the social-democratic regime. The earnings inequality people think is acceptable between lower and higher-level occupations is comparatively low, and meritocratic wage criteria are considered less relevant than elsewhere. Furthermore, a relatively high proportion of people would still enjoy their jobs if they did not need the money. Postmaterialism also shows in the fact that relatively few respondents think a job should offer good career opportunities. Such attitudes coincide with a comparatively strong inclination by women to work in (semi-)government jobs.

The third group of items (numbers 11–16 in Appendix 2) combines high negative loadings on the second dimension with moderately positive ones on the first. Theoretically, these characteristics are mainly associated with the corporatist regime. A fairly high proportion of the population agree that family life would suffer if women worked full-time. People believe more than elsewhere that seniority should be a wage criterion. The high ranking of a Cabinet minister in the preferred earnings distribution suggests a considerable prestige of state officials; this is corroborated by the comparatively high proportion of men who would prefer to work in the public sector. Bending the rules is more accepted than elsewhere: a fairly high share of respondents think that tax evasion or obtaining benefits by giving false information is not – or only slightly – wrong.

Summarizing, the first dimension measures (non-)liberal orientations: the degree to which the population favour individual freedom or collective solidarity in social security and on the labour market. It chiefly shows contrasts relating to preferred government (non-)intervention in this field, and to the (non-)acceptance of income inequality. These are associated with some other juxtapositions: meritocratic versus non-meritocratic wage allocation, materialism versus postmaterialism, and low versus high preferred earnings of a Cabinet minister.

The second dimension is an amalgam of social-democratic and corporatist orientations. It mainly reflects a distinction between support for vertical redistribution and certain related values (postmaterialism, non-meritocratic wage allocation) and preferences (female public sector employment) on the one hand; and the inclination to make status distinctions (civil servants, seniority, traditional gender roles) plus lenient rule interpretation on the other.

Cultural clusters

The scale values of the countries on the principal components are presented in Figure 2. In line with the regime analysis, the first dimension reveals a contrast between countries with liberal value orientations and the rest, while on the second dimension, countries with social-democratic and corporatist orientations are set apart. These groups of countries have different coherent sets of informal institutions and preferences, suggesting rather fundamental cultural differences.

Figure 2.

Optimal scaling of 10 countries^a on value orientations (nonlinear PCA, object scores).

A liberal social security culture emerges in the USA, Canada, Great Britain and Australia. In the 1990s fewer people than elsewhere thought the government should be responsible for ensuring a decent standard of living for the elderly and unemployed, for the provision of jobs and for reducing income inequality. They were also less averse to income differentials at the top. Within this group of countries, the scale values of the United States and Great Britain are consistent with their positions in Figure 1. The USA had the most residual social security regime in the 1990s, and this is backed up by the value orientations of its population, which were generally the most liberal of all the countries studied. In line with the UK’s less pure social security regime, the British were more in favour of government interventions and smaller income differentials than the inhabitants of other liberal countries. Yet the positions of Canada and Australia in Figure 2 are not entirely in line with the regime scalings. The Canadian social security system was not a perfect example of the liberal type; but the Canadians’ value orientations were quite liberal. In Australia the opposite occurs. Here, the residual social security regime concurred with orientations that were less liberal than in the USA and Canada. This can only partially be explained by the fact that some data for Australia were missing.²³

Sweden and Norway are scaled close to each other, with high scores on the positive side of both the first and the second dimension. Typical for their social-democratic culture is that a large proportion of people had a strong aversion to earnings inequality between higher and lower occupations; and a majority wanted the government to combat this. To a lesser extent than elsewhere, people felt that job performance ought to be the central reward criterion. Postmaterialist work orientations were widespread, and females had a stronger preference for working for the government than in other countries. Although according to Figure 1 Norway was a less clear representative of the social-democratic regime type, the value orientations of its population seem very similar to those which prevailed in Sweden (which in both graphs emerges as a rather pure case). Denmark, on the other hand, was a fairly clear exemplar of the regime type, but seemed less social-democratic in its culture. The comparatively low Danish score on the first axis can be explained partly by missing data on two variables. If scores similar to the other Scandinavian countries are imputed, Denmark moves closer to Norway and Sweden, but remains a less typical case, especially on the second dimension. In the 1990s, the Danish resembled their fellow Nordic people in a comparatively strong rejection of traditional family roles, benefit fraud and tax evasion. But on postmaterialism they scored considerably lower than Swedes and Norwegians, and the female preference for working in the public sector was also less pronounced. In two respects the Danish were rather corporatist: many people thought seniority should be an important earnings criterion, and a fairly high proportion of men favoured working in the government sector.

The third cluster comprises France and Germany, which are scaled quite close together. These countries attain high negative scores on the second dimension of Figure 2. Typical for their corporatist culture at the time was the comparatively strong endorsement of traditional gender roles, the value placed on seniority as a key wage criterion, and the rather lenient views on tax evasion and social security fraud. The preferred earnings of a Cabinet minister were comparatively high and males often favoured working for the government, both suggesting a considerable prestige of state officials.

In cultural terms the Netherlands may once again be considered a hybrid. On the first dimension, the Dutch appear to be less collectivistic than inhabitants of the other countries in Western Europe and Scandinavia. This is largely due to the fact that two variables were missing: if ‘corporatist’ or ‘social-democratic’ responses are imputed, the Netherlands attains a position close to France. The second dimension, however, presents a very mixed picture. The Dutch favoured postmaterialism in the 1990s, but to a lesser degree than the Swedes and Norwegians; and the female preference for working in the public sector lagged far behind that in Scandinavia. Furthermore, while the Dutch attained a ‘corporatist’ level on traditional gender roles and the acceptability of tax evasion, they recorded fairly low scores on the preference of males for working in the collective sector, on the importance of seniority as a wage criterion, and on the acceptability of benefit fraud. Thus it is likely that the Netherlands in fact occupies a somewhat higher position on the first dimension than Figure 2 suggests, and has a truly hybrid score on the second.

Cluster analyses of country scores

The classification is largely confirmed by the outcomes of hierarchical cluster analyses of the country scores.²⁴ A two-cluster solution distinguishes between the two corporatist countries plus the Netherlands on the one hand, and the representatives of the liberal and social-democratic regime on the other. In a three-cluster model the first group consists of France, Germany and the Netherlands, the second comprises Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and the third contains Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the USA. A four-cluster solution splits the latter group in two (the North American countries versus the rest).

Correlation between regimes and cultures

All in all, the correspondence of these orientations with regime types is found to be greater than in the previous work. On the first dimension, the correlation of the country scores in Figures 1 and 2 is 0.84; on the second it is 0.85. The analyses therefore suggest that during the 1990s Esping-Andersen’s regime typology largely coincided with three different cultures of social security, at least in its key countries. In revealing this relationship, the incorporation of indicators singling out corporatist and social-democratic orientations was essential.

Conclusions

Esping-Andersen’s ‘Three Worlds’ indicate general, qualitatively different and coherent systems of formal institutions. Their empirical status is open to debate, as the many alternative classifications of regime types published over the last two decades demonstrate. Previous analyses in this field had several drawbacks. They tended to cover only a part of the regime traits (e.g. pensions or social assistance), to be based on a small number of variables, and to use multivariate techniques that were not entirely suitable. The first nonlinear principal components analysis performed here sought to accommodate these issues. By applying this technique, an extensive dataset covering 54 regime traits of eleven countries during the first part of the 1990s was reduced to two main dimensions. Generally speaking, the results confirm Esping-Andersen’s typology. The component loadings of the variables fall into a number of consistent groups. These allow for a clear interpretation of two underlying dimensions, one referring to the scope of social security, the other to the degree of universalism. The grouping of countries on the principal components largely corresponds to what was expected, and is corroborated by cluster analyses of the country scores. Scrutiny of a subset of variables indicates that the clustering remains fairly intact today, even if more countries are added. Compared with classic PCA, the nonlinear technique results in a better fit and a clearer identification of regime types. While the first question addressed in this article – ‘Do Esping-Andersen’s ‘Three Worlds’ exist empirically if one considers a comprehensive set of formal institutions?’ – may therefore be answered in the affirmative, some qualifications need to be made. Seven countries may be regarded as fairly characteristic exponents of the regime types in the early 1990s: Sweden and Denmark for the social-democratic regime type, which is extensive and universalistic; Belgium, Germany and France for the corporatist model (extensive-particularistic), and the USA and Australia for the liberal group (residual, and about average in terms of the degree of universalism). Yet three countries belonged less clearly to these clusters. In the social-democratic group, Norway was not as extensive as Sweden, and not as universalistic as Denmark. The United Kingdom and Canada had social security regimes with a wider scope than the other liberal countries. The Netherlands emerged as a true hybrid, occupying a position between the social-democratic and corporatist countries. Moreover, the outcomes relating to the reduced dataset for 2008–2010 indicate that the dispersion on the second dimension may have decreased over time: the corporatist group seems less selective, the social-democratic cluster not as universalistic as it used to be. Of the countries that were added in that analysis, Iceland, Ireland and New Zealand end up in the group to which they belong theoretically; but in line with previous research, Austria, Finland and Switzerland are less typical cases.

In the 1990s, the link between formal regime types and informal social security cultures turned out to be fairly straightforward. A similar typology emerged from a nonlinear PCA relating to value orientations. More than elsewhere, people in countries with a liberal social security regime favoured individual freedom above collective solidarity. Fewer people wanted the government to intervene in order to guarantee minimum income standards and to provide jobs. To a lesser extent than elsewhere the government was held responsible for reducing income inequality, and there was less aversion to income differentials at the top. This liberal culture was more pronounced in the USA and Canada than in Australia and Great Britain. The social-democratic regime type mostly coincided with social-democratic value orientations: people more often favoured a strong role for the government, endorsed postmaterialist work values and preferred small earnings differentials between lower and higher occupations. In line with the actual situation, women would choose to work in the public sector to a greater extent than women elsewhere. The social-democratic culture emerged less clearly in Denmark than in Sweden and Norway. In two countries operating a corporatist regime, value orientations also conform to the expected pattern. The French and Germans more often favoured traditional gender roles, attributed a comparatively elevated status to state officials, more often thought seniority should be an essential earnings criterion, and had a comparatively lenient interpretation of formal rules. Finally, the Janus-headed Dutch social security regime was supported by a set of orientations that resembled those of the corporatist countries in some respects and those of the social-democratic group in others; its culture was therefore hybrid as well. Thus, the answer to the second research question – do structural regimes coincide with different ‘cultures of social security’ – is largely positive for the countries studied here: the correlations of the country scores on the two principal components of Figures 1 and 2 equal 0.84 and 0.85, respectively.

Of course, this does not imply that these issues are now settled once and for all. The analyses could be extended to other traits and countries – Mediterranean, Eastern Asiatic, new EU member states – and include more years, in order to assess the path of change in different regime types and cultures. It also may be that part of the correlation found here is due to the fact that countries operating the same regime are similar in other respects as well, for example in their demography, religious background or political organization. Even more important, the present analysis looks only at if regime types and social security cultures exist and correspond to any extent, not why they do so. Is it simply that regimes produce their own cultural legitimacy, or is the relationship far more complex and dynamic, as postulated in new institutionalism? A more elaborate historical analysis could shed light on these matters. Preferably, the evolution of the various aspects of regimes and cultures of social security identified here would then be linked to socioeconomic, demographic and technological developments; to the negotiated responses of policy actors facing these challenges; and to social outcomes in terms of de-commodification, stratification and social rights.

Footnotes

Appendix

Appendix 4.

Data sources

Var #	Regime analysis 1990s (see Appendix 1)	Regime analysis 2008–2010 (see Appendices 1, 3)	Informal cultures analysis 1990s (see Appendix 2)
1	Luxembourg Income Study	ILO (2011)	ISSP 1996
2	OECD (1995a)	----	ISSP 1996
3	OECD (1995b)	----	ISSP 1998
4	Luxembourg Income Study	----	ISSP 1999
5	OECD (1994)	----	ISSP 1999
6	OECD (1995a)	OECD (2011)	ISSP 1997
7	OECD (1995a)	----	ISSP 1997
8	OECD (1994)	----	ISSP 1997
9	OECD (1995a)	----	ISSP 1999
10	OECD (1994)	----	ISSP 1999
11	OECD (1997a)	OECD (2007)	ISSP 1998
12	OECD (1997a)	----	ISSP 1998
13	OECD (1997a)	----	ISSP 1998
14	OECD (1997a)	OECD (2011)	ISSP 1997
15	OECD (1997a)	----	ISSP 1999
16	Eardley et al. (1996)	----	ISSP 1997
17	DHHS (1991); EC (1990)	----	----
18	Bradshaw et al. (1993); DHHS (1991)	----	----
19	Bradshaw et al. (1993); DHHS (1991)	----	----
20	Bradshaw et al. (1993)	----	----
21	Bradshaw et al. (1993)	----	----
22	OECD (1988)	----	----
23	DHHS (1991)	----	----
24	OECD (1992)	----	----
25	DHHS (1991)	ILO (2011)	----
26	DHHS (1991)	----	----
27	DHHS (1991); EC (1990)	----	----
28	DHHS (1991); EC (1990)	----	----
29	OECD (1997b)	ICTWSS (2011)	----
30	Bradshaw et al. (1993); OECD (1995a)	----	----
31	OECD (2001)	----	----
32	OECD (1995b)	----	----
33	OECD (1995a)	----	----
34	ILO (1992)	----	----
35	DHHS (1991)	----	----
36	Bradshaw et al. (1993)	----	----
37	Bradshaw et al. (1993)	----	----
38	ILO (1992)	OECD (2011)	----
39	DHHS (1991)	----	----
40	DHHS (1991)	----	----
41	DHHS (1991); CPB (1995)	----	----
42	De Kemp (1992); OECD (1988)	OECD (2009)	----
43	OECD (1992)	----	----
44	OECD (1997a)	----	----
45	OECD (1997a)	OECD (2011)	----
46	De Kemp (1992); OECD (1988)	----	----
47	Bradshaw et al. (1993)	----	----
48	OECD (1994)	----	----
49	DHHS (1991); EC (1990)	ILO (2011)	----
50	DHHS (1991); EC (1990)	----	----
51	DHHS (1991); EC (1990)	----	----
52	OECD (1994)	----	----
53	OECD (1993)	----	----
54	DHHS (1991)	----	----

Note: Sources of variables included in sensitivity analysis of reduced dataset are in italics.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

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