Democratic governance at times of crisis: rebuilding our communities and building on our citizens *

Introduction: the onslaught on ‘big government’ and its effects

This article will suggest that, at the heart of the problem before us, lies a failed model of governance. It is called the business model or market model of governance because it seeks to impose on government the methods, standards and values of private enterprise. It originally rested on the assumption that government, by definition, is less efficient than business because it ‘is insulated from the rigours of the market place’ (Ellington, 2011: 139) and is overly protected for its own good. This arbitrary assumption started an onslaught on government, which still goes strong, in some places. It has been mostly directed against the Administrative State, which saw the light of day during the Great Depression and prospered during the post-war Reconstruction, Decolonization and the Development efforts of the 1950s and 1960s.

The attack on the State and ‘big government’ was the product of neo-liberalism and neo-conservative policies which triumphed in the 1980s and on into the early years of the twenty-first century. Remarkably, this onslaught, and the hollowing out of the State, had little effect on the budgets of the armed forces, whose relative importance increased in notable cases, in spite of the ‘peace dividend’ that was supposed to follow the end of the Cold War. While, to be sure, some members of the EU have actually reduced their budgets for defence, over the past two decades, the leader in this field, the USA, still invests in military hardware and personnel more than all other countries combined (Parent and MacDonald, 2011: 34). According to a recent report, ‘military spending has soared by 35 percent in the past decade – and that … not even counting the more than $1 trillion spent on the Iraq and Afghan Wars’ (New York Times, 2011a: 10). It took Joseph S. Nye, former US assistant secretary of defence and subsequently Harvard Professor, to argue that ‘strength and influence abroad begins with steps … at home’ (Nye, 2011: A23).

With the risk of new arms races looming on the horizon (Landler, 2011: 4SR), it may be time to question the wisdom of this course; to state, in other words, that arguably too many of the world’s scarce resources are expended on defence and that these could be better applied to relieving the plight of the poor and advancing development goals (Krugman, 2011b: A21). At the risk of generalizing, it would be fair to argue that all too many countries have sought to address the crisis through cuts in public services. Together with massive outsourcing, downsizing social services has altered the profile and, in some ways, the relevance of government, as it comes through to people. To make the matters worse, outsourcing and privatization have opened wide the windows of opportunity for massive cost overruns, corruption and embezzlement of public funds. Pronounced in certain countries, these trends have brought government and public administration into disrepute, causing rapid erosion of public trust in the very institutions of government.

In all too many countries, the cumulative effect of this combination of trends has been to drive a wedge between government and people, but also to aggravate a loss of social capital, contributing to a mood of apathy and distrust towards some of the institutions of democratic governance. With massive unemployment, among the youth especially, and rising income disparities in tandem with corruption, cynicism and anomie have been allowed to grow among citizens at large. Simply put, there may be a risk that citizens will cease to have a stake and put their trust in government. If this happened, democracy would be in danger; when citizens lose interest and corrupt elites appropriate the State for their own private purposes. The events of recent months have revealed a train of abuses but also sent a message concerning pressing issues that must be addressed.

Restoring order and purpose to the chaos caused by crises calls for committed leadership and competent professionalism. It needs to be emphasized that both are predicated on institution-building, reclaiming public space and creating a structured environment for citizens’ participation in the processes of governance. Somehow, we must endeavour to restore, among all people, a strong sense of community, even where this has gravely waned.

In hollowing out the State, we hollowed out democracy, which rests on the belief that power belongs to the people and must be applied to purposes in which they have a stake. The concepts of community and citizen participation are those that give vitality to democratic governance. Without a sense of sharing, neither participation nor trust in the basic objectives of governance may be expected. These are the very concepts which have been undermined by the business model of governance. The market or business model has rested, in effect, on technocratic assumptions, which would entrust the functions of government to experts and leave it to expert managers to carry out these tasks efficiently and effectively. Nothing else appeared to matter. This assumption went in tandem with an idea that citizens are clients or consumers. It prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s, with adverse effects on democracy.

The source of inspiration for this neo-liberal concept is none other, in effect, than the rational actor model, which has long antecedents. It yielded positive outcomes in terms of reinforcing our claims to private space and individual rights. However, one may argue that it has also strengthened a negative perception of government in general, and its executive branch in particular. It bolstered the idea that less government is best. It engendered the belief that, for all intents and purposes, all government is an encroachment on individual privacy and tolerable only in the areas of defence, law and order and the administration of justice.

A lesson from the crises …

The lessons of the crises – both natural and man-made – tell us a different story; that people, by and large, expect a lot from government, provided that it is their government. A strong sense of community, of ‘being in this together’, of sharing long-term interests, represent vital prerequisites for democratic governance. To defuse the ticking bombs that crises represent, we need effective States, professionals in government, and democratic governance. We need to give communities and citizens the sense that something can be done; that something is being done and that all have a stake in the outcome.

The last few months and years were marked by major crises: man-made in several cases but often the result of natural calamities of cataclysmic proportions. The social upheaval, which like wildfire has spread from Tunisia to Bahrain, is still very much in the news, impacting human lives, as well as global markets. The earthquake and tsunami which recently ravaged Japan sent thousands to their deaths. However, it came on the heels of similar tragic events in Christchurch, New Zealand and earlier in Haiti and on the Chilean coastline. It was followed by tornadoes of seldom-known ferocity which, during April and in May 2011, devastated the Mid-west and the South of the USA. What added to the tragedy is the abruptness of the onslaught, which hit with little warning, allowing little time to seek protection and shelter.

In spite of obvious differences, this is true of man-made crises, as it is visibly true of natural calamities. In both cases, the initial reaction may have been one of shock, as if we should have known; certainly stand in readiness. We blame intelligence failures for not foreseeing upheavals, whether in the financial markets or in regions of the world home to ineffective governments with rulers of weak legitimacy (Taleb and Blyth, 2011: 33–9). We seem to take for granted that there are tell-tale signs of an impending peril and, judging by the frequency of courses on emergency management, also better ways of handling such contingencies in terms of both prevention and timely, effective response. It is generally conceded that a critical function of government, part of its raison d’être one would be tempted to argue, is that of heading off; certainly addressing crises, mitigating their effects, serving as a shock absorber and containing both their impact and likely aftermath.

Recent experience shows the validity of this viewpoint and the pivotal role of government with regard to crisis management. Comparing, for example, the cases of New Orleans, Haiti and Japan, one can hardly escape the conclusion that well-targeted, decisive and coordinated action by government authorities was a factor in Japan that spared its country and people an even worse experience of the disaster; its absence in Haiti and New Orleans was what accounted, to an extent, for the scale of human suffering in the months that followed Nature’s devastating blows. In Lynda Boswell’s words:

The hypothesis is that Japan will be more rapid in its recovery. New Orleans, many years later, has not seen the construction that should have been completed for such devastation. And Haiti, a year later, still has many families living in tents. (Boswell, 2011: 13)

In terms of plight inflicted after calamity struck, Ms Boswell’s comparative study sheds this additional light on the importance of government’s presence:

According to USA Today, New Orleans still struggles with crime, unemployment, homelessness and red tape for recovery. Japan will not have these same issues … (Boswell, 2011: 13)

More specifically, regarding the Haitian situation, recovery efforts have been slowed by a signal lack of security for human life and property:

Vigilante justice is the norm, not the exception. Until the government can provide the basics in this regards, concerted honest effort in rebuilding cannot even truly begin … Therefore, Haiti’s recovery efforts … are dependent on the morale and ethics of government leadership … (Boswell, 2011: 13)

… and the needed capacity-building: what exactly do we mean?

Talking of government leadership, we ought to couple references to moral example and guidance with mention of capacity. This touches on preparedness in terms of knowledge, skills and institutional competence not merely to take charge under stressful circumstances, but equally to restore and boost a mood of confidence, which would enable people, as well as partner countries and other key stakeholders to follow the government’s lead. Looking around today, we observe how different countries have fared in major crises. It is hard to escape the conclusion that what has made the difference has been a combination of:

Leadership

The thrust of this article will be to affirm:

that leadership, institutional capacity and public trust represent essential attributes and sine qua non of effective democratic governance;

A fundamental premise on which this article rests is that public service professionalism is more than ever required for democratic governance, on the international, the regional and national levels. It is needed on account of the massive scale and complexity of the challenges constantly emerging and confronting the people in government. While improvisation may be welcome in some cases, it cannot be at the expense of expertise, which is more than ever required. The mastery of a field and institutional memory, which represent the fruit of study, experience and practice in the service of a government, are critical components of public service professionalism. Contemporary literature highlights its importance and the perils that flow from its absence (De Vries and Kim, 2011).

Professionalism in government is pivotal, not only in fending off catastrophes and effectively responding to the winds of change, but also in removing the serious threats of populism and of corruption. The dangers of demagoguery are ever-present whenever political leaders are not ably supported by official expert advice or held in check by well-informed and organized communities. It needs to be emphasized that a competent officialdom and democratic governance are not contradictory terms, provided such officialdom is truly merit-based and wholly dedicated to the service of the citizenry and the long-term general interest, under the rule of law.

There is reason to believe that an important factor adding gravity to crises in several parts of the world was the populist rhetoric which skilfully confused the existence of ‘bureaucracy’ within the state apparatus with public service systems adhering to the principles of merit and professionalism. The onslaught on big government sadly undid the gains of earlier decades of reform (Moynihan and Ingraham, 2010: 229–37). It opened public services to clientelist practices and politicization (Herbert, 2011: A29). A critical component of managerial doctrines, which added credibility to these attacks, was the representation of citizens as ‘clients’ and the related concept that government, in essence, was really no different from private enterprise and could behave as such. Like private sector firms, so that argument went, the government was in the ‘business’ of providing service to citizens. Success in the enterprise depended most of all on ‘consumer satisfaction’. First and foremost, a ‘consumer’, the individual citizen was what the term suggested; a demanding beneficiary of dispensations from government. His/her status as a citizen and membership of a community receded into the background.

Like other simplifications, this argument undoubtedly contains a germ of truth. However, like so many oversimplifications, it clouds and obfuscates critical facets of government, which touch upon the nature of democratic governance. No one requires a lecture on constitutional theory in order to realize that government activity is really not confined to that of the Executive Branch; that it encompasses Courts and legislative bodies, but also so much else. Increasingly, the concept of democratic governance has come to include a role for civil society and to highlight, accordingly, citizen participation and organized communities, including minority groups, interfacing with the government, at the centre or the periphery and, through consultative processes, partaking of policy-making and programme implementation.

A basic precondition of success in these regards is government investing in building the capacity as well as credibility of community-based institutions. Inclusiveness, transparency and accountability are key to the success of any public activity. Rigged elections, which effectively deny all opposition any representation in legislative bodies, very soon end up discrediting the electoral process itself, undermining public trust (Shehata, 2011: 29). Elections represent a means through which the people express political preferences and choose their representatives.

Likewise, consultative processes, which either become moribund or serve decorative purposes to make government look good, have a similar effect, soon leading to alienation, indifference and cynicism, as citizens despair of ever bridging the gap that separates them from power. It has been argued widely that many of the dominoes that fell in recent months were, in reality, victims of self-inflicted distance and isolation; retreat to an ivory tower where sycophants prevail. In an attempt to evade public criticism and pressures from organized communities, some governments were tempted to undermine or, worse, corrupt such groups in order to coopt them and use them for their purposes.

‘Suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous’ (Taleb and Blyth, 2011: 33). In democratic governance, we may sometimes be forced to choose between short-term effectiveness and sustainable results. The lessons of the crises which still afflict the world forcefully argue the case for not falling into the trap of opting for the former to the detriment of long-term socioeconomic development and institution-building for democratic governance.

To be sure, this is easier said than done. The pressures on government leaders; the numerous constraints, to which politicians are subject, all too often prime expediency over strategic direction and vision of the future, which most people would consider to be the hallmarks of responsible statesmanship. Opportunistic laxity and tolerance for practices – ‘creative accounting’, among them – which, in the event, contributed to the financial crisis, stand out as telling examples of priming short-term gain over the common good, and inordinate profits for the few to the detriment of the many. They further demonstrate the fallacy of discounting the risks of human frailty and propensity to err. We must beware of narratives which, in the name of ‘freedom’, opened windows of opportunity for only limited groups or for corrupt individuals; those who, arguably, already enjoy a bounty.

Regulation represents a necessary prerequisite of probity in public life. As such, it constitutes a critical component, as well as a valuable tool of democratic governance. We need it as a check against the slovenly ways and corruption that have plagued so much of public life, world-wide in recent years. Primarily, however, we need it to safeguard the primacy of the general over the special interests in democratic governance and, I would venture to add, the primacy of politics over economics in public life (Farrell and Quiggin, 2011: 103). Somehow, we need to recapture the deeper meaning of citizenship and the importance of community to which this is closely related (Nabatchi, 2010: s309–11).

Two conflicting models of government and governance

If democratic governance means anything at all, it signifies that citizens, as members of communities, assume responsibility, take charge and make decisions on issues that are theirs to address and to resolve, because they are matters belonging to the public realm; centuries-old ideas, one might argue, but some that it has taken the recent major crises to bring back into focus. In countries where citizens’ initiatives were mostly viewed as threats and, therefore, were closely monitored, discouraged or suppressed, stability was sought by weakening civil society, repressing union movements, policing all activity and coopting through corruption. Not surprisingly, the flip-side of ‘such over-the-top urge to control everything’ was increasing vulnerability together with growing stagnation (Slackman, 2011: A.11). To be sure, there are exceptions; countries that have done well over a period of time in spite of a system of government that could not be called democratic. Our argument, however, is that such systems of government may be prone to instability, as well as to corruption.

A mere few weeks sufficed to bring down to their knees political regimes that had lasted for decades. The upheaval demonstrated, not merely the fragility of authoritarian government but also the awesome power and self-organizing capacity of communities of citizens, when they decide to take the matters into their hands. In the words of a local observer:

What is so striking about Egypt’s tumult is the ardor that protesters have brought to an idea of community … In a country made miserable by the petty humiliation of authority … men, organized as guards, declared … ‘These are the Egyptian people.’ (Shahid, 2011: A7)

From Egypt and Tunisia to tsunami-stricken Japan, communities sprang into action to alleviate the pain, safeguard the continued provision of essential public services and even to assure the safety and security of ordinary citizens (Boswell, 2011: 14). The lessons of experience from this wide range of crises are plain for all to see. They demonstrate not only the illusion of stability, which repressive governments nurture by dint of strong-arm tactics and targeted corruption. They also bring to light the need to revaluate the role of civil society in democratic governance. In spite of much lip service to grassroots participation, we have yet to find ways of credibly engaging communities and citizens in a constructive dialogue, thus restoring public trust in partnership arrangements, in lieu of the mutual suspicion to which adversarial relations are all too often prone.

Are we in need of a paradigm change? This might well be the case, in light of recent happenings in several parts of the world which are currently in turmoil and the cracks in governance systems which crises have revealed. More than fault lines in performance and short-comings in service delivery, what crises have laid bare is a democratic deficit in all too many countries, in spite of much lip service to democratic governance in the prevailing narratives. It would be fair to argue – it certainly is the thrust of this article – that the deficit results from two conflicting models, both with a germ of truth and a measure of utility but also grave shortcomings. Simply put, the two models of government (and governance) to which we invite attention are the older technocratic and the arguably more recent market or business models of government and governance.

A product of the industrial age, the technocratic model has served us well in terms of emphasizing values like economy, predictability, efficiency and effectiveness. Perversely, on the other hand, it has also strengthened the impression of the State as a piece of machinery. In troubled times like ours, this generates the view of a world in need of fixing, but fixing uniformly. Worse still, it nurtures confidence in technocratic solutions – ‘silver bullets’ we might call them – which would provide the answer to all problems, all the time. ‘One size fits all solutions’ were developed, accordingly, and an army of consultants has now invaded the field ready to put ‘best practices’ and prescriptive advice into effect (Walker et al., 2011: 707–17).

It would be hard to ascribe all needs and calls for reform to one overarching cause or to find the ‘silver bullet’ that would resolve all problems. In most of Europe and East Asia, to take but two examples, the issue with the State is not the public service; and democratic deficits result, not from shortcomings and flaws in public administration but, arguably, the effectiveness of private interest groups in evading regulation, while maximizing their take from relations with the government. The antics of these groups and the ability they have shown to appropriate the processes of democratic governance for their particular ends have been a problem in several parts of the world, including some advanced and democratic States.

But this is hardly a failing that can be ‘fixed’ by ‘tinkering’ with the machinery of government. It is this simplistic approach and the business model of government which prompted the outsourcing and related emasculation of public administration in a number of different countries – developed or developing (Stanger, 2009). Outsourcing has been promoted not always in an effort to maximize efficiency and optimize effectiveness but, in a number of cases, to further the agendas of private interest groups. More than 50 years ago, President Eisenhower, in his parting speech, referred to the many dangers present in the ‘military-industrial complex’ (Ledbetter, 2010: A35; Roberts, 2010: A13). Regrettably, this statement has lost none of its relevance to contemporary governance.

Related to this concept of the ‘machinery of government’ is the notion of Society as an artifact, which Man decides to join either for self-protection – because ‘the world is a jungle’ (sic!) – or to optimize his ‘take’ from fellowship and commerce (the benign view of society). Unreal in many ways, this atomistic view has not been without benefits. It yielded the belief in human rights and the idea of limited government. What it did not accomplish, on the other hand, was to give substance to the concept of republics as communities of citizens who take charge of their destinies and assume responsibility for the conduct of public affairs. In spite of clarion calls – they are regularly heard on Bastille Day, and similar occasions – the Age of Revolution did not reduce sufficiently the gap and inequality that separate the citizen from an all-powerful State. ‘Subjects’ of Kings and Emperors did not readily metamorphose into citizens of republics as one might have expected. Indeed, the expression ‘subject’ has not vanished altogether from the glossary in use.

Some of the existing narratives which still employ the term must accept their share of blame for the perpetuation of this approach and the related distance between a powerful State and its ‘administered subjects’. Neither the rule of law nor the pursuit of the 3Es (economy, efficiency and effectiveness), important as they are, have diminished the force of a doctrine that demanded of the State that it treat its citizens as wards, conceding to them rights, safeguarding certain rights, but also commanding deference and obedience. The earliest of these rights (freedom of speech and assembly, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness) are frequently referred to as ‘formal rights’. They are basic rights, of course. Thus, a range of ‘rights’ were recognized under the Universal Declaration of 10 December 1948. Of particular importance are articles 21–29, highlighting the ‘will of the people’ as the basis of legitimation, equality before the law, and a range of social entitlements giving palpable expression to the ‘pursuit of happiness’ but also to the role of community in the quest for self-fulfilment and socioeconomic progress.

It is thanks to these nine articles – out of 30, one may add – that the rights of the individual, which clearly dominate the text of this Declaration, are tempered by recognition of ‘duties to the community’ (Art. 29); the role of the community, one is even tempted to say, with the need for distributive justice and conditions giving substance to the calls for self-fulfillment. Even these tentative steps, signalling new perceptions of ‘community’ and ‘citizen’, were far from widely accepted in 1948. As Pierre de Senarclens, a Professor at the University of Lausanne, has aptly pointed out (de Senarclens, 1988: 366), this classic Declaration of Human Rights was clearly underpinned by a liberal ideology with seventeenth-century roots, propounding, as universal, a particular model of Man; a master of his destiny, or at least trying to be so, and eyeing both the State and organized society with a degree of suspicion, as something of a threat or an encumbrance. Other than these nine articles (21–29), little in the Declaration suggested the evolution of models of Man and Society world-wide over the past few centuries. Even so, these final articles, added almost as an afterthought, have had a chequered history. In recent years especially, they have hardly been influential in shaping the discourse on social, economic and political rights which may also be true for the African Charter.

The market model of government …

The market model of governance, which dominated the scene from the 1980s onwards, had little time or taste for the right to full employment, the right to work and leisure or the right to join a union in order to defend hard-won rights and prerogatives. Rather, underpinning it all has been an atomistic perception of the citizen fundamentally hostile to a big invasive government, or unions for that matter. The State has been portrayed as the problem but even the community was grudgingly conceded a measure of legitimacy (Friedman, 1993; Hayek, 1944, 1960). This atomistic perception has yielded a view of society as, to all intents and purposes, composed of ‘a-social’ individualists; of citizens portrayed as having on their minds only their self-advancement, comfort … and self-enrichment.

That such a singular model should have found favour so widely in the days immediately following the end of the Cold War may not be wholly surprising. However, that it continues to exert a measure of influence on international fora should be a matter of concern. It ought to be countered by arguments more in tune with the needs of the times, as well as with social reality. Society portrayed either as non-existent – in Mrs Thatcher’s words – or as composed of citizens who viewed their role and interest in terms of fending off a wasteful and invasive State, hardly seems the type of model of state administration that either resonates with the bulk of the world’s population or answers to its demands (Moloney and Gulrajani, 2010: 298). In light of recent crises in Northern Africa and West Asia, we need to make it clear that uprisings were directed not against the State or ‘big government’ as such, but at tyrannical power.

What people have called into question has been the appropriation of government and of the state institutions by cliques of power-holders who used them for their own purposes, corrupted the State in this process, and refused to be held to account. What has equally been noticeable is the strong sense of community displayed by groups of citizens taking democracy seriously, reclaiming what was theirs, refusing to be cowed, and asking that the government should serve the public good under the rule of law; what democratic governance is all about. On one condition only: that citizens take part not merely as ‘end-users’, or ‘clients’ of government services but, through organized communities, as responsible stakeholders, in keeping public services and government on track.

The major concerns of the past were protection against arbitrariness, mismanagement, corruption and the abuse of powers. In developing countries especially, as the cases of Egypt and Libya, Tunisia and the Ivory Coast so poignantly illustrated, these continued to be relevant and needed to be addressed, urgently and forcefully. But they do not suffice. They ought to be expanded and citizens entitled to fair consideration, respect and recognition not only in the public sphere, which is of vital importance, but also in the workplace. The Ombudsman institution – a Scandinavian invention – demands of the State that it seek solutions that are fair and user-friendly, as well as law-abiding.

Above all else, however, we need to give another, proactive dimension to citizenship. With concepts like responsiveness, engagement and participation in the foreground, we ought to redefine it in action terms. Progressively, civil society world-wide should be invested with roles which go beyond periodic elections, important as these may be. Realistically, however, this concept and new role can only become operative if new institutional frameworks are put in place and new values invested in governance. Decentralized, inclusive, participative processes accord a place to groups and communities of citizens, which authoritarian governments have studiously avoided granting. For only collectivities can give effect to a role that lone individuals can never hope to play. Significantly, these concepts and roles have value only insofar as process, not just outputs, and meaningful participation of all concerned stakeholders – not only the 3Es (economy, efficiency and effectiveness) – are viewed as important criteria in evaluating performance in public organizations.

… and democratic governance

It helps, in this regard, to draw a distinction between government and governance, without in any way diminishing the relevance or significance of either. Governance without an effective, accountable government becomes an empty formality. In democratic governance, responsiveness, inclusiveness and legitimation pinpoint the contribution that citizens’ participation brings to the established processes of consultation, policy implementation and the evaluation of outcomes. In this context, one might say that the degree of inclusion and involvement of stakeholders reliably indicates how seriously a government takes its citizens into account. The quality and degree of citizen participation can be measured. To a very large extent, these depend on the structures and processes that have been put in place and the spirit animating the citizens’ collective endeavours and concerns.

In light of the chain of events still unfolding in parts of the world, we may conclude that, as was rightly expressed by Nobel Laureate Professor Amartyas Sen, freedom, citizen participation and sustainable development go together (Sen, 1999). Democracy has a future. Such, clearly, was the message that communities of citizens in several parts of the world have delivered to their governments in recent months. It is the way to the future and surely represents the more effective bulwark against tyranny and autocracy, as they try to escape all scrutiny and keep their hold on power with the help of corrupt clienteles.

Without effective controls and communities of citizens keeping a vigilant watch, the risks are all too real that power elites and governments may veer away from service of the common good in order to accommodate the interests of lobbies and pressure groups. Almost all participative systems seem to attract individuals who are not representative – not an accurate cross-section of society as a whole or of a particular group of the relevant population. Still, representative systems have been with us for centuries and have improved over time. This article has not argued for a perfect representative system but rather one that may be fine-tuned progressively. As experience demonstrates, such dangers cannot be dismissed. Correspondingly, the role of democratic governance may be viewed in terms of capacity to engage and mobilize communities of citizens in the conduct of public affairs, ensuring that all benefit, while also maintaining the probity, responsiveness and accountability of government.

To be sure, this is easier said than done. Much depends on structures and culture, on the make-up of civil society in any particular country or region; how forceful, organized, articulate, effective and democratic it is. We need to take account of the fact that various cultures accord widely differing weights to equality, power distance, individualism, collectivism, compassion, solidarity, and commitment to the general as opposed to special interests. How well communities fit into a scheme of governance depends, of course, on the efficiency of government itself but also on how well the processes of governance are acted out; in orderly, constructive and democratic ways on every level of government; not in the public squares, as happens when the rulers leave the citizens no other viable option.

Speaking of structures, however, we need to emphasize the critical importance of capacity to govern (Dror, 2001), on which so much depends. Experience demonstrates that lack of such capacity – or a capacity deficit – and the troubling sense of inadequacy that this may generate, often prompt the power-holders to look for expedients and shortcuts in order to get by (Shehata, 2011) Capacity-building in government needs to be reconsidered for what it really is: not merely an increase of efficiency and effectiveness but, more important still, the essential preconditions for building public trust, that is to say transparency, integrity and professionalism in democratic governance. It is only when the government is staffed by true professionals, committed to performing at a high level of competence, that the affairs of State may likely be conducted in a proper and due fashion. To be sure, this does not mean that problems disappear. What it entails, however, is that citizens respond to challenges and crises as concerned stakeholders should; in the spirit, that is to say, that ‘we are all in this together’.

This sense of shared predicament and shared responsibility has not been much in evidence around the world of late. In particular, those countries affected by debt crises and the accompanying recession have seen a waning confidence driving a wedge between the power elites at the top and large segments of the citizenry, the more disadvantaged especially. The clamour from tent cities, from Tel Aviv to Athens, from London to Madrid, with notable ones pitched in Wall Street and other US cities, should not be dismissed lightly (Krugman, 2011a: A25; Lacey, 2011: A1, A3; Sachs, 2011: 6SR). More peaceful, to be sure, than the movements which toppled dictators in a number of African countries, these popular protests point to deep dissatisfaction with the conduct of public affairs under a model of governance that favours very few but ignores the plight of many. The resulting inequalities in prospects for advancement, employment opportunities and income security have grown by leaps and bounds, undermining the foundations of democratic governance which, since the eighteenth century, but also the more recent Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000), we have come to accept as liberty, equality and fraternity or solidarity.

There is reason to believe that the widespread protest movement questions not only the outcomes but also the modalities and process of policy-making, demanding for the citizen a place and a voice in that process. Of course, it may be argued that wider participation in policy dialogue does not unfailingly yield better quality of outcomes or even higher levels of public trust, especially when expectations are greatly raised by leaders – or demagogues – and then unavoidably dashed. Much depends on the structures created and on a culture nurtured both to empower the citizenry and to facilitate constructive social dialogue and public participation. Beyond quality, however, involvement of the citizenry is needed to restore the sense of ‘having a stake’ in the affairs of State.

Inclusion must be seen for what it really is: a source of ‘legitimation’ for democratic governance, where this is either wanting or weak and undermined, in recent years especially, by growing inequality and rampant abuse or corruption (Brooks, 2011: A27; Krugman, 2011c: A31; Reich, 2011: 6SR). There is virtue in ‘ownership’. Exclusion and marginalization of segments of the citizenry, on any grounds, have ceased to be an option. This may have been the message that recent protests yield. What needs to be emphasized, on the other hand, is that informed debate and a constructive dialogue depend, to a large extent, on public service professionals; on professionals in government helping out in the discourse; informing and elevating the quality of the discussion. The complexity of the challenges facing governments today, at times of crisis especially, demands nothing less.

A sense of solidarity and shared concerns is what underpins the morale and vitality of communities. It is a powerful antidote to cynicism, indifference, apathy and alienation which crises bring in their trail. In order to combat this sense of alienation, communities and governments ought to restore the confidence of citizens at large in the critical importance of current public affairs and the capacity of governments to carry out their mission. In most developing countries, as well as many developed ones, the citizens look to the government to build a better future; most certainly to stem a coming storm or ease the pain it brings. The State is not the enemy unless, through sheer incompetence, massive corruption or both, it fails to meet this challenge.

Looking to the future: concluding remarks

As mentioned at the outset, this article reflects the experience of years of public service. We have built on past experience in venturing to address some of the major issues of democratic governance and the overarching goal to press on with the tasks of building the capacity that is needed for this purpose. In conclusion, let us look at certain salient trends which, in the immediate future, will almost certainly test those critical capacities and, accordingly, the prospects for appropriate responses.