Integrity management and the public service ethos in the UK: patchwork quilt or threadbare blanket?

Abstract

This article focuses on integrity management in contemporary UK public life. Despite traditionally high standards of integrity in the public service, it has recently been argued that the UK’s approach resembles a patchwork quilt of poorly defined institutional roles, questionable independence, and contested notions of how best to disseminate and uphold ethical practice. The article traces how the British public service ethos (PSE), which places emphasis on informal codes of conduct and moral integrity, has evolved within broader systemic changes to the style of public service delivery. It is argued that pressures to decentralize public service delivery sit in tension with, and feed into, piecemeal attempts to centralize and codify integrity management. This dynamic is presented in terms of the tension between compliance-based and values-based approaches to integrity management. The article is structured in three parts. The first traces the evolution of the British public service ethos in order to situate integrity management in both its institutional and structural context. The second addresses recent academic debates and recommendations from key bodies such as the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) and the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC). It is shown how recommendations to create independent statutory bodies of ethical oversight have not been fully implemented. The third part seeks to place the UK experience within a broader context. In doing so, the article reflects on ways in which we can understand the concept and application of integrity management within and beyond the UK experience.

Point for practitioners

The article discusses the tensions between values-based and compliance-based approaches to integrity management in the United Kingdom. It seeks to explore how the former is closely linked to the existence and reproduction of what has been termed a ‘public service ethos'. As that ethos has been challenged by reforms associated with New Public Management, a series of scandals in the public sector has given rise to the adoption of more compliance-based responses. The key challenge for those designing approaches to integrity management is to reconcile the core values which underpin the public service ethos with accountability mechanisms that can be assessed on the basis of measurable performance indicators.

Keywords

accountability audit civil service ethics good governance public management

Introduction

The United Kingdom’s Constitutional Reform and Governance Act of April 2010 ‘puts the Civil Service and its core values of integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality on a statutory footing. It means that there can be no changes to core Civil Service values and principles without Parliamentary scrutiny and approval. With few exceptions, appointments to the Civil Service must be made on merit and on the basis of fair and open competition’ (Civil Service, 2010). The new Act was warmly welcomed. The Cabinet Secretary, Gus O’Donnell, commented that ‘[t]hese values represent what is best about the Civil Service’, while Dame Janet Paraskeva, the First Civil Service Commissioner, saw the Act as ‘a truly historic moment and one which secures the impartiality of the Civil Service and the independence of our role’ (Civil Service, 2010).

Without question, the 2010 Act represented a very significant moment in the development of integrity management in the UK. Yet it also added to an increasingly confused picture, not least in the relationship between ministers and civil servants. Over the last 30 years, the role of the latter has been progressively reduced to focusing on public service delivery rather than policy advice, thereby fundamentally changing their relationship with ministers and the nature of ethical oversight (Chapman and O’Toole, 2009). There are now at least 15 different bodies operating at national level that could be seen as ethical watchdogs (see Table 1) with separate arrangements covering Scotland and Wales. Some of these regulatory bodies are statutory; others are not. The 2004 Transparency International UK Study Report remarked how ‘at present the regulatory landscape is confusing, being described to us as, variously: “a patchwork quilt”; “a multi-piece jigsaw”; and “a game of chess”’ (Transparency International, 2004: 63). In the words of the Public Administration Select Committee 2007 report, Ethics and Standards: The Regulation of Conduct in Public Life:

The British system of public administration contains a range of bodies at arm’s length from government which are intended to ensure that government is properly carried out. Their functions vary widely. Some, like the National Audit Office or the Audit Commission, are concerned with the propriety and efficiency of expenditure. Some deal with administrative propriety, such as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (the Parliamentary Ombudsman) and the Civil Service Commissioners. Others deal with wider ethical matters. Indeed, it is sometimes hard, or even impossible, to identify the distinction between the ethical and the administrative … There is no easy way to capture what is meant by ‘ethics’ in government. (PASC, 2007: 5)

In particular, the report singled out the constitutional duty of senior civil servants to keep political power in check. However, the decreasing prominence of civil servants within the machinery of government, with ministers increasingly favouring ‘special advisers’, makes such a duty appear out of step with the realities of how integrity management operates.

Table 1.

UK ethical watchdogs

	Body	Recent activity of note
C&AG	Comptroller and Auditor General (Core – Statutory)	Scandal of extensive overseas expenditure and lack of independent regulation led to adoption of new corporate governance structures following 2007 Tiner report.
Ombudsman	Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (Core – Statutory)	Concern over the constitutional role of the office: ‘adjunct of representative democracy’ or ‘agent of more direct accountability to the people’.
IC	Information Commissioner (Core – Statutory)	Calls to make the IC an Officer of Parliament owing to conflict of interest over level and source of funding.
EC	Electoral Commissioner (Core – Statutory)	CSPL argued it has been too timid on regulatory functions; MPs argued it lacks practical experience of politics to be effective.
CSPL	Committee on Standards in Public Life (Cabinet Office – non-statutory)	PASC considered it inappropriate that any body fulfilling the remit of the CSPL should be subsumed into a body consisting of those it might have to examine.
CSC	Civil Service Commissioners (Cabinet Office – statutory)	The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 put the principles of the civil service in statute.
PAC	Public Appointments Commissioner (Cabinet Office – non-statutory)	The Office of the Commissioner of Public Appointments (OCPA) not included in 2010 reform Act creates inconsistency between watchdogs.
BAC	Business Appointments Committee (Cabinet Office – NDPB)	Elite make up of watchdog criticized, concern over influence of ‘revolving door’ between business and government.
HLAC	House of Lords Appointments Committee (Cabinet Office – non-statutory)	In 2005 blocked four nominees to House of Lords, who were among those that had given non-declarable loans to political parties.
EHR	Commission for Equality and Human Rights (Statutory – NDPB)	Lord Ouseley, former chair of theCRE, questioned the NDPB model, seen as inappropriate Government interference in appointments.
SA	UK Statistics Authority (Statutory – NDPB)	Established in 2008 following the Statistics and Registration Services Act 2007 to promote and safeguard the production and publication of official statistics.
JAC	Judicial Appointments Commission (Statutory)	Independent commission that selects candidates for judicial office ‘solely on merit’. Took the responsibility from Lord Chancellor.
IAMI	Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests (Non-statutory, personal appointment by PM)	Investigates breaches of Ministerial Code; PASC noted that: ‘the post of Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests meets very few of the accountability requirements – and none of those associated with independence’.
AC	Audit Commission (Statutory)	To be wound up by Coalition government.
SE	Standards for England (Statutory)	Created in 2000 in response to Nolan report and high profile standards failings in local government.
PSC	Parliamentary Standards Commissioner (Non-statutory official)	8th CSPL report commented on lack of a clear legal definition separating Officers of the House, as independent constitutional watchdogs, from employees of the House.

Two questions naturally arise. First, why does the UK have such a confused integrity management structure? Second, why is such a complex structure necessary, given the much-vaunted public sector ethos? To answer these questions, we need to look not only at the specificities of the UK’s approach to public service, but also how these relate to wider international developments in integrity management. The concept of integrity management refers to the formal framework that ensures ethical behaviour, conforming to broadly shared notions of honesty and fairness and complying with prevailing legal norms (Behnke and Maesschalck, 2006). Of particular importance in this respect has been the widespread adoption of New Public Management (NPM), characterized by performance-based, entrepreneurial management, alongside competitive tendering of public service contracts, and efficiency drives through privatization, downsizing and decentralization. NPM has been said to constitute a paradigm shift from public sector bureaucracy towards entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), creating new conflicts between private sector values and the traditional responsibilities and standards of the public sector (Doig and Wilson, 1998). NPM is an international trend reflected in changes in the size, role, and functions of the state: a fundamental restructuring that has required a corresponding integrity and ethical framework for civil servants and their ministers (Horton, 2006).

Although the two terms are often used interchangeably, this article follows Brereton and Temple (1999) in drawing an analytical distinction between the UK’s public sector ethos and public service ethos. The former is associated specifically with civil servants’ commitment to working in the public interest with probity and political neutrality (John and Johnson, 2008: 106) and has historically developed through a less rules-bound and codified system of conduct than exists in many other jurisdictions. The latter is associated with attempts to combine the traditional civil service ethos with business ideals such as efficiency and value for money, changes that have not only brought private actors into the public realm, but also generated new forms of ethical oversight. The combination of pressures for change consequent upon NPM reforms, and declining public trust in the machinery of government following a series of political scandals since the early 1990s, has raised questions about the suitability of the regulatory landscape and the evolving relationship between civil servants, ministers, and special advisers.

This article argues that the confused structure of the regulatory landscape reflects a tension between values-based and compliance-based approaches to ensuring integrity. Values-based public management embeds integrity in human resources management, creating an ethical climate, drafting codes of conduct, and providing employees with moral awareness training (Anechiarico and Goldstock, 2007). Compliance-based public management, on the other hand, entails adherence to ‘clear rules and procedures’ (Huberts et al., 2008: 282). These procedures are set and formalized; they monitor and detect violations, and give specific actors such as an Ombudsman powers to investigate allegations. Key reforms to the integrity management framework have been piecemeal and reactive. They have often been prompted by specific scandals or events, rather than developed in a comprehensive and integrated manner. Using civil servants and ministers and the institutional and juridical frameworks in which they operate as examples, this article addresses limits and tensions in the UK’s evolving integrity management landscape.

Integrity management in the UK: from complacency to crisis?

Historically, the UK has been regarded as exercising high standards of integrity within public life. As Moore and Smith (2007: 3) point out, the classic work by Almond and Verba (1963) described Britain as possessing the ‘ideal civic culture’: open, consensual, and free of corruption, with active and informed citizen participation in political life. Ethical standards in public life were deemed to be exemplary, with isolated scandals such as Stanley (1948), Profumo (1963) and Poulson (1972) being dealt with swiftly and appropriately. In particular, the civil service was noted for its commitment to core values of integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality, the enduring hallmarks of a professional system established following the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan report. The ‘Haldane model’, based on the eponymous 1918 report, prompted the development of close relationships between departmental ministers and civil servants. Although constitutional convention held ministers ultimately responsible for all actions within their ministry, the emergence of specialist parliamentary select committees after 1945 began to hold officials to public account over matters of policy (Chapman and O’Toole, 2009). One such example was the 1954 Crichel Down Affair when civil servants involved in the compulsory purchase of agricultural lands were found responsible for maladministration and misuse of power. In an apparently honourable act of public responsibility the Minister of Agriculture, Thomas Dugdale, resigned. It later emerged that he had been aware and approved of the behaviour of his civil servants and tried to shift the blame. Although Dugdale resigned, the affair clarified that ministerial ‘responsibility does not require ministers to say that they themselves have made the mistake’ (Wheare, 1973: 58); in cases where civil servants are personally responsible for maladministration, ministers can escape censure. This case also prompted the establishment of the Ombudsman in 1967 and provided much of the contemporary precedent for dealing with complaints about government.

As recently as 1997, Andrew (now Lord) Adonis (1997: 103) observed that ‘The UK is widely seen as the model of the non-corrupt industrial democracy. It certainly sees itself that way.’ Such a view has come under increasing challenge as a string of political scandals engulfed successive governments. Although mainly revealing errant ministerial behaviour, the emergence of these scandals has been coterminous with the development of what Hood and Lodge (2007) have termed the ‘civil service reform syndrome’, a trend that emerged under the Conservative administration of 1979–97, and continued with the Labour governments of 1997–2010.

It is now generally accepted that restructuring the public sector – involving privatization, contracting out, market testing, cost awareness, consumer choice, performance-based management and ultimately the break-up of a unified civil service – undermined the ethos upon which integrity management had traditionally relied (Carr, 1999: 7). Starting in 1979, the policy roles of mandarins was progressively reduced in favour of managerial and performance functions, and in 1981 the Civil Service Department (CSD) was abolished, transferring power over the civil service to the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office. The 1982 Financial Management Initiative (FMI) sought to institutionalize resource management and introduce a culture of cost awareness (Gray et al., 1991). Continued oversight by the Treasury initially meant that this did not fully disrupt the existing public servant oversight (Vandenabeele and Horton, 2008). However, the introduction of Next Steps Agencies introduced firmer performance-based management and reduced Treasury influence. The new agencies were charged with implementing far-reaching strategic change to satisfy externally imposed demands for greater efficiency and effectiveness (McHugh, 1998). They represented an incremental transfer of government activities to the private sector and the incorporation of private sector values and beliefs within the Civil Service. McHugh (1998: 54) questioned the feasibility of such radical changes, given the way most employees had been socialized within the old organizational culture, which encouraged institutional inertia. Yet even though the established approach ‘was becoming more and more out of tune with the prevailing values in society’ (Vandenabeele and Horton, 2008: 18), there was a reluctance to abandon the belief in a continued public sector ethos.

A related issue was that ‘assumptions about the integrity of ministers in relation to parliament and to civil servants, and about their awareness of the principles underpinning these relationships, were becoming increasingly tenuous’ (O’Toole, 2006: 41). A series of scandals involving civil servants such as Clive Ponting and Sarah Tidsall leaking confidential information and the findings of the Scott Report¹ revealed how Ministers had consistently failed to adhere to the Questions of Procedure for Ministers. Drafted by Clement Attlee after the Second World War, these guidelines were first made public by John Major in 1992, partly because of his professed belief in openness, but partly because he was becoming increasingly concerned about the apparent lack of trust between the governed and the governors (O’Toole, 2006: 41). The Blair government replaced them in 1997 with The Ministerial Code, which upholds ‘the political impartiality of the Civil Service, and not ask[ing] civil servants to act in any way which would conflict with the Civil Service Code’ (PASC, 2006: §1 i, ii, iii and ix). However, as the most recent restatement of the Code in 2010 (§1.5, 7) indicates,

Ministers only remain in office for so long as they retain the confidence of the Prime Minister. He is the ultimate judge of the standards of behaviour expected of a Minister and the appropriate consequences of a breach of those standards.

O’Toole (2007: 122, 124) concludes that this arrangement means the Prime Minister, despite being subject to the provisions in the Code, ‘is also ultimately its guardian’ and ‘[t]o that extent, in terms of an ethical framework for ministers, it could be argued that [it] is hardly worth the paper it is written on’.

A significant element of continuity in the approach adopted by both Conservative and New Labour administrations to ethical standards in public life lay in their shared belief that only a small number of individuals engaged in misconduct, ‘thus avoiding looking in detail at structural changes or unfolding social and other trends’ (Doig, 2006: 18). One way in which an idealized notion of the public sector ethos has been co-opted into a wider public service ethos is in the tendency for misconduct to be individualized – the problem lies in personal character (agency) rather than in the underlying organization of the institutions at stake (structure). Indeed the Labour government began to cast ethical conduct in different terms, seeing it as relating less to tensions between public office and private benefit than to the delivery of public services, including value for money, specifically through outside agencies in PFI and PPP relationships. Such an approach, which privileges the power of individuals and the market over a notion of the collective public interest, ironically finds its origins in the philosophy of the ‘New Right’ (Elcock, 2006).

It is important not to equate civil service and public sector reforms directly with the emergence of political scandals. Nonetheless, the disruption of the traditional organizing public sector ethos of the British civil service helped to create the impression of a changing landscape in which unethical behaviour was, if not becoming more widespread, then encompassing new challenges. In part, such scandals reflected an increased focus on corruption in the post-Cold War world, driven by the turmoil generated by a rapidly changing world order (Heywood and Krastev, 2006). But they also reflected a genuine weakening of the traditional sense of propriety which had characterized the British public service. John Major’s ill-judged ‘Back to Basics’ campaign of 1993 already signalled a deep concern that ethical standards and ‘common-sense British values’ had come under threat: ‘We live in a world that sometimes seems to be changing too fast for comfort. Old certainties crumbling. Traditional values falling away. People are bewildered’ (Major, 1993).

One by-product of that change was an increased focus on the process of governance. People may have been bewildered, but they were also becoming mistrustful and even cynical about the conduct of politics. As Brereton and Temple (1999: 455) note, ‘this sense of moral malaise is real’; scandals, once rare occurrences, now seemed almost commonplace. Of an admittedly journalistic but nonetheless reasonably comprehensive list of the ‘top 50’ UK political scandals published by The Spectator in July 2009, 37 took place after 1980.

Values-based and compliance-based approaches

John Major’s comments were made in the context of a growing climate of ‘sleaze’ around the Conservative government (Doig and Wilson, 1995: 21–22). A series of high-profile scandals, many involving sexual peccadillos, but including others more damaging in terms of public integrity (particularly ‘cash for questions’), prompted Major to establish the Committee on Standards in Public Life (the so-called Nolan Committee), charged with examining ‘concerns about standards of conduct of all holders of public office’.

The CSPL ‘sits at the apex of a large and growing, and costly, set of bureaucracies regulating the conduct of public servants in virtually all spheres of public life’ (O’Toole, 2007: 113). It has been a high profile advisory body, issuing a range of influential reports on such aspects of public life as the funding of political parties, standards of conduct in local government, and MPs’ allowances. The CSPL has tended to favour a values-based approach to public integrity, with a strong commitment to the public service ethos captured in the Seven Principles of Public Life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership. These ‘Nolan principles’ have become a guiding framework for all public sector activities. They were designed to work within the traditions of the public sector ethos, in part because statute had rarely been a favoured option to establish ethical standards. Partly as a result, the managerial reforms associated with NPM were not accompanied by appropriate constitutional reforms, giving rise instead to piecemeal and often reactive legislation. Recommendations were made following specific events or scandals, but with little thought about how they related to the wider landscape of ‘watchdoggery’ (Gay and Winetrobe, 2008).

Building upon the Nolan principles, the Office for Public Management (OPM) and the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), in partnership with the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, established the Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services, in order to develop a set of principles for good governance across public services. Its 2004 report, The Good Governance Standard for Public Services (OPM and CIPFA, 2004), again reflects a values-based rather than a compliance-based approach:

We call on governing bodies to report publicly on the extent to which they live up to the Standard, and explain why and how they have adapted any of the principles and their applications to suit their type and size of organization. In doing so, we ask organizations to demonstrate the spirit and ethos of good governance, which the Standard aims to capture and which cannot be achieved by rules and procedures alone. (OPM and CIPFA, 2004: 2)

Although it proposed a more consistent legal framework governing propriety and accountability of public bodies (Doig, 2006: 17), the report did not resolve the impasse of ethical management in the UK. Instead, it echoed the original CSPL analysis of 1995 that ‘a return to the age of austerity’ was necessary to uphold ethical standards.

According to the Fourth Report (2007) of House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), the CSPL has encouraged the codification of most of the conventions and understandings under which the traditional framework for standards operated, and has supported the establishment of new bodies to police them, in particular the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, the OCPA and the Electoral Commission. However, increasing criticisms have been voiced about the functioning, coherence and efficacy of the CSPL. In the same report, the PASC noted uncertainty about the CSPL’s developing role, and that its direct reporting line to the executive now constrained its activities, rather than acting as an advantage as had been the case initially. Moreover, the Committee’s budgetary dependence served as a further constraint. The former chairman, Sir Alistair Graham, revealed in oral evidence that the CSPL’s offers to look at business appointments, honours and party funding had been refused by No. 10. In addition, the PASC

… considered it inappropriate that … the remit of the CSPL – that of an ‘ethical auditor' – should be subsumed into a body consisting of those it might have to examine. Its solution was a new Public Standards Commission, established by statute, to promote and protect ethical watchdogs. At the minimum, this would recognize that a permanent form of oversight was necessary. A Commission would reflect and encourage the collegiate character of the constitutional watchdogs, and provide a framework for coherent development of the regulatory system. (Gay, 2008: 24)

The PASC took a rather more compliance-based view than had the CSPL or the Independent Commission on Good Governance; like the CSPL, it has a particular interest in integrity management and ethical standards in public life. It has explored, among other issues, the role of special advisers (PASC, 2001), patronage within the state (PASC, 2003), the ethical organization and conduct of key institutions for government and Parliament (PASC, 2007), lobbying and access in Whitehall (PASC, 2008), and whistleblowing in Whitehall (PASC, 2009).

The PASC’s 2003 report, Government by Appointment: Opening up the Patronage State, looked into how appointments are made to various public bodies. The report identified a far greater range of public bodies than those given by the Cabinet Office (Public Bodies 2002). There were 300 executive non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) and over 530 advisory NDPBs in central and devolved government, more than 5300 local quangos and 2300 local partnerships, boards of action zones, and so forth (PASC, 2003: §9). Only 1163 out of 1375 central government bodies (as listed in Public Bodies 2002) are regulated by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA), meaning 212 bodies, or 15 percent, are not independently regulated (PASC, 2003: §20). Also, many bodies (e.g. the Civil Service Commissioners, the Electoral Commission, the Financial Services Authority) were not classified as NDPBs and, therefore, not subject to any independent regulation, raising significant questions about their accountability.

The role of ethical regulators was addressed directly in Ethics and Standards: The Regulation of Conduct in Public Life (PASC, 2007). It called for action to ensure the independence of the ethical regulators who scrutinize standards of behaviour in public life, appointments to public office, and ministers' acceptance of posts in business after leaving office. The PASC has been more robust than the CSPL in criticisms of and recommendations to Parliament, largely advocating a compliance-based model of integrity management. It strongly advocated a Civil Service Bill, drafting its own version in 2004. While welcoming plans to put the Civil Service Commission and House of Lords Appointments Commission on a statutory footing, the PASC also observed that these moves ‘suggest a piecemeal and potentially inconsistent approach’ to the issue so long as the other watchdogs (such as the CSPL, Public Appointments Commissioner, and Business Appointments Committee) continued to be sponsored by the Cabinet Office. Ethical regulation, it argued, was conducted by an illogical and unplanned patchwork of unconnected bodies, of various institutional designs, with budgets varying from £164,000 (House of Lords Appointments Commission) to over £65 million (National Audit Office). Concern was expressed about the confusion and overlap between regulators, the extent to which regulators were properly embedded in the constitutional system, and the effect of regulation on public trust (PASC, 2007: 12). Moreover the increase in regulatory activity ‘has served to shift the common understanding of the role of government, Parliament and the civil service with regard to the conduct of public life. The significance of this fashion for codification has been described as either a written-down form of what civil servants had always understood or “constitution-making by stealth”’ (PASC, 2007). The PASC concluded that the time had come to recognize that the machinery of ethical regulation was an integral and permanent part of the constitutional landscape.

In the broader context of its recommendations, the PASC (2007: §88) saw ‘scope for a more collegiate model’ of ethical regulation. A College of Regulators, overseen by a statutory Public Standards Commission, would undertake ‘a sponsoring role of appointing, funding, staffing and auditing the college’ (§111). Such a college would facilitate a partnership between Parliament and the executive as an acceptable and effective option when discharging the sponsorship role for core constitutional watchdogs (Winetrobe, 2008: 118). This form of cooperation could operate through some sort of free-standing, statutory commission at arm’s length from both Parliament and government, ‘leaving Parliament to fulfil its proper constitutional scrutiny and oversight role, and the watchdogs themselves the appropriate balance of independence and accountability to enable them to carry out their work properly’ (PASC, 2007: §112).

The actual functioning of the proposed Public Standards Commission and its relationship to the accountability framework involving Parliament was left unresolved by the PASC. The government’s response – that the independence of the ethical regulators ‘is not in question’ – was at loggerheads with the views of the Select Committee (PASC, 2007a). In addition, the watchdogs themselves did not show much enthusiasm for more parliamentary scrutiny, fearing that parliamentarians would inevitably start to challenge their decisions on individual cases.

The issues raised in the 2007 Report did not go away. In 2009, while still awaiting the government’s full response, a follow-up report (PASC, 2009a: 4) reaffirmed the Committee’s position that ‘it is unacceptable and incompatible with genuine independence for the ethical regulators, which were created to regulate government, to be appointed by government and funded by government. We therefore urge the Government to adopt a coherent and principle-based approach to ethical regulation that is designed to secure the independence of ethical regulators from the Executive.’ The proliferation of watchdogs causes confusion and inconsistency and piecemeal arrangements for individual bodies store up problems for the future.

Nevertheless, some watchdog design details were clarified as a result of the 2007 report. The principle of long, but non-renewable, terms of office was generally accepted. The government’s response announced that future appointments of the First Civil Service Commissioner, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, the Chairs of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the House of Lords Appointments Commission would each be made for a single non-renewable term (usually five years). The government also announced that two Cabinet Office watchdogs, the Civil Service Commission and the House of Lords Appointments Commission, would achieve statutory status, promises which were made good in the 2010 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. The Act, which is very wide-ranging and covers the Civil Service, parliamentary standards, and the tax status of MPs and Members of the House of Lords, among other things, re-established the Civil Service Commission, which had been abolished in 1991 and replaced by Recruitment and Assessment Services and the Office of Civil Service Commissioners.

The 2010 Act to some extent reflects the tension between values-based and compliance-based approaches to integrity management. Section 5 stipulates that a Civil Service Code, approved by Parliament, must be published and that all civil servants must carry out their duties with integrity, honesty, objectivity, and impartiality (although the latter two conditions do not apply to special advisers). And under Section 9, civil servants may complain to the Civil Service Commission if they suspect breaches of the code. However, there are some important limitations. The Act does not authorize the Commissioners to initiate inquiries without receiving a complaint and, in the context of competition, the end of lifetime tenure, and performance pressures within ministries, civil servants may well hesitate before launching an official complaint.

Section 8 of the Act also provides a code for special advisers, who may not authorize expenditure of public funds, nor exercise management or other powers in relation to the civil service or state. Unlike civil servants, special advisers need not be appointed on merit or through open competition. While they must carry out their duties with honesty and integrity and their numbers and conduct must be reported annually (Section 16), their tenure expires when either the minister who appointed them ceases to hold office or following a change of government. Thus, integrity management of special advisers is more compliance-based than that of civil servants, their remit being explicitly the responsibility of the minister.

Regulation of MPs’ financial interests is covered in Sections 28 to 40 of the Act. Section 26 identifies the Compliance Officer in the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA), established by the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, as being responsible for investigating cases of financial irregularity. As a new compliance-based body, the general duties of IPSA are to end self-regulation by MPs, independently verify expense claims, promote transparency in public engagement, and increase cost efficiency.

Integrity management in an international perspective

While the specific development path of the UK can, in part, be explained by the particular cultural and political evolution of the notion of both a public sector and public service ethos, it is also clear that some drivers of change are not just national:

... intensifying global competition has brought about a fiscal crisis in developed states necessitating public sector economies, privatization, outsourcing, re-engineering and the like. Accordingly, we have seen in most developed countries the emergence over the last decade of the New Public Management. So far as such countries are concerned, public administration, may be in the process of becoming a relic of the past. (Theobald, 1998, cited in Doig, 2006: 20–21)

In all countries where NPM reforms have been introduced, marketization and the development of contractual relationships between civil servants and outside providers have raised questions about unethical behaviour and corruption. The introduction of competition for government contracts has multiplied the opportunity for favouritism and even bribery – a common theme underpinning corruption scandals related to privatization processes (Heywood and Krastev, 2006). Disaggregation entails the de-coupling of policy and executive/delivery function, thereby creating a much more heterogeneous civil service.

One result of increased concerns about unethical behaviour and corruption among public servants has been a global focus on integrity management. Since the beginning of the 1990s, ‘ethics management’ or ‘integrity policy’ has become a genuine policy area (Behnke and Maesschalck, 2006). The logic is that the ‘compliance’ approach to ethics management should be complemented by an ‘integrity’ approach. An integrity system combines law enforcement and motivation in an integrated system of rules, values, guidelines, and socialization mechanisms. It seeks to address the complex task of rooting integrity reliably within the public sector.

The idea of a National Integrity System (NIS) emerged in the late 1990s, promoted primarily by Transparency International (TI) as part of its anti-corruption campaign. It is conventionally pictured as a Greek temple (Pope, 2000: 35–37), with a series of pillars supporting the overarching structure of national integrity. These pillars encompass crucial institutions, sectors or activities, such as the political will to fight corruption, an active parliament, an auditor general as financial watchdog, an attorney general as guardian of the public interest, protection of public decision-making processes, an independent judiciary to protect the rule of law, an ombudsman, independent anti-corruption agencies, adequate public procurement procedures, accounting and financial management, a private sector operating within the law, and public awareness developed through an independent media, civil society, and international organizations supportive of ethics and integrity. Establishing and strengthening such an integrity system requires identifying opportunities for reinforcing and utilizing each of these pillars in the fight against corruption.

Given the particular circumstances in which British integrity management strategies have emerged, without clear constitutional structures and a persistent individualization of what are emerging as systemic tendencies, the traditional Greek temple does not seem an appropriate metaphor for the UK system. A potential alternative framework derives from the Australian National Integrity System Assessment (NISA) project (also sponsored by TI), which replaces Pope’s Greek temple metaphor with that of a bird’s nest. It is argued that while integrity system theory rightly emphasizes the role of mutually supportive institutions, it has little to say about how key institutions interact and change to maintain integrity. Since the main theoretical explanation of system effectiveness hinges on relationships between a multiplicity of institutions – cast in terms of horizontal accountability – this ‘provides as much reason for integrity bodies to remain separate and sometimes to conflict as it does for them to work cooperatively’ (Sampford et al., 2005: 96). Striving for a more interdependent and network-based representation, the image of a bird’s nest suggests that ‘institutions and relationships, often weak individually but collectively potentially strong, combine to protect and promote a fragile good “public integrity”’. Constitutional interrelationships between ethical watchdogs, therefore, are seen as being based on mutual accountability, ‘because horizontal implies an equality of legal and/or political power between institutions that is typically absent’ (Sampford et al., 2005: 98).

Mapping relations between the various integrity ‘pillars’ in a practical sense requires being able to recognize and differentiate between a triad of relationship types: constitutional, policy, and operational. In the UK, a plethora of policy and operational relationships exist, given the burgeoning of ad hoc ethical watchdogs, but significantly fewer constitutional relationships because of the slow pace at which the ethical framework has achieved a statutory footing. Thus, a horizontal relationship between regulators, with clear and equal legal status, is notably absent – which helps to explain the vacillation between compliance-based and values-based approaches to the contemporary management of public sector integrity.

An alternative approach has been proposed by the NGO, Global Integrity (www.globalintegrity.org). Established in the early 2000s, Global Integrity has become a significant international player in the field, largely on account of its innovative Public Integrity Index, which it is argued,

… measures something positive rather than negative (integrity rather than corruption) and does so through methods that are meant to be as transparent and as objective as possible. The focus throughout is on measuring the existence in law (de jure) and the effectiveness in practice (de facto) of institutions and practices that can help to control or reduce existing corruption, prevent future abuses of power, and promote more effective governance. (Camerer, 2007: 154)

The Index sees public integrity systems as the positive ‘flipside of corruption’ which can help keep public officials honest and accountable. The Index is based, therefore, on the assumption that the greater the presence of public integrity systems the less likely corruption is to be prevalent. The Index does not measure corruption, but maps the ‘public integrity “topography” of a given country, revealing peaks and valleys when it comes to checking and preventing the abuse of power’ (ibid.: 156). Rather than give scores, it aggregates its findings into a range of indicators covering six broad areas (civil society and the media; electoral systems and parties; executive, legislative, and judicial accountability; civil service regulation and management; national audit systems; and anti-corruption mechanisms). Global Integrity has not yet undertaken an analysis of the UK. However, the UK system would appear reasonably strong in relation to local government and, following the 2010 Act, the civil service where statute now exists, but less so in regard to ministers and members of parliament, where it does not.

Bowman and West (2008), meanwhile, focus on the role and influence of ‘political exchange’ and ‘civic culture’ as operating principles in the public service across Western European countries. The former is premised upon contacts, favours, and jobs in exchange for political support – an approach susceptible to corruption because it easily degenerates into cronyism and waste. The latter, civic culture, is an approach in which the commonweal is the central value; it is based upon universally applicable rules, equal treatment, professional ethics, and stewardship of public resources – public good rather than personal gain is the motive. All liberal political systems inevitably entail a combination of the two approaches, but the emergence of NPM has instigated a challenge to civic culture with a profound shift across most European democracies towards greater emphasis on political exchange. While acknowledging that generalizations about the nature of civil service reform across the European context is difficult, Bowman and West suggest that converging organizational structures and guiding principles can be identified – especially through a North/South distinction in Western Europe. The distinction they identify is between ‘employment’ and ‘career’ systems in the civil service. The former, prevalent in northern Europe, is modelled on the private sector as special skills are hired for specific posts and lack job security. The latter, prevalent in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, has civil service jobs for life with stable employment and job protection. The risk of civil service politicization is said to be greater in the employment system where a premium is placed on loyalty to the government in power.

The risk of politicization does not necessarily derive from permanency in the civil service. The flexibilization and ending of tenure for UK civil servants has been accompanied by the growth in special advisers, appointed by and loyal to certain ministers without the need to act with impartiality and objectivity. Indeed, a significant concern has been a growing politicization of the relationship between government ministers and the senior civil service, which has gathered pace since the Conservative administrations of 1979–97 and reached its apogee under the so-called ‘sofa-style’ of government under Tony Blair. Sofa government was characterized by an informal style of policy making in which, according to its critics, experienced civil servants were bypassed in favour of politically appointed policy advisers. According to O’Toole (2007: 123), the policy roles previously held by civil servants have been

… taken over by other groups, for example ‘think-tanks’, policy ‘czars’, policy ‘task forces’ and, perhaps most importantly, special advisers. These changes have led to greater formalization of ethics requirements for civil servants and less reliance on traditional approaches based on an ‘ethos’ of public service.

These advisers ran roughshod over long-established procedures and ignored constitutional safeguards such as consultation, discussion, and recording that were apparently inimical to the efficiency of government – a practice that acutely changed the relationship between ministers and civil servants (Chapman and O’Toole, 2009: 10). Reflecting upon the intelligence gathering before the Iraq War and the closed-door discussions between a select group of ministers and special advisers, Lord Butler commented that ‘It isn’t wise to listen only to special advisers, and not to listen to fuddy-duddy civil servants who may produce boringly inconvenient arguments’ (Butler, 2004). Although the 2010 Act defined the role and number of special advisers, their activities continue to be the source of controversy under the new Coalition Government. Thus, it could be argued that we are witnessing a process of politicization of central government alongside the privatization of the peripheries, marked by a distinction between political tasks (those in the minister’s purview) and managerial tasks (day-to-day administration) (Bowman and West, 2008: 188).

Concluding remarks

Recent trends within the civil service and management of the public services inevitably raise questions about accountability (O’Toole, 2006: 44). However, new accountability measures developed in the UK have their roots in a ‘positivist approach’ which assumes that ‘the complexities of service provision can be broken down and definitively assessed on measurable performance indicators’ (Clark, 1996: 24). This kind of quantitative approach sits uneasily with a sector that historically has been guided by principles such as impartiality, trust, and fairness that are inherently qualitative in nature. In fact, it has been argued that ‘when checks are applied as a surrogate for virtue and trust, then they become dysfunctional’ (Barberis, 2001: 121). For Dawn Oliver, in evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee, the very ‘creation of watchdogs signals the collapse of a trust based system and also a loss of belief in the trustworthiness of civil servants … If trust and trustworthiness have broken down, watchdogs may be able to counteract unethical selfish activity by those providing public services, but in doing so will generate even more mistrust and possibly unethical behaviour and legalism – focus on the letter rather than the spirit of the rules – if the person thinks they can get away with it’ (PASC, 2007: 7). Indeed, Barberis (2001: 124) argues that ‘there should be a retreat from the excess of audit trails and “management by numbers” that are often self-defeating within their own confines and corrosive of the public service ethos’. On the other hand, Carr (1999: 5) has also pointed out that we can no longer rely on ‘old fashioned’ public service values; instead, external monitoring and legal sanctions – compliance-based measures – are needed as a surrogate for subjective responsibility. Thus, if the qualitative essence of the public sector has changed, so too must the mechanisms of measurement, control and oversight.

The 2010 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act represents an attempt to institutionalize core integrity values, particularly within the civil service, but the capacity to do so may not be present given the gradual reconfiguration of the public service architecture. It remains to be seen how, and if at all, the values and traditions of the British public sector ethos can be institutionalized, especially when the very structure and functioning of public life has qualitatively changed. Thus, if the public sector ethos was a particular moment of elite institutionalized values, its dismantling, in favour of a broader public service ethos, may reflect not so much the decline of standards per se but a reorientation of what constitutes standards in the conduct of public life.

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

I am grateful for research assistance by Tom Purcell, and for very helpful comments by two anonymous referees, as well as Ian Scott, Ian Thynne, Ting Gong, Cees van der Eijk, Jonathan Rose, and Mary Vincent. The article is based on a paper given at a conference on ‘Collaborative Governance and Integrity Management’, organized by the Independent Commission against Corruption’s Centre of Anti-corruption Studies, Hong Kong, 16--17 September 2010.

Note

Paul M. Heywood is Sir Francis Hill Professor of European Politics and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Nottingham, UK. He is also Adjunct Professor at Hunan University, China, where he is adviser to the Clean Governance Center.

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