Managerial reforms,Public Service Bargains and top civil servant identity

Abstract

In the past couple of decades, a wide range of managerial reforms have been witnessed in many OECD countries. These reforms may have significantly affected the identity of top civil servants. This change in identity may, in turn, have an impact on the performance of top officials, their roles, their views, their relations with political personnel and their expected competencies. Within a sample of countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands) we explore these reforms, the changes that have occurred in top officials’ identity (personal, role and social) with document analysis and a series of interviews. We conclude that in all cases, regardless of the goals or the intensity of the reforms, there is now more individualization, more mobility, fixed-term contracts and more accountability. We did not find a full-blown managerial or any unambiguous evolution towards a pure managerial identity.

Points for practitioners

Managerial reforms certainly affect the relationships between politicians and top civil servants. Role perceptions of top civil servants are, depending on the context, more resistant to change than expected. Despite the omnipresent managerial discourse, the role of policy advisor remains very important. Corporate management designs tend to facilitate corporate identification, the type of employment relationship, contract and level of goals, thus affecting the social identity of top civil servants.

Keywords

civil service reforms identity NPM politico-administrative relations PSB responsibility rewards roles senior civil service

Introduction

During the past several decades, an avalanche of managerial reforms has affected several OECD countries, inspired by managerial components of the new public management (NPM) movement (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Those reforms have impacted the relationships between politicians and top civil servants defined as Public Service Bargains (PSBs) (Hood, 2000b; Hood and Lodge, 2006). Our objective here is to investigate how these bargains have evolved and have affected the identity of top civil servants. Policy changes for top civil servants (competencies, activities, influence, roles, etc.) now impact many aspects of identity. In turn, they also determine the manner in which these civil servants are rewarded.

It is important to investigate these new bargain designs since they may well affect who gets or keeps a job (competency) and who is to be served first (government of the day, State or long-term public interest). Top civil servants’ identity may also affect the government’s political agenda in terms of policy design and implementation, and may signal the need for other administrative reforms.

Hood’s typology of Public Service Bargains aside, little empirical research has been conducted on the relationship between managerial aspects of NPM and PSB regarding top civil servants and their sense of role and identity.

First, we discuss the theoretical framework of the Public Service Bargain and its components. Subsequently, we present our definitions and concepts, and explain the methodology used. Next, we present our research findings and conclude with some implications for top civil service system design.

The theory of Public Service Bargains

According to the Public Service Bargain (PSB) typology (Hood, 2000b; Hood and Lodge, 2006), the relationship between civil servants and politicians, arranged as a bargain, tends to follow a pattern of expectations on one side, and of roles performed, on the other. The expectations, an interpretation of civil society requests, come from the political system: the Chief of State, PM, Cabinet, Ministers, Ministers’ secretariats and Parliament being linked together, depending on the institutions and political culture (Painter and Peters, 2010). Top civil servants, acting as mandates, relays, and leaders, link public service to the political system, and offer diverse contributions depending on their expected role (Aberbach et al., 1982) and professional identity.

The Schafferian bargain is the most homogeneous of all bargains, as most of its components are the same for the whole of the top civil service. The managerial bargain, at the other end of the spectrum, allows status conditions and working relationships to be person-specific and individually negotiable. The hybrid bargain, placed in between the other two, provides greater scope for individual ‘deals’ between politicians and civil servants than the Schafferian bargain. In this Schafferian bargain, top civil servants are typically loyal, anonymous career civil servants subject to close central agency control, as opposed to top civil servants in the managerial bargain, who often come from outside the public sector and are trained to act as managers with a high degree of autonomy and personal responsibility for departmental results (Hood, 2000a). Different national traditions and reform agendas may have different impacts on PSBs; yet despite those variations, there are important similarities among the countries studied (Mintzberg and Bourgault, 2000).

It seems promising to ask whether reforms call for a new top civil servant identity. Are the people recruited/retained in jobs fit for the challenges and then, do they help facilitate the reform? Changing top civil servants’ identity may be one strategy to break the path dependency obstacle in implementing reforms (Peters, 2005). Our main hypothesis is that NPM elements have modified some components of the Public Service Bargain and, therefore, a part of the top civil servants’ identity. That makes our independent variable the managerial reforms, while our dependent variable is top civil servants’ identity. The relationship between the two means that the managerial aspects of NPM make the political system search for a new type of top civil servant, who is expected to be more entrepreneurial (Émery and Giauque 2012).

We investigate this hypothesis by researching within a sample of countries the evolution of three bargain dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty/responsibility. Reward is what civil servants get in return for their work and loyalty. Civil servants, then, exchange competencies and loyalty for rewards. Responsibility is the breakdown of who is in charge and accountable, and who owes loyalty to whom, and how. We observe the changes in these three dimensions, try to find patterns across countries, and see if we can link these to changes to elements of top civil servant identity, recognizing that identity is not permanent but ever transforming (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003) and evolving (Émery and Giauque, 2012). If competency elements affect the recruitment and identity of top civil servants, then when those civil servants climb to their next position, they may reinforce a new managerial culture within the organization with new values and rationale (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006).

Identity

Identity is a complex concept with various components: sex, geographic and social origins, religion, language, profession, actual and past experiences, relations, and ambitions. There are multiple arrangements and prioritizations in any individual flowing from his or her values, objectives, and perceptions. There is no consensus in the literature on an exact definition of identity, nor is there agreement on the dimensions of identity (Albert and Whetten, 2004; Berg, 2006; Émery and Giauque, 2012; Exworthy and Halford, 1999). This research distinguishes between personal identity, social identity, and role identity (Perry and Vandenabeele, 2008), since those are the three that are found at the heart of PSB components.

Personal identity is seeing oneself as distinct from others (Vandenabeele, 2007). It refers to a set of characteristics, opinions, desires, and principles through which a person believes he is distinct in a relevant way from others. In this research we limit our use of demographic data for our population, as our main focus is on role identity and social identity.

Role identity refers to seeing oneself as the holder of a particular role. The literature often contrasts managerial identity with bureaucratic identity (Berg, 2006; Rondeaux, 2008), or managerial with professional identity (Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Noordegraaf, 2007). We don’t believe that such one-dimensional conceptions correspond to reality (see Émery and Giauque, 2012, on hybrid identities and motivations). We have identified five roles as the primary functions of top civil servants: the manager, bureaucrat, professional, leader, and policy advisor. We recognize that a plurality of roles may be played at the same time, because this complex job has multiple components.

Social identity means regarding oneself as a member of a particular group. Social identity plays an influencing role for this study since a Schafferian bargain offers general conditions to a group, while a managerial bargain offers specific conditions to each individual. There is little interaction required for someone to behave as a member of a group (Stets and Burke, 2000). Group identity acts as a bridge between personal identity and organizational identity, as values, visions, ethics, etc. can be common and shared among members (Émery and Giauque, 2012; Whetten and Godfrey, 1998). We inquire into: Who are we/who are they (in/out group) (Tajfel and Turner, 2004)? Do they behave as a group? What social identity is prevailing? Alvesson and Willmott (1996) wrote that corporate management competes with other groups and categories for an individual’s time, self-perception, attention, and loyalty. Has identification moved from the macro level (government in general) towards the meso level today (the specific organization)? Likewise, individual performance contracts may lead to an increased sense of departmental loyalty. Further, social identity is linked to competency: career technical specialists in a department might identify with the dominant profession within that department (for example: lawyers, engineers, etc.).

Bargains and role expectations may affect certain identity elements of recruits. Identities do not necessarily change suddenly, or even radically. To achieve transformation, for instance, one may change the rules (including recruitment, compensation) or the systems (training, decision process), and in doing so install a new culture. If so, top civil servants no longer act in accordance with old values, and new values are being added to replace others (Émery and Giauque, 2012; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006; Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003).

Methodology and sample

This article relies on document analysis and empirical data gathered to investigate the bargain and its evolution in each country. This analytical approach allows us to examine three elements: the evolution of reforms in each country (NPM and non-NPM reforms), and the nature of the bargain before and after those reforms. A survey was sent to all of the highest ranking civil servants (ministry heads) in the sample countries. We only include top civil servants on the national or federal level, in the ministries or departments. Top civil servants in agencies or others are not a part of this population. In a subsequent stage, a number of participating top civil servants were interviewed in depth in order to allow respondents to enlarge on their answers to the questionnaire. The questionnaires were adapted to capture the national reality of the respondent: titles, specific organizational institutions, the existence of ministerial cabinets, etc.

The study sample consists of four cases analyzed in accordance with the theoretical framework of Public Service Bargains: the systemic and the pragmatic. In a systemic bargain, the role of the public service is part of a fundamental constitutional settlement; in a pragmatic bargain, rights and duties of public servants are a more or less convenient agency arrangement between politicians and bureaucrats (Hood, 2000b). We use two cases, the Belgian and the Dutch, as examples of a systemic bargain. The Canadian and Danish cases serve as examples of pragmatic (Schafferian) bargains. The question, however, is whether in all of these countries shifts are being seen towards a managerial bargain (Hondeghem, 2011).

Table 1 shows the number of respondents to the interviews and the questionnaire.

Table 1.

Population of top civil servants

Country/ Designation	Total population	Questionnaire only	Interview only	Questionnaire + interview	Percentage^a
Belgium^b Chairman of the board of directors	13	–	–	11	85%
Canada^c Deputy minister	27	4	2	13	70%
Denmark Permanent secretary	19	1	3	9	68%
The Netherlands Secretary general	14	–	5	4^d	64%

Notes: ^aThe percentages presented here are the total number of top civil servants who participated in this research.

^bA supplementary series of interviews was conducted in October 2009 with 14 high civil servants and politicians.

^cThe total population of deputy ministers in Canada was 32, but five deputy ministers had retired. Interviewed thanks to a SHRC grant 410-2008-1785.

^dFour secretaries-general filled out the entire questionnaire, two additional secretaries-general filled out only the questions about role identity.

Our survey is focused on top civil servants, so conclusions may not apply to the whole of the civil service. Since participation rates within our population are high, we can identify some patterns and tendencies with a high degree of certainty. It also allows us to compare these groups across the different countries.

On role identity, we created five Likert-scales to measure the perception of top civil servants. Items for these scales were selected based on the existing literature.¹ Internal consistency was monitored. For each item, respondents indicated to what extent they agreed. Due to material limitations, the research does not capture ‘the complete identity’ of each group. We have focused on those specific identity elements relevant to our research.

The Public Service Bargain in retrospect

This section gives a rough sketch of Public Service Bargains in the countries studied. The question posed here is whether public sector managerialism generates a new managerial Public Service Bargain, as Hood and Lodge hypothesize (Hood and Lodge, 2006). For each country, the original bargain is compared with the current bargain between top civil servants in national/federal government and ministers, in terms of the three bargain components: reward, competency, and loyalty/responsibility. Cases are classified following the systemic/pragmatic bargain divide, using Hood’s statement that a move towards a managerial-type bargain will be harder/easier when departing from the former/latter. It is expected that managerial reforms cause bargain changes towards a managerial end and, due to institutional resistence, lead to hybrid bargains. The results are found in the Appendix.

Citing comprehensive international and national sudies, the countries that have experienced the deepest NPM impact are, in order, Canada (Bourgault, 2010), the Netherlands (Noordegraaf, 2009; Steen and Van der Meer, 2011), Belgium (de Visscher et al., 2011) and Denmark (Christensen, 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).

Pragmatic bargains

Following Hood’s theory, as a consequence of NPM reforms, the Canadian and Danish pragmatic Public Service Bargains are expected to move more readily towards a managerial Public Service Bargain than are the systemic bargains.

Canada

The Canadian reform process has been incremental, starting in the 1970s, and accelerating from the 1990s onwards. After a range of managerial reforms, an entrepreneurial culture has slowly emerged in the Canadian senior civil service.

The Canadian civil service is still a professional form of career system, based on permanence and political neutrality. The top civil servant, i.e. the deputy minister, is appointed ‘at pleasure’. Interdepartmental mobility is encouraged at all levels. In terms of competency, top civil servants were predominantly technical specialists when entering their careers, evolving gradually towards ‘statesmen in disguise’. They provided policy advice to their minister, and were responsible for the policy implementation. Today, greater emphasis is placed on managerial skills, and considerable time and money is invested in management training. The top civil servant with expert knowledge has made way for a deliverer type of top official.

Average time in office for successive deputy minister level assignments has decreased, from 12 years (in the 1980s) to six years now (Bourgault, 2004). In an attempt to deliver better public service, more emphasis was given to results (instead of procedures), ex-post reporting, and multiple auditing, leading to the Management Accountability Framework in 2003.² Regarding reward, a hierarchical pay structure outlived the reforms: the higher the position, the higher the reward. Career advancement and rewards in the past were strongly linked to seniority. A system of individual performance appraisals for senior civil servants began before the 1970s. Appraisals still lead to promotions, an increased overall compensation, or demotion for insufficient performance. The limited bonus system gave way to a performance management program for senior personnel.³ Rewards have become more generous and more directly related to individual performance, with a more detailed performance agreement contract with the clerk. Performance assessment is formalized and directly affects any bonus (Bourgault, 2004).

Loyalty and responsibility, principles of ministerial responsibility, are still a characteristic of Canadian politico-administrative relations and a new Act in 2006 reaffirmed the existing boundaries. Deputy ministers carry more responsibility when appearing before parliamentary committees. Top civil servants are loyal to successive governments and the State, but provide advice from the public interest perspective. Deputy ministers are now removed from office when their superior has little confidence in their capacity to cope with the agenda.

Denmark

A reform of interest is the introduction of performance contracts for Danish senior civil servants in 1998, excluding permanent secretaries (Hansen and Salomonsen, 2011). Prior to the reform, the Danish civil service resembled the career ideal-type, with civil servants enjoying tenure within a closed career civil service staffed by generalists. Concerning competence, top civil servants were the primary policy advisors to their ministers for technical, legal, and economic advice. Concerning loyalty and responsibility, the Danish civil service was organized along the principle of ministerial responsibility. Top civil servants had no formal autonomy from their political master. As senior civil service was permanent, they were loyal to successive ministers and governments and, as such, politically neutral.

Since the reforms, the permanent secretaries’ contracts are still not performance contracts in the usual sense and the evaluation procedure remains relatively informal. A performance-related pay system (informal and opaque) has been introduced for permanent secretaries, and bonuses are low (Hansen and Salomonsen, 2011). The decision regarding any bonus is based upon a general assessment of the overall performance of the permanent secretary, including his share in the success of major reforms. Managerial competencies, however, have become more significant, although this varies between permanent secretaries. When it comes to loyalty and responsibility, permanent secretaries are still engaged in a partnership with their minister. They are still serial loyalists to successive ministers, but an increase in providing political-tactical advice has somewhat altered this relationship, and they are becoming closer to their minister. This might partly explain the higher turnover among top civil servants.

Systemic bargains

Public Service Bargains in the Netherlands and in Belgium are initially systemic (consociational). According to Hood, a move from this type of bargain is more difficult because of its firm entrenchment in law.

The Netherlands

The creation of the Senior Public Service (Algemene Bestuursdienst, or ABD) in 1996, and the formation of an elite group within the ABD in 2000 (Top Management Group), are the primary managerial reforms of interest for changes in the Public Service Bargain. Prior to these reforms, the Dutch central administration was characterized by permanence, a closed career system, and strong departmentalism. Promotion was based on merit and seniority. Senior civil servants remained in office until retirement. The pay scheme showed a pyramidal structure. In terms of competency, senior civil servants were mostly technical experts in their field serving as principal policy advisors to successive governments and ministers.

After the reforms, top officials are no longer guaranteed career progression or, although they remain statutory employees, permanent assignment. They are encouraged to change positions at least every seven years. The government aims to decrease departmentalism. Ministers and top civil servants introduce management plans, so-called ‘work agreements’, to enhance the degree of managerial concerns among top officials.

With regard to rewards, elements of performance-related pay have been introduced. These higher rewards should compensate for decreased job security.

Concerning role expectations, secretaries-general are now first and foremost expected to deliver on government objectives. The focus on policy advice has decreased, yet directors general (i.e. the level below the secretary general) are still the primary policy advisors for their ministers. The competency framework introduced is another instrument to professionalize the senior civil service. Concerning loyalty/responsibility, the primary principle is the ministerial responsibility. The introduction of ‘work agreements’ into the equation has transferred responsibility to top civil servants, and has increased the focus on delivery. Although Dutch top civil servants are ‘serial loyalists’ to successive ministers and governments (neutral in a partisan sense), some evidence points to an increased importance of corresponding political color between ministers and top civil servants (Steen and Van der Meer, 2011).

Belgium⁴

In Belgium, the Copernicus reform of 2000 has been the most important managerial reform, radically changing the Public Service Bargain. As a response to a loss of public confidence in politics, a newly elected coalition government launched an ambitious reform program.

Prior to this reform, Belgium had a closed career system, with tenure and pay structure based on seniority. Interdepartmental mobility was almost non-existent. One pitfall of the administration was its strong bent towards politicization, and reform aimed to put an end to this. The primary task for top civil servants, regarded as technical experts in their field and only marginally involved in the policy preparation process, was the implementation of policies decided upon by ministers and members of ministerial cabinets. Top civil servants were essentially serial loyalists.

Since the Copernicus reform, the highest permanent positions within the administration have been transformed into ‘management functions’. As part of the introduction of this new managerial discourse, secretaries-general are now called ‘chairmen of the board of directors’. They no longer enjoy guaranteed permanence or career progression. The reform also aimed to improve their participation in the policy process by abolishing ministerial cabinets, although this did not happen in practice.

With regard to reward, the reform has led to a substantial pay increase for top officials (Brans, 2012). So far, almost all top civil servants have been assessed positively.

Concerning competency, the reform declared all top positions vacant. New ‘managers’ were sought both inside and outside the administration; they were to be the drivers of the reform and the new managerial culture. Moreover, many former cabinet members can be found among top civil servants, pointing towards the importance of boundary-spanning skills, or towards the importance of political support.

Regarding loyalty/responsibility, we observe a shift towards the executive type of bargain. Top officials work with performance contracts, and personal and organizational goals are defined within a limited span of action. As the minister is the main evaluator of top civil servants, questions arise about the increased dependence on their political master for their further career.

Conclusions pertaining to the bargains’ evolution

Our cases demonstrate various managerial reforms implemented to various degrees, with different outcomes.

The Public Service Bargain in Canada evolved from a primarily Schafferian type of bargain towards a more managerial style. However, important elements of the old bargain still remain. The Canadian case seems to support Hood’s hypothesis about the sensitivity of pragmatic bargains to change, due to conservative minority governments and managerial reforms.

The Danish case provides no further evidence to support Hood’s hypothesis that moving towards a managerial bargain is easier when departing from a pragmatic bargain. The original pragmatic Danish bargain remains relatively unchanged, even though some elements have been altered as a consequence of managerial reforms.⁵

The PSB in the Netherlands has changed following managerial reforms, but did not lead to a full-blown managerial type of PSB. A good number of elements of the old PSB have persisted.

The research shows that the bargain has not changed radically in Belgium. It seems that most of the traditional elements have persisted. The reform seems to have added elements of the individualist managerial bargain to the pre-existing bargain.

We did not find strong evidence to support Hood and Lodge’s hypothesis that an evolution towards a managerial bargain is easier when the original bargain was a pragmatic one. In all cases, we find a new bargain consisting of elements of the old bargain intertwined with managerial bargain elements. It follows that, as bargains are the result of agreements between different parties and are shaped by a country’s institutional history, radically changing them turns out to be very difficult. The question thus arises whether this ‘hybrid’ category needs to be refined. One may also wonder whether all hybrid bargains come with the same profile.

Exploring the identity of top civil servants

It is risky pretending to ‘capture’ identity with a small set of questions, particularly for a variety of national cultures. Therefore we can only offer a limited exploration of identity. First, we searched for any demographic evolution since personal characteristics affect identity: are there as many lawyers or science specialists, or more diplomas or careerists in management? Second, for loyalty/responsibility, we investigated the role identity of top officials: besides policy advice, managerial bargains require responsibilities and competencies focused on delivery or execution. Third, we explored top civil servant social identification: do they see themselves as well-rewarded individual entrepreneurs temporarily employed by a governmental authority, or as members of a select group in search of a general interest? Throughout our research, we examined whether the range of managerial reforms significantly changed task assignments, working conditions, or managerial discourses, and generated a new kind of top civil servant.

Competency as identity factor: the last of the specialists?

The introduction of open competition and the removal of the seniority criterion for promotions could have led to top appointments at a younger age. Our data, however, do not sustain this assumption. For instance, the average age of Belgian top managers went down, but it went up in Denmark. However, the reform was bolder in Belgium and addressed this particular issue more than in Denmark. We observed little change in the Canadian and Dutch cases.

The educational profile of top civil servants has changed, though not dramatically, in all cases. In the past, most top civil servants had a law or an economics degree; these are still the dominant diplomas, complemented by degrees in social sciences. The number of top managers holding degrees in management or public management is booming, especially in Canada, and, to a lesser extent, in Belgium, reflecting the increased demand for management skills. A more intense managerial change causes more opportunities for managerial profiles to come on the scene. This is why we found a greater managerial and leadership focus within continuous learning programs everywhere.

Role identity: the march of the managers

In all cases, top civil servants were primarily career bureaucrats. Furthermore, top officials were the primary policy advisors to their ministers in all cases except Belgium. How have these roles evolved after the successive reforms in the various countries?

In Belgium, marginalization of top civil servants in the policy process did not come to an end: ‘Politicians have succeeded in hijacking the reform to save their partisan control over the administration’ (Belgian top civil servant). Belgian top officials consequently do not identify with their role as policy advisors, which is very different from the top civil servants’ role perception in the other cases. The questionnaire revealed that Belgian top officials identified primarily with their role as leaders and professionals,⁶ referring to their position as tenure employees protecting the public interest. In the interviews, they mentioned their role as managers first, and as leaders second.

In Canada, much emphasis was placed upon the development of managerial skills within the civil service. The results of the questionnaire indicate leaders and bureaucrats as dominant roles, where leader in the Canadian culture includes manager,⁷ and bureaucrat refers to the public interest guardian’s role vis-a-vis the politicians’ projects.⁸ The interviews, however, did reveal that managerial and policy advisor role identities were the most important for deputy ministers. Many regret the conservative government’s practice: ‘I would like to act as the principal advisor to the minister, but he would have to accept consulting me!’ Conservative ministers are said to be more autonomous in decision-making.⁹

The Danish permanent secretaries are in charge of small policy departments, whereas the larger agencies are run by ‘directors’. This means that permanent secretaries have limited managerial responsibilities, mainly exercised by the directors (Kettl et al., 2004). Not surprisingly, the questionnaire revealed that the dominant role identities of Danish top civil servants are those of policy advisor and bureaucrat. Furthermore, the reform in 1998 legitimized the employment of special advisors for ministers, with the task of providing political advice regarding media, tactics, and party politics. At present, special advisors mainly provide media advice. Political-tactical advice has become part of the permanent secretaries’ tasks, a major difference with regard to their role prior to the reforms.

In the Netherlands, a different evolution occurred. The reform had several goals: to decrease departmentalism, to curb the power of top civil servants deemed too powerful, and to increase the management capability of top officials. At the same time, ministers were allowed to hire a ‘political assistant’ (non-civil servant) in charge of maintaining relations with the party, parliament, and media. Ministers have expanded sources of policy advice, such as external consultants. These conditions have led to an increased focus on ‘process’ rather than ‘content’ for secretaries-general. As such, the questionnaire showed that Dutch top officials identify foremost with the roles of leader and bureaucrat. In interviews, they considered themselves predominantly as managers and, still, policy advisors. In the post-Fortuyn era, they are expected to show increased political sensitivity. They have become more visible in the media. A top official states: ‘The role identity is linked to the personality of both the minister and the civil servant himself, and also to the particular expectations of the minister’.

Table 2 demonstrates the differences between the questionnaire and in-depth interviews: first, in three cases the questionnaire reveals the leadership role identity to be the most prominent.¹⁰ Second, top officials see themselves primarily as managers, revealed in the interviews, as a result of the importance and impact of managerial discourse. We cannot exclude the motive of social desirability behind their answers. Third, political sensitivity is more expected everywhere, even though political presence was increased in all cases. Finally, concerns for delivering the government’s political agenda are widespread.

Table 2.

Top civil servants’ role identity

Questionnaire	Interviews
Belgium	1 Leader	1 Manager
Belgium	2 Professional	2 Leader
Canada	1 Leader	1 Manager
Canada	2 Bureaucrat	2 Policy advisor
Denmark	1 Policy advisor	1 Policy advisor
Denmark	2 Bureaucrat	2 Bureaucrat
The Netherlands	1 Leader	1 Manager
The Netherlands	2 Bureaucrat	2 Policy advisor

We observed that role identity has changed from a traditional bureaucrat, based mostly or solely on enforcing rules and guarding the public interest, towards the managerial, based on leading people through changes and maximizing resource utility to deliver optimal service and results. The bureaucrat and policy advisor role identity persists, but new managerial elements are added to this role identity: ‘We are now expected to deliver results and we are made accountable by everyone!’ This creates a mixed, more individualized identity, founded in the new bargain. Specific roles varied somewhat within countries or from one person to another: leader may mean motivator, but may also refer to the person in charge who bears the ultimate responsibility. This variation in terms may lead researchers to dangerous conclusions, especially when clear definitions are not provided within the structure of the questions asked.

Social identity: corporate identity as a cure for fragmentation

To investigate the social identity of top officials, we asked for their primary level of identification, their preference for working in the public or private sector, and their preference for working at the federal or national level as opposed to the regional or local level.

The results for the first item (primary level of identification) look very different across our cases. Both the Dutch and Canadian top civil servants identify themselves primarily with government in general at the national/federal level. In the Dutch case, this is very different from before, when top officials identified themselves foremost with their own department (Van Dorpe and Hondeghem, 2011). This identification can be explained by heightened interdepartmental mobility, and by employment in the general, overall service of the state instead of the department. ‘There is an explicit ambition of the government to decrease departmentalism’ (Dutch top official), while in Canada we find government-wide targets. In contrast, Belgian and Danish officials identify themselves primarily with their department. In the Belgian case, top officials used to identify more with the federal government (de Visscher et al., 2012). The introduction of performance contracts and increased responsibility seems to have changed this, since there is now little focus on the whole-of-government level, and an increased focus on the department. A Danish top official said: ‘We identify ourselves primarily with the group of top civil servants.’ This identification with the group is, as in Canada, linked to the frequency with which top officials meet each other, follow training together, and exchange best practices, or use corporate management practices (Bourgault, 2007). In Belgium, for instance, there are virtually no more of these organized activities, and as a consequence, top civil servants do not identify themselves with the larger group of top officials, whereas Dutch and Canadian top civil servants do.

The results from the Dutch, Danish and Belgian cases show that there is less of a distinction between the public and the private sector as opposed to their Canadian counterparts (see Table 3). In the Belgian case, there is a remarkable difference between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking top civil servants: the respective scores are 3.6 and 2.16. Dutch-speaking top civil servants are much more willing to work in the private sector than their French-speaking colleagues. A possible explanation for this is that Dutch and Belgian (especially Dutch-speaking) top officials have some prior work experience in the private and wider public sector, unlike Belgian French-speaking and Canadian officials. Danish top officials are also career civil servants, but they head small policy departments which are linked to large executive agencies. This may explain why Danish top officials make little distinction between the two sectors, since the agency model, involving the private sector, has been in place for a long time (Christensen, 2009).

Table 3.

Social identity

Preferences of top civil servants	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	The Netherlands
I think it is important to work for the government, instead of the private sector.	2.81	2.6	2.89	2.89
I could just as well work for the regional government, as for the national/federal government.	2.27	3.2	4	Not applicable^a

Scale from 1 =strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.

The Netherlands does not have regional governments.

If we compare Belgian, Canadian and Danish figures on the difference between the national/federal and the regional levels, we find that Belgian top officials are more inclined to work at the regional level than are the Canadian and Danish. This may reflect a series of organizational reasons such as the perception of professional challenges and the sense of belonging. In Belgium, Dutch-speaking top officials are much more willing than French-speaking officials to work for regional government (scores: 1.8 and 2.67).

Would top civil servants identify themselves more with their own department when they are made personally responsible for its performance? This seems to be the case in Belgium, whereas the others move in the opposite direction. In Denmark, the association came with the top official’s group they most often met. In Canada and in the Netherlands, we can explain the results by drawing attention to the continued corporate management culture and devices on one hand (Bourgault, 2007; Noordegraaf, 2009), and career perspective on the other, as future appointments depend on approval from the center (Savoie, 1999).

These results are not clear-cut, but trends seem to exist. Past events, career experiences, perceptions, administrative culture, and particularly the corporate management initiatives and the promises of the future seem to influence the social identity of top officials.

General conclusions

Our goal was to present managerial changes in the bargain components of the four countries studied. Some changes seem obviously inspired by managerial ideas, like performance contracts, performance bonuses, and balanced scorecards. Others may have occurred as part of the national political system’s evolution. In all cases, no matter the bargain or the intensity of the reforms, we observe more individualization, mobility, fixed-term contracts, and accountability. We did not find a full-blown managerial bargain or any unambiguous evolution towards a pure managerial identity.

Our expectation was to find more of a managerial identity after the implementation of managerial reforms. When looking at the profiles of top officials, we found a general reduction in the number of graduates from law programs to the benefit of political or economics diplomas (including management). An increase in managerial training as part of the top civil servants’ continuous training is occurring everywhere.

The dominant role identities found were those of manager and policy advisor. While the latter was part of the old bargain, the managerial identity is a new construct and seems to have developed in response to new needs and expectations on the part of politicians, and, by extension, of society. The combination of these two dominant role identities reflects the hybrid nature of the current Public Service Bargain. Many of the old bargain elements have been preserved, and have been combined with new elements relating to profiles, mandates, roles, performance appraisal, rewards, and accountability, without moving towards the full-blown managerialism of theoretical models.

Evolution in social identity is observed. Corporate management designs tend to facilitate corporate identification. Changes expected from the managerial reforms tend to be mitigated by contextual national factors: culture and organizational perceptions may affect identification with private sector or regional governments. We believe that the persistence of institutions (of which bargains ultimately form a part) accounts for the findings, and this may be why systemic bargains are more difficult to change.

Why do we observe such diversity in top officials’ identities? The factors affecting identity are the demographics of recruitment, the credibility of managerial reform, the use and restraint of managerial vocabulary, the length of time the reform has been in place, and the language of the top officials’ national mission, along with the institutional design for managing top officials’ status and roles.

From what we have learned, there is a need to recruit a new type of top official embracing several elements, observed in all cases: a decrease in law and technical expertise for the job; greater manager-leader competencies; a capacity to cope with the increasing role of the political center (accompanied by more administrative accountability); a greater sensitivity to governmental political agendas; a new role of policy advisor; a capacity to envision and cope government-wide; and a greater degree of attention paid to service delivery.

Our research has provided some reflections on the theoretical implications for the PSB perspective. First, it appears that bargain categories are not mutually exclusive: for instance, a national bargain could at the same time be based on partnership and serial loyalist. Second, there are particular questions about the concept of hybrid bargains. The reforms have changed the bargains to varying degrees. If all countries in the sample are characterized as hybrids (i.e. bargains partly individualized) and show some important differences in the roles, autonomy, and managerial identity, it becomes obvious then, that the term hybrid may cover a series of considerably different situations and seems rather inappropriate. It would thus be necessary to split and refine these hybrid categories.

The author would like to thank his doctoral assistant, Mrs Stéphanie Viola-Plante for her help.

Footnotes

Notes

Jacques Bourgault is adjunct professor with ENAP and UQAM and is currently working in national and international consulting on public administration with COFAP Inc. He chaired the Institute of Public Administration in Canada (IPAC), has sat on many boards (such as UQAM, CCMD), and has participated in several panels of inquiry. He has published numerous books, chapters and articles, participated in conferences and conducted many studies on public administration, senior officials, strategic planning, human resources and performance appraisal. For more, see

Karolien Van Dorpe was a researcher at the Public Management Institute, KU Leuven. She worked on the MANDATE project and carried out research on top civil servants in Belgium, the UK, and the Netherlands. She is now a civil servant in the Department of Administrative Affairs in the Flemish government.

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Managerial reforms,Public Service Bargains and top civil servant identity

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

The theory of Public Service Bargains

Identity

Methodology and sample

The Public Service Bargain in retrospect

Pragmatic bargains

Canada

Denmark

Systemic bargains

The Netherlands

Belgium 4

Conclusions pertaining to the bargains’ evolution

Exploring the identity of top civil servants

Competency as identity factor: the last of the specialists?

Role identity: the march of the managers

Social identity: corporate identity as a cure for fragmentation

General conclusions

Footnotes

Notes

References

Belgium⁴